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Abstract
This thesis examines British foreign policy-making in Esprit by applying 
insights from the Bureaucratic Politics perspective of foreign policy analysis. Esprit 
was a ten year programme that funded collaborative research and development in 
information technology between researchers across the European Community.
Weaknesses in the Bureaucratic Politics perspective are recognized and ways 
to strengthen the perspective are suggested. No a priori assumptions about the 
usefulness of the approach or of the suggested modifications are made. This thesis is as 
much a test of the applicability of the Bureaucratic Politics perspective to British 
foreign policy analysis as it is a study of British foreign policy-making itself.
While recognizing the ubiquity of competition between bureaucrats in 
Whitehall, traditional approaches to British foreign policy-making deny that 
bureaucratic competition affects British policy. Strong Ministers and a large and 
complex web of Whitehall interdepartmental and Cabinet coordinating committees are 
said to set Government-wide priorities and resolve bureaucratic conflict before it 
affects policy. Thus, from this point of view, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective is 
not applicable to Britain.
Following that argument to its logical end, is it possible that bureaucratic 
competition affects policy in the absence of Ministerial authority or effective Whitehall 
coordinating committees? This thesis argues that competition between bureaucrats for 
budgets and responsibilities affected British policy in Esprit when Ministers did not 
clearly articulate consistent objectives, when Ministers did not maintain control and 
supervision over the policy issue and when Whitehall coordination and control 
mechanisms were absent or ineffective.
When these conditions prevailed, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective, as 
modified, was useful in analyzing British foreign policy-making in Esprit. The question 
remains whether the perspective was useful because Esprit was uniquely qualified to 
encourage bureaucratic competition or whether other policy issues are similarly 
qualified and hence conducive to the Bureaucratic Politics approach.
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Introduction 
Chapter 1
The policies o f the State were the policies of the Government then in power.
- Mr Justice McGowan
This logic was used by Mr Justice McGowan in the 1984 trial of Mr Glive Ponting, a 
civil servant prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act for leaking classified 
information about a Ministerial decision to mislead Parliament on the sinking of the 
Belgrano during the Falklands War. Mr Ponting argued that he acted in accordance 
with a duty higher than his duty as a civil servant, which was to obey the orders of his 
Minister. Mr Ponting's higher duty was to the national interest, which was separable 
from the interests, or policies, of Ministers then in power. Mr Justice McGowan 
responded that there were no national interests above the policies set by Ministers and 
that Mr Ponting had no duty higher than that of obedience to his Ministers.
In the aftermath of the Falklands War, British Cabinet Ministers were accused 
of misleading Parliament and the public. They were also criticized for naming 
individual civil servants in the affair and for sending civil servants to defend themselves 
before a Select Committee. Ministers seemed to be abrogating three conventions of 
British Government; Ministers are responsible for the actions of civil servants; civil 
servants are anonymous, permanent and politically neutral; and Ministers are 
accountable to Parliament.^
A year later, the Government again acted contrary to the conventions of British 
Government. The issue this time was ownership of a British helicopter firm called 
Westland. A civil servant in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) leaked the 
contents of a confidential letter written by the Solicitor-General to the Secretary of 
State at the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Mr Michael Heseltine, to the Press 
Association. It is unknown whether she leaked the letter, the contents of which were 
damaging to Mr Heseltine, on her own accord, on instructions from her Minister at the 
DTI, Mr Leon Brittan, from civil servants at Number 10 or from the Prime Minister.
 ^Quoted in Clive Ponting, The Right to Know: The Inside Story o f the Belgrano (London: 
Sphere Books, 1985), p. 191.
 ^For a discussion of these conventions see, for example, Ga\in Dre\vT>' and Tony Butcher, The Civil 
Service Today, Second Edition (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1991); Sir Robert Armstrong, Note o f  
Guidance on the Duties and Responsibilities o f Civil Servants in Relation to Ministers, reproduced as 
memorandum submitted by the Cabinet Office to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Session 
1985-86, HC 92-11 (London: HMSO, 1986), Annex A; Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, Fifth Edition 
(London: University of London Press, 1959).
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The Prime Minister denied authorizing the leak. Two Ministers resigned, five civil 
servants (who had been implicated by the Prime Minister) were accused of breaching 
Whitehall rules and two civil servants, Mr Charles Powell and Sir Robert Armstrong, 
testified in defence of the Prime Minister before a House Select Committee.
The Westland affair turned upside down the traditional relationship between 
Ministers and civil servants. As Hugo Young concluded, the "balance of power had 
been reversed'.^
What he [Armstrong] was doing, from his unimpeachable height, was surveying 
the Prime Minister's behaviour and giving it the seal of official approval.
Instead of the Minister being responsible for the conduct of the civil servant, 
here was the chief civil servant solemnly assuming responsibility for the 
integrity of the Prime Minister. Normally it would be the Minister up front, and 
the civil servant in the back room. That was what Ministerial accountability to 
Parliament was all about. But this time it was the civil servant who...had to face 
the public heat on the entire Government's behalf.'*
Not only did the Westland affair challenge the traditional relationship between 
civil servants and Ministers, it also raised the specter of a Government awash in the 
European Community. Who was making policy and whose interests were being 
advanced? Answers to these seemingly intractable questions, which have plagued 
British foreign policy in the European Community for the past decade, could perhaps 
be found by asking them in the context of a single issue area. Because I had a working 
knowledge of information technology and because information technology is of great 
economic importance to the countries of the European Community, I chose to apply 
these questions to British policy in the European Strategic Programme for Research 
and Development in Information Technology (Esprit) .
Approved in 1982, Esprit was a ten year, 4.7 billion ECU programme that 
funded collaborative research and development in information technology between 
companies, universities and research establishments in the European Community. It 
was designed to make the European Community's information technology industry 
competitive with its Japanese and American rivals.
Information technology (IT) refers to the 'products and processes concerned 
with the collection, storing, processing and transmission of information, including 
voice, data and images'^ that have resulted from the convergence of computer, 
microelectronics and telecommunication technology. IT is everywhere; in the home in 
consumer electronics such as programmable video recorders and teleshopping, in the
 ^Hugo Young, One o f  C/5 (London: Pan Books, 1990), p. 458.
 ^Ibid.
 ^OECD, Information Technology and New Growth Opportunities (Paris: OECD, 1989), p. 11.
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office in facsimile machines and electronic mail and in the factory in computer 
integrated manufacturing and computer aided design. None of these IT products was 
widely commercially available in 1976. The OECD suggests that the 'sum of these 
technologies constitutes a technological change which could be without precedent 
from the standpoint of its magnitude, its consequences and, no doubt the rapidity — the 
brutality even — of its diffusion'.^ Whether or not IT meets this expectation, it is 
'arguably the most pervasive technology of our time'."^
IT is a building-block of modem economies, generating economic wealth. From 
1984-1988, European IT grew at a rate of 15.5 per cent; the next highest was for 
passenger cars at 5 per cent.* In 1984, IT annual production was $300 billion. It was 
predicted to be more than $1 trillion by the mid-1990s and the largest manufacturing 
industry by 1990.^ IT has effects on employment, wages and productive capacity. In 
1980, for example, the Commission estimated that nearly 50 per cent of the employed 
civilian work force were in 'information' and that IT manufacturing employed 5 per 
cent of the total Community work force, or five million people.
IT is a strategic industry, linked to conceptions of economic and political 
security. John Zysman links global power and the ability to pursue foreign policy goals 
to a country's relative position in international trade and high technology. William 
Wallace expresses a similar concern; 'the way in which technological progress became 
identified in the minds of political leaders, in Britain and elsewhere, with the symbols of 
national prestige and sovereignty has elevated technological policy, like defence, to the 
status of high policy and the link between technology and national security has been
increasingly a p p a r e n t .
IT was perceived to be the bedrock of a healthy European economy. However, 
the state of European Community and British IT by the early 1980s was dismal. In 
1975, Europe ran a positive trade balance in IT goods and services. By 1983, that 
surplus had slipped into a deficit of approximately $9 billion and it was predicted to be
 ^OECD, Major R&D Programmes for Information Technology OECD, 1989), p. 11.
 ^Erik Arnold and Ken Guy, "Policy Options for Promoting Growth Through Information Technology" 
in OECD, op. ait, in note 5, p. 135.
* Commission of the European Communities, "The European Electronics and Information Technology 
Industry: State of Play, Issues at Stake and Proposals for Action", SEC (91) 565 final (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities, 3 April 1991).
 ^"Europe"s Technology Gap", Economist, 24 November 1983, p. 100.
Commission of the European Communities, "Proposal for a Council Decision Adopting the First 
European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technologies (Esprit)", 
Com (83) 258 final (Brussels: Official Journal o f the European Communities, C321, 26 November 
1983), p. 8.
John Zysman, "US Power, Trade and Technology", International Affairs QJo\. 67, No. 1, 1991), pp. 
81-106.
William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 122.
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$26 billion by 1994.*  ^ Some observers claimed that Europe was suffering from a wide 
'technology gap' in relation to the United States and Japan and that Europe's reliance 
on imported technology made it vulnerable.*^
The dismal state of European IT was laid at the feet of numerous factors: lack 
of education and training; weak entrepreneurial drive in Europe; and low levels of 
research. The nature of IT discouraged the requisite investment: IT product life cycles 
are extremely short; technological trajectories are uncertain although technological 
break-through occurs often; development costs and risks have sky-rocketed. Few firms 
were able independently to adapt to, much less master and succeed in, this 
environment. They needed to collaborate to survive, but for commercial reasons, they 
were hesitant to join forces in the design or manufacturing phases of production. They 
were, however, willing to collaborate in pre-competitive research (research that does 
not have immediate commercial application).*^
Driven by the strategic importance of IT and the fact that public support for 
pre-competitive research was permitted under GATT regulations and EC competition 
law, governments across Europe funded a spate of programmes encouraging 
collaborative pre-competitive IT research.*^ Esprit was one such programme. Esprit 
would reduce or avoid the duplication of national pre-competitive IT R&D efforts, 
enable research teams to reach the 'critical mass' and stability necessary for effective 
R&D and decrease European reliance on imported technology. All of these would 
facilitate the development of standards of European origin and a European technology 
base that would allow European IT to become competitive with Japan and the US.*^
To implement Esprit, a new bureaucracy was created in Brussels. The bureaucracy 
opened with fewer than 50 civil servants. By the turn of the decade, it had become°of 
the European Commission's largest, and some say ambitious. Directorate Generals.
Simultaneous with the creation of Esprit at the Community level, some EC 
governments created their own national information technology research and 
development programmes. For example, the French government created the 1982 Plan 
d'Action Filiere Electronique and a programme of microelectronics support while the 
German government fiinded research programmes in microelectronics, optoelectronics 
and telecommunications. In 1983, the British Government approved the Alvey
*^  'Europe's Technology Gap', op. cit., in note 9.
*^* See, for example, Jean Jacques Servan Schreiber, L eDefi Américain ÇP^ ns: De Noel, 1967).
* ^  OECD, Technical Cooperation Agreements Between Firms: Some Initial Data and Analysis (Paris: 
OECD, 1986).
*^  For a discussion of the relationship between R&D and economic performance and the requirements 
of government technology policy, see Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman (eds ). Economic Policy 
and Technological Performance tSl2xdon&%e,\ Cambridge Universit>'Press, 1987).
*^  See Joachim W. Muller, European Collaboration in Advanced TecAoo/qgy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
1990).
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Programme, which was a five-year, £350 million programme supporting collaborative, 
pre-competitive IT research between British firms, universities and research 
establishments. Alvey was created in the belief that Government funding for research 
would protect British firms from the vagaries of competition, giving British firms an 
opportunity to catch up with their Japanese, US and European rivals.
A small Directorate was created in the Department of Industry (later the 
Department of Trade and Industry) specifically to implement the Alvey Programme. 
The Alvey Directorate was a bureaucratic anomaly. It was comprised of civil servants 
from three Whitehall departments (the Ministry of Defence, the Science Engineering 
Research Council and the Department of Industry) and secondees from British 
information technology companies. The Directorate operated independently of 
existing, although weak. Departmental, interdepartmental and Cabinet Office control 
and coordination mechanisms. Its members intentionally ignored Whitehall operating 
procedures and applied their own, rather lax and unorthodox, decision-making 
methods. This autonomous organization was given responsibility for administering 
Esprit in the UK.
Esprit and the Alvey Programme were remarkably similar. They focused on 
pre-competitive R&D and although Esprit was wider in scope, it covered the same 
enabling technologies as the Alvey Programme. Alvey’s goal, however, seemed to 
contravene the spirit of Esprit. Alvey was autarkic. It protected British firms fi*om 
foreign competition, including from European firms with whom British companies and 
academics collaborated in Esprit.
The simultaneous existence of two strikingly similar programmes, which were 
both administered in Britain by a single bureaucracy, immediately raises the issues of 
coordination and duplication. What was the relationship between the two programmes? 
In 1983, the relationship was expressed in the following terms: 'Esprit is 
complementary to the programme we propose [the Alvey Programme].
By 1988, the Alvey Programme and its implementing Directorate had been 
disbanded. The demise of the Alvey Programme did not, however, mark the end of 
British Government support for IT research. Government continued to fund British IT 
research, at a significantly lower level than the Alvey Programme, while it contributed 
to Esprit finances. In 1988, the relationship between Esprit and the national effort had 
changed: British IT research programmes were to be 'complementary to Esprit'.
Department of Industry, 'A Programme for Advanced Information Technology: The Report of the 
Alvey Committee' (London: Department of Industry, 1982), p. 7.
Department of Trade and Industry, 'DTI — the Department for Enterprise', Cm 278 (London: 
HMSO, January 1988), p. 36.
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Was the difference between these two statements of linguistic interest only or 
did it reveal a significant shift in policy? Preliminary interviews suggested that Esprit 
and the Alvey Programme were perceived as rivals, as competitors. Perhaps the latter 
explanation was valid. In order to make sense of this ’competition', I turned to the 
literature on bureaucratic politics; to Allison, Halperin, Destler, Steinbruner, Gallucci 
and others.20
It quickly became apparent that while the simplicity of the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective is attractive, it has important weaknesses that could render it more 
misleading than illuminating. The basic argument of the perspective is simple: 
bureaucrats have interests that are often not synonymous with the objectives of their 
Ministers; those interests are determined by the bureaucrat's position in the 
bureaucracy; bureaucrats compete to protect or advance their own interests; that 
competition can determine a country's foreign policy. This perspective is now largely 
accepted by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic as a core middle range theory 
assisting in the analysis of foreign policy-making,21 but it contains significant 
weaknesses. 22 It is overstated,2^ too reliant on a single-factor explanation of foreign
2®I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy ÇPnnQtion, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1972); John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Tbeoiy o f Decision Making (ŸnncçiOTL, NJ; 
Princeton University Press, 1974); Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); Graham T. Allison, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile O 75/5 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971); Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and 
Foreign Po//cy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1974); Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, 
'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications' in Raymond Tanter and Richard 
Ullman, Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1972).
2 * See, for example, Steve Smith, "Foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy' in 
Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke, Britain in the World (Cambridge: (Cambridge University 
Press, 1991); Steve Smith, "Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Bureaucratic Politics 
Approaches' in Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds ). Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign 
Policy Systems Approach (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989); Christopher Hill and Margot Light, 
'Foreign Policy Analysis' in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds ). International Relations: A 
Handbook o f Current Theory (London: Pinter, 1985); and Charles F. Hermann, e t al. (eds.). New 
Directions in the Study o f Foreign Policy (^ .ondon: Harper Collins, 1987).
22 Many critiques of the perspective concentrate on specific weaknesses, but some are more general. 
See, for example, R.J. Art, 'Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy', Policy Sciences (Wo\. 
4, 1983), pp. 467-90; Dan Caldwell, 'Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-making', American Behavioural 
Scientist (ydi. 21, No. 1, 1977), pp. 87-110; Dan Caldwell, 'A Research Note on the Quarantine of 
Cuba', International Studies Quarterly (WoX. 22, No. 4, 1978), pp. 625-33; J.P. Comford, 'The Illusion 
of Decision', British Journal o f Political Science (yo\. 4, Part 2, 1974), pp. 231-43; W. Wagner, 
'Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations', International 
Organization (Wo\. 28, 1974), pp. 436-66.
2^  Christopher Hill, 'A Theoretical Introduction' in William Wallace and William E. Paterson (eds ). 
Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe: A Comparative Approach (FamhorongL: Saxon House, 
1978), p. 19. See also Art, ibid.\ and Steve Smith, 'Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of 
the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making', Millennium: Journal o f 
International Studies (yo\. 9, No. 1, Spring 1980), pp. 21-40.
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policy-making,24 too 'mechanical and static'^  ^ and too culture-specific.^^ The 
perspective would be of little use in analysing British policy in Esprit if the weaknesses 
are not redressed. Before doing so, however, it is helpful to outline its fundamental 
propositions.
1.1 The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: the Fundamental Propositions
The Bureaucratic Politics perspective explores a paradox in those modem governments 
that are organized on the lines of Weber's classic bureaucracy. 22 Weber posited 
bureaucracy as the most 'virtuous' organization because it is 'dehumanized', or void, of 
the emotional concerns that hinder rational calculation among humans. Government is 
divided into official and fixed jurisdictional areas where authority is distributed in a 
stable way and according to a strict hierarchy. Bureaucrats perform routine activities 
according to strict rules, or standard operating procedures. Bureaucracies are 
exclusive: only those who meet strict qualifications can participate in the process. For 
Weber, 'bureaucracy has a "rational" character: rules, means, ends and matter-of- 
factness dominate its bearing.'2* 'Modern loyalty is devoted to impersonal and 
fimctional purposes'2^ and strict rules govern the use of'coercive means, physical, 
sacerdotal, or otherwise'.
Although bureaucracy is designed to 'dehumanize' decision-making, it does not 
eradicate entirely the emotional, or more irrational, elements of human nature.^ ^  Even 
Weber admitted that: 'Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the 
professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic 
administration always tends to be an administration of "secret sessions": in so far as it 
can, it hides the knowledge and action from c r i t i c i s m . ' ^ 2  Thus, government cannot be
24 Hill, ibid.
2  ^Steve Smith, 'Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage 
Rescue Mission', International Affairs (yo\. 61, No. 1, Winter 1984/85), pp. 23-25.
2  ^Christopher Hill, 'Theories of Foreign Policy-Making for Developing Countries' in Christopher 
Clapham (ed.) Foreign Policy Making in Developing States Saxon House, 1978). See
also Joel S. Migdal, 'International Structure and External Behaviour', International Relations ÇIo\. 15, 
May 1973), pp. 510-26; Karen Dawisha, 'The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations 
on the Soviet Case', Studies in Comparative Communism iyo\. 13, No. 3, 1980), pp. 300-46; and 
Arnold Lawrence Horelick, et. al.. The Study o f Soviet Foreign Policy: Decision-Tbeory-Related 
Approaches ÇBç,\ç.Te\y lAiWs, CA: Sage, 1975).
22  Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds ), 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).
^^Ibid, p. 244.
'^^Ibid,^. 199.
'^^Ibid, p. 196.
3i7Z>/d,p.216.
32j»/d, p. 233.
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rid of the very influences it is designed to abolish. It is around this paradox that Allison 
and Halperin built their conceptualization of foreign policy-making in the United States 
(US).
In 1969, Allison applied insights from pluralist, or interest-group, analyses of 
US domestic policy-making to the US foreign policy process. Pluralist approaches 
view policy-making as a process of bargaining and competition among individual or 
organized interests in society.^^ Societal pressures may come from private organized 
actors or even departments within government. The pluralist approach sees 
government as a formal set of structures processing inputs and outputs. Government 
does not have a single, cohesive, controlling decision-making centre, but instead an 
array of departments exerting pressure according to the issue and the resources 
available to them.^^ Government moves in the direction of the strongest pressure.
From this perspective, the state pursues some aggregation of particular societal 
interests rather than objectives that supersede particular interests and are understood in 
terms of the national interest.
Allison took insights from the pluralist account of domestic policy-making and 
applied them to foreign policy-making. He developed two models: Organization 
Process (Model II) and Bureaucratic Politics (Model III). These Models were 
concerned to look behind decision-making, so to speak, at the process o f decision­
making. They see a plurality of actors pursuing numerous, often conflicting, interests 
as the source of government decisions. Allison posited these models as distinct from, 
and contrary to, what he termed the Rational Actor Model (Model I). The Rational 
Actor Model paid little attention to the process or mechanics of decision-making.
See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic (Chicago, IL; University of
Chicago Press, 1956); Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense York: Columbia
University Press, 1961); Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Charles E. 
Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through', Public Administration ReviewQfoX. 29, No. 2,
Spring 1959), pp. 79-88; Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power The Politics o f  Leadership 
York: Wiley, 1960).
David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: 
Knopf, 1951).
For advocates of the national interest approach, see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Year's Crisis, 1919- 
1939: An Introduction to the Study o f International Relations, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 
1946); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981); Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. 
Foreign Policy NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Sixth Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1985); Robert W. Tucker, The Purpose o f American Power: An Essay on National Security (New 
York: Praeger, 1981); Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and 
British Experience ÇBosXon, MA: Little, Brown, 1967); and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and 
Collaboration: Essays on International Politics MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1962).
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Government decision-making was a simple process where governmental actors 
pursued a single interest, called the national interest.
Although the Organization Process and Bureaucratic Politics Models explain 
government decisions in terms of the processes by which it is made, they emphasize 
different elements in that process. Organization Process focuses on standard operating 
procedures and explores organizational inertia and managerial complexity inherent to 
large organizations. Individual motivation and behaviour are not a significant variables. 
Bureaucratic Politics,^® on the other hand, empowers the individual by viewing policy 
as the unintended resultant of competition between individuals acting on behalf of 
government. They do not pursue that ephemeral national interest, but rather some 
combination of personal, organizational and national security interests.
1.1a Interests
Early scholars of international relations suggested that governments 'follow...but one 
guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action; the national interest'.^’
They saw foreign policy-making as a rational, or logical, process involving bureaucrats 
who make choices, each having known consequences, that advanced the national 
interest. Bureaucratic Politics dismisses the idea that foreign policy-making involves 
bureaucrats who single-mindedly pursue the national interest. It proposes instead that 
foreign policy-making results from competition among bureaucrats who desire to 
advance interests other than the mythical national interest. (Allison and Halperin use 
the term 'bureaucrat's in a general sense to refer to individuals who make decisions in a 
government.) The intimately related alternative interests are personal, domestic, 
organizational and national security.
Personal interests are numerous. Bureaucrats may be driven by the desire to 
infer their own deeply felt images, assumptions and values on a particular issue. They 
may be compelled by psychological needs unrelated to the immediate issue. They may 
be concerned with occupational issues such as career advancement, influence, job 
satisfaction, responsibility and resources. While not underestimating the others. 
Bureaucratic Politics emphasizes occupational interests.
The following convention is used. 'Bureaucratic Politics' denotes the perspective advanced by 
Allison and Halperin. This is in contrast to 'politics among bureaucrats', which refers simply to 
competition among bureaucrats. Wherever possible, I refrain from using the term 'politics among 
bureaucrats' and use the term 'competition' instead.
Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense o f the National Interest: A Critical Examination o f American 
Foreign Policy York: Knopf, 1951), p. 242. See also Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1970).
Allison and Halperin suggested domestic interests, but failed to distinguish it from the other three. 
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 43.
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The occupational interests of bureaucrats are determined by the position they 
occupy, or role they play, in the bureaucracy. A particular issue will have a different 
effect on each bureaucrat's interest and, as a result, each bureaucrat will interpret and 
act upon issues in a different manner. Thus, because their stakes differ and because 
they see different faces of an issue, their stands will differ. Preference is determined by 
position: where you stand depends on where you sit.'^^
The Bureaucratic Politics perspective understands bureaucracy as an institution 
through which bureaucrats' personal interests are legitimated, perpetuated and 
advanced. Because their personal interests are anchored in their bureaucracy, 
bureaucrats will defend their organization's interests: its autonomy, morale, essence, 
roles, missions and budgets."*® Thus, organizational interests cannot exist 
independently of personal interests. They are a composite of the personal interests of a 
dominant coalition within the organization.
Allison and Halperin cursorily introduced a third category of interest that 
bureaucrats pursue in lieu of the national interest: national security. They write that no 
government actor 'wants to see his nation attacked'."** This is an interest shared by all 
participants, but it is overshadowed by personal and organizational interests: 'Even 
when players are concerned about national security interests, however, they are likely 
to see the battles as being won or lost mainly at home.'"*^  While national security 
interests may be common to all bureaucrats, they define a in terms of their personal 
and organizational interests.
1.1b The Nature of Policv-Making
The essence of Bureaucratic Politics is simple. It sees 'the individuals within 
government, and the interaction among them, as determinants of the actions of a 
government in international politics. What a government does in any particular instance 
can be understood largely as a result of bargaining among players positioned 
hierarchically in government'."*^ Allison and Halperin use the term 'politics' to refer to 
'bargaining' and to 'subtle pulling and hauling and intricate games'"*"* that are employed 
as bureaucrats compete to achieve their personal and organizational interests. Thus, 
government action is determined by politics among bureaucrats.
Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 16.
"*® Morton Halperin, 'Why Bureaucrats Play Games'. Foreign Policy (^o. 2, Spring 1971), pp. 74-88. 
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 58.
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 58.
"*^ Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 43.
"*"* Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 162 and p. 268.
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Bargaining, or politics, involves one bureaucrat making use of advantages that 
he or she has over others. One such advantage is the perception of power. Allison and 
Halperin suggest that individuals with power win and they win because others perceive 
them as powerful.'*^ Although the reasoning is tautological, perceptions of power are 
significant. They are, however, difficult to measure. Therefore, Allison and Halperin 
explored structural and procedural features of an organizational that bestow bargaining 
advantage on particular actors as they maneuver to advance their interests. Allison and 
Halperin referred to these features as 'action channels' or 'regularized means of taking 
governmental action on a specific kind of issue'.'^
1.1c Constraints on Bureaucratic Politics
Allison and Halperin did not suggest that government decisions and actions are always 
the result of politics among bureaucrats. In fact, they suggested two conditions under 
which politics among bureaucrats does not determine government behaviour. First, 
when the standard operating procedures of large organizations determine who receives 
information, limit the menu of alternatives and fix action within a prescribed range. 
Second, when shared images set boundaries of play in the bureaucratic game.
Beneath the differences that fuel bureaucratic politics is a foundation of shared 
assumptions about basic values and facts. These underlying assumptions are 
reflected in various attitudes and images which are taken for granted by most 
players...Most participants accept these images. Their idea of the national 
interest is shaped by these attitudes...'*'^
Allison and Halperin suggested that these shared images can, under certain 
circumstances, be so strong that they alone determine behaviour. This occurs when: 
national security interests dominate; when shared values create a consensus on what 
the national security requires; and when actions derive directly from decisions."** In 
these cases, personal and organization interests, and competition over them, become 
irrelevant in the policy process.
Allison, op. cit., in note 20, p. 52 and p. 169.
Allison, op. cit., in note 20, p. 169. 'Action' was defined as the 'various acts of officials of a 
government in exercises of governmental authority that can be perceived outside the government'. 
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 45.
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 56.
"** Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 49.
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1.2 Weaknesses o f the Bureaucratic Politics Perspective
The Bureaucratic Politics perspective was met with a flurry of analysis and criticism 
that persists to this day. The following discussion is by no means exhaustive, but rather 
focuses on six of the most substantive weakness of the perspective: the logic/politics 
dichotomy; treatment of national interest; the role of political leaders; the perspective's 
culture-specificity; its treatment of preference formation; and its methodological 
soundness.
1.2a Logic/Politics Dichotomy
Scholars traditionally portrayed foreign policy-making as a rational, or logical, process 
where bureaucrats made choices, each having known consequences, that advanced the 
national interest. The process was harmonious and policy appeared coherent because 
leaders, unified in their objectives, controlled the bureaucracy. Allison and Halperin 
called this portrayal the Rational Actor model.
Observing the workings of the US foreign policy bureaucracy, Allison and 
Halperin witnessed different phenomena. The process appeared conflictual; policy 
seemed incoherent; and the national interest seemed an inherently ambiguous concept. 
They deduced that something other than the process attributed to the Rational Actor 
Model was at work. This other process was politics, or competition, among 
bureaucrats. They then formulated a model alternative to the Rational Actor one: 
Bureaucratic Politics.
The two models were presented as alternative approaches. Their distinction 
was based on the following dichotomy: harmony prevails when a logical or rational 
process occurs; conflict prevails when politics occurs. Lawrence Freedman exposed 
the false dichotomy between 'logic' and 'politics'.'*  ^ That false dichotomy is as follows. 
Politics is twinned with conflict while logic, or rationality, is twinned with harmony; 
harmony is the converse of conflict therefore logic, or rationality, is the converse of 
politics. Thus when bureaucrats act politically, they cannot be acting rationally.
Allison and Halperin did not assert that pulling and hauling is irrational 
behaviour, but the logic of their argument leads the reader to that unsettling 
conclusion.^® This conclusion is untenable in light of Bureaucratic Politics' proposition 
that bureaucrats behave in a manner that maximizes their interests. Bureaucratic 
Politics presumes intent and calculation as bureaucrats consciously calibrate their
LawTence Freedman, 'Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model', International Affairs (yo\. 52, No. 3, July 1976), p. 434-48.
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 43.
22
behaviour to meet desired ends. Such an association of means with ends is the 
cornerstone of definitions of rationality.^^ Thus, if bureaucrats employ political means 
to achieve personal ends, then they must, by definition be acting rationally. Why, then, 
is their behaviour grouped into a category that is juxtaposed to rationality?
Just as the dichotomy between logic and politics is untenable, the direct 
correlation between policy incoherence and conflict with politics, or competition, 
among bureaucrats is suspect. As Freedman suggests policy is inherently 'messy' given 
the difficulty of coordinating activity across so many participants and given the lack of 
complete information upon which many decisions are based. Disorder and conflict 
should not be attributed to bureaucratic behaviour alone.^^ Moreover, lack of visible 
conflict should not be presumed to signal that bureaucratic competition is absent. 
Decisions offered for public scrutiny are often couched in terms of the national interest 
and reveal little, if any, of the competition that produced them.
1.2b Interests
Bureaucratic Politics suggests that policy results from competition among bureaucrats 
as each pursues conflicting interests. These interests may be personal, domestic, 
organizational or national security.^^ Although some categorization of interests is 
instrumental, this particular typology is weak. The model does not delineate between 
domestic and personal interests; the distinction between organizational interests and 
personal interests is tenuous; and the treatment of national security interests and shared 
images severely weakens the internal logic of the perspective.
Allison and Halperin suggested that the personal interests of bureaucrats are 
pursued through and legitimized by their organization, thus making the distinction 
between personal and organizational interests questionable and rendering the 
applicability of the perspective tenuous. Consider, for example, when behaviour is 
unlikely to result from the pursuit of organizational interests. This may occur when 
bureaucrats are not certain how a particular course of action will affect their 
organization, when a decision will have no perceived effect on their organizational 
interests or when important actors are not bureaucrats with an organization to protect
See, for example, Sidney Verba, 'Assumptions ofRationalit) and Non-Rationality in Models of the 
International System' in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy 
York: Free Press, 1969). See also James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); and Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, 'A Behavioral Theory of 
Organizational Objectives' in Mason Haire (ed.). Modem Organization Theory York: Wiley, 
1959); and Lindblom, op. cit., in note 33.
Freedman, op. cit., in note 49, p. 438.
Allison, op. cit., in note 20, p. 48.
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or a bureaucratic position that dictates behaviour.H ow  does Bureaucratic Politics 
apply in this case?
As regards national interest, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective suggested 
that because that national interest is inherently ambiguous, personal and organizational 
interests established by bureaucratic position determine behaviour. Having devalued 
the national interest concept, Allison and Halperin brought jn  through the back door by 
suggesting that national security interests are shared by all members of government. In 
some cases, shared national security interests over-ride personal and organizational 
interests and determine behaviour. These cases are: when national security interests 
dominate; when shared values create a consensus on what the national security 
requires; and when actions derive directly from decisions.T hus, the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model applies under one set of circumstances while the Rational Actor Model 
applies under another.
This is acceptable if it was not for two other elements of the Bureaucratic 
Politics perspective. First, shared images, those things that are pre-determined, not 
controversial and somehow related to the national interest, circumscribe bureaucratic 
behaviour. It would seem that shared images perform the same role that Allison and 
Halperin attributed to national interest. Thus, a concept associated with the Rational 
Actor Model is at work in the Bureaucratic Politics perspective. The bureaucrat obeys 
shared images, but at the same time struggles to advance personal or organizational 
interests.
Second, national security interests are shared and in some cases determine 
bureaucratic behaviour, causing the policy process to resemble the Rational Actor 
Model. However, Allison and Halperin wrote that bureaucrats define national security 
interests in terms of their personal and organizational interests, which differ from 
bureaucrat to bureaucrat according to their position in the bureaucracy. It would 
seem that national security interests may not be common at all and that the Rational 
Actor Model includes elements of the Bureaucratic Politics Model.
Freedman is correct in suggesting that Model I and Model III are not two 
distinct paradigms, but rather 'two ends of a continuum. At one end all is rationality: at 
the other all is politics. The "rational" part proceeds from shared principles and is non- 
controversial while the political part consists of those areas where values and interests 
compete for influence'.O ne perspective is most appropriate given one set of 
circumstances and the other is most appropriate given another set, but they are not 
distinct as Allison and Halperin proposed.
Gallucci, op. cit., in note 20, p. 146.
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 58. 
56 Freedman, op. cit., in note 49, p. 441.
Allison and Halperin's treatment of shared images contributes to the false 
dichotomy internal to their Bureaucratic Politics Model. Shared images are pre­
determined, not controversial and somehow related to the national interest. They thus 
fall into the category of behaviour that is rational, or logical. Personal, domestic and 
organizational interests, on the other hand, are political and fall into the category of 
non-rational. By suggesting that shared images delimit bureaucratic behaviour, Allison 
and Halperin create a bureaucrat who acts rationally and non-rationally at the same 
time. The bureaucrat obeys shared images while struggling to advance personal or 
organizational interests.
This weakens the model. First, the wisdom of assuming rationality or non- 
rationality, but not both simultaneously, in models of decision-making is ignored.s? 
Second, a model that was to present an alternative to the rationality assumption is 
based upon an assumption of rationality. Perhaps Allison and Halperin were aware of 
the strained logic. Their suggestion that individuals equate their personal and 
organizational interests with the national interest enabled bureaucrats to pursue each 
interest set simultaneously and without conflict. But if this the case, then why 
distinguish between the different interests at all?
Furthermore, although Allison and Halperin referred to the policy-elite as the 
source of shared images and to the fact that shared images may change as leadership 
changes or in response to an external stimulus, their treatment of the concept was too 
cursory given the fundamental role of shared images in the perspective. The analyst 
should question whether shared images are pre-determined, static and constraining and 
explore their sources, how they come to be shared and how they evolve over time and 
across issues. Most importantly, the analyst should consider the possibility that shared 
images may not be shared at all, but rather that they may be contested within a 
government among leaders as well as bureaucrats.
1.2c Role of Leaders
Bureaucratic Politics refers to political leaders as the source of shared images. Because 
these shared images constrain bureaucratic behaviour, political leaders do have some 
role to play in the perspective. It is a limited and rather impotent role, h ow e v e r . As  
presented, the perspective asks us to believe that the 'Chief Executive is tramelled by
See Verba, op. cit., in note 51.
For criticisms, Stephen Krasner, 'Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland)', Foreign 
Policy QÜO. 7, 1972), pp. 159-79; Amos Perlmutter, 'The Presidential Political Center and Foreign 
Policy', World Politics (yo\. 27, No. 1, 1974), pp. 87-106; and Jerel A. Rosati, 'Developing a 
Systematic Decision-Making Framework; Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective', World Politics (Wo\. 
23, No. 2, January 1981), pp. 234-52.
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the permanent government' and that the 'bureaucratic machine escapes manipulation 
and direction even by the highest officials ' .A few studies have proven this to be the 
case, but to imply that it occurs under most circumstances is certainly a tall order. It is 
inconceivable, in my mind, that political leaders are always, or even almost always, 
held hostage to the workings of the bureaucracy.
1.2d Culture-Specificitv
Allison and Halperin advanced their Bureaucratic Politics perspective by analysing an 
important US foreign policy crisis: the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although they suggested 
that the perspective was applicable to foreign policy-making in other countries, several 
studies have found the perspective to be of limited use explaining foreign policy in 
developing states, the Soviet Union and Western Europe.^® Other studies, however, 
have found that the perspective does shed light on policy-making in developing 
countries and the Soviet Union.Clearly,  the issue has not been resolved.
1.2e Preference-from-Position
As mentioned previously, one of the major strengths of the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective is its simplicity. Bureaucrats compete to advance their own interests; those 
interests are determined by their position in the bureaucracy; and that competition can 
affect policy. Perhaps the perspective is over-simplified. Although it allows for 
bureaucrats' interests to be shaped by the (nebulous) shared images and national 
security concerns, its main proposition is that preferences are determined by 
p o s i t i o n . ^ 2  (Henceforth, this is referred to as the preference-ffom-position function.)
This function reduces the individual to a 'Homo Bureaucratjcus,..a, being with a 
somewhat petty and parochial perspective who knows on what side his bread is 
buttered'^^ and who is fundamentally conflictual and competitive.^"* Bureaucrats are 
hostage to their place in the system. They are not free agents, capable of establishing
Krasner, ibid., p. 160.
op. cit., in note 23; Migdal, op. cit., in note 26; Dawisha, op. cit., in note 26; Horelick, et.al, 
op. cit., in note 26; Wallace, op. cit., in note 12; William Wallace, 'Old States and New 
Circumstances: the International Predicament of Britain, France and Germany' in Wallace and 
Paterson (eds.), op. cit., in note 23.
See, for example, Herman M. Weil, 'Can Bureaucracies be Rational Actors?', International Studies 
Quarterly (Wo\. 19, No. 4, 1975); and Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: 
Anatomy o f a.Decision MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).
Smith, op. cit., in note 25; Hill, op. cit., in note 23, p. 19.
63 Freedman, op. cit., in note 49, p. 437.
Hill, op. cit., in note 23, p. 17.
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their preferences according to, for example, personal values or individual belief 
systems.^5
1.2f Methodological Strength
Although the perspective has been useful in a number of foreign policy studies, some 
critics have cautioned against employing it as a theory.^^ They suggest that it is 
incapable of formulating and testing hypotheses or of predicting behaviour and 
therefore cannot be seen as a theory. Its usefulness comes instead as an 'analogy' that 
presents an alternative way of viewing foreign policy decision-making or as a 
'productive paradigm' that 'paves the way for a normal science capable of solving a 
good proportion of the puzzles drawn to the analysts attention'.
1.3 Strengthening the Perspective
The Bureaucratic Politics perspective as formulated by Allison and Halperin clearly has 
substantial weaknesses, but its strength lies in its focus on an important element of the 
decision-making process that was ignored in other theories of foreign policy-making. 
Can the perspective be o f use in analysing British foreign policy in Esprit i f i t  is 
refined in such a manner that its essence is preserved, but some o f its inflated claims 
p u n c t u r e d thesis sets out to answer that question, keeping in mind one 
fundamental caveat. This thesis tests the usefulness of the perspective as an analytical 
tool, as a perspective, rather than as an all-singing, all-dancing theory or model capable 
of explaining every decision taken in Esprit. The fact that Bureaucratic Politics can 
only be used as a middle range theory does not detract from its usefulness, however. 
The utility of the perspective for explaining important elements of the policy process 
has been proven in earlier literature. Having established that caveat, this thesis now 
goes on to refine the perspective.
See Smith, op. cit., in note 25; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Holes and Reasons in Foreign 
Policy Decision-making', British Journal o f Political Science (yo\. 16, No. 3, 1986), pp. 269-86; and 
Steve Smith, 'Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System', op. cit., in note 21, p. 128.
Davis B. Bobrow, International Relations: New Approaches (New York; Free Press, 1972), p. 41. 
See also, E. Yanarella, "'Reconstructed Logic" and "Logic-in-use"' in 'Decision-making Analysis: 
Graham Allison', Polity (yo\. 8, 1975), pp. 156-72; and M. Steiner, 'The Elusive Essence of 
Decision', International Studies Quarterly (yo\. 21, 1977), pp. 389-422.
David A. Welch, The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms', International 
Security (Wq\. 17, No. 2, 1992), p. 120.
For a discussion of the merits of middle range theory in foreign policy analysis, see Smith, 'Foreign 
Policy Analysis', op. cit., in note 21.
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1.3 a Interests
The human condition is infinitely complex, thus rendering any typology of bureaucrats' 
interests weak, but some simplifying typology is necessary. It must be more discerning 
than one based on personal, organizational and national security interests, as is the 
Bureaucratic Politics perspective.
When analysis focuses on bureaucrats in their occupational setting, it is futile to 
distinguish between personal and organizational interests. Allison and Halperin 
suggested that personal interests are pursued through their organization and that 
organizational interests are the aggregation of the personal interests of a dominant sub­
group. Having related personal and organizational interests so closely, they did not 
provide enough justification for why the two should be separate. In fact, the two are so 
inextricably linked that it makes more sense to combine them in a single category; 
occupational interests. This category includes the desire to maximize responsibilities, 
rank and budgets. Bureaucrats may not pursue all of these simultaneously (under some 
circumstances, pursuit of one may even prohibit pursuit of another) or with equal 
zest.^^ Nevertheless, this thesis tests whether all bureaucrats are interested at some 
point and to some degree with one or more o f these occupational concerns. An 
organization may be comprised of bureaucrats with similar interests, but the 
organization itself does not have interests that are distinct from the occupational 
interests of its members.
Using a single category of interests facilitates explanation of behaviour that 
falls into the following categories: when actors are uncertain how a particular course of 
action would affect their organization; when a decision has no perceived effect on the 
organization; or when actors are not bureaucrats with an organization to protect or a 
bureaucratic position that conditions behaviour.T he ability to explain the behaviour
The public choice literature on bureaucracy is helpful. William Niskanen, Bureaucracy: Servant or 
(London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1973) and Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government (fiew  York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), suggests that budget maximization wus the sole 
force driving bureaucraUc§^Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (London: 
Harvester, 1991) suggests a number of non-pecuniary interests as alternatives to budget maximization. 
See also Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Bosiow, MA: Little, Brown, 1967).
Robert Gallucci highlights this weakness of Bureaucratic Politics. He suggests that individuals 
falling within this category do not possess organizational interests that are bound up with their careers 
in the bureaucracy. Thus, their behaviour is not geared toward protecting their organization. Gallucci 
suggests instead that they are driven by personal interests that are independent of the bureaucracy. 
Gallucci, op. cit., in note 20, p. 147. Gallucci's assertion is reasonable, but difficult to prove unless the 
interests and actions of private actors brought into a bureaucratic organization depart significantly 
from bureaucrats in the same organization or that private actors behave in a manner that damages the 
organization. In fact, the interests of private actors, like bureaucrats, are inextricably linked to their 
organization. Hence, it is futile to try to separate them.
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of non-bureaucratic actors is particularly important for this study because many 
important actors were not bureaucrats, but industrialists and academics seconded for a 
limited time into the Department of Trade and Industry.
1.3b Preference Formation and Action Channels
This thesis tests Bureaucratic Politics' fundamental assertion that preference is 
determined by a bureaucrat's position in an organization (the preference-from- 
position function,) Is a bureaucrat's preference, or preferred course of action, on a 
particular issue determined by the bureaucrat's perception of how that issue affects his 
or her budgets, rank and responsibilities (occupational interests), which are in turn 
determined by his or her current, or desired future, position in the organization? Will 
the bureaucrat chop^c action designed to advance his or her occupational interests?
The means a bureaucrat chooses to employ in pursuit of that preference is 
largely determined by the operation of action channels. Allison and Halperin defined 
action channels as 'regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind 
of issue'. Action channels were given a central role in the perspective as a determinant 
of bargaining advantage, but their formulation was sketchy and static. A more detailed 
exposition of action channels is warranted.
I found March and Simon's work valuable in this regard. They argue that the 
'organizational environment and social environment in which the decision maker finds 
himself determines what consequences he will anticipate, what ones he will not; what 
alternatives he will consider, what ones he will ignore'."^  ^ Organizations have rules, 
which may be formal or informal, that establish who is involved in decision-making and 
on what issues. Those normally involved in decision-making develop relations and 
contacts with one another. The rules also determine who collects, analyzes and 
disseminates information. Individuals who have access to valuable information and are 
included in decision-making can define the issue at hand, set the agenda and identify 
and advance particular options. Those options usually benefit themselves or those with 
whom they have developed a relationship. Action is then taken in pursuit of these 
particular options while other possible issues, agendas and options are dismissed along 
with any action necessary for their fulfilment. Action is channelled in the direction 
determined by those involved in decision-making and inside the information loop.
This is so for several reasons. It is unlikely that private actors uill be invited into a 
government bureaucracy if they do not entertain interests that are similar to those of the other 
members of the organization. Similarly, private actors will seek or agree to the secondment only if 
they perceive that the move will advance their own interests.
March and Simon, op. cit., in note 51, p. 160.
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Hence, the term 'action channels'. This thesis suggests that bureaucrats, in pursuit o f 
their own objectives, choosf. action (or means) from the menu o f alternatives thrown 
up by their organization's action channels.
This thesis does not treat action channels as static and pre-determined or 
necessarily standard and consistently applied. Rather, action channels are seen as the 
product o f  bureaucratic competition and therefore dynamic. Because action channels 
bestow advantage and disadvantage, bureaucrats will work to design action channels 
that advance their interests. Theorizing action channels in such terms addresses the 
need for a 'two-way process between structure and actor'.
This thesis' treatment of action channels is also designed to give the 
Bureaucratic Politics perspective predictive capability. Action channels predispose 
bureaucrats to certain behaviour and confer bargaining advantages in competition 
among bureaucrats. If these action channels can be identified, they can be analysed and 
used to predict behaviour.
1.3c Political Leaders
The Bureaucratic Politics perspective virtually ignores the dynamic (and significant) 
relationship between bureaucrats and political leaders. Homo bureaucraticus must 
evolve.
In this study homo bureaucraticus has evolved into a being who, while 
competitive and actively pursuing occupational interests, is also capable ofpursuing 
the interests o f  others, even i f  the interests o f others are contrary and harmful to his or 
her occupational interests. These alternative interests are those articulated by elected 
politicians holding Ministerial rank. Because this thesis explores how civil servants 
form their preferences, it is not overly concerned to theorize how Ministers decide 
their objectives. It may be that Ministerial interests are synonymous with the national 
interest conceptualized by Morgenthau and Frankel;'^  ^ that Ministerial interests are 
representative of societal interests, as Krasner perceives them;"^^  that Ministerial 
interests are related to Furnis and Snyder's conception of the national interest — 
national interest is 'what the nation, i.e., the decision-maker decides it is';"^  ^ or, more
Hollis and Smith, op. cit., in note 65, p. 285.
Morgenthau, op. cit., in note 37; Frankel, op. cit., in note 37. For a discussion of the weaknesses of 
the national interest as an analytical concept, see James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study o f Foreign 
Policy ÇHew York; Free Press, 1971), pp. 239-49; and George A. Modelski, A Theory o f Foreign 
Po//cy(New York: Praeger, 1962).
Krasner, op. cit., in note 35.
Edgar S. Fumiss and Richard C. Snyder, An Introduction to American Foreign (New York: 
Rinehart, 1955), p. 17.
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likely, Ministerial interests are determined by the position they occupy in the 
bureaucracy or the result of group pressures exerted from that bureaucracy 7  ^ This 
thesis takes Ministerial interests as given (Ministerial interests are simply taken to be 
the objectives a Minister pursues while in office) in order to explore how civil servants' 
interests are determined.
The following question immediately comes to mind: Under what conditions 
does a bureaucrat pursue Ministerial interests rather than his or her own occupational 
ones? I found an answer to this question in, of all places, the literature advocating a 
domestic institutional approach to British foreign policy-m aking.For example, in his 
analysis of British foreign-policy making, William Wallace acknowledges that 
bureaucratic competition is a natural part of the policy process in Britain.
...policy evolves in a continuing dialogue between the responsible ministers and 
their civil servants, a continuing interaction between political direction and the 
pressures of established practice and administrative interests. Where political 
direction is clear, it is able to carry the administrative machine with it; in the 
absence of firm political pressures, however, administrative politics prevail.
And, 'In the British civil service, as in the American, "Where you stand depends on 
where you sit'"."^  ^ David Vital likewise recognizes the existence of bureaucratic 
competition in Britain: 'All governments face the problem of distinct ministries 
operating within a single field, producing distinct and sometimes conflicting analyses 
and plans, manned by officers with separate departmental loyalties and career 
structures...
These analyses recognize the ubiquity of bureaucratic competition, but deny 
that it has real and tangible effects upon policy. According to Wallace,
Whitehall is not Washington; the open conflicts between sections of the 
administration which characterize bureaucratic politics in America have no 
exact parallel in Britain. Many officials indeed deny the relevance of analyses of
This formulation is advanced in the Foreign Policy Approach (FPA) approach advocated by Steven 
Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis', op. cit., in note 21.
See, for example, Peter Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affaii^ Allen & Unwin, 1967);
Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The British and American Experience 
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967); David Vital, The Making o f British Foreign Policy QLonAon: 
Allen & Unwin, 1968); Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom (eds). The Management o f Britain's 
External Relations (London: Macmillan, 1973); John Barber, Who Makes British Foreign Policy? 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1976); Wallace, op. cit., in note 12; Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones 
and Keith Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries Since 1945(Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 
1977); and Christopher Coker, Nation in Retreat?{0'sîox&. Pergamon, 1986).
Wallace refered to "administrative politics" rather than bureaucratic competition, but the similarity 
is clear. Wallace, op. cit., in note 12, p. 9.
Wallace, op. cit., in note 12, p. 10.
Vital, op. cit., in note 77, p. 64.
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policy-making in terms of administrative conflict or bureaucratic politics. It is 
part of the style of Whitehall that differences are muted and as far as possible 
concealed from the public eye, and that interdepartmental disputes are subject 
to the acceptance of an overriding common interest.
Such denials are not surprising given the fact that the British policy-making system is 
grounded in the theory of Ministerial accountability and Cabinet collective 
responsibility. Decisions that visibly resulted from the machinations of a bureaucracy 
concerned with its own interests clearly fall short of the image collective responsibility 
is meant to portray. Denials should not be taken as unequivocable proof that 
bureaucratic competition does not affect policy.
Wallace and Vital argue^Ministerial authority and the large and complex web of 
Whitehall interdepartmental and Cabinet coordinating committees set Government- 
wide priorities and resolve conflict before it affects policy, thus preventing bureaucratic 
competition from having a real effect on policy. Vital described the British policy­
making process in the following terms. 'The influence [of the civil service] is brought 
to bear through the machinery itself according to a plan and in a manner well- 
understood and accepted by all concerned.'*^ 'Where conviction is lacking, respect for 
constitutional principles, habit and self-interest will usually suffice to ensure that the 
administrative machine keeps together.'*^ The efficiency of the machine 'hinges on the 
cooperation and mutual confidence that obtains between those who are at the top of 
the pyramid of authority and responsibility and those at its base upon whom they 
depend. In Britain both such cooperations and such confidence are to be found to a 
high degree'.
Wallace emphasizes the importance of Ministers. Although disputing the 
relevance of the Bureaucratic Politics perspective to British policy-making, he suggests 
that,
...policy evolves in a continuing dialogue between the responsible ministers and 
their civil servants, a continuing interaction between political direction and the 
pressures of established practice and administrative interests. Where political 
direction is clear, it is able to carry the administrative machine with it; in the 
absence of firm political pressures, however, administrative politics prevail.*^
Wallace, op. cit., in note 12, p. 9.
Wallace, op. cit., in note 12, pp. 1-19, pp. 45-55; and Vital, op. cit., in note 77, pp. 57-102. 
Vital, op. cit., in note 77, p. 46.
^^Ibid, p. 47.
Ibid.
Wallace, op. cit., in note 12, p. 9.
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Writing on the civil service during Mrs Thatcher's tenure. Sir Patrick Naime 
argues that the relationship between Ministers and civil servants is the most important 
factor affecting the efficient working of the Whitehall system. Nairne suggests that 
Ministers must perform several duties in order for Whitehall to perform effectively. 
Among the duties are: Ministers must 'know their own mind — that is, to know what 
they want to achieve in their department in the light of their particular political and 
ministerial responsibilities'; Ministers must provide the guidance civil servants depend 
upon to perform effectively; and Ministers must be 'up front' in presenting their 
Departmental policies. When these conditions are present, civil servants faithfully 
implement their Minister's objectives.
These scholars may be accurate in suggesting that bureaucratic competition 
does not affect British policy when Ministerial authority is established and when 
Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms are functioning effectively. But what 
happens when Ministerial authority is not established and when Whitehall structures 
are incapable of controlling and coordinating policy within and across departments? It 
could be that bureaucratic competition has an effect on policy-making.
This thesis hypothesizes that civil servants are more likely to pursue their own 
occupational interests in lieu o f their Minister's interests under the following 
conditions: 1) when Ministers fail to articulate clearly consistent objectives to civil 
servants and when Ministers fail to exert control or maintain supervision over a 
particular issue; and 2) when Whitehall mechanisms fail to control and coordinate
activity within and across departments.
As regards the first, while Ministers may perceive their objectives as 
unambiguous, immutable and internally consistent, civil servants may be uncertain of 
the direction they are expected to take. This may occur when, for example, leaders 
respond to the realities of office by making decisions that are inconsistent or 
incompatible with their stated objectives; when they articulate conflicting objectives; 
when leadership, united in Opposition, splits after taking office and individual Ministers 
undertake contradictory policies; or when the leadership itself is uncertain of its own 
objectives.
Sir Patrick Naime, 'The Civil Service: "Mandarins and Ministers"' (Wroxton College, Wroxton 
Papers in Politics, 1990). See also Anthony Sampson, Anatomy o f  Britain (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1962).
** Rosati, op. cit., in note 58, took something of a similar line, but focused exclusively on the 
Presidency without consideration of Ministers or control and coordination structures and procedures 
within the American civil service. He proposed three US decision-making types (Presidential, 
Bureaucratic and Local Dominance) and suggested that when Presidents do not dominate a policy 
issue, then policy-making may resemble that proposed by the Bureaucratic Politics perspective.
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Ministers may fail to control or maintain supervision over a particular issue for 
a number of reasons: when policy is of a long-term nature and not regularly 
incorporated into the more urgent matters facing Ministers;*^ when the nature of the 
particular area allows it to be easily isolated from wider foreign policy concerns;^® 
when the area is not deemed of enough significance to warrant close attention; when 
they are incapable, due to lack of knowledge, of making decisions and are 
consequently forced to rely heavily on civil servants; or because they have not created 
organizational structures and procedures that force civil servants to pursue Ministerial 
objectives. On the latter, Ministers may, for example, create departmental standard 
operating procedures that reduce the scope for behaviour that departs from Ministerial 
objectives or they may design a system for granting promotions, resources and 
responsibility within a department in such a manner that civil servants who advocate 
the objectives consistent with their Ministers are rewarded with promotions, larger 
budgets and greater responsibility. When Ministerial oversight and control are weak, 
bureaucrats are free to make decisions that advance their own concerns rather than 
those of their Minister.
Conversely, when Ministers clearly articulate consistent objectives and when 
they control and supervise an issue, bureaucrats are inclined to pursue Ministerial 
objectives. The reason for this is that bureaucrats eventually see convergence between 
their interests and those of their Minister: bureaucrats' occupational interests, as 
influenced by their position in the bureaucracy, can be achieved by pursuing Ministerial 
objectives.^* This is not to suggest that bureaucrats' concerns and Ministerial 
objectives are necessarily synonymous or that bureaucrats necessarily agree with or 
sympathize with their Minister’s objectives. Objectives are not 'shared' in the sense that 
participants agree on what constitutes the greater good. Rather, it suggests that when 
Ministerial authority is exercised. Ministerial objectives and bureaucrats' objectives 
become compatible. Pursuit of Ministerial objectives facilitates the achievement of 
occupational interests. In this way, individual rationality and the structural influence of
Wallace, op. cit., in note 12, p. 18.
Wallace, op. cit., in note 12, p. 12. In this case, Wallace suggested that it is more appropriate to 
speak of departmental policies rather than government policies. Michael Clarke, British External 
Policy-Making in the (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992), p. 112, suggested a similar situation: in 
a 'political climate which takes a minimalist view of government's role in the British economy and 
society, it is natural that individual ministries will tend to have ministerial objectives rather than 
national objectives, as such'.
Downs' analysis of bureaucracy posited a life-cycle where bureaucratic personalities fluctuate 
according to the age of the bureaucracy. This thesis is likewise based upon an evolutionary cycle, but 
one determined by the relationship between Ministers and civil servants. This issue is discussed 
further later in this Chapter.
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bureaucratic position are l i n k e d . j n  contrast, a civil servant opposing the interests of 
a Minister who has established authority is likely to find that his or her occupational 
interests are frustrated. Promotions do not occur and responsibilities and budgets 
shrink or remain static. Opposing a Minister is a very high cost strategy. A more 
fruitful strategy is to pursue Ministerial objectives and reap the possible rewards of 
promotions, larger budgets and greater responsibility.
Bureaucracies are designed to limit the scope for individual freedom and 
authority. The Whitehall system is praised for its hierarchical structures, its network of 
committees and its consultation mechanisms that, even in the absence of Ministerial 
oversight and control, circumscribe the freedom and autonomy of individual civil 
servants and departments. When responsibilities are unambiguously allocated, when 
hierarchical reporting lines are clearly delineated and when communication and 
coordination procedures work, the scope for individual freedom is reduced.
Conversely, when Whitehall mechanisms fail to control and coordinate policy, civil 
servants are free to pursue their occupational interests.
1.3d Applicabilitv to Whitehall
This formulation sensitizes the Bureaucratic Politics perspective to British 
governmental decision-making processes. The ability to do so is made possible by the 
subject matter of the perspective. The Weberian bureaucracy to which the perspective 
applies is not culture-specific. As a governmental form characteristic of industrialized 
economies and democratic societies, bureaucracies are similar from one such society to 
another. It therefore follows that patterns of behaviour observed in one country's 
bureaucracy would have parallels in another. Sensibly applied and refined to account 
for unique governmental structures, procedures and traditions across different 
societies. Bureaucratic Politics can indeed offer insights into policy-making in 
governments other than that of the United States. This particular refinement applies to 
the British political system. It may not be directly applicable to other political systems, 
but perhaps the basic ideas could be used as the basis for another formulation.
1.3e Behaviour
Bureaucratic Politics' treatment of'politics', or competition, is inadequate, particularly 
if it is to be applied to British decision-making. The perspective makes no distinction
Smith, op. cit., in note 25, argues for a linkage between rationality and the dictates of bureaucratic 
position.
35
between behaviour associated with bureaucratic competition and action in aid of 
consensus-building. This is particularly problematic when Bureaucratic Politics is 
applied to British decision-making. A hallmark of British Government is consensus- 
building, or Government by committee, the ultimate incarnation of which is Ministerial 
collective responsibility. If behaviour in aid of consensus-building and bureaucratic 
competition are not distinguished, the analyst is tempted to attribute every action or 
decision to bureaucratic competition. To make the distinction, it is tempting to explore 
the nature of the two activities to determine whether behaviour in each differs.
Consensus-building is a process, often without a clear beginning or end, of 
mutual accommodation and reconciliation where a solution endorsed by all participants 
is sought. Although consensus-building presumes the existence of divergent interests 
and although it does not necessarily involve charity and altruism, it is a positive sum 
game where participants use bargaining, negotiation and coalition-building. Because a 
long-term commitment is implied, participants are perhaps hesitant to employ means 
that will jeopardize the good-will they have accumulated. One might say that behaviour 
in consensus-building is cautious, perhaps considerate, and mitigated by the 
commitment to a process whose result will be endorsed by all.^^
Bureaucratic competition, on the other hand, is a zero sum game: one party's 
gain is necessarily another's loss. The ultimate end of bureaucratic competition is not 
agreement among participants and arrival at a solution representing the greater good. 
Rather, victory for a single participant and defeat for another are sought. Behaviour is 
geared toward immediate personal gain. Consequently, one might find more instances 
of coercive measures such as domination, repression and secrecy,a l l  of which may 
be used in an indiscriminate, rash, even vindictive manner.
A distinction derived in such a manner is untenable. Bureaucrats interviewed in 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) frequently referred to bureaucrats in the 
Treasury as 'devious', 'sneaky', 'manipulative'. Should we assume, therefore, that the 
Treasury never tries to build a consensus, but rather that it always competes with the 
DTI? Further, this distinction does not prevent the analyst from attributing all politics 
to bureaucratic competition. For these reasons, objective criteria for attributing 
behaviour to bureaucratic competition, rather than consensus-building, are needed. 
They are:
• The bureaucrat defined or identified the objective(s) he or she pursued.
Roger Hilsman, The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report', Journal o f Conflict 
Resolution ÇJoV 3, No. 4, 1959), pp. 361-81, disassociates consensus-building and conflict. 
Freedman, op. cit., in note 49, p. 445.
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• That objective(s) included one or more of the following only; promotion, larger 
budgets, greater responsibility.
• Although those objectives may have conflicted in the short-term, the bureaucrat 
perceived a long-term harmony between them.
• The bureaucrat perceived a conflicting relationship between his or her objectives 
and those of other bureaucrats.
• The bureaucrat interpreted events or issues in terms of how they affected his or 
her objectives.
• Based on this interpretation and using the best possible information and some 
calculation of potential consequences, the bureaucrat chose action that he or she 
expected would lead to larger budgets, greater responsibility or a promotion. 
(This is the preference-from-position function.) That action may have been 
negotiation, coalition-building, bargaining, manipulation, deceit, domination, etc. 
The action would be chosen from a menu established by action channels.
This categorization serves a dual purpose. First, it deters the analyst from 
attributing all observable behaviour to bureaucratic competition. Only that behaviour 
designed explicitly to gain budgets, responsibilities or rank is classified as bureaucratic 
competition. It may be that the criteria are too strict, but I prefer to err on the side of 
caution.
Second, it redresses the perspective's faulty logic/politics dichotomy. The 
solution to this problem is self-evident. Any behaviour where a means-ends 
relationship is perceived should be treated as rational?^ This bureaucrat is the portrait 
of March and Simon's 'administrative man': his or her rationality is 'bounded' because 
he or she chooses behaviour with respect to a personal interpretation that may or may 
not mirror the real situation. The bureaucrat may have conflicting objectives that are 
not consciously ranked in order of importance; the bureaucrat may choose from a set 
of alternatives that describe the minimally satisfactory alternatives, or satisfice, rather 
than search all alternatives and choose the one that maximizes a particular objective; 
and the bureaucrat may make decisions incrementally rather than treat each decision 
separately and in terms of how it affects a particular goal.^^
The Public Choice literature is based on this formulation. See, for example, Niskanen, op. cit., in 
note 69; Dunleavy, op. cit., in note 69. The assumption of rationality is clearly a simplifying model 
with numerous limitations, but these facts in and of themselves do not render models useless. For a 
summary of the limitations of the rationality assumption, see Donald R. Kinder and Janet A. Weiss, 
'In Lieu of Rationality; Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision-Making', Journal o f  
Conflict Resolution (Vol. 22, No. 4, 1978), pp. 707-35; and Verba, op. cit., in note 51. For a 
discussion of means-ends relationships, see Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour Qiew York: 
Free Press, 1976).
^^Lindblom, op. cit., in note 33.
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1.4 Summary of Purpose
Competition between bureaucrats, each advancing their own preferences, is endemic in 
Whitehall. Scholars of British policy-making have recognized this fact. Thus, the 
question is not whether bureaucratic competition exists, but whether it has a real effect 
on foreign policy-making in Britain. This thesis looks for an answer in a particular case 
study. Esprit, by employing a reformulation of the Bureaucratic Politics perspective.
The perspective, as reformulated here, argues that civil servants wish to 
maximize their budgets, responsibilities and rank. The validity of this argument will be 
tested. One of the perspective's most important arguments is that a bureaucrats' 
preferences are determined by their position in the bureaucracy. The thesis will explore 
whether position is an adequate guide to preference formation among British civil 
servants involved in Esprit. It will also apply a refined concept of action channels in 
order to test whether they are an effective predictor of the means bureaucrats employ 
in pursuit of their preferences. Ultimately a judgment will be passed on the usefulness 
of the Bureaucratic Politics perspective in a study of British foreign policy-making.
Finally, this thesis hypothesizes that bureaucratic competition can have a real 
effect on British policy in Esprit under the following conditions: 1) when Ministers fail 
to articulate clearly consistent objectives to civil servants and when they fail to exert 
control and maintain scrutiny over the issue; and 2) when Whitehall mechanisms fail to 
control and coordinate activities within and across departments. Those hypotheses will 
be tested against the evidence.
1.5 Contribution to Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations
Although Bureaucratic Politics is accepted as a core middle range theory in foreign 
policy analysis, it has substantial weaknesses that should be overcome. The above 
discussion suggested possible ways to strengthen the perspective. If these prove useful, 
this thesis will have advanced the perspective.
The application of the perspective has been limited. This study extends the
Bureaucratic Politics perspective into areas not previously explored. Existing
applications of the perspective have focused on discrete decisions of a military nature
made by high level officials in response to an external stimulus that is often of crisis
proportions. Application need not be limited to such situations. Bureaucratic Politics
may be applied to issues of a non-military nature. Allison and Halperin discussed the
relevance of Bureaucratic Politics to areas of non-military or strategic concern and
suggested that the 'extension of the argument to other issue areas, e.g., foreign trade is
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straightforward'.^"^ The application is not as straightforward as they suggested, 
however, because sectoral policy-making involves low and middle level bureaucratic 
actors and private sector actors. Information technology, for example, is a knowledge- 
intense industrial sector where a relatively small group of academic and industrial 
researchers possess knowledge. Effective and appropriate government programmes in 
IT can not be made or implemented without the input of this small group of technical 
experts. The motivations of technical experts and their relationships with high, middle 
and low level governmental actors must be considered, thus expanding the application 
of the perspective to include actors other than those traditionally s t ud i ed . By  
exploring policy-making in IT, this thesis extends the perspective to decisions in a 
particular economic sector and to ones involving non-governmental actors.
The Bureaucratic Politics perspective has been limited to studies involving 
actors from one government only. Because so much policy-making now takes place in 
international settings, its usefulness would be improved if it is made capable of 
explaining decision-making on issues that involve bureaucracies of different countries 
or international organizations interacting with national bureaucracies. This study tests 
the perspective's ability in this regard by applying it to Esprit.
Although some studies have attempted to theorize the national dimension to 
policy-making in the EC, they often take national leaders or the executive branch of 
government to be the sole source of national policy preferences. Even the 
intergovernmental approach, which allows for sources of policy influence outside the 
executive, fails to theorize adequately the domestic political determinants of 
governmental action.^^ It does not give adequate consideration to the 
intragovemmental negotiations, bargains and coalition-building between bureaucrats 
that take place in the creation of national policy positions. Similarly, the 
interdependence approach to policy-making in the EC, which sees the Commission, 
member states' bureaucracies and various other interest groups competing and
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 47.
High level actors include the Prime Minister, politically appointed Ministers and bureaucrats of 
Permanent, Deputy and Under-Secretary rank. Low level actors are bureaucrats holding a rank below 
Assistant Secretary. Relevant Whitehall Departments are the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Science and Engineering Research Council, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defence and Treasury.
For a discussion of the limitations of the intergovernmental approach, see Carole Webb, 
'Theoretical Perspectives and Problems' in Helen Wallace, et. al., (eds.). Policy Making in the 
European Community, Second Edition (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1989), pp. 23-28. Fora 
summary of the arguments of intergovernmentalism, see Paul Taylor, The Limits o f European 
Integration (^ echevùvàm. Croom Helm, 1983).
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collaborating with one another in a fragmented policy process where no single group 
dominates, does not explicitly relate bureaucratic behaviour to policy outcomes.
Several studies have explored bureaucratic activity within the Commission, 
focusing on deviations from Weber's 'rational' bureaucracies by highlighting a 
malfunctioning of the Commission's bureaucratic machinery. Coombes, for example, 
argues that the Commission has become the staging ground for bureaucrats whose 
primary motivation has shifted from European integration to career advancement. 
Because of this reorientation, the Commission is unable to take a leadership role in 
new initiatives, but must settle with managing and implementing existing ones 
ins t ead .Poul l e t  and Deprez suggest that compartmentalization among upper level 
commissioners results in the inability of Directorate Generals to coordinate their 
policies which, in turn, leads to fragmented and uncoordinated policy across the 
Community. Michelmann suggests that the Commission's administrative problems 
are caused by its multinational membership, which results in too much diversity of 
style, tradition and practices among bureaucrats. Allen and Byrne suggest that the 
implementation of EC policy and programmes faces similar problems that are found at 
the national level, bureaucratic resistance being one of them.*®'^  Kakabadse applies the 
Bureaucratic Politics model to explore the role of the Commission in the Tokyo Round 
of GATT negotiations and finds that bureaucratic processes paralyzed the 
Commission's negotiating capacity.*®^
These studies focus primarily upon the internal functioning of the Commission 
rather than on relationships between the Commission and member states' 
bureaucracies. This study sets out to explore the interaction between the British and 
EC bureaucracies, but it does so with the purpose of shedding light on British foreign 
policy making rather than explaining policy-making in the European Community.
See, for example, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics 
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. xi; William Wallace, Britain's Bilateral Links within 
Western Europe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984); and Webb, ibid., p. 34.
Ï01 David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community (X o^néovi’. Allen & Unwin, 
1970).
Edouard Poullet and Gerard Deprez, 'The Place of the Commission within the Institutional 
System' in Christopher Sasse, et. a/., (eds.). Decision-making in the European Community Çtiew 
York: Praeger, 1977).
Hans J. Michelmann, Organizational Effectiveness in a Multinational Bureaucracy (F^mkyoxow :^ 
Saxon House, 1977).
David Allen and Paul Byme, 'Multilateral Decision-Making and Implementation: the Case of the 
European Community' in Steve Smith and Michael Clarke (eds ). Foreign Policy Implementation 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).
Mario Alexis Kakabadse, The Negotiating Role o f the Commission o f the European Community 
in the GATT Tokyo Round 1973-79, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
1981.
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The application of the perspective to Esprit involves an extended set of actors, 
on both the national and EC levels, and it involves consideration of decisions made 
during the implementation phase of policy-making. Although decisions made during 
the implementation phase of decision-making were of secondary relevance to Allison 
and H a l p e r i n ,  ^ 0 6  foreign policy analysts have realized the importance of implementation 
and developed a perspective on how implementation affects foreign policy 
outcomes. Although this study does not take an implementation approach per se^  it 
does consider decisions following the single, non-military decision to fund Esprit.
This study also applies the Bureaucratic Politics perspective to British foreign 
policy-making. The Bureaucratic Politics perspective has been rejected as a useful tool 
for analyzing British foreign policy-making. This thesis questions that conclusion and 
heeds the following call from Steve Smith;
...in many ways the single most important task that a study of British foreign 
policy could perform for FPA would be to investigate the phenomena of 
bureaucratic and organisational politics at a variety of levels within 
government over a variety of policy issue-areas. As it stands, we simply do not 
know the extent to which they operate in the British case. We know the 
arguments for and against in the case of the United States (and even in the 
Soviet one!) but we, as FPA theorists, do not know the caveats that must be 
applied to the findings that come from over the Atlantic.
In terms of foreign policy analysis more generally, this thesis makes two 
contributions. First, it tests the usefulness of applying a middle range theory, rather 
than trying to construct a general one, to foreign policy-making. Second, it explores 
how international factors and domestic factors combine to affect policy even though it 
takes as its basis a domestic level approach. It does so by exploring how, and with 
what effect, governmental foreign policy machinery adapts to the demands of 
international bureaucracies. Esprit is an appropriate vehicle through which to trace 
adaptation because it spanned a decade, during which time a single political party held
Allison and Halperin, op. cit., in note 20, p. 57.
For an overview, see Michael Clarke and Steve Smith, Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: 
Implementation Appraoches' in Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds.). Understanding Foreign 
Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach {f^ diershoX: Edward Elgar, 1989). See also David 
Lewis and Helen Wallace (eds.), Policies into Aacrice (London: Heinemann, 1984); Christopher C. 
Hood, The Limits o f Administration (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); and Jeffrey L. Pressman 
and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (London: University of California Press, 1984).
Smith, 'Foreign Policy Analysis', op. cit., in note 21, p. 68.
For a discussion on the increasing importance of international factors on British foreign policy­
making, see Smith, 'Foreign Policy Analysis', op. cit., in note 21; and Steve Smith and Michael 
Smith, 'The Anal>tical Background: Approaches to the Study of British Foreign Policy' in Michael 
Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds ), British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change & 
Transformation (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
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office thus affording some consistency of political thought in Government, and because 
it was a vehicle through which the Community bureaucracy sought to increase its 
competence and responsibilities.
The study also points to the need for further study of how international 
collective action is affected by implementation at the national level, the latter being at 
least partially a function of domestic politics. Although the focus is on the information 
technology sector, the findings may have implications for collaborative efforts in other 
areas, such as the European Fighter Programme or the European Space Agency. 
Further, while the study concentrates on British policy-making in Esprit, insights 
garnered here may be applied and tested in the cases of French and German policy­
making in Esprit because those governments also implemented large national IT R&D 
programmes alongside Esprit.
1.6 Structure and Methodology
This thesis is organized chronologically. A chronological ordering enables a coherent 
and structured examination of numerous policy initiatives that occurred simultaneously 
in London and in Brussels and it allows this thesis to explore an evolution of policy­
making that took place during the decade. Although a single party held office during 
the entire decade, its policies, particularly toward the economy and the European 
Community, were often ambiguous, inconsistently pursued and in flux. Further, 
although a single Prime Minster held office throughout the entire period, her authority 
waxed and waned during the decade. Her policies and policy style encouraged division 
and 'vacillation' at the centre of Government.^^^ Finally, the Prime Minister shuffled 
her Cabinet frequently, particularly the DTI portfolio, making it difficult for a single 
Minister to establish authority within the department. These conditions of flux were 
certain to affect the nature of policy-making.
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the issue, 
discussed the theoretical framework and reviewed the relevant literature. Chapter 2
 ^ Margaret Sharp suggests that Esprit marked the 'sea change' in Community policy-making that 
culminated in the signing of the Single European Act. Margaret Sharp, 'The Single Market and 
European Policies for Advanced Technologies', The Political Quarterly Issue, The Politics of
1992', 1990), pp. 100-20. Hugh Ward and Geoffrey Edwards, 'Chicken and Technology: The Politics 
of the European Community's Budget for Research and Development', Review o f  International 
Studies (WoX. 16, No. 2, April 1990), pp. 111-29, argue that the Commission viewed Esprit as a means 
to draw more activity and responsibility to itself, increasing expectations and demands. See also Neil 
Kay, 'Industrial Collaborative Activity and the Completion of the Internal Market', Journal o f  
Common Market Studies (yo\. 29, No. 4, June 1991), pp. 347-62; Claire Shearman, "European 
Collaboration in Computing and Telecommunications: A Policy Approach' in Kenneth Dyson and 
Peter Humphreys (eds). Politics o f the Communications Revolution Frank Cass, 1986).
Clarke, op. cit., in note 90, p. 263.
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offers a brief history of UK IT policy and describes the Whitehall science and 
technology policy-making machinery Mrs Thatcher inherited. It discusses the major 
policies of Mrs Thatcher's first Government and how they were implemented in the 
Department of Industry (as the DTI was prior to Mrs Thatcher's second election 
victory). The emotive appeal of information technology during this period is 
highlighted. The Chapter then describes the structure and workings of the IT policy­
making machinery that existed from 1979 to 1983.
Chapter 3 explores the origins of Esprit and the Alvey Programme. The actors 
involved, their interests and the processes by which decisions were made are of 
particular concern. The relationship between the two programmes is discussed. In 
Chapter 4, the implementation of the Alvey Programme is examined. During this 
period, the Department of Industry was reorganized numerous times and was assigned 
a rapid succession of Secretaries of State. The effects of such change are examined. 
Emphasis is given to the structure and operations of the implementing bureaucracy, the 
Alvey Directorate, and to the relationship between the Directorate and other Whitehall 
bureaucracies. Chapter 5 briefly discusses the funding decisions of the Alvey 
Directorate. Close attention is paid to the nature of the funding recipients and the 
technical areas supported. An exposition of action channels is provided.
Chapters 6 discusses British policy in Esprit from April 1983 to late 1984 while 
Chapter 7 explores it from late 1984 through 1985. In each Chapter, five hypotheses 
derived from the Bureaucratic Politics approach are tested. Those hypotheses primarily 
concern the occupational interests of civil servants, the nature of competition they 
faced, whether they chose action in Esprit that furthered their occupational interests 
and whether those actions were affected by action channels. It also judges whether 
bureaucratic competition had a real effect on Esprit and, if so, whether it was due to a 
lack of consistent Ministerial objectives. Ministerial control and supervision and to 
ineffective Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms.
Chapter 8 looks at the period from 1986 through 1987. This was a period of 
great uncertainty in the DTI. New Ministers arrived and slashed the DTI's budget for 
R&D. In Brussels, the Commission was marching relentlessly forward on the R&D 
front. Would bureaucrats abandon national R&D programmes, which now promised 
little in the way of budgets and responsibilities, and adopt European ones instead?
Chapter 9 chronicles the changes in the DTI brought about by a strong
Secretary of State. The Alvey Directorate was disbanded and a new organization was
given responsibility for Esprit. Chapter 9 also examines the Whitehall coordination
structures and mechanisms that existed from 1988 to 1992. British policy in Esprit is
examined in light of the new structures and relationships across the DTI and Whitehall.
Chapter 10 concludes by judging whether this thesis' formulation of the Bureaucratic
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Politics perspective is instrumental in explaining British foreign policy-making in 
Esprit.
This thesis is not an assessment of Esprit or the Alvey Programme nor is it an 
evaluation of British policy or policy-making in Esprit. Further, although it tells an 
interesting tale, its primary purpose is to shed light on how British foreign policy is 
made, how the process may be adapting to new demands placed on it from the 
European Community and sectoral issues and whether the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective is a useful tool for British foreign policy analysis. To accomplish these 
goals, each Chapter presents information on the following; the interests of bureaucrats, 
the nature of the bureaucratic environment, the degree of Ministerial involvement and 
the effectiveness of Whitehall coordinating structures and procedures. Based on this 
information, five questions will be answered:
• Do bureaucrats work to maximize their budgets, rank and responsibilities?
• Must they compete with one another to do so?
• Does the preference-from-position function explain bureaucrats' objectives in 
Esprit? That is, can bureaucrats' behaviour in Esprit be explained by reference to 
their perceptions of how Esprit would affect their budgets, responsibilities and 
promotional prospects?
• Do action channels provide insight into the means by which bureaucrats pursued 
their objectives in Esprit?
• Does bureaucratic competition affect British policy in Esprit and if so, was it due 
to a lack of clearly articulated consistent Ministerial objectives. Ministerial control 
and supervision and to ineffective Whitehall control mechanisms?
To research British policy-making in Esprit, I relied primarily on interviews.
Eighty-four interviews were conducted, the majority falling within a twenty month
period from July 1991 to March 1993. Interviewees represented the major
Governmental organizations (in Whitehall, Westminster and the European
Commission), industrialists and academics active in IT as well as scholars in the field of
European Community studies and British foreign policy-making. Much of the
information gathered from interviews has never been recorded and hence represents a
substantial and original contribution to the body of existing literature on British foreign
policy-making, on the organization of the British Government for science and
technology policy-making, on Esprit and on the operations of the European
Commission. Because the bulk of information was obtained through interviews, it is
useful to discuss in more detail the methods by which I chose interviewees and
conducted interviews. This information is presented in Appendix A.
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In addition to interviews, I used numerous other sources. Among them were 
publications of the Alvey Directorate and the European Commission, official 
Government documents and memoirs. Thanks to technological advances in document 
storage and retrieval (information technology), I was able to carry out an exhaustive 
survey of all pertinent literature relating to information technology, to Esprit, to the 
Alvey Programme and to all significant participants. Articles from the Financial Times, 
the Economist, Electronics Weekly mà Computer Weekly particularly useful 
secondary sources providing background information and corroboration of facts 
gathered during interviews. Greater detail on the literature search is also provided in 
Appendix A.
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History and Evolution of British Information Technology 
Research and Development Policy-Making 
Chapter 2
This chapter briefly describes the machinery of Government for policy-making in 
information technology research and development (IT R&D) and the state of IT R&D 
Mrs Thatcher inherited in 1979. It then turns to Mrs Thatcher's first term as Prime 
Minister and discusses her IT R&D policies and how they were implemented in the 
Department of Industry (Dol). It also assesses the nature of the leadership offered by 
Mrs Thatcher and her Secretary of State at the Dol. Finally, the structures and 
functioning of the Whitehall machinery for control and coordination of departmental IT 
R&D spending from 1979 to 1983 are described.
2.1 Structure of Government for Policy-Making in Research and Development
Modem government is organized according to a functional division of responsibility 
among departments. Research and development (R&D) contravenes this logic. R&D is 
not a function. It is a process; a creative, fluid evolution from learning to application. 
As such, R&D is not amenable to functional classification. Because R&D covers a 
broad spectrum of activity, it is not amenable to functional division either. When R&D 
is allocated across different departments,^ fragmented and incoherent policy often 
results if strong coordinating mechanisms are absent. IT R&D policy in Britain has 
exhibited such fragmentation and incoherence.^
To redress the fragmentation and incoherence, the machinery of Government 
for R&D policy-making has been reorganized numerous times. Centralization failed: a 
single Minister or Ministry did not have the power to wrest control of R&D from other 
Whitehall departments. Decentralization failed: it led to policy fragmentation and 
incoherence.^
Under Mr Callaghan's tenure, responsibility for research and development 
policy was divided between the Science Group, which was led by the Chief Scientific
 ^Jeremy Timstali and Michael B. Palmer, Liberating Communications: Policy-Making in France and 
Britain (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1990), identify nine Cabinet ministers with interests in R&D. Jill 
Hills, Information Technology and Industrial Policy (^eckeiihzm'. Croom Helm, 1984), adds 
numerous quasi-govemmental agencies to the list.
 ^See Erik Arnold and Ken Guy, Parallel Convergence: National Strategies in Information 
Technology Francis Pinter, 1986); Hills, ibid.\ Tunstall and Palmer, ibid.\ and Philip
Gummett, The Evolution of Science and Technology Policy: A UK Perspective', Science and Public 
Policy (So\. 18, No. 1, February 1991), pp. 31-37.
 ^See, for example. Report o f the Committee o f Enquiry into the Organisation o f Civil Science, under 
the chairmanship of Sir Burke Trend (The Trend Report), Cm 2171 (London: HMSG, 1963).
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Advisor and which was part of the Central Policy Review Staff, and the Secretary of 
the Cabinet. Reporting to the Secretary of the Cabinet was the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Scientific and Technical Information, which was comprised of 
departmental Chief Scientists and Permanent Secretaries. This committee had the 
monumental task of coordinating the science policies (including R&D) of all Whitehall 
<iepartments and presenting Cabinet Ministers with scientific priorities that represented 
Government as a whole.'* Mr Callaghan created an Advisory Council for Applied 
Research and Development (ACARD), comprised of industrialists and academics but 
located in the Cabinet Office, to improve relationships between Government and non­
governmental organizations on applied R&D issues.^ ACARD was also to advise 
Ministers on issues relating to applied R&D both domestically and internationally.
On international R&D issues, a single department, usually the DTI (or one of 
its manifestations) took the lead unless the Prime Minister took a personal interest.^
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had an interest in international research and 
development since the issues were often embroiled in larger foreign policy issues, but it 
was unable to play a lead or coordinating role because it lacked technically trained 
staff. Likewise, the Treasury was ill-equipt to play a major role.^ This was the 
organization of Government for R&D policy-making that Mrs Thatcher inherited.
2.2 The State of Information Technology
Information technology has three component sectors; computers, microelectronics and 
telecommunications. From the 1960s to 1979, Government intervention shaped each of 
these sectors.^
From the 1960s to early 1970s, regardless of the party in office. Government 
sought to create a national computer champion and support it through public 
procurement. 'Buy British' was the policy and, after 1968 when the Government forced 
the creation of ICL, 'Buy British' meant 'Buy ICL'. This was so despite the fact that 
IBM, an American company, dominated the British computer market.^ ICL's fortunes 
changed in 1974 when the Labour Government cut public expenditure and forced
 ^Mr Paul Channon, Minutes of Evidence, House of Commons Education, Science and Arts 
Committee, enquiry into Information Technology, HC107i, 14 December 1981.
 ^'Applied' is the name given to research with a practial application as its objective. This is opposed to 
'basic' research, which is entirely curiosity-driven, with no practial application as its objective.
 ^William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Bn'tain (Lxmdon: Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 147.
 ^Ibid., p. 146; and Geoffrey Findlay, 'International Collaboration' in Robin Nicholson, e t al., (eds.). 
Science and Technology in the United Kingdom (Harlow: Longman, 1991).
* For a comprehensive study of British information technology policy, see Hills, op. cit., in note 1.
 ^Hills, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 152-57.
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departments to lease computers rather than buy them. ICL's strength was eroded and 
the national champion Mrs Thatcher inherited in 1979 was very weak.
The British microelectronics industry was likewise shaped by Government 
intervention. By the early 1970s, over 50 per cent of the microchips sold in Britain 
were imported despite the high tariffs Government placed on imports to protect the 
British microelectronics industry. The protective measures had an adverse effect: 
foreign microchip manufacturers moved to Britain and continued to control the British 
market. The three largest British microchip manufacturers (GEC, Plessey and Ferranti) 
were forced to quit producing standard chips altogether and concentrate instead on 
customized chips. (See Appendix C for a glossary of terms.)
Government support of British microelectronics manufacturers increased under 
Mr Callaghan. Numerous Whitehall departments channelled Government money to the 
sector through the 1975 Industrial Strategy. In addition, a company called Inmos, in 
which the Government held a 72.5 per cent share, was created to manufacture standard 
microchips.
On the telecommunications front, the Government decided in 1973 to award a 
British company the contract to install the country's switching system. The decision 
was ill-fated and by the early 1980s, the British telecommunications network was 
technically inferior to the systems operating in many other West European countries.
Despite the weak state of the British IT industry, it was not short of 
Government funding for R&D. Several departments funded IT R&D. In 1977, the 
Science Research Council (SRC) funded the Distributed Computing Systems 
Programme of academic and industrial research and it organized a panel under the 
chairmanship of Mr Derek Roberts of Plessey to formulate a national programme of 
collaborative research in computing science and computer applications.^^ The strategy 
was not implemented, but the SRC did supply grants for industrially relevant academic 
research in microelectronics and it funded five university semiconductor processing
facilities. ^ 2
The Department of Industry was highly involved in the sector because it 
administered most of the funds made available through the Industrial Strategy. The 
Dol created the Microelectronics Industry Support Programme (MISP), the 
Microelectronics Applications Project (MAP) and a number of smaller programmes in
For a discussion of the government's decision to purchase the System X switch, see Hills, op. c/A, in 
note 1, pp. 130-46.
Science Research Council, Proposed New Initiatives in Computing and Computer Applications,
The Roberts Report, (London; Science Research Council, March 1979).
"The Role of the Science and Engineering Research Council in Information Technology', 
Information Technology and Public Policy (WoX. 2, No. 1, 1983), p. 24-29.
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fibreoptics, optoelectronics and robotics. The Dol administered this support with 
minimal oversight or interference from the Prime Minister or the Chancellor and with 
minimal coordination or consultation with other Whitehall departments that were 
spending on IT Within the Dol, responsibility for information technology was
contested and fragmented. MAP was administered by Mr Reay Atkinson and MISP by 
Mr John Major. Both gentlemen held Undersecretary rank and their jostling for 
position was well-known.*^
The support administered by the Dol for industrial R&D paled in comparison 
to the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) spending on defence R&D, however. The British 
Government funded more defence R&D, as a percentage of gross domestic product, 
than any country other than the United States and the former Soviet Union. In 1978, 
33 per cent of total defence R&D went to electronics and microelectronics received a 
large portion of this.*"^  Of the MoD's total spend on R&D, almost three-quarters went 
to microelectronics companies such as Ferranti, GEC-Marconi, British Aerospace, 
Racal and Plessey. Predictably, these firms switched most of their R&D from industrial 
to defence related work.
Government intervention had shaped the structure of the British IT industry. 
Mrs Thatcher inherited several industrial albatrosses (ICL and Inmos) and an outdated 
telecommunications switching system. Numerous Whitehall departments were 
channelling substantial amounts of Government funding for R&D to the IT sector, but 
each according to their own departmental priorities and strategies rather than 
according to a Whitehall-wide strategy. Consultation and coordination between the 
departments was minimal.
2.3 The Conservatives and Mrs Thatcher
In 1979 Britain elected a party whose leader was a self-proclaimed conviction 
politician with little sympathy for the consensual policy-making style of the post-
National Economic Development Council, Information Technology EDC, Policy for the UK 
Information Technology Industry NEDC, 1983), pp. 39-40.
Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, Volume 3 (Houndmills; Macmillan, 1991), p. 
89.
The Guardian, 2 October 1978. Interviews, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992; and Mr Reay 
Atkinson. NOTE: When an individual was interviewed more than once, the date of the interview is 
placed next to the name. Otherwise, only the name of the interviewee appears in footnotes. This 
convention is followed throughout the thesis. For a full list and dates of all interviews, see Appendix 
B.
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Civil Research and Development, 
First Report, Session 1986-87, HL 20-1 (London: HMSO, 1987), p. 167.
Ken Guy, UK Policies and Programmes in Electronics and Information Technology: A Report to 
the A lvey Directorate (Qng\\X.on: Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 1986), p. 9.
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Second World War Governments.^* Mrs Thatcher compared herself to the Old 
Testament Prophets. According to her, the prophets did not say, 'Brothers I want a 
consensus'. They said, 'This is my faith, this is what I passionately believe. If you 
believe it too, then come with me'.^  ^ Although history may remember Mrs Thatcher as 
the 'Iron Lady', domineering, aggressive and unbending, her hold over the Party, 
Cabinet and the populace during her first term was tenuous and her Government's 
actions often abrogated the convictions she so zealously professed.
The zest with which she plunged into the affairs of Number 10 belied it, but 
Mrs Thatcher was apprehensive of her new position. She had not held an important 
office, she lacked experience and did not have a party united behind her monetarist 
cause. Careful not to ostracize her powerful critics (Prior, Walker, Carrington and 
Gilmour), Mrs Thatcher invited them into her first Cabinet. This did not, however, 
guarantee their loyalty. Mr Ian Gilmour, who went to the Foreign Office, 'never 
thought for a moment that the Thatcher experiment would last. The Thatcherite phase 
would be no more than an intermission, he thought, after which those to whom the 
Conservative Party historically belonged would reassume command. And Gilmour was 
not alone'.2°
This precarious Cabinet was divided on many issues, including economic 
reform and foreign policy. The Conservatives were elected on a promise to reverse the 
economic decline of Britain. Although monetarist prescriptions (tax cuts, tightly 
controlled money supply, decreased Government spending) were to be the cure, the 
implementation of those medicines and their political side-effects (inflation and 
unemployment) were not well theorized. Working out the details of implementation on 
the job proved extremely difficult in the face of the worst recession to hit Britain since 
the Second World War. After two years, the economy was in trouble: gross domestic 
product had fallen 5.5 per cent; unemployment was at 2.7 million and rising fast; 
rioting had occurred in several cities. Several Cabinet Ministers began to lose faith. 
These 'wets', as they became known, wanted to abandon the monetarist cause and
This discussion draws from the following; Hugo Young, One o f Us (London: Pan Books, 1990); 
Peter Hennessy, (London: Fontana Press, 1990); Peter Hennessy, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986; Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State Q^ owndimiWs'. Macmillan, 
1988); Peter Clarke, 'Margaret Thatcher's Leadership in Historical Perspective', Parliamentary Affairs 
(Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1992); Peter Riddell, The TbatcberEra and Its Legacy {Oyîoi&. Basil 
Blackwell, 1991); Michael Clarke, British External Policy-making in the (Houndmills:
Macmillan, 1992); Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics {0>Sox&. Oxford University 
Press, 1990); Middlemas, op. cit., in note 14; Kenneth Baker, The Turbulent Years: M y Life in 
Fo///‘/c5 (London: Faber and Faber, 1993); Alan Clarke, Diaries (Xxmdon: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
1993); Nigel Lawson, The View From No. 11: Memoirs o f a Tory Radical (LonAoiv. Corgi Books, 
1993); and Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Fears (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
Quoted in Gamble, ibid.
Young, op. cit., in note 18, pp. 138-39.
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replace it with an incomes policy, the anathema to monetarism. Dissent was not limited 
to the 'wets’. Many Ministers loyal to the Prime Minister and/or to the monetarist cure 
(Heseltine, Biffen, Nott, Howe) began to question its wisdom. By July 1981, 
demoralization in Cabinet was 'endemic'.^i
In September 1981, the Prime Minister determined to quell rebellion in Cabinet 
and sacked some of the Cabinet 'wets'. This did not, however, guarantee unity of 
purpose in the Cabinet nor did it confer upon her the complete backing of her Party. 
The 'wets' she sacked became more vociferous and the 1992 Committee of 
Conservative backbenchers challenged her authority. The words 'hung Parliament' were 
heard across Westminster and Whitehall.
Thus, although the Prime Minister was bristling with confidence and prepared 
to take painful steps toward the realization of her objectives, her Ministers and Party 
were apprehensive and cautious. Ministers were able^emper some of the Prime 
Minister's more radical instincts and even force her to accept policies against her will. 
(The Alvey Programme was such a case and is discussed in the next Chapter).
Mrs Thatcher's Cabinet was divided not only on economic policy, but also on 
foreign policy, particularly toward the European Community. Mrs Thatcher had very 
little foreign policy experience but she knew where she stood on the issue of 
Europe. Mrs Thatcher was instinctively skeptical of the European Community and the 
demands it placed on Government finances. Her Foreign Office Ministers did not 
possess the same antipathy and it was on the issue of Britain's contribution to the 
Community budget that Cabinet first overruled her. Even the Falklands War, which 
buttressed Mrs Thatcher's self-confidence and sent her popularity soaring, did little to 
improve her relationship with Cabinet. Cabinet was not united behind the Prime 
Minister's approach to the Falklands crisis.
The Prime Minister's response to the dissension and demoralization in Cabinet 
was to adopt a decision-making style much different from British Government 
tradition. (That tradition involved Cabinet debate, collective responsibility and 
Ministerial accountability.) She reduced the number of decisions that were taken in 
C a b i n e t . Decisions were now taken by a small group, or 'inner' Cabinet, of hand- 
picked Ministers and advisers who shared her convictions (or, at least, were willing to 
follow her l e a d ) .22 The nature of Cabinet debate changed as well. Cabinet became 
more of a discussion forum than a decision-making body.2‘* In these discussions, she
2  ^Young, op. ch., in note 18, p. 204.
22 See Hennessy, Cabinetm à Wbhebail, op. ch., in note 18. See also George W. Jones, 'Cabinet 
Government and Mrs Thatcher', Contemporary Record (WoX. 1, No. 3, 1987), pp. 8-12.
22 Hennessy, Cabinet, op. ch., in note 18, p. 100.
2"* Anthony Seldon, The Cabinet Office and Coordination 1979-87', Public Administration (yo\. 68, 
Spring 1990), pp. 103-21.
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often seemed 'more of an external pressure group on her Cabinet than the traditional 
resolver of its conflicting f o r c e s . . . . A s  the Prime Minister concentrated decision­
making around herself, the principle of Cabinet collective responsibility and Ministerial 
accountability was threatened. Insiders talked of a 'devaluation of Cabinet government'. 
Her stridency and efforts to decrease the Cabinet's authority demoralized Cabinet more 
and 'perpetuated vacillation at the heart of government'.
Discontent and demoralization were not limited to Cabinet: they spread to the 
civil service as well. Generally speaking, the civil service welcomed Mrs Thatcher's 
new Government. As Sir Ian Bancroft, head of the civil service in 1979, suggested, 'So 
in 1979 there was a positive welcome, on no party political grounds, for a new 
administration with a mandate, with firm policies and with a firm profile to if.^ "^  The 
firm policies and firm profile civil servants hoped for did not materialize during the first 
two years of Mrs Thatcher's administration.
Compounding the lack of leadership with 'firm policies' and a 'firm profile* was 
the demoralization civil servants suffered at the hands of the Prime Minister. Mrs 
Thatcher harboured an inherent distrust of the civil service and its consensus-building 
ethos. She believed that painful, but necessary, action to curb Britain's economic 
decline had been avoided as a result of the conciliatory' practices of the civil service.
As Hennessy remarks:
in Mrs Thatcher's demonology, it is the protagonists of the failed Keynes- 
Beveridge consensus who have brought Britain low. And those with the biggest 
horns are the senior civil servants who assisted at the birth of that consensus 
and who had succeeded in capturing every Cabinet, Labour or Conservative, 
for its cause from the mid-forties till May 1919?^
Mrs Thatcher set out to 'Deprivilege the Civil Service ' .She by-passed many 
Permanent Secretaries, oversaw replacements for those who retired and brought 
young, hand chosen, civil servants not yet seeped in the traditions of the civil service 
into her inner circle. After several years of this, Mrs Thatcher was accused of 
politicizing the civil service.^^
Economist, 4 October 1980.
Michael Clarke, British External Policy-Making in the (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992), p.
16.
Quoted in Young, op. cit., in note 18, p. 155.
For a discussion of the tradition of consensus-building, see Kavanagh, op. cit., in note 18. 
Hennessy, Whitehall, op. cit., in note 18, p. 632.
Hennessy, Whitehall, op. cit., in note 18, p. 628. This sentence was in the annex of a Cabinet 
committee paper discussing the strategies and priorities for the Conservative government.
The Williams Committee cleared Mrs Thatcher of charges that she politicized the civil service, but 
did note that Number 10 was highly interested in appointments.
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Mrs Thatcher was aggressive and domineering toward civil servants outside her 
inner circle. Her wrath was aimed particularly at civil servants in the Foreign Office. In 
Mrs Thatcher's view, Foreign Office officials were the epitome of consensus politics 
and, to make matters worse, they were pro-Europe. Mrs Thatcher reduced the Foreign 
Office's influence by, for example, bringing Sir Anthony Parsons to Number 10 as 
foreign affairs adviser and she dominated EC negotiations, often foiling the carefully 
laid plans of the Foreign Office Officials in thej^eign  o ^ e  despaired of the 
reputation for 'awkwardness' she earned Britain in Community negotiations.^^
The Prime Minister sought to instill in the civil service the efficiency she 
associated with private enterprise. Soon after taking office, she created an Efficiency 
Unit in the Cabinet Office to evaluate the efficiency of the civil service and suggest 
reforms. The reforms, encapsulated in the Financial Management Initiative (FMI), 
were 'intended to melt and then alter the traditional culture of the Civil Service from 
top to bottom.'^ 3
The FMI forced Ministers to take ultimate managerial responsibility for their 
Departments, in addition to their policy-making responsibilities in Cabinet and the 
committee and constituency work demanded of them as Members of Parliament. The 
ideals encapsulated in the FMI were not wholeheartedly endorsed by Cabinet or among 
civil servants. Ministers and civil servants alike had to 'wrestle with the contradictions 
of devolved responsibilities in a system whose accountability genes all reflected a 
genetic code in which the Minister was supreme and, for the health of democracy, had 
to account personally for every penny and every activity in Parliament'. '^^ Mrs 
Thatcher's advocacy proved sufficient to drive the reforms through, but not without 
worsening the demoralization felt in the civil service.
The civil service strike added to the despondency in the civil service, but the 
icing on the cake came in November 1981 when Mrs Thatcher abolished the Civil 
Service Department. While the logic of the move may have been sensible, it symbolized 
the disregard with which the Prime Minister viewed the civil service. The civil service 
no longer merited the attention of an individual devoted entirely to it. It was now one 
of many responsibilities of the Cabinet Secretary.
Mrs Thatcher's objective was to change the ethos of the civil service and to 
impose political control over it. It may be argued that she succeeded in these objectives 
by the end of her tenure, but during her first term, she succeeded only in instilling a 
'clammy air of mutual mistrust, as unsatisfactory to the mandarins as it was to the
Stephen George, An Awkward Partner Britain in the European Conamunity {Oy£oi&. Oxford 
University Press, 1990).
Hennessy, Whitehall, op. cit., in note 18, p. 605.
Hennessy, Whitehall, op. cit., in note 18, p. 616.
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politicians, hung over the early dealings between Thatcherism and the government 
machine....
Demoralization of the civil service hindered the functioning of Whitehall, where 
'more or less formally organized, meeting either regularly or irregularly as 
circumstances require, a network of interdepartmental committees and consultations 
on matters of external relations extends throughout Whitehall'.^^ This informal 
network was the linchpin in a Departmental system with a tendency toward 
fragmentation. It was through this informal network that Government-wide priorities 
were created from the disparate interests of the individual Departments. Mrs Thatcher's 
treatment of the civil service impaired this vital system.
2.4 The Department of Industry Under Sir Keith Joseph
Sir Keith came to the Department of Industry in 1979 armed with copies of Adam 
Smith's The Wealth o f Nations fox his civil servants to read. He had two objectives; 
get Government off the backs of industry, or 'roll back the frontiers of the state', and 
absolve bureaucrats of the power to make decisions that affected the state of British 
industry. He combined the two objectives into a clarion cry: he would proudly oversee 
the dissolution of the Department of Industry.
Given his often repeated objectives, bureaucrats in the Department of Industry 
waited for the axe to fall on their budget and on the interventionist ethos of Industrial 
Strategy.37 y^e axe did not fall. In the face of the worst recession to hit Britain since 
the Second World War, Sir Keith was forced to abandon the economic philosophy he 
was moulding and preaching. Rather than rolling back the frontiers of the state, he 
rolled them forward in many cases.Government expenditure on trade, industry and 
energy doubled in real terms from 1978/79 to 1982/83. Even the instruments of 
intervention were kept. The National Enterprise Board, the epitome of Government 
intervention, was given a longer lease on life when it was combined, in 1981, with the 
National Research Development Corporation to form the British Technology Group.
Sir Keith was in a predicament. Given the potential political fall-out of the 
recession, he could not cut Government support to industry. At the same time, 
however, the architect of the blossoming Conservative philosophy could not blatantly 
continue the much maligned policies of the previous Government. The solution: 
Government support had to be repackaged in a manner that appeared, at least on the 
face of it, consistent with the developing Conservative economic philosophy.
35 Young, op. cit., in note 18, p. 230.
3^  Wallace, op. cit., in note 6, p. 50.
37 Middlemas, op. cit., in note 14, p. 238.
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To accomplish this, Sir Keith created a small unit in the Dol, the Policy 
Planning Unit, and gave them the task of redefining the Department's role.^* As Mr 
Andrew Duguid, who at the time was Sir Keith's private secretary and a member of the 
unit, remarked, 'We were looking at the range of things to help Ministers answer the 
question: "What is the Dol for? What should it do?" The Department was looking for a 
new look, for a new face'.^  ^ Sir Keith allowed his civil servants a wide degree of 
latitude in repackaging their department's objectives, but he made one thing very clear: 
any recommendation that involved Government support for ailing firms in the 
manufacturing sector would be rejected.
Aware of the need to repackage Government industrial support, Mr Reay 
Atkinson, Head of the Dol's Information Technology Division, prepared a report on 
the Department's information technology programmes. Mr Atkinson, four of his 
Assistant Secretaries and the Policy Planning Unit deliberated for several months. They 
wished to increase their budgets and responsibilities and devise an ingenious way for 
Government to increase its support for information technology in a manner that did not 
blatantly contradict the fundamentals of the Conservative Party's emerging economic 
philosophy. In a document entitled 'A Strategy for Information Technology', they 
recommended that Government support British IT through public procurement and 
subsidies for research. The message may have been politically ingenious, but the choice 
of title was not. Lord Trenchard, Industry Minister, reportedly received the report, 
bellowing, 'What's this bloody nonsense? We don't have strategies in this 
government'.
2.5 Information Technology Moves Up the Political Agenda
'A Strategy for Information Technology' presented the outlines of a possible 
Government policy toward IT and the force of its recommendations gained strength as 
Government came under fire for several highly publicized IT debacles. In early 1980, 
the second tranche of Government funding for Inmos had to be approved. The 
Government's stated policy was that it would reduce its stake in Inmos by bringing in 
private sector funds."*^  However, after seven months of acrimonious debate, 
Government agreed to inject another £25 million into Inmos. Mr Thatcher and her
National Economic Development Council, memorandum by the Director General, Industrial Policy 
in the MC(NEDC (82) 25, 23 April 1982), Annex I, p. 12.
Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owtw, Alvey: Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative (\jOX\ùon\ 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989), p. 13; and Interview, Mr Reay Atkinson.
For a statement of government policy, see Kenneth Baker, House of Commons debate, 18 July 
1983, Hansard(Wo\. 46, cols. 151-158).
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Ministers were criticized, even by Conservatives, for 'picking winners'. (The 
Government finally sold its share of Inmos in July 1983.)
Government was on the blocks again in November 1980 when it tendered for a 
contractor to computerize the Inland Revenue's PAYE system. Newly negotiated 
GATT rules prohibited preferential purchasing by Governments from their own 
computer national champion. Government had to consider companies other than ICL, 
so it short-listed America's IBM and ICL, the latter by now on the brink of collapse. 
With the objective of keeping ICL afloat. Government awarded it the contract. The 
large contract did not cure ICL's problems and Sir Keith was forced to grant it a credit 
guarantee of £200 million. Labour and Conservatives alike again criticized 
Government of supporting lame ducks.
A single Member of Parliament, Mr Kenneth Baker, helped keep information 
technology on the political burner. Mr Baker had been Minister for the Civil Service 
from 1972 to 1974 under Mr Edward Heath and he had been head of the Central 
Computer Agency, an interventionist organization that instituted Britain's 'buy ICL' 
procurement policy. Mr Baker's interventionist credentials were well-known"^  ^ and 
because he was associated with the 'Heath men' Mrs Thatcher banished him to the back 
benches.
While warming the back benches. Baker consulted for Logica, a successful 
British software house. He was committed to the IT cause and in June 1980 delivered 
a paper, written with the help of Mr Philip Hughes, Director of Logica,'*  ^ entitled 'A 
National Strategy for Information Technology', to a conference on business 
telecommunications. Mr Baker called for a coherent. Government-led national IT 
strategy that included; a Minister for Information Technology in the Dol; a 
Government procurement policy that supported the British IT industry; Government- 
sponsored IT awareness campaigns; and a large IT R&D program m e.T he similarity 
between Mr Baker's recommendations and the suggestions made by civil servants in 'A 
Strategy for Information Technology' is remarkable. Mr Baker circulated his paper 
widely. Mrs Thatcher received a copy and, on Mr Baker's insistence, visited Logica.
Other Whitehall organizations Joined the IT bandwagon. The Advisory 
Committee for Applied Research and Development (ACARD), a body that advised the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office on R&D, undertook a study of whether the 
development and application of IT in the UK should be stimulated by Government. In 
its deliberations, ACARD consulted with civil servants from departments with an
In 1976, he had called for a national strategy for computers. Times, 11 May 1976.
Interview, Mr Kenneth Warren; and Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 40, p. 10.
"*'*For the text of his speech, see Baker, op. cit., in note 18, Appendix 1. See also Times, 19 June 1980. 
Baker, op. cit., in note 18, p. 57.
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interest in IT. Dol civil servants who had designed 'A Strategy for Information 
Technology ' no doubt recommended that Government should support IT. ACARD 
published it report, entitled Information Technology, in September 1980.^ *^  It argued 
that the commercial competitiveness of British industry depended on IT and it called 
attention to fragmented decision-making in Government and incoherent policies. 
Echoing Mr Baker's call for a Minister of Information Technology, ACARD 
recommended that one Minister and Government department should have 
responsibility for coordinating Government policy. ACARD also called for 
Government support of IT through public procurement and publicly funded R&D. 
Thus, from another quarter came the call for a national IT strategy that was very 
similar to that designed earlier by civil servants in the Department of Industry.
Before ACARD reports were published, the Prime Minister had to approve 
them. Thus, Mrs Thatcher must have approved, or at least been sympathetic to, the 
arguments for a Minister for Information Technology and Government support of the 
industry though R&D subsidies and public procurement.'*^ If she was not firmly 
convinced of the merits of Government support for IT, the Chief Scientific Advisor in 
the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), Professor John Ashworth, pushed her in that 
direction. Although Mrs Thatcher was suspicious of the CPRS, she and Professor 
Ashworth developed a close relationship.
While Professor Ashworth was the Chief Scientist, Mrs Thatcher created an 
Official Cabinet Committee on Information Technology. He chaired this Committee.'** 
Although it has not been officially acknowledged, it is possible that Professor 
Ashworth's Committee of officials shadowed and supported a Ministerial Committee 
on Information Technology.'*^
Professor Ashworth exerted pressure through the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) as well. In January 1981, the Electronics Economic 
Development Committee of the NEDC was reconstituted to include an Information 
Technology Economic Development Committee under the chairmanship of Professor
Advisory Council for Applied Research and Development, Information Technology Qjon6.Qn\ 
HMSO, September 1980).
Testimony of Dr A. Spinks (Chairman of ACARD), House of Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technolog)', Science and Government, First Report, Session 1981-82, HL20-II (London: HMSO,
1982), p. 75.
'** Interview, Professor John Ashworth. An 'Official' Cabinet Committee is attended by civil servants 
as well as ministers while a 'ministerial' Cabinet Committee is attended by ministers only. The 
Committee was later chaired by Mr Keimeth Baker (the Minister for IT) and then by Sir Robin 
Nicholson, Professor Ashworth's successor.
'*^  Hennessy, Whitehall, op. cit., in note 18, p. 640; and Hennessy, Cabinet, op. cit., in note 18, p. 27.
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Ashworth. The NEDC made several calls for a coherent policy toward the UK 
microelectronics industry.
Five months after Mr Baker's speech and two months after ACARD's 
publication, Mrs Thatcher appointed a Minister for Information Technology in the 
Dol. Professor Ashworth claimed credit for persuading her to create the position. At 
the time. Government was working on the Telecommunications Act in preparation for 
privatizing telecommunications. Professor Ashworth suggested to Mrs Thatcher that, 
'This is really going to upset industry, so you need someone to go out and cheer them 
up'. The Minister for IT was that "Minister for Good News' — a public relations post. 
Mr Adam Butler was the first to hold the post, but only for two months. In January 
1980, Mr Kenneth Baker took over. Mr Baker was a skilled publicist and he travelled 
the country preaching the miracles of IT and the necessity of Government support for 
IT.
Mr Baker greatly increased awareness of IT. A Government commissioned poll 
found that before 1982, 17 per cent of the population had heard of IT; after 1982, 62 
per cent had.^  ^ The Financial Times ran a competition to define information 
technology. The winning entry read: 'Information Technology is the modern method of 
getting to know as much about your business as your grandfather knew about his.'^  ^
Also submitted in the competition was the following limerick:
Ken was a man of few airs
And when Maggie answered his prayers
She said with apology
Try Information Technology
They've already used Administrative Affairs.
2.6 Back in the Department of Industry
Civil servants in the Dol interpreted Mr Baker's appointment as a desperate act of a 
desperate Government. They were not far off the mark. According to Mr Baker:
This was the low point of the Thatcher years. There had been a bitterly 
unpopular Budget, unemployment was rising, factories were closing at a record
National Economic Development Committee, op. cit., in note 38; and National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) Electronics EDC, Policy for the UK Electronics Industry 
NEDC, 1982).
Interview, Professor John Ashworth.
Speech by Kenneth Baker to Barbican Conference, IT 82, reprinted in Information Technology and 
Public Policy {Wo\. 1, No. 2, 1983), pp. 111-15.
Baker, op. cit., in note 18, p. 57.
Baker, op. cit., in note 18, p. 58.
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rate....The Cabinet was openly divided, the SDP racing ahead, Margaret 
Thatcher was dismissed as a one-term Prime Minister, and there was talk of a 
leadership challenge in October. So desperate was Number 10 that at the DTI 
[Dol] we had to devise a package of industrial support which she could 
announce in a censure debate in the House of Commons. The depths had been 
plumbed.^^
In this package. Sir Keith gave in to requests from civil servant s call for 
increased funding for MAP and MISP. He promised £25 million to new awareness and 
applications programmes in fibreoptics and optoelectronics, £10 million to robotics and 
£34 million to IT in manufacturing. 1982 was declared the Year of Information 
Technology (IT82) and a £4 million national IT awareness campaign got underway. 
Government money supported IT for the blind, for small businesses, for dentists and 
for GPs. It helped design Offices of the Future and it financed over 100 Information 
Technology Education Centres.
It also implemented the two most important planks of Mr Reay Atkinson's *A 
Strategy for Information Technology'. Sir Keith promised £80 million in support for 
research in information technology and it announced a new Government procurement 
policy for IT. Government was committed to 'continue to support British IT suppliers, 
in order to help them compete effectively'^  ^ through judicious and careful public 
purchasing.
For civil servants in the Dol, these decisions were a mixed blessing. Sir Keith 
was expected to emasculate their budgets and responsibilities, but he actually increased 
them. From the point o f view o f larger budgets and increased responsibility, civil 
servants gained. However, this gain was off-set by an air o f uncertainty and 
apprehension that pervaded the Department as a result o f the huge gap between Sir 
Keith's words and actions. The discrepancy was so great that the NEDC dared 
attribute an industrial policy to the Conservative Government, concluding that, 'While 
the Conservatives have not radically altered industrial policy legislation, there seems to 
have been a shift in emphasis from disengagement in the 1979-1981 period to a more 
active (or at least higher profile) industrial po licy '.C iv il servants were anxious, 
knowing they were implementing programmes that were fundamentally opposed to the 
true objectives of their Secretary of State.
Christopher Johnson summarized the result: 'Mrs Thatcher's new broom, 
wielded at first by Joseph, made remarkably little difference to the broad lines of
Baker, op. cit., in note 18, p. 58.
Department of Industr}', Government Response to the ACARD Report on Information Technology 
(London; Department of Industry, September 1981).
National Economic Development Council, Memorandum by the Director General, op. cit., in note 
38, Aimex I, p. 12.
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policy. It simply meant... the demoralization of civil servants who were made to feel 
that they were acting against her true beliefs'.^* Middlemas suggested likewise. 
Officials in the Dol 'sometimes wondered whether he [Sir Keith] had not been planted 
on the Department to induce what Saki once called an "unrest-cure"'.^^
2.7 Who is in Control Here?
The Dol was not the only department supporting IT R&D. The Science Research 
Council and the Ministry of Defence were as well. Each department was formulating 
and implementing its own policies without concern for coordination or a Government- 
wide strategy. The disjointed and uncoordinated nature of those efforts quickly became 
clear to observers. In the House of Commons, Mrs Thatcher was asked who was 
ultimately responsible for ensuring coordination. She responded: 'Ministers...are 
responsible for policy in connection with research and development within their own 
areas of concern. In appropriate cases I should play a coordinating role.'^ ® The Inmos 
and ICL spectacles, which seemed to have no end, compounded this frustration in the 
Commons.
Government succumbed to the pressure and instituted six reforms to 
G overnm ent.First, a committee of independent advisors, the Information 
Technology Advisory Panel (ITAP), was created to advise all departments on their IT 
policies. Second, a small unit called the IT Secretariat was established in the Cabinet 
Office.^2 The unit included three industrialists and was headed by Mr JB Unwin, an 
Under Secretary from the Treasury. The IT Secretariat reported to Mr Baker and to 
the Secretary of the Cabinet. It had a wide remit to coordinate IT policy across 
departments and it encouraged consultation between ITAP and the departments. Third, 
the Dol was reorganized where one Deputy Secretary, Mr Roy Crofl, reporting to Mr 
Baker was responsible for all programmes concerned with Post, Telecommunications, 
Computers and Information Technology. (Responsibility for MAP and MISP was 
consolidated under one Under Secretary, John Major, when Mr Atkinson, the Under 
Secretary previously responsible for MAP, retired.) Fourth, the Central Computer 
Agency in the Civil Service Department was renamed and empowered to manage the
Christopher Johnson, The Economy Under Mrs Thatcher, 1979-1990QloxmdimiXls : Penguin, 1991), 
p. 183.
Middlemas, op. cit., in note 14, p. 238.
Margaret Thatcher, House of Commons written answers, 29 October 1979, Hansard (Vol. 972, cols. 
411-412).
Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 56.
Testimony of Kenneth Baker, Minutes of Evidence taken by the Commons Education, Science and 
Arts Committee on Information Technology, HC 107i, 14 December 1981.
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growing connection between computers and telecommunications. Fifth, the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Technical Information staffed by 
departmental Chief Scientists and Permanent Secretaries and serviced by the IT 
Secretariat was reconstituted.^^ Sixth, the mechanism through which the Dol received 
advice from industry was amended. The Electronics Advisory Board, a organization 
comprised primarily of industrialists, was subsumed into the new Electronics and 
Avionics Requirements Board. Civil servants from the MoD, Science and Engineering 
Research Council, British Telecom and the Dol were to sit on the Board. Sir Robert 
Telford of GEC was named chairman.^"*
This was as far as Mrs Thatcher would concede to the forces criticizing her 
Government's management of IT. The Government's September 1981 response to the 
earlier ACARD report Information Technology argued that the new structures were 
sufficient to ensure interdepartmental coordination and coherent policy.^^ In fact, they 
were not.
The IT Secretariat was incapable of coordinating IT policy across departments. 
It was too small and its mandate overlapped that of the Cabinet Office Science Group 
and the Chief Scientist, Professor Ashworth, in the CPRS who had exerted strong 
influence in IT policy-making.
The Chief Scientist could not coordinate departmental efforts either: 'It was all 
very loose and there was no powerful coordinating machinery. It is the role of the 
Chief Scientist to coordinate, but the position is very ineffectual. All he does is play 
bureaucratic games and play one group off against another ' .The  Chief Scientist was 
ineffectual for several reasons. First, he was a Deputy Secretary trying to force 
Ministers and Permanent Secretaries to coordinate their policies. Second, he was 
located in the CPRS, an organization Mrs Thatcher was rapidly downgrading. Third, 
he had no portfolio or budget of his own and was seen as powerless by other 
Ministers.^^
Interdepartmental coordinating machinery was ineffective as well. For example, 
although the MoD Chief Scientist was supposed to sit on the Dol's requirements 
board, the House of Lords found that he did not.^* Further, the Dol was not 
represented on the MoD's Defence Science Advisory Council as it should have been. 
Finally, the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Technical Information did
63 Ibid
6"* Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 56.
63 Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 56.
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6^  Interview, Mr Kenneth Baker.
6* Testimony of Sir Ronald Mason (Chief Scientific Advisor, Ministry of Defence), House of Lords, 
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not 'contribute much. It seems too unwieldy a body for the purpose' and its meetings 
were 'infrequent'.
The Minister for Information Technology would not coordinate policy. He was 
concerned to protect his own IT strategy. Mr Baker was ambitious and departmental 
boundaries did not earn his respect. For example, in November 1981, Mr Baker made 
a foray into the Home Office's territory. He argued that responsibility for the radio 
frequency, personal communications and cable should be moved from the Home Office 
to the Dol. He was fended off by the Home Office Secretary, Mr William Whitelaw,”^® 
but his second attempt was more successful. He gained responsibility for regulation of 
the radio frequency.”^ ^ Mr Baker also moved in on the territory of the Department of 
Education and Science (DES). He wished to see more technical and vocational training 
in schools, but was 'hamstrung by the slowness and reluctance of the DES to take any 
initiatives on technological e d u c a t i o n ' .  He turned to Mr David Young, Head of the 
Manpower Services Commission, who agreed to help finance a £100 million 
programme for technical and vocational training in schools.
In November 1981, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology attacked the inadequacy of the machinery for science and technology 
policy-making in Government .The Lords fell short of criticizing Mrs Thatcher 
directly, but their message was clear: 'The Prime Minister is her own Minister for 
Science and Technology and even though it is questionable whether a Prime Minister 
has the time to perform this function in the way a less preoccupied Minister might, 
nevertheless the role has been taken on.'"^ "* The Lords concluded that R&D policy 
resulted from different Ministers protecting their own interests and budgets and that 
policy was consequently incoherent. Stronger centralized coordination and 
responsibility for R&D were necessary.
The Lords recommended that the Chief Scientist be promoted from Deputy 
Secretary to Second Permanent Secretary rank and be moved from the CPRS to the 
Cabinet, thus reporting to the Cabinet Secretary and having a direct line to the Prime 
Minister. They called for the creation of a Cabinet level Council on Science and 
Technology to assess the strategies of all departments's R&D activities. Stronger 
machinery for interdepartmental coordination was also deemed necessary. Government
Testimony of Sir Peter Carey (Permanent Secretary, Department of lndustr>0, House of Lords, op. 
cit., in note 47, p. 33.
Sunday Times, 15 November 1981.
This was a significant change given developments in the UK telecommunications market that were 
to follow the 1981 Telecommunications Act and privatization of British Telecom.
Baker, op. cit., in note 18, p. 62.
House of Lords, op. cit., in note 47.
House of Lords, op. cit., in note 47, p. 30.
62
needed to prepare an annual report on science and technology in the UK and produce 
an annual review of publicly funded research. Finally, the Lords called for a Minister of 
Science (not Ministry of Science) to be appointed at Cabinet level.
The Government's response was m i x e d . I t  would not create a post of 
Minister of Science. Mrs Thatcher kept full responsibility for that portfolio. 
Government would not create a Cabinet Council on Science and Technology. Instead, 
the Advisory Board for the Research Councils would be empowered to coordinate 
basic and applied research, to consider the relevance of other countries R&D 
programmes and to assess UK international collaborative activities. Government would 
produce annual reviews of Government funded research and a new Cabinet committee 
comprised of departmental Chief Scientists and chaired by the Chief Scientist was 
created. The rank and location of the Chief Scientist would remain the same.
As regards international issues, the Chief Scientist had a 'general responsibility 
for co-ordination of international scientific and technological relationships' including 
representing the UK in the European Community's R&D budget negotiations.
However, the centre lacked intimate knowledge of international issues. It was 
dependent on information that filtered up from departments. As the Lords suggested:
Advice on S&T must be obtained internationally as well as at home. To some 
extent this is achieved on a hit-and-miss basis, relying on the international 
contacts of scientists (in or out of Government service), inter-Govemmental 
meetings and the peripatetic habits of the Chief Scientists in CPRS, Dol and so 
on.”^^
Given the lack of political direction from the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the 
only two bodies able to clarify goals given the fragmentation of R&D across 
Whitehall,' '^  ^ departments independently formulated their own priorities in the 
international arena. The information they passed up to Cabinet was tempered by their 
own priorities. Possessing biased information and lacking effective structures and 
procedures, the Government's machinery could not perform the control and 
coordination role expected of it.
Government and Science: Government Observations on the First Report o f  the House o f Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, Session 1981-82, Cm 8591, July 1982 (London: 
HMSO, 1982).
House of Lords, op. cit., in note 47, p. 13.
^^Tunstall and Palmer, op. cit., in note 1, p. 233.
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2.8 Conclusion
Before 1979, the Government machinery for science and technology policy-making 
was reformed numerous times. Centralization followed decentralization, but 
fragmentation and lack of coordination remained the hallmarks. Mrs Thatcher inherited 
a rather shambolic system.
When the Conservatives were elected, they did not have an explicit agenda for 
R&D. Instead, R&D was subsumed within a larger philosophy for stemming the 
economic decline of Britain. Among the planned reforms were tax cuts, public 
expenditure control, 'good housekeeping' and strong leadership from the centre. 
Although the philosophy would be pursued with near religious zeal, a harsh recession 
and a divided Cabinet allowed only tentative application during the early 1980s. In the 
Department of Industry, many of the reforms were abandoned and the much maligned 
legacies of previous Governments continued. A wide g u lf between the rhetoric o f 
M inisters and the reality o f their actions opened.
In the Department of Industry, Sir Keith Joseph was unable to establish 
control. Sir Keith let his suspicion of civil servants be known, but relied on them to 
formulate departmental spending priorities. A s Bureaucratic Politics would predict, 
civil sen'ants maneuvered to increase their budgets and responsibilities. Civil servants 
responsible for information technology were particularly successful in this. Despite 
larger budgets and responsibilities, civil servants were apprehensive. Their new budgets 
and programmes were fundamentally at odds with their Minister's economic and 
political philosophy and their Minister was skeptical of their abilities. Apprehension 
and demoralization were endemic.
In addition to the Dol, the SERC and MoD had budgets for industrial R&D. 
Priorities and actions of the three departments were not coordinated, however. There 
was no strong, central organization or Minister capable o f coordinating and 
controlling the R&D policies o f individual departments. Furthermore, the Prime 
Minister's reforms of the civil service had introduced such a degree of uncertainty and 
demoralization that the informal committee network of officials that traditionally 
assists with the coordination of policy across departments ceased to function 
effectively.
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\The Origins of Esprit and the Alvey Programme 
Chapter 3
This chapter explores the genesis of Britain's Alvey programme and of the European 
Community's Esprit programme. The Alvey Programme was designed to make the 
British IT industry competitive with its Japanese and American rivals. Esprit had a 
similar goal, but it was to make the IT industry of the entire European Community 
competitive. Both programmes funded pre-competitive, collaborative research between 
industiy and academia. Particular concern is given here to the relationship between the 
two programmes and to the interests of the actors involved in their creation.
3.1 Origins of Alvey
In the early 1980s, British IT firms were technologically and commercially weak 
relative to their American and Japanese counterparts. Britain's share of the world IT 
market paled in comparison. (See Table 3.1.) The British IT trade deficit, which had 
held steady during the 1970s, began to increase rapidly.^
Table 3.1: Share of World IT Market (%), 1981 
Country % Share
United Kingdom 4
France 6
West Germany 7
Japan 19
United States 47
Source: National Economic Development Coimcil, Information Technolog}' EDC, Crisis Facing UK 
Information Technology NEDC, 1984), p. 3.
Mr Kenneth Baker, having worked his way into a Government post as Minister 
of Information Technology at the Department of Industry (Dol), was responsible for 
improving this state of affairs. Mr Baker believed the best way to save British IT was 
to encourage industrial joint ventures between British and Japanese firms.^ In October 
1981, he sent a delegation to Tokyo to explore the possibilities. The delegation was 
financed by the Dol, was led by Mr Reay Atkinson (Under Secretary of Information
 ^Department of Industry, 'A Progranune for Advanced Information Technology: The Report of the 
Alvey Committee' (London: Department of Industry, 1982), p. 14.
2 Interview, Mr Reay Atkinson.
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Technology division) and included a Ministry of Defence (MoD) official and several 
academics.^
Officials from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry were 
not interested in Japanese/British industrial collaboration, but they were keen to bring 
several British academics into their ambitious collaborative research programme 
between Japanese Government, industry and academia in fifth generation (5G) 
computing/ British civil servants were shocked at the advanced state of Japanese IT 
and feared a brain drain if British academics were enticed to Japan.
The team of civil servants returned to London 'deeply shaken'^ and united in 
the conviction that Britain needed its own 5G computing initiative bringing 
Government, academics and industry together if Britain was ever to remain 
internationally competitive in IT. The team prepared a report for Mr Baker and Sir 
Keith Joseph, Secretary of State at the Dol, arguing that British firms were 
unattractive joint venture partners and would remain so until Britain put its own IT 
house in order. A large. Government funded programme in 5G computing in Britain 
was necessary. Mr Baker was receptive to the idea so civil servants responsible for IT  
in the D ol set out to design a large 5Gprogramme proposal that was packaged in a 
politically acceptable form. Bureaucratic Politics would predict that their programme 
would afford them large budgets and responsibilities.
It would not have been politically astute to recommend direct subsidies to 
industry. The Inmos and ICL debacles were causing a furor in Westminster. (See 
Chapter 2.) Subsidies for industrial research in IT seemed a more acceptable approach 
given the fact that Sir Keith had already agreed to allocate a small amount of Dol 
money for research.^
This prescription had to be massaged further to fit other political necessities. 
Generally speaking, research is undertaken in two environments and with two different 
objectives. Research that takes place in universities or research establishments and with 
no particular application in mind is called 'basic' research or 'pre-competitive' research.
 ^For a detailed discussion of the Tokyo mission, see Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owen, Alvey; 
Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative (London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989); 
and Leo Keliher, Policy-Making in Information Technology: A Decisional Analysis o f the A lvey 
Programme, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1987. Professors Brian 
Randell and Roger Needham were the two academics.
 ^The revolution from data processing and computation to knowledge processing is key to fifth 
generation computing. Fifth generation computers will offer direct communication betvveen people 
and machines tlu-ough pictures and speech, for example, and the system's behaviour will resemble 
human reasoning processes, such as association and inference.
 ^Interview, Mr Reay Atkinson.
 ^See Chapter 2. Interviews Mr Andrew Duguid, 27 November 1992; and Mr Oscar Roith, 19 
November 1992. See House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Science and 
Government, First Report, Session 1981-82, HL20-I, p. 26 and HL20-II, pp. 46-57.
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In contrast, research undertaken by industry with a particular commercial application in 
mind is called 'applied' research. Because Sir Keith and the Prime Minister were 
determined to 'get Government off the backs of industry', they felt that Government 
had no business funding industrial applied research. Sir Keith could, however, see 
some justification for funding basic research. As one civil servant suggested. There 
was no political or conceptual hang-up among Tory Ministers about this [basic 
research]. But when it came to applied research, the feeling was that industry should 
fund the work. Government funding of any research that industry should do was 
entirely an anathema'.^
Civil servants were worried that if Government supported basic research only, 
the Department of Education would be responsible for allocating the budgets rather 
than the Department of Industry. From the point of view of civil servants in the 
Department of Industry, this was unacceptable, so they devised a way to convince 
Ministers not to take this path. They argued that a severe imbalance between academic 
and industrial research would occur. This imbalance would harm the British economy. 
If, however. Government would support pre-competitive (basic) research in industry, 
the imbalance could be prevented. 'We developed an ingenious solution to convince 
non-interventionist Ministers that they had a role to play in solving this imbalance. The 
way we did this was to point out that there was an added value which could be got 
from Government funding of pre-competitive research in industry.'*
One obstacle remained. Ministers would never agree to fund research in 
industry, whether pre-competitive or applied, at a level of 100 per cent. Nor would 
Government agree to channel funds into a single company regardless of how the 
support was packaged. Civil servants found a way around these constraints: 
Government should fund collaborative, pre-competitive research in industry at a level 
of 50 per cent. In order for a company to receive Government support, it had to 
collaborate with another company or academic institution and it had to contribute 50 
per cent of the research costs. Thus, although Government funding for industry was an 
anathema, civil servants packaged it in a form that allowed Sir Keith to channel money 
to industry without overtly abrogating Conservative philosophy.
The strategy now had to be sold to all civil servants in the Department of 
Industry, not just those who stood to benefit from the proposed programme
Bureaucrats have a warm way of working with each other. There was no need
at this point to involve Ministers in it. We went away to get consensus among
 ^Interview, Mr Oscar Roith. Not only were direct subsidies to industry an anathema to the 
Government, but they were also prohibited under GATT regulations and European Community 
competition rules.
* Interview, Mr Oscar Roith.
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officiais and then we could present the finalized thing to the Minister. It was 
necessary to have consensus among the civil servants in order to give advice to 
the Minister so that he doesn't have to arbitrate between civil servants. IT had 
to be sold within the Dol.^
The Department was quickly convinced of the merits of the proposal. Now it 
had to be sold to Ministers. Again, it was not a difficult sell. As one civil servant put it:
Ministers wanted to cut down support for industry. They were cutting money, 
but they did not want to loose the vote, so they could see a point in banging 
companies' heads together and get them to collaborate in pre-competitive 
research. Fifty per cent funding developed into a viable political solution and IT 
became acceptable politically.
Mr Baker took the message to other Whitehall departments. The Science and 
Engineering Research Council (SERC) was quick to jump on board. Before the 
Tokyo mission, Mr Laurence Clarke (Technical Director at GEC-Marconi and 
Chairman of the SERC Information Engineering Committee) had urged the Dol to 
create a 5 0  computing programme. The Dol was finally responding.
Mr Baker took the message to Downing Street. He organized a seminar on 
Information Technology, attended by the Prime Minister, at which the findings of the 
Tokyo mission were discussed and the need for a British 5 0  programme m e n t i o n e d .  
The Prime Minister was not overly enthusiastic, but she did not dismiss the idea out of 
hand.^^ Recall that at this time, Mr Baker, the Chief Scientist and ACARD were 
pressuring for a coherent Government IT programme and IT was high on the political 
agenda following the ICL and Inmos disasters. (See Chapter 2.)
Interpreting her response as tacit approval for a project of some kind entailing 
cooperation between Government and industry, Mr Alastair Macdonald, who had 
replaced Mr Reay Atkinson as Under Secretary of the Dol's Information Technology 
division, met with SERC officials. They agreed the need to hold a 'town meeting* of 
industrialists to discuss the project. In preparation for the town meeting, officials from 
the Dol, SERC, MoD and British Telecom met and sketched out a £250 million 
collaborative, pre-competitive IT research programme, called ITS7, that would be
 ^Interview, Mr Oscar Roith.
Interview, Mr Oscar Roith.
This was the renamed Science Research Council.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 3, p. 21.
Interview, Mr Kenneth Baker.
Mr John Major, Under Secretary of the Dol's Electronics Applications division, Mr Brian Oakley, 
Secretary of the SERC and Dr David Worsnip, Secretary of the SERC Information Engineering 
Committee were present.
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jointly funded by the Del, SERC, MoD and industry. The programme was in line with 
the strategy hammered out earlier by civil servants in the Dol. IT87 would cover two 
technologies; Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems (IKBS) and Very Large Scale 
Integration (VLSI). (See Appendix C for a definition.) Civil servants believed 
industrialists would warmly embrace IT87 at the town meeting, which was to be held 
at the Westmoreland Hotel near the Lords cricket ground.
Mr Baker addressed the town meeting, whose attendees were mostly 
industrialists. He left the impression that his Government was eager to contribute 
financially to a programme if industry would contribute as well. Industrialists agreed 
that a programme of some type was necessary, but decided that IT87 was not 
appropriate: it had been designed without their input. Mr Baker decided to form a 
committee, reporting to him, that would design a more appropriate programme. On 6 
April 1982, the Dol announced that Mr John Alvey, Director of Technology at British 
Telecom, would lead a committee exploring possibilities for a national IT programme.
3.1a Alvev Committee Deliberations^^
Mr Alvey was surprised to find that the membership of his committee had already been 
decided by Mr Baker, Mr Alastair Macdonald (Under Secretary of the Dol's 
Information Technology division) and Mr John Major (Under Secretary of the Dol's 
Electronics Applications division). The committee included five civil servants, six 
industrialists and a lone academic who was added in hind-sight.^"  ^ It was assisted by a 
number of smaller working groups. The committee's composition reflected the greater 
influence of the Dol relative to the SERC and MoD and of industrialists relative to
For a detailed discussion of the Alvey Committee, see Keliher, op. cit., in note 3. 
Interview, Mr John Alvey.
Members included:
Mr J. Alvey, Senior Director Technology, British Telecom (British Telecom had not 
been privatized)
Mr I. Barron, Managing Director, Inmos
Mr C. Haley, Director Product Line Planning, ICL
Mr P. Hughes, CBE, Chairman, Logica Holdings
Professor R  Needham, Director, Cambridge University Computer Laboratoiy 
Mr C. Read, Director, Inter-Bank Research Organization 
Mr D. Roberts, Research Director, GEC
Dr K. Warren, Director Technology and Strategic Planning, Plessey
Mr B. Oakley, CBE, Secretary, SERC
Dr H. Davies, Deputy Controller Research Programmes, MoD
Mr A. MacDonald, Under Secretary, Information Technology Division, Dol
Mr J. Major, Under Secretary, Electronics Applications Division, Dol
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academics. As Mr Oakley (a member of the Committee) remarked, and Mr Alvey 
confirmed, there was a 'revolt against academics'.^*
Not only had Dol civil servants set the membership of Mr Alvey's committee, 
they also had in mind the design of the programme they wished to implement. It was 
very similar to the one they had called 'A Strategy for Information Technology', but 
with some of the interests of the SERC and MoD added. It was a programme designed 
to increase their budgets and responsibilities. The programme was to be jointly funded 
by Government and by industry, with each financing 50 per cent of the research costs, 
and it would support collaborative, pre-competitive research between industry and 
academia. Mr Baker had already signalled his approval of such a programme. 
Consequently, the Alvey Committee did not consider alternative programme formats.
The programme looked as follows. Recall from Chapter 2 that R&D 
responsibilities were fragmented across departments and not coordinated. The 
Government was coming under attack for the resulting policy incoherence. Civil 
servants in the Dol understood that any funding regime permitting such fragmentation 
had little chance of being approved. Consequently, the Dol recommended that the 
Government's contribution to the programme should come from the three departments 
with IT research budgets; the MoD, SERC and Dol.
In terms of size, Mr Alvey originally had in mind a programme worth £100 
million. D ol officials on the Committee envisioned a more ambitious programme and 
suggested that Mr A lvey triple the recommended budget?-^  The final proposal was for 
a five year (extendible to another five), £350 million programme. Three departments 
would contribute £200 million: Dol, £90 million; MoD, £60 million; SERC, £50 
million. Academic research would be 100 per cent funded by Government while 
industry would contribute £150 million, thus meeting half the costs of research. (See 
Table 3.2.) For industrial projects where 'very wide dissemination of the results is 
required', the Committee recommended Government funding of 90 per cent of costs. 
This was clearly an industrial support programme, but one less overt than a 100 per 
cent subsidy or direct assistance.
Each of the three funding departments had something to gain from the 
'Advanced Technology Programme' or 'Alvey Programme', as it was now called. 
Immediately prior to the Alvey discussions, the MoD was considering whether to fund 
a large research programme called Very High Performance Integrated Circuit 
(VHPIC). Because the MoD traditionally funded research at a level of 100 per cent of 
costs, the VHPIC would be a substantial drain on the department's budget. If the MoD
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 Februaiy 1992. 
Interview, Mr John Alvey.
Interviews, Mr John Alvey; and Mr Derek Roberts.
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joined forces with the Dol and SERC, it could still fund VLSI research, but because 
the Alvey Programme was to be funded at a 50 per cent level, the MoD could save half 
the costs it would have incurred had it approved VHPIC.
The SERC was in the unenviable position of losing a large percentage of its IT 
budget. The 1981 SERC 'Forward Look' (a process whereby funding priorities for the 
next five years are decided) showed a large decrease in SERC funds for IKBS 
research.^ 1 The SERC was keen to maintain a presence in IKBS research. The Alvey 
Programme provided the opportune way for the SERC to pursue its IKBS interests in 
a time of decreasing budgets.
The Dol was particularly keen on the Alvey Programme. Civil servants wanted 
to protect their budgets, but their spending had to be consistent with Conservative 
philosophy. The Alvey Programme was their prototype. Furthermore, D ol officials 
were searching for a new identity and responsibilities in this changing political 
environment. As Sir Robert Telford, who was to become chairman of the Alvey 
Steering Committee, suggested, civil servants in the Dol were looking for 'something 
to get hold of and do . . .That was important for the civil servants ' .The Alvey 
Programme afforded them this opportunity.
Table 3.2: Alvey Programme Funding Scheme 
Contributor Funding Level (^millions)
Government
Academic Research 100% 50
Industrial Research 50% 150
Industry 150
Total Programme Cost 350
The programme would be divided into sub-programmes covering the following 
technologies: Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) (often referred to as 
microelectronics or hardware). Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems (IKBS),
Software Engineering (SE) and Man-Machine Interface (MMI). (See Appendix C for 
definitions.) Projects that demonstrated the results of research and educate the user in 
the benefits of IT would be funded as would some educational programmes and a 
communications system for programme management.
Eric Arnold, A Review o f the Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems (IKBS) Programme, Report to 
the Information Engineering Directorate, Department of Trade and Industry (Brighton: Science Policy 
Research Unit, 1988), p. 21.
Interviews, Mr Kenneth Baker; and Dr David Worsnip.
23 Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
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Committee deliberations over how the money would be allocated across 
technology areas and how the programme would be managed were acrimonious. 
Representatives from the large hardware firms (GEC, Plessey and ICL), backed by the 
MoD, dominated representatives from small to medium sized firms active in software 
engineering and academics involved in MMI. As a result, the budget of VLSI dwarfed 
the other areas. (See Table 3.3.)
Table 3.3; Alvey Programme: Total Cost 
Activity Total (^millions)
Software Engineering (SE) 70
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) 90
Computer Aided Design for VLSI 25
Man-Machine Interface (MMI) 44
Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems (IKBS) 26
Communications 19
Large Scale Demonstrators 58
Education 20
Total 352
Source; Department of Industry, A Programme for Advanced In formation Technology: The Report o f  
the A lvey Committee L^ovidion-. Department of Industry, 1982), p. 11.
As regards management, the Alvey Committee was divided into two camps. 
Industrialists wanted the programme to be run by a single individual, a 'superman', who 
was free of Government interference. Civil servants, on the other hand, argued fora 
more complex implementing organization in which they had a large role. Mr Derek 
Roberts described the split;
Some members wanted a super individual. The DTI [Dol as it was then] would 
hand over all their money and that individual would have total right to manage 
it. John Major [a Dol civil servant] kept out of it for two discussions then said 
that this kind of arms length relationship was not acceptable to his Minister.
Mr Major recommended a compromise solution.^^ The programme should be 
administered by a small directorate, located in the Dol, with 15 members seconded 
from the Dol, MoD, SERC and industry (none from academia) plus support staff.
There would be one primary Director who was assisted by directors for the individual 
technology sub-programmes. The Committee envisioned that the civil servants from 
the Dol, MoD and SERC would 'provide a link with these departments'.^^
Interview, Mr Derek Roberts.
Interview, Mr Derek Roberts.
26 Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11.
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The Directorate was responsible to the Dol, but it would have a great degree 
of autonomy.
We are convinced that the prime requirement is for a dynamic management 
style with the management being allowed a large measure of discretion.... We 
propose that there should be a new Directorate with the authority and flexibility 
to expedite the programme and manage it effectively.^"^
It is essential that the Director has under his own control all the resources and 
expertise needed to run the programme, particularly his own contract, finance 
and patent specialists, and his own office support; and that he has the freedom 
to recruit these staff as necessary. To this extent the Directorate should be an 
autonomous unit within the Dol?'^
The director would be advised by a steering committee whose members would 
be chosen from the Dol's Electronics and Avionics Requirements Board (BARB). 
Advice would also come from numerous advisory committees answering to the 
director and the sub-programme directors. Despite the advisory structure, the director 
was to be given 'enough autonomy to get on and run the p r o g r a m m e ' . To facilitate 
this autonomy, the Directorate had sole responsibility for establishing programme 
strategy and awarding contracts. No scrutiny would come from the three funding 
departments. The Committee did not make recommendations on the project approval 
process, on criteria upon which contracts would be awarded or on regulations for 
intellectual property rights.
3.2 Origins of Esprit
While Mr Alvey's Committee designed a national IT R&D programme, civil servants in 
the European Commission were creating a European IT R&D programme. The 
Commission had been working since the early 1970s to create a Science and 
Technology Community,^® but the catalyst for Esprit was the work of the 12 person 
Forecasting and Assessment in the Field of Science and Technology (FAST) secretariat 
in Directorate General XII (Science, Research and Development) of the European 
Commission. The FAST secretariat was created by the Commission in 1978 to explore
Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 1, p. 51.
Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 1, p. 53. Emphasis added.
29 Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11.
For a history of 1970s Community efforts on the field of science and technology and their failures,
see Margaret Sharp and Claire Shearman, European Technology Collaboration (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1987); Margaret Sharp (ed.), Europe and the New Technologies (London: Francis 
Pinter, 1985); and Stephen Woolcock, 'Information Technology: the Challenge to Europe', Journal o f  
Common Market Studies (Wo\. 21, No. 4, June 1984), pp. 515-31.
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structural change in the EC. It had concluded that Community growth was dependent 
upon support for new, sunrise industries, particularly IT, rather than for declining 
industries such as steel. In 1980, FAST explored Community needs in 'long lead-time 
R&D' and recommended a European Strategic Programme for R&D in Information 
Technology (Esprit).^*
Viscount Etienne Davignon, the Commissioner for Industry, began to work 
with members of the FAST group dealing with IT issues. He renamed the group the 
Information Technology Task Force (ITTF), expanded its membership to include 
career bureaucrats and experts on temporary contract and physically moved it 
'temporarily' to his Directorate General (DGIII - Industry). At this point, the ITTF had 
a nebulous existence. It was independent of all Directorate Generals, but was 
responsible to Viscount Davignon.
In 1980, Viscount Davignon invited directors of the twelve largest European 
IT firms to a roundtable discussion on the state of European IT z^ These companies 
were subsequently referred to as the 'Roundtable 12' or simply the 'Twelve'. At the 
meeting. Viscount Davignon stressed the dismal state of European IT and suggested 
that the Twelve collaborate in manufacturing. The Twelve were concerned to increase 
their competitiveness, but were unwilling to sacrifice their individual manufacturing 
strengths for the larger good. Viscount Davignon subsequently readjusted his strategy, 
arguing for collaboration in an area that was not so commercially sensitive: pre- 
competitive research. The shift in emphasis served two functions. First, Community 
competition law and GATT regulations allowed subsidies to firms undertaking 
collaborative projects that were not 'close to the market' — ones of a 'pre-competitive' 
nature. Second, because pre-competitive research was removed from core business 
activity, firms were more willing to collaborate and perhaps allow the Commission to 
play a leading role.^^
Viscount Davignon asked the Twelve to design a strategy in collaborative pre- 
competitive research. In very close consultation with Commission officials in the ITTF, 
Roundtable representatives (now referred to as the Steering Committee) and over 100 
technical experts, primarily from industry, gathered in Brussels to design a programme.
Many of the British representatives were members of the Mr Alvey's 
Committee or its working groups. Thus, they were simultaneously involved in 
designing Esprit and the Alvey Programme. In the area of VLSI, for example, 'there
Forecasting and Assessment in Science and Technology, The FAST report of 1982, reprinted as 
Eurofiitiires: the Challenges o f Innovation (London: Butterworths, 1984).
The companies included: Bull, Thomson, CGE (France); Siemens, Nixdorf and AEG (Germany); 
GEC, ICL and Plessey (UK); Olivetti and STET (Italy); and Philips (Netherlands).
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, ESPRIT, 8th Report, Session 
1984-85 (London: HMSG, 1985), p. 169.
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was a one-to-one correspondence between Alvey and Esprit working parties'. "^* Mr 
Derek Roberts chaired the working party that designed the Alvey VLSI sub- 
programme. This working party was comprised of three senior industrialists from 
Plessey, Ferranti and GEC. Together with Mr Roberts, these men also sat on the Esprit 
VLSI working party. Mr Roberts suggested that in the Alvey VLSI working party,
we would have to keep reminding ourselves whether we were working on a 
UK joint venture or whether we were putting UK input into Esprit. I used the 
Esprit VLSI paper that was done with Thomson and Siemens and then we 
edited out the commercial concerns of theirs. The quickest way to generate the 
Alvey paper was to go through the Esprit paper and edit out the things that had 
to do with Siemens or Thomson.^^
And, 'while every attempt was made to appear otherwise, they [Alvey and Esprit 
VLSI] were identical programmes'.^^
A similar phenomenon, but in reverse order, happened in the Alvey software 
engineering sub-programme. Mr Philip Hughes of Logica chaired the Alvey software 
engineering working party and he also designed the Esprit software engineering sub- 
programme. Mr Oakley, a member of the Alvey Committee, suggested that, 'Philip 
Hughes set the Alvey and Esprit software programmes despite the fact that he was 
outnumbered by French and Germans in the Esprit working groups. He took the Alvey 
documents and used them in Brussels even as they were maturing them in Alvey'.^ "^
On 25 May 1982, the Commission submitted a discussion document to the 
Council entitled 'Towards a European Strategic Programme for Research and 
Development in Information Technologies'.^* The document called for a 11.5 million 
ECU (approximately £6.5 million) two year pilot programme, beginning in January 
1983, to precede the larger Esprit programme. The Commission envisioned that the 
Esprit programme would run from 1982-1992 and subsidize collaborative, pre- 
competitive research across the Community in five technical areas: advanced 
microelectronics, advanced computing, software technologies, office automation and 
integrated computer systems.
Esprit would help European IT become competitive by reversing the 
Community's dependence on US and Japanese imports, encouraging standards of
Interview, Mr Derek Roberts.
Interview, Mr Derek Roberts.
Interview, Mr Derek Roberts.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Commission of the European Communities, 'Towards a European Strategic Programme for 
Research and Development in Information Technologies', Com (82) 287 final (Brussels: Commission 
of the European Communities, 25 May 1982).
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European origin and reducing the inefficient and wasteful duplication of national 
research programmes. While the Commission argued that national programmes in IT 
were ineffective, it pledged that Esprit would not compete with or replace national 
programmes. 'Esprit will thus not be in competition with national programmes; it will, 
on the contrary, reinforce them and make them more effect ive' . In addition to 
Britain's Alvey Programme, the French and German governments were implementing 
national IT R&D programmes similar to Esprit. The Commission was aware that 
Member State governments would not allow their national programmes to be replaced 
by a European one.
The Commission's proposed management structure was remarkably similar to 
that of the Alvey Committee.
A programme of [this] nature...will be highly complex to prepare and 
execute... Programme management will have to be: very flexible to take 
account of the fact that the IT sector is subject to a rapid rate of change and 
very efficient to ensure the participation of many small companies active in the 
field, which must not be discouraged by bureaucratic procedures leading to 
high overheads.
For these reasons, the ITTF would implement the pilot phase. The ITTF would take 
advice from a Steering Committee, which was made up of the Roundtable companies, 
and five working groups. Lessons learned from implementation of the pilot phase 
would be incorporated into the implementation of the Esprit programme. Governments 
of member states would have little role to play in the implementation of the Esprit pilot 
phase.
Inevitably, the Council of Ministers haggled over the pilot phase's price tag.
Mrs Thatcher's crusade for a rebate of £1 billion from Britain's contribution to the 
Community budget was in full swing. By May 1982, when the Commission submitted 
its call for the Esprit pilot phase to the Council, relations between Britain and other 
members of the Community had reached their nadir.'*  ^ Mrs Thatcher was holding up 
agreement on agricultural prices for the 1982-83 Community budget and had linked 
this issue to the larger issue of budgetary reform. To force the Council's hand, the 
Commission published an advance call for Esprit pilot projects in the Official Journal 
of October 1982 (the report of the Alvey Committee was also published in October). 
The Council finally acquiesced and approved the pilot phase on 21 December 1982 at
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid, V. 19.
Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in tbe European Cowwunity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 150.
Agence Europe, 21 October 1982, p. 11.
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the requested funding level of 11.5 million ECU. In February 1983, the Commission 
published its formal call for proposals, drawing over 200 proposals from 600 
companies, academic and research establishments. The Commission quickly allocated 
all 11.5 million ECU to 38 projects. Not surprisingly, about 70 per cent of the funds 
went to the 12 Roundtable companies whose officials had helped design the pilot 
phase.
3.3 Esprit in the Alvey Committee
While the Esprit pilot phase proposal awaited Council approval, the Alvey Committee 
prepared its final report. Civil servants from the Dol had the important task of writing 
the report. Although short on detail, the report was a masterpiece of political acumen 
and it revealed the competition civil servants felt toward the Commission and toward 
Esprit.
In the numerous meetings of the Alvey Committee, discussion of Esprit was 
kept to a minimum despite the fact that the two programmes were proposing to fund 
virtually identical areas of research and despite the fact that the companies involved in 
the Alvey discussions were simultaneously involved in Esprit discussions. When asked 
why discussion of Esprit was minimal, Professor Needham suggested that. Esprit was 
regarded as interesting, but not important. It was pretty clear...what we had gone there 
to do. Knowing what we were there to do, it was clear that the Community was doing 
something else'.'*^  Mr Alvey answered that discussion of Esprit would have distracted 
the Committee from its main purpose.'*'* He admitted that the Committee deliberations 
were 'extremely insular' and that 'We were like ostriches putting our heads in the sand.'
Another explanation of the insularity of the Alvey Committee deliberations 
exists. It lies in competition between civil servants in the D TI and Brussels. 
Industrialists active on the Alvey Committee participated in Esprit deliberations, but 
Viscount Davignon had excluded civil servants from the Member States from the 
important discussions. He felt that if civil servants were included, industry would be 
less enthusiastic and discussions would get bogged down in a bureaucratic morass. 
Civil servants on the Alvey Committee responded by excluding members of the ITTF 
from their deliberations and Esprit from consideration. As Mr Oakley suggested. We 
deliberately kept the Commission out of the planning of Alvey. It was childish actually.
Interview, Professor Roger Needham.
'*'* Interview, Sir John Alvey.
Interview, Mr Virgilio Pasquali.
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We [civil servants] knew that we wanted to create a UK programme and we 
purposively played down Europe'/^ Mr Derek Roberts agreed;
The UK civil servants, and I am sure that they will deny this now, at the time 
were anti-Esprit because they were not involved in the Esprit negotiations. 
Esprit was driven by industry through the industrial Roundtable of which I was 
a member. There was initial antagonism in the DTI. They were not happy 
because they kept being left out. They felt that it was effectively UK money 
being spent on UK firms but being filtered through Brussels. And they were not 
in a position to influence how it was spent.
In a less straight forward fashion, Mr Macdonald alluded to the antagonism 
between the Dol and the Commission: 'There was skepticism as to whether the 
Commission could get its act together. Before Esprit began working, everyone here 
was thoroughly skeptical of whether bureaucrats in Brussels could manage a 
collaborative effort of this size. We wondered if they were biting off more than they 
could chew.'*^ * Another official from the DTI, Dr Margaret Sharp, who is now an 
expert on Community IT programmes, confirmed that general attitude in the DTI 
toward Esprit was that hopefully Esprit 'would fall flat on its face'."*^
Civil servants in the Dol perceived Esprit as a threat to their Alvey Programme. 
As Mr Macdonald put it, 'There was definitely competition between the two. There 
were two cooking pots on the stove at once and the gas could have been turned off on 
either one or both of them'.^° Mr Atkinson concurred: 'In the early days, Alvey would 
be Alvey and the European counterpart would be almost rivals. ..What we were out to 
do, pure and simple, was to put the UK IT industry in a position where we could 
compete effectively in developments in IT. Europe just did not enter into it.'^ ^
Both programmes would be presented for Ministerial approval at nearly the 
same time, thus increasing the likelihood that Ministers would realize the potential for 
duplication of effort and waste of public money. The two programmes were strikingly 
similar. Esprit was wider in scope than Alvey, but both programmes focused on VLSI, 
artificial intelligence (called IKBS in Alvey and Advanced Information Processing in 
Esprit) and software engineering. Both were designed by and primarily for large firms 
such as GEC, Plessey and ICL, making it likely that one research project could be
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Mr Derek Roberts.
Interview, Mr Alastair MacDonald, 21 January 1992. 
Interview, Dr Margaret Sharp.
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 21 January 1992. 
Interview, Mr Reay Atkinson.
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supported through two different sources, thus undermining Alvey's 50 per cent funding 
formula and giving British industry a windfall of Government support.
If Ministers dismissed the potential for duplication, certainly they would see 
that the Alvey Programme and Esprit were working at cross-purposes. Alvey was 
designed to protect British firms from foreign competition — including European 
companies with whom British firms would be collaborating in Esprit. Moreover, Dol 
officials feared that Mrs Thatcher would use Alvey as a test-case of her resolve. She 
had been forced into a number of embarrassing U-tums and by rejecting Alvey and 
approving Esprit, she could have her cake and eat it. She could signal her resolve to 
roll back the frontiers of the state yet at the same time assist British IT on the sly 
through funds from EC coffers. From the civil servants' point o f view, Esprit was 
clearly a threat to their A lvey Programme.
Dol officials who wrote the Alvey Committee report walked a fine line. They 
had designed an essentially interventionist programme that would increase their 
budgets and responsibilities. In order for it to be approved, they had to play down the 
interventionist nature of the Programme while simultaneously emphasizing elements to 
which Ministers might be more sympathetic. They presented Alvey as necessary for 
Britain's economic revival. Esprit, on the other hand, was portrayed as a threat to the 
British economy and as evidence of the Commission's relentless advance into areas of 
national competence. (The latter could always be expected to incense the Prime 
Minister.)
The report suggested;
The US, Japan and countries in Europe are now all mounting programmes 
comparable to the one we propose for the UK. These rival programmes present 
a serious challenge to the UK, which we must face. The EEC Esprit 
programme is complementary to the programme we p r o p o s e .
A collaborative UK programme...would assist in feeding in the UK input to any 
EEC programme, not least by widening the range of potential UK participants 
to include the small and medium sized businesses which would otherwise tend 
to be excluded. Whatever the potential value of Esprit, we are clear that it is 
not a substitute for a UK programme; rather a UK programme would help us 
participate more effectively in any European one.^^
Mr Macdonald suggested that these were 'nice ways of saying that we will go 
on plowing our own f u r r o w . M r  Oakley also remarked on the references:
Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 1, p. II. 
Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 1, p. 20. 
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 21 January 1992.
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We [civil servants] knew that we wanted to create a UK programme and we 
purposively played down Europe even though firms were playing it both ways. 
We put a pious reference about keeping a balance between the two, but we 
essentially planned Alvey as if Esprit did not exist. Culturally, Alvey was more 
important than Esprit.
Despite the opportunity for duplication of effort, the Alvey Committee report 
did not establish any means by which the two programmes could be coordinated. In 
fact, the Alvey Committee did not consider the i s s u e . M r  Derek Roberts recalled:
When people were formulating programmes for Alvey and Esprit, they [civil 
servants] were having to play one off against another. Sensible cross- 
referencing was not possible. It was unsatisfactory that Esprit and Alvey were 
in the formative stage together. It would have been better if Alvey came first 
and Esprit later, or vice-versa. At the civil service level, that restricted cross- 
referencing.^'^
In their attempt to present their A lvey Programme in a favourable light, civil 
servants inadvertently established future policy in Esprit in a single sentence: The 
EEC Esprit programme is complementary to the programme we propose. The 
Alvey Programme was the primary, fixed policy object: Esprit was secondary and 
malleable. (More on this in Chapters 6 and 7.)
3.4 Alvey in Cabinet
The Alvey Committee presented its report to Mr Baker in September 1982. It was now 
up to him to sell an interventionist programme to a Prime Minister who was suspicious 
of his spending propensities. Mr Patrick Jenkin, who had replaced Sir Keith as 
Secretary of State at the Dol, suggested that 'in the Cabinet Ofifice, his [Baker's] name 
was mud'.^^ Nevertheless, Mr Baker relished the opportunity. He had fashioned his 
own Ministerial post and gained much publicity through IT82, but Alvey would be 
tangible proof of his ability and a step up the ladder to higher office.
Because Mr Baker was a junior Minister, he did not have a seat in Cabinet, so 
he had to exert pressure from other directions. He convinced the Parliamentary
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 February 1992.
Interviews, Sir John Alvey; Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992; Mr Alastair MacDonald, 21 January 
1992 and 28 October 1992; and Mr Roger Needham.
Interview, Mr Derek Roberts.
Department of Industry, op. cit., in note 1, p. II.
Interview, Lord Patrick Jenkin.
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Information Technology Committee to lobby on the Programme's behalf He also 
worked through the Information Technology Advisory Panel (ITAP), from which Mrs 
Thatcher took advice on IT matters. Because Mr Baker was ITAP's chairman, it was a 
foregone conclusion that ITAP would press Mrs Thatcher to approve the Alvey 
Programme.^^
Mr Baker influenced high level civil servants from other Departments through 
Mr Roy Croft, Deputy Secretary in the Dol responsible for all information technology 
issues. Mr Croft chaired the interdepartmental committee that coordinated IT policy 
across Government. Although Mr Croft was originally skeptical of Alvey, he was won 
over and, with the support of his Permanent Secretary, Sir Peter Carey, he pressured 
other senior Whitehall officials to support the Alvey Programme to their M i n i s t e r s . ® ^
Mr Baker's most important asset was his Secretary of State, Mr Patrick Jenkin, 
one of the 'wets'. Upon taking office, Mr Jenkin produced a short paper, entitled 
Strategic Aims, calling on Dol officials to reformulate their aims and objectives (yet 
a g a i n ) . T h e  result was another repackaging of Government support rather than an 
overhaul because, as Middlemas suggests, 'Jenkin made it discreetly clear that he 
believed industrial markets could not work adequately without selective 
intervention'.^"* The Dol's new strategy was a mix of new-style intervention and old 
style support. Funds were no longer to be given for regional assistance, to the National 
Enterprise Board or directly to individual firms, but instead were channelled to high 
technology research and development, biotechnology and microelectronics, 
telecommunications, fibre optics and robotics.^^ Innovation, efficiency and enterprise 
were the politically correct words used to describe the 'industrial policy but without a 
name [that] broke out of its confines and began a mutation of its own'^^ under Mr 
Jenkin. Mr Jenkin became a strong advocate of the Alvey Programme because it 
exemplified his industrial strategy.
Mr Jenkin included the Alvey Programme in the industrial strategy budget that 
he took into his first round of public expenditure negotiations. Mr Geoffrey Howe, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, approved funding for Mr Jenkin's industrial strategy, but
Interview, Sir Michael Marshall.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 3, p. 53.
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Department of Trade and Industry, Strategic Aims Department of Trade and Industry,
1983).
Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition & tbe State, Volume 3 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991), p. 
355.
For figures on industrial support programmes, see M. Sharp and G. Shepherd, Managing Change in 
British Industry {Ge,ne\2k'. International Labour Office, 1987). Funding was charmelled to high tech 
areas through the Department's 'Support For Innovation' scheme.
Middlemas, op. cit., in note 64, p. 355.
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recommended that Alvey be negotiated at a later date.^^ Mr Howe said that he 'did not 
want to engage in fisticuffs now, but this [Alvey] was basically a dead duck'A* The 
Treasury and Number 10 apparently saw Alvey as a 'huge white elephant', another 
Concorde, but Mr Jenkin had the backing of several Ministers who had lost faith in the 
Prime Minister's painful monetarist prescriptions for economic recovery. Among them 
were Mr Michael Heseltine (Welsh Department), Mr Keith Joseph (Department of 
Education), Mr Geoffrey Pattie (Ministry of Defence) and, surprisingly, Mr Norman 
Tebbit (Department of Employment).^^ With this backing, Mr Jenkin kept pressure on 
the Treasury and convinced Mr Howe to place Alvey as a line item on the public 
expenditure survey that would go to Mrs Thatcher. Mr Howe acquiesced.
Mrs Thatcher received the public expenditure report without commenting on 
Alvey and Mr Jenkin assumed that her silence meant approval. Soon after, Mr Howe, 
Mr Nigel Lawson (Department of Energy) and Mr Robin Nicholson (who had replaced 
Professor Ashworth as the Chief Scientific Advisor) summoned Mr Jenkin to Number 
10 to put his case for Alvey before the Prime Minister at a meeting of the Cabinet 
Committee on Information Technology. Mr Jenkin's officials at the Dol informed him 
that Mr Howe and Mr Lawson were 'briefed to support Alvey'. Mr Jenkin went into 
the meeting 'brimming with confidence'. The outcome:
I was taken apart. Thatcher lost her wool. She was in full flight. It was an hour 
of vintage Thatcher tirade. She thought I had taken a woman for granted when 
I actually thought she was sympathetic to Alvey. I had no idea what I was in 
for. I was deeply shaken and had a bloody nose. My officials had failed to pick 
up the vibes from the Treasury and from Nicholson.
Where were Mr Howe and Mr Lawson? They had their heads under the table. Lawson 
later said that he had never seen a group of more cowardly Ministers.
Mr Jenkin wrote a letter to Mrs Thatcher apologizing for his over-confidence 
and urging her to reconsider Alvey, arguing that it was the 'single most important 
industrial initiative she could undertake. It was absolutely crucial'. Jenkin realized Mrs 
Thatcher had lost faith in her Ministers on economic issues, so he called Lord Arnold 
Weinstock (Chairman of GEC) and asked him to convince her that industry would 
support Alvey and pay its share. Lord Weinstock confirmed industry's commitment and 
two weeks later the Prime Minister approved the Alvey Programme.
The following account is based on interviews with Lord Patrick Jenkin; and Mr Kenneth Baker. 
Interview, Lord Patrick Jenkin.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 3, p. 62. Interviews, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992; and Lord 
Patrick Jenkin.
Interview, Lord Patrick Jenkin.
Interview, Lord Patrick Jenkin.
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Mr Jenkin and Mr Baker reported that there was no mention of Esprit in 
Cabinet discussions of Alvey, despite the fact Esprit's pilot phase was being negotiated 
(and eventually approved) at that time in the Council of Research Ministers and despite 
the fact that the Commission was preparing to launch its proposal for the first phase of 
Esprit. (The Commission was to await the results of an official review of the Esprit 
pilot phase before designing Esprit I, but it did not. In fact, the pilot phase contracts 
had just been awarded when, on 25 May 1983, the Commission submitted its formal 
proposal for the first phase of Esprit to the Council .
The omission was due to the skillful drafting of the Alvey Committee report 
and to the work of Mr Baker. Mr Baker represented Britain in the Council of Research 
Ministers where Esprit's pilot phase was being negotiated. Mr Baker admitted that he 
'was always extremely suspicious' of Esprit.^^ While leery of Esprit, he was intimately 
associated with the Alvey Programme. As Mr Oakley suggested, 'Baker's heart was in 
the UK and all the PR that went with it. He had a personal stake in Alvey, being 
Minister of Information Technology'." "^* During an interview, Mr Baker claimed that he 
had seen no significant relationship between the two programmes and he therefore 
tried to keep them separate in the mind of his Minister. He was successful: Mr Jenkin 
reported that he had 'absolutely nothing to do with Esprit'."^^
After nearly eight months of deliberation Mr Jenkin announced approval of the 
Alvey Programme in the Commons on 28 April 1983: 'This is the first time in our 
history that we shall be embarking on a collaborative research project on anything like 
this s c a l e . T h e  programme announced was significantly different than that proposed 
by the Alvey Committee, however. Mrs Thatcher's touch was evident.
First, the Alvey Directorate would be much smaller than recommended. Mr 
Oakley, Secretary of the SERC, would be head of the Alvey Directorate, which would 
be comprised of five civil servants only. The Directorate would be in the Dol chain of 
command. Four industrialists would be brought into the Directorate to lead the four 
technical sub-programmes.
Second, Mrs Thatcher dictated that the Alvey Steering Committee was to be 
comprised of three or four industrialists from the large IT firms rather than from the 
Dol's Electronics and Avionics Requirements Board (EARB) as had been suggested by
Commission of the European Communities. 'Proposal for a Council Decision Adopting the First 
European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technologies (Esprit)'. 
Com (83) 258 final (Brussels: OfficialJoumal o f tbe European Communities, C 321, 26 November
1983).
Interview, Mr Kenneth Baker.
Interview, Brian Oakley, 25 February 1992.
Interview, Lord Patrick Jenkin.
Patrick Jenkin, House of Commons debate, 28 April 1983, HansardÇsloX. 41, col. 1007).
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the Alvey Committee. Sir Robert Telford, Chairman of the EARB, was to chair the 
Steering Committee. The Prime Minister was intent on giving the impression that 
Alvey was an industrial programme rather than a Government one. The repercussions 
these changes would have on the operation of the Alvey Directorate, its relationship 
with Whitehall departments and British policy in Esprit are discussed in the next 
Chapter.
Third, Mrs Thatcher ruled that all projects would receive 50 per cent 
Government funding. There were to be no projects with 'wide dissemination' 
warranting 90 per cent Government funding. This ruling was likely to have three 
effects. It would discourage the participation of small to medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) because many SMEs were unable to meet the 50 per cent contribution. 
Further, the ability of civil servants to control the programme might be reduced. The 
large firms were not likely to pass decision-making authority to Government when they 
were footing half of the bill. Finally, the Alvey Directorate was now flush with funds. 
The Alvey Committee recommended a Government contribution of £250 that would 
fund some projects at 50 per cent, others at 90 per cent. While Mrs Thatcher's blanket 
50 per cent funding rule increased the industrial contribution, she did not decrease the 
total Government contribution. Thus, the Alvey Directorate had more money than it 
expected. Remarking on how this came about, Mr Oakley wrote;
It is inconceivable that the officials in the DTI could not have recognized that 
an opportunity for reducing the total expenditure was being passed over. 
Whether Kenneth Baker and the Cabinet recognized it, I cannot say. My guess 
is that the change came in the middle of a hard-fought Cabinet Committee 
meeting, when the point would have been overlooked.
Fourth, no new money was allocated to Alvey. The three funding Departments 
would have to find money for Alvey from their existing budgets.
3.5 Conclusion
The Alvey Programme was approved, but with the grudging acceptance of the Prime 
Minister. Her hand was forced by economic circumstances, a vocal Minister and a 
powerful lobby of civil servants .As  Mr Reay Atkinson concluded:
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 3, p. 61.
Keliher, op. cit., in note 3, argues that Alvey was the product primarily of pressure exerted on the 
Prime Minister from a tight-knit and well established industrial policy community in information 
technology.
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Alvey was an accident. I think that the catalytic things were: Mrs Thatcher, 
until the Falklands helped her out, feeling that she was bashing things, putting 
nothing constructive in their place, getting Government out of things and not 
into; Baker coming in, wanting to make his way, enthusiastic, and I think that 
he exploited an opportunity, a window, at the time; and we [civil servants] put 
forth powerful arguments. I think the Tory philosophy was totally against the 
Alvey type approach.^^
The A lvey Programme was designed by civil servants at a time when 
M inisterial control was lacking and when political objectives were contested within 
Cabinet and abrogated in practice. The shape o f the Programme reveals their desire to 
increase (or protect) their budgets and responsibilities.
The Esprit programme was also a bureaucratic initiative designed to serve two 
purposes. First, it would help reverse the economic decline of the Community. Second, 
it would provide a channel through which the European Commission could extend its 
areas of responsibility.
The similarity between the Alvey Programme and Esprit was striking. Many 
British industrialists who designed Alvey helped create Esprit; both programmes 
supported pre-competitive research between firms and research institutions in similar 
technical areas; their implementation structures were alike; and the same British firms 
and academic institutions were likely to participate in both. Given the overlap in 
programme content and in potential participants. Esprit was certain to affect Alvey in 
some manner. The most likely effect was duplication of effort and inefficient allocation 
of funds. The Committee that designed the Alvey Programme acknowledged a 
relationship, but failed adjust Alvey's design accordingly. Instead, civil servants erected 
an artificial divide between Alvey and Esprit. They had a vested interest in the A lvey 
Programme because it afforded them large budgets and responsibilities. They would 
not allow Esprit to threaten those interests. This separation was condoned by Mr 
Baker and it established future British policy in Esprit
Interview, Mr Reay Atkinson.
85
Implementation of the Alvey Programme 
Chapter 4
The Alvey Directorate was a bureaucratic anomaly. It transgressed the traditional 
demarcation lines according to which IT responsibilities were distributed between the 
SERC, MoD and Dol. Because industrial secondees directed the technical sub- 
programmes, the Directorate also broke the traditional divide between Government 
and the private sector. This chapter explores the structure and decision-making 
procedures of the Directorate from April 1983 through 1985. The relationship between 
the Alvey Directorate and civil servants from its three funding Departments is 
examined. Lastly, the effects of Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms on the 
Alvey Directorate are explored.
4.1 In the Department of Trade and Industry
Following the June 1983 general election, the Department of Industry and the 
Department of Trade were merged into a single mammoth department: the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI).‘ The merger forced a marriage of civil servants with 
different historical traditions and departmental ethos. The Board of Trade was imbued 
with the liberal, free trade spirit of its founders who despaired of Government 
intervention in industry. The Department of Industry, in contrast, reflected the 
interventionist tide of political thinking and had a long history of administering direct 
Government support to industry. The two traditions were not easily reconciled. Proof 
of the difficulty is the fact that the department was divided into Trade and Industry 
branches and had two Permanent Secretaries, one for Trade and one for Industry, until 
March 1985. As Hennessy quips, The DTI is, perhaps, the most schizophrenic of all 
departments'.^
Internecine conflict soon broke out in the DTI. While the Trade division was 
poised against the Industry division, civil servants within the Industry branch itse lf 
competed for budgets and responsibilities. Mr David Wiseman, a civil servant in the 
Research Technology Policy division of the DTI, recalled the atmosphere.
T o r a brief history of the DTI, see Brian W. Hogwood, The Rise and Fall and Rise of the 
Department of Trade and Industry' in Colin Campbell and B. Guy Peters (eds.). Organizing 
Governance, Governing Organizations (Pittsburgh, PN: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988); and 
Susan Foreman, Shoes and Ships and Sealing Wax (London: HMSO, 1986). Samuel Brittan, Times, 
16 April 1974, p. 2, criticized the 'reorganization complex' as a preference for making difficult 
choices in economic policy.
 ^Peter Hennessy, (London: Fontana Press, 1990), p. 435.
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The DTI was split in the middle between free traders and interventionists. You 
can understand that someone had carved out an industry as his. He was used to 
being wined and dined by industry and he knew them all by their Christian 
names. He was going to make certain that no one trampled on his patch. That 
was the language of the day.^
Competition was exacerbated by the weakness of successive Secretaries of 
State. Mr Cecil Parkinson was the DTI's first, but short-tenured, Secretary of State. He 
was followed in October 1983 by Mr Norman Tebbit. Mr Leon Brittan took over in 
September 1985, but resigned eight months later following the Westland affair. None 
o f these men was able to establish control over the Department or provide it with 
consistent objectives. Hennessy again captures the atmosphere in the Department: 'All 
this was no way to treat the ministry presiding over the deepest-seated of all the 
country's problems'."*
The absence of Ministerial control at the DTI was made worse by the lack of 
strong leadership from the centre. The Financial Times summarized these years:
Legislation became bogged down in Parliament, unemployment continued to 
rise, senior Ministers were sniped at from the cover of anonymous sources in 
No 10, and even the Tory press said that Mrs Thatcher had run out of puff. 
Those years of banana skins culminated in the Westland affair, which led to the 
resignation of two members of the Cabinet while the machinery of Government 
very nearly fell apart.^
The Alvey Directorate was embroiled in and contributed to the competition 
that enveloped the DTI Alvey was fianded at the expense of other industry 
programmes, its responsibilities trespassed onto the responsibilities of other civil 
servants, its Directorate broke down both traditional Departmental barriers and the 
public/private divide and its Directors unabashedly flaunted Whitehall operating 
procedures.^
 ^Interview, Mr David Wiseman.
"* Hennessy, op. cit., in note 2, p. 434.
 ^Financial Times, 9 April 1987, p. 15.
 ^The following account of the operations of the Alvey Directorate is concerned primarily with the 
relationships between the Alvey Directorate and other Whitehall organizations. For a more factual 
and detailed account of the Alvey Directorate, see Leo Keliher, Policy-Making in Information 
Technology: a Decisional Analysis o f the Alvey Programme, PhD thesis, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1987.
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4.2 Organizational Considerations
The Alvey Committee had envisioned a Director from industry and determined that a 
rank of Deputy Secretary level was necessary to entice an industrialist into Whitehall. 
(See civil service ranks in Table 4.1.) No industrialist was willing to take the job, but 
industrialists on the Alvey Committee would not allow an academic to take the 
position. The only remaining option was for a civil servant to take up the post.
Mr John Major volunteered himself for the job.^ (Bureaucratic Politics expects 
to see civil servants working for prom otions.)l{t had been very active on the Alvey 
Committee, but was not awarded the position. It went to another member of the Alvey 
Committee, Mr Brian Oakley. Mr Oakley was Secretary of the SERC and had worked 
at both the MoD and Dol during his career. Mr Oakley was promoted from Under 
Secretary to Deputy Secretary rank and Mr Major remained Under Secretary in charge 
of the DTI's Electronic Applications Division.
The decision to appoint Mr Oakley as a Deputy Secretary abrogated the 
existing hierarchical and functional organization of IT in the DTI. The DTI was 
organized in the following manner. Mr Roy Croft was Deputy Secretary in charge of 
all IT issues, which were allocated across five divisions; Aircraft, Post and 
Telecommunications, Nationalized Industries, Electronic Applications and Information 
Technology. Information Technology division was led by Mr Alastair Macdonald, of 
Under Secretary rank, and Electronic Applications division was the responsibility of 
Mr Major, also an Under Secretary. Both men reported to Mr Croft who reported to 
the Permanent Secretary of the Industry branch of the DTI.
Because the technical content of the Alvey Programme overlapped 
programmes sponsored by the Information Technology and Electronic Applications 
divisions, it would have been reasonable to appoint Mr Oakley at Under Secretary rank 
and have him report to Mr Croft, as Mr Major and Mr Macdonald did, in order to 
ensure coordination and coherence across IT programmes. Instead, Mr Oakley was 
given a Deputy Secretary rank and he reported directly to the Permanent Secretary and 
the Minister for Information Technology, thus bypassing Mr Croft, Mr Macdonald and 
Mr Major. Within several months of Mr Oakley’s appointment, the Treasury 
department responsible for overseeing senior grades in the civil service objected to his 
rank. Mr Baker intervened on Mr Oakley's behalf, arguing that it was too late to 
reverse the decision. Mr Oakley kept the rank of Deputy Secretary.*
 ^Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
* Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owen, Alvey: Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative (London; 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989), p. 66.
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Table 4.1: Civil Service Rankings
Rank Title
G1 Permanent Secretary
G2 Deputy Secretary
G3 Under Secretary
G4 Executive Directing
Bands
G5 Assistant Secretary
G6 Senior Principal
G7 Principal
Mr Oakley's appointment raised eyebrows among civil servants in the DTI. 
Aside from the fact that he was an 'SERC man', he was known to have a rebellious 
streak and an antipathy toward bureaucratic niceties, rules and regulations. As Sir 
Robert Telford suggested, 'Brian Oakley was a senior member of the civil servant's 
club, but he did not act as a civil servant when it came to administrative rules'.^
The manner in which Mr Oakley appointed his staff exacerbated the concern 
and suspicion surrounding his own appointment. The Alvey Directorate was to be 
staffed with industrial secondees and with civil servants from the three funding 
Departments. Rather than selecting staff in a transparent manner, perhaps involving an 
application process, Mr Oakley used 'insider dealing' instead. This is not surprising 
given the speed with which he was expected to get his Directorate up and running, but 
his lack of sensitivity to procedure generated resentment among DTI officials. At this 
point, competition for jobs in the newly amalgamated DTI was at a frenzy. Civil 
servants from the former Dol were having their budgets cut and their jobs dismantled 
as the DTI was brought in line with a new trade orientation.
The most sensitive post to fill was Director of Administration, the person 
responsible for liaison between the Directorate and other Whitehall departments. This 
person had to be a 'Whitehall warrior', someone who knew 'not just of how to work 
under Ministers but how to work with the mandarins. It requires an intimate 
knowledge o f where the levers of power actually reside'. The Permanent Secretary of 
the Industry division. Sir Brian Hayes, recommended Dr Timothy Walker. Dr Walker 
had been identified as a high flier and was returning to the DTI after a year at the 
London Business School. Mr Oakley accepted Dr Walker without considering any 
other candidates.
 ^Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit, in note 8, p. 69.
 ^^  Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
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Mr Oakley filled the other civil service positions in a similar manner. Given the 
MoD's involvement in VLSI research, the Director of the VLSI sub-programme had to 
be from the MoD. Dr William Fawcett, an expert on VLSI at the MoD's Royal Signals 
Radar Establishment, was recommended. Mr Oakley called Dr Fawcett in for a Very 
informal interview' and gave him the job on the spot.^^ Dr Fawcett was the only person 
interviewed.^^
The nCBS sub-programme was to be led by a civil servant from the SERC. Mr 
Oakley filled the post with Dr David Thomas, who he had worked closely with in the 
SERC. Dr Thomas was a kindred spirit. He was known to have little sympathy for civil 
service procedure or bureaucratic red-tape. Dr Thomas was appointed despite his lack 
of experience in IKBS or contacts in industry.
Industrial secondees were to complement the civil service representation. Mr 
Laurence Clarke, of GEC and Chairman of the SERC's Information Engineering 
Committee, was appointed Deputy Director and manager of the large scale 
demonstrators sub-programme. The appointment was astute. As Mr Oakley suggested, 
'It was essential for me as a lifelong civil servant to have a deputy from industry and it 
was highly convenient to have that man from the largest UK firm in the IT industry 
and, as experience was to show, the largest participant in the programme.. . M r  
David Talbot, of ICL, took over the Software Engineering sub-programme. A Plessey 
man, Mr Chris Barrow, led the MMI sub-programme. Thus, the largest British IT firms 
were represented by the appointment of these gentlemen. Small firms and universities 
were not represented. Mr Oakley tried to address the imbalance by appointing Mr 
Derek Barber, of Logica, director of communications.
Mr Clarke was given the rank of a civil service G3 and the sub-programme 
directors were given a G5 rank. Mr Robert Morland, Dr Fawcett's replacement, 
remarked that this policy caused considerable friction. There were civil servants who 
had spent thirty years in the civil service and had only reached G5 grade.
Furthermore, many of the privileges associated with secondment were not enjoyed by 
civil servants. According to Morland:
I was in a very privileged position. I had a G5 grade and I reported directly to 
Brian Oakley, a G2, skipping a whole layer of bureaucracy. Thus, although I 
was a G5,1 had the influence of a G3.1 was in a very curious position. I could
Interview, Dr William Fawcett.
Interviews, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992; and Dr William Fawcett.
Interview, Dr David Thomas. Oakley and Owen, op. cÆ, in note 8, pp. 72-73. 
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 69.
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
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appear to be from any of the three Departments. I had passes into the DTI, the 
MoD and the SERC and I could appear to be from industry.
The Directorate's members, the manner in which they were chosen and their 
rank position in the DTI were contentious matters. The Director was an outsider, 
appointed at a high level and uniquely positioned in the DTI hierarchy. His Directorate 
broke down the organizational boundaries that traditionally applied to British policy­
making in IT : industrialists were formally integrated into a civil service department; 
and civil servants from the MoD and SERC were brought into the DTI hierarchy. Mr 
Oakley had recruited his personnel in a closed, opaque manner at a time when the DTI 
was reeling under the strain of amalgamation.
Complementing the resentment generated by the Directorate's membership and 
style of appointment was disquiet caused by the membership of the Alvey Steering 
Committee. The original plan of the Alvey Committee recommended that the 
Directorate report to a Steering Committee that was a modified version of the Dol's 
Electronics and Avionics Requirements Board (EARB). The Steering Committee was 
to control the Programme. With this in mind, the Chairman of the EARB, Sir Robert 
Telford, expanded the board before Alvey was approved; 'I was able to bring several 
very influential and respected people onto the EARB because I told them they would 
be involved in Alvey. I built up the EARB on the basis that we would run Alvey.
The Prime Minister had decreed, however, that the Directorate would report to 
a Steering Committee comprised of a few industrialists from Britain's largest IT firms 
rather than to members of the EARB. The Prime Minister wished to make the Alvey 
Programme appear as if it was a programme run by industrialists rather than a support 
programme run by Government in the fashion of the old Industrial Strategy. The Dol's 
requirements boards were the embodiment of the ethos o f that era — an ethos loathed 
by the Prime Minister.
Mr Jenkin and Mr Baker obeyed her dictate, but rather than nominating people 
for their expertise and because they were representative o f the IT industry, they 
appointed 'their fnends'^o to the Alvey Steering Committee. When Sir Robert Telford 
was appointed Chairman of the Steering Committee, he found it wholly inadequate. It 
was far too small (he often had difficulty gathering a quorum) and the members were
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Interview, Mr Kenneth Baker.
They were: Philip Hughes (Chairman, Logica), Dr Keith Warren (Director of Technology and 
Strategic Planning, Plessey), Colin Southgate (Chief Executive, Thom-EMI Information 
Technology), John Leighfield (Managing Director, BL Systems) and Professor Eric Ash (Head of the 
Department of Electrical Engineering, University College London).
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not representative of the technologies addressed by the Alvey Programme.^^ Sir 
Robert told the Permanent Secretary of the Industry branch that 'this was a nonsense' 
and that he wanted to include members of the EARB on the Steering Committee. The 
Permanent Secretary agreed that the Committee was too small, but Mr Baker would 
not allow EARB members on the Committee. The Prime Minister had made her 
position very clear and Mr Baker could not afford to disobey her in such an explicit 
manner. Mr Baker did, however, acquiesce to Sir Robert's requests for a larger 
Committee by appointing more of his 'friends' to the Steering Committee.^2
Sir Robert was still not satisfied. Size and representation remained a problem, 
but the largest concern was that the Steering Committee had split into factions. 
Representatives from hardware firms were pitted against representatives from software 
firms. Constructive debate on the overall strategic trajectory of the Alvey Programme 
was impossible. Sir Robert again approached the Permanent Secretary, who finally 
agreed to allow EARB members on the Committee, but only as 'ex-officio' observers. 
To Sir Robert, the term 'ex-officio' was pedantic and he loaded the Committee with 
'ex-officio' observers. In fact, 'ex-officio' members were often the only ones who 
attended Committee meetings. 'Official' members became incensed and Sir Robert 
agreed to stop flooding the Committee on the condition that he be allowed to increase 
the size of his Committee by two. The Permanent Secretary granted the request, but 
insisted that the two new members were only there 'informally'. Two 'official' members 
resigned in frustrat ion.As Sir Robert admitted, 'It was really getting to be a bit of a 
farce'. 2'*
Not only did the Prime Minister's formula for the Steering Committee hinder its 
effectiveness, it also deprived civil servants in the DTI proper of one mechanism 
through which they could influence the Alvey Directorate. The Alvey Committee 
recommended that the Alvey Directorate report to the DTI's EARB. Mr Major and 
civil servants in his LA Division were responsible for all liaison between the EARB and 
the DTI. When the EARB was removed from the Alvey equation, so were Mr Major 
and his civil servants.
Deprived of this means of influencing the Alvey Programme, they devised 
another: they attended, uninvited, the meetings of the Steering Committee. Mr Major 
was particularly memorable. Sir Robert suggested that, 'John Major was against Alvey 
because he knew that it would affect his programmes. So he decided to sit on the 
Committee. This is a civil service thing. They come as advisors and then they become
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
They were Philip Hughes and Colin Southgate. 
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
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members and fight for their comer. They are self-selected' .Mr Oscar Roith, DTI 
Chief Scientist at the time, suggested the same: 'Everyone was making sure their 
interests were properly p ro te c t ed .By  1986, there were 17 members of the Steering 
Committee, seven of whom were civil servants not serving in the Alvey Directorate: 
four from the DTI, two from the Alvey Directorate and one from the MoD.
DTI officials dominated Steering Committee meetings.^"  ^ Mr Oakley tried to 
dilute their influence by requesting that a civil servant from the SERC sit on the 
Committee. (Prior to this, the SERC was represented by Professor Eric Ash from 
University College London. Professor Ash was chairman of the SERC Engineering 
Committee, but not a civil servant.) Mr Oakley's request was denied. Rumour had it 
that John Major was instrumental in having Mr Oakley's request denied, thus keeping 
the DTI representation disproportionately large.
Mrs Thatcher had envisioned a Steering Committee of three or four 
industrialists from Britain's largest IT firms. As it turned out, the Committee was four 
times that size and monopolized by civil servants. Interviewees attest that everyone 
was at pains to hide the size and composition of the Committee from the Prime 
Minister and apparently she did not find out.^^
4.3 Budget Poaching
Alvey was approved on the condition that no new money would be allocated to it. 
Rather, its funds would come from the existing budgets of the Dol, MoD and SERC. 
The Department of Industry had no difficulty coming up with its share of the funds. Mr 
Jenkin had, unknown to the Treasury, amassed a pool of funds large enough to fund 
the department's share of Alvey without cutting existing programmes.^® Thus, for the 
Department of Industry, approval of the Alvey Programme involved a minimum of 
financial discomfort.
The comfort did not last long. When the Department of Industry merged with 
the Department of Trade, Mr Jenkin's nest egg was exposed. When Mr Tebbit took 
over, he returned the excess funds to the Treasury and reallocated much of the 
remaining funds to programmes falling under the Trade branch's remit. His successor, 
Mr Brittan followed suit. As the portion of funds allocated to programmes 
implemented by the Industry branch decreased, existing programmes were sacrificed to
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Interview, Mr Oscar Roith.
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Interviews, Sir Robert Telford; and Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interviews, Dr John Thynne, 23 January 1992; and Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
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in order to fund Alvey. From 1984, the budgets for the Information Technology (IT), 
Electronic Applications (LA) and Telecommunications and Posts divisions decreased 
as a result of Alvey, but the budget of LA was hardest hit. (See Table 4.2.) 
Immediately prior to Alvey's approval, the budget for the second phase of MISP, 
which was implemented by LA division, was to be increased to £50-60 million. When 
Alvey was approved, part of the DTI's £110 million Alvey contribution was taken from 
the MISP 2 b u d g e t . I t  was clear to civil servants concerned that Alvey would 
continue in future to be funded at the expense of other DTI programmes, particularly 
those of LA division.^^
Table 4.2; DTI Expenditure on IT Research and Development
IT Division LA Division Telecomms 
and Posts 
Division
Alvey
Directorate
Total
(£millions)
1980/81 7.7 11.6 —— —— 19.3
1981/82 8.9 15.9 —— —— 24.8
1982/83 21.8 21.6 —— 43.4
1983/84 26.1 40.2 —* —— 66.3
1984/85 31.2 56.3 - - 6.3 93.8
1985/86 26.3 51.1 3.6 13.0 94.0
1986/87 18.3 32.5 1.7 30.2 82.7
1987/88 11.8 27.1 1.6 21.2 71.1
Source: House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industr>', Information Technology, First 
Report, Session 1988-89, Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1988), p. 7.
4.4 Territorial Encroachment
During the Alvey Committee deliberations, the MoD, SERC and Dol agreed to pool 
their finances for IT R&D and allow the Alvey Directorate to allocate the funds 
without interference. This changed after Alvey was approved and civil servants 
realized the implications of that commitment.
Shortly after Alvey was approved and Mr Oakley appointed Director, Mr 
Major (whose application for Director of Alvey had been rejected) threw a spanner in 
the works by insisting that he oversee all VLSI work under Alvey. His LA division 
already sponsored VLSI research in silicon and gallium arsenide materials technology. 
The MoD would not have it. They threatened to pull out of Alvey altogether if LA 
division was given control over Alvey VLSI work.^^ Mr Oakley and the MoD agreed a
 ^^  Ken Guy, UK Policies and Programmes in Electronics and Information Technology, Report to the 
Alvey Directorate (Brighton: SPRU, December 1986), p. 43.
Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
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compromise/*'^ The MoD would nominally place its microelectronics work under the 
Alvey VLSI rubric by transferring its budget to the Alvey budget, but it could 
administer all Alvey contracts for silicon work through its own Central Valve 
Development Agency (CVD).*^ The CVD was an old bureaucracy within the MoD 
through which computer research had been funded for decades. As a result, companies 
receiving funds under Alvey VLSI received them in much the same way as they would 
have had they been sponsored directly by the MoD.
Dr Fawcett described the situation;
Previous to Alvey, the MoD and DTI funded programmes which Alvey 
subsequently covered. When the Alvey Directorate was created, the funding 
was merged. Then it became a question of who would be responsible for 
running the show. The view in some areas was that the DTI should have 
authority to oversee and sign-off spending of money. It was really a case of 
people protecting their own patches.*^
Dr Fawcett's successor gave the following insight:
LA division were extremely miffed about the setting up of the Alvey 
Directorate. They were even more miffed when they weren't asked to be in 
charge of VLSI. Bill Fawcett took a strong line about this. He warned that the 
MoD would pull out of the entire programme if the Alvey Directorate did not 
have effective control of Alvey VLSI. Brian Oakley and Bill Fawcett insisted 
that the Alvey Directorate would control VLSI. This was partly because they 
were not impressed by the way LA ran its own programmes.
Having settled it that the MoD would effectively control Alvey VLSI, Mr 
Oakley and Dr Fawcett decided that the silicon research and gallium arsenide work 
sponsored by the LA division should be absorbed into the Alvey Programme. Mr 
Major fought to protect his responsibilities. He was forced to concede his silicon work, 
but refused to release his responsibilities for gallium arsenide.^*
Many interviewees referred to the 'tense' or 'uncomfortable' relations between 
the Alvey Directorate and LA division.^^ Dr Timothy Walker, Director of 
Administration in the Alvey Directorate, explained the 'tense' relationship in terms of:
Interview, Dr William Fawcett.
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 
ESPRIT, 8th Report, Session 1984-85 (London: HMSO, 1985), p. 7; and interview Dr William 
Fawcett 
Interview, Dr William Fawcett.
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
Interviews, Dr John Thynne, 15 October 1992; and Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
For example, interviews with Dr AJ Wallard, Dr Timothy Walker, Mr Andrew Duguid, Mr Chris 
Barrow, Dr William Fawcett and Mr Brian Oakley.
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the usual bureaucratic considerations. When a new organization is being 
created that does things that are already being done in another organization, 
they will try to protect their areas. Alvey had functions in the semiconductor 
area that the LA division wanted to protect.”*®
LA division's responsibility for silicon research was not the only responsibility 
vulnerable to attack from the Alvey Directorate. The Alvey Directorate attempted a 
similar foray into Man Machine interface (MMI). MMI technology covered four areas: 
human interface, image processing, speech processing and displays technology. Prior 
to Alvey, displays technology was funded through the Joint Optoeletronics Research 
Scheme (JOERS), which was the responsibility of LA division. When Alvey was 
approved, it was agreed that Alvey would fund the more speculative and innovative 
displays technology research at a level of £1.3 million and LA division would take the 
results of Alvey research and fund product development. Thus, responsibility^isplays 
technology research was divided between the Alvey Directorate and LA division.
This formula would work only if LA division and the Alvey Directorate worked 
closely together. This did not happen. As Mr Chris Barrow, Director of Alvey MMI, 
confessed, 'We had meetings with our opposites in LA only when we thought it was 
necessary. That is how we covered ourselves'.*^ Relations soured. Mr Barrow said that 
the 'mix of personalities' between his division and LA division was 'not right'.
Ironically, the Alvey Directorate ended up putting £6.6 million into displays 
research, but that money was spent by Mr Major's LA division. The reason: Mr 
Barrow had lost control of the displays element of the sub-programme. 'There was a 
lot of hand waving from LA and Brian Oakley and Roy Croft decided to put displays 
back into LA. I didn't give two hoots. Actually, I did give two hoots, but I learned not 
to give two hoots.'^^ When Mr Barrow left the Directorate after three years, he was 
not replaced. The human factors, speech and vision components of the programme 
were distributed between two other sub-programme Directors. Displays remained in 
LA division.
Limited consultation and information exchange between the Alvey Directorate 
and LA was not limited to MMI issues. It was endemic. As Dr Walker suggested.
There are always arguments about who takes the lead and whether you are 
consulting each other adequately. For six months, I looked around to find rules. 
After six months of looking, I realized that everyone made up their own. In any 
bureaucracy, although there may be procedures, consulting depends on the
"*® Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
Interview, Mr Chris Barrow.
Interview, Mr Chris Barrow.
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people. They will consult with others because they are afraid of what would 
happen if they didn't or because they want to because it is in their interest."*^
It was not in the Alvey Directorate's interest to consult with LA division. When 
consultation did take place, it was by agreement of the Directorate and the agenda was 
tightly controlled by the Directorate.
The lack of consultation had long-term ramifications for health of LA division. 
The Alvey Programme was meant to be one part of an integrated IT strategy. The 
Alvey Programme was to provide research results, in VLSI and MMI, that LA 
division's development programmes would bring to market under MISP 2 and JOERS. 
Because LA division was not briefed on Alvey progress or results, its ability to design 
MISP projects that would bring Alvey Programme results to market was severely 
hampered. Shortly after this wrangling began, a moratorium was placed^MISP 2. 
(MISP was LA division's major source of funds and responsibilities.) As a result of 
Alvey, LA division lost its responsibility for silicon technology and its major source of 
funding. As Robert Morland commented, Alvey 'made the dust fly' in LA division.^ 
The Alvey Directorate's relations with Mr Macdonald's IT division were less 
strained. Mr Macdonald and Mr Oakley were on fiiendly terms and although the Alvey 
Programme covered image technology and some areas of software research relevant to 
IT division the overlap was not as threatening as it was to LA division. IT division was 
primarily concerned with development whereas Alvey focused on research. 
Consequently, consultation and coordination with IT division was less necessary than it 
was with LA division. As Mr Andrew Duguid, a civil servant in IT division, saw it, 'IT 
division was staffed with regular civil servants who were overworked and didn't have 
time to walk around and think about things. Close or intimate contact did not happen. 
After all, busy people don't do things that they don't have to do'."*^  Dr WB Willot, Mr 
Macdonald's successor summed up the relationship:
There was far more tension between the Alvey Directorate and EA [LA] than 
between IT and Alvey. We were far more downstream of what Alvey was 
trying to do. EA, on the other hand, ran many of the programmes before Alvey 
came along. EA had a much more passionate interest. Most of the people in EA 
were technologists who didn't want to let go of what they had been involved 
with before. We were much less interested in the day to day running of Alvey 
than we were in the outputs. We weren't really fussed.. .EA took a different 
attitude than us. They were much more mixed in with it than we were. They
Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
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were tangling with the Alvey Directorate on a day to day basis. They were
much closer, but much more fraught."^
Relations between the Alvey Directorate and the SERC were strained on 
occasion as well. Although a Tew eyebrows were raised' in the SERC when Oakley 
was moved from there to the Alvey Directorate, the SERC felt that 'their man' was in 
charge and would therefore keep their interests in mind.'*'^  Like the MoD, the SERC 
wished to maintain some authority in the Programme it was helping to fund. As David 
Worsnip suggested, 'The SERC was concerned that the Alvey Directorate would not 
be funding the best academics and the best quality projects, but might instead fund 
people who just happened to be at the right place at the right time'.^* The SERC 
agreed to allow the Directorate ultimate authority in approving project funding, but 
with several conditions: grants to academics would be administered through the SERC 
offices in Swindon; the SERC had to approve all sub-programme strategies before they 
were implemented; and the SERC would independently monitor and evaluate all 
projects funded by Alvey. In this way, the SERC maintained a semblance of control, 
but lost policy-making authority.
The authority the SERC insisted on keeping proved particularly difficult for Mr 
Barrow's Alvey MMI sub-programme. His MMI strategy had to be approved by the 
SERC before he could spend any money. Mr Barrow was late getting his strategy 
completed and by the time it was ready, the SERC had already approved strategies for 
the VLSI and software engineering sub-programmes. The SERC had become resentful 
of the Alvey Directorate's authority and took revenge, so to speak, on Mr Barrow.^^ 
When Mr Barrow submitted his MMI strategy, the SERC delayed approval for three 
months. While Mr Barrow regretted the 'resentment on the part of the SERC, he 
understood because they were‘losing their autonomy'.
4.5 Lack of Control
The Alvey Committee was aware that the hybrid and anomalous Directorate they 
envisioned would be ineffective if placed within a normal bureaucratic hierarchy and 
subjected to Whitehall control mechanisms. Consequently, the Alvey Directorate was 
given tools with which it could act autonomously, free from outside interference. At 
the same time, however, it was essential that the Alvey Directorate coordinate its
^  Interview, Dr WB Willott.
Interview, Dr David Worsnip.
Interview, Dr David Worsnip.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 163. 
Interview, Mr Chris Barrow.
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activities with IT and LA divisions because Alvey was to be part of a larger, integrated 
IT programme. Pre-competitive research would be funded by the Alvey Programme 
and the results brought to market through programmes implemented by LA and IT 
divisions. The Alvey Committee envisioned that coordination between the 
organizations would be enforced by the EARB members on the Alvey Steering 
Committee. The need for other coordination mechanisms was not deemed necessary. 
However, when the Prime Minister forbid EARB members from sitting on the Alvey 
Steering Committee, the coordination mechanism was demolished. No other control 
mechanism was put in its place.
As a result, the Alvey Directorate had an astonishing degree of autonomy. As 
previously mentioned, the Directorate was not incorporated into the DTI's 
coordination and control mechanisms for IT issues. Unlike the Information Technology 
and Electronic Applications divisions, which operated in a briefing channel flowing 
through a Deputy Secretary to the Permanent Secretary and Minister of Information 
Technology, the Alvey Directorate had a direct line to the Permanent Secretary and 
Minister of Information Technology.
Further, the Alvey Directorate was not incorporated into the DTI mechanism 
through which all departmental research programmes were supervised. The Research 
Technology Policy Division (RTP) was responsible for ensuring coherence and 
coordination across the entire gamut of the department's research programmes, but 
Alvey was not briefed into RTP.^^
Operating alongside RTP was a smaller group called the Science and 
Technology Assessment Management Group (STAMG). STAMG was chaired by the 
DTI Chief Engineer and Scientist, Mr Oscar Roith, who was also head of RTP 
division. All the main spending units of the DTI were represented in the Group.^^ 
STAMG reported ultimately to the Resource Management Group, which was chaired 
by the Permanent Secretary, who then reported Ministers. STAMG was advised by 16 
specialist advisory committees, which were staffed by industrialists, called the 
Technology Requirements Boards.
Officials from STAMG met annually with Treasury officials to decide the DTI's 
annual b u d g e t . T h e  Group then met twice a month and decided how that budget was 
to be allocated across the department. Despite the appearance of budgetary oversight 
instilled by STAMG, Alvey was excluded from their deliberations. According to a
 ^* Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
Memorandum submitted by the Department of Trade and Industry, House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, Civil Research and Development, First Report, Session 1986- 
87, HL20-II, p. 58; and testimony of Mr Oscar Roith (Chief Engineer and Scientist, DTI), ibid, pp. 
64-76.
Testimony of Mr Oscar Roith, House of Lords, ibid., p. 70.
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member of STAMG, 'this body influenced Alvey very little because Alvey had its own 
budget and remit'. AJvey was treated as a 'black box' in terms of departmental control 
mechanisms.LA and IT divisions, on the other hand, were briefed into STAMG 
through their Deputy Secretary.
The Alvey Directorate's finances were not scrutinized by the DTI finance 
division, which oversaw the spending of all other DTI divisions. Consequently, the 
Directorate was allowed to spend its money in rather heretical ways. For example, 
funds were surreptitiously transferred between the MoD, the SERC and the DTI and 
the Alvey Directorate paid the salaries of two industrial secondees although it had been 
agreed that companies would pay the salaries of their secondees.
Mr Oakley boasted of this autonomy. 'There was some regulation which they 
[Finance division] were propagating which was nonsense really and I just ignored it. If 
they had operated, it would have become almost impossible to get contracts placed and 
so on. There used to be standard memos which went around to all the research 
spending people saying follow this procedure....[this] was nonsense really and I just 
ignored it. I never passed these [memos] down to the troops.'^^
Dr Fawcett's testimony was similar.
... we set the rules from the beginning and we bent the rules. Individual 
directors had responsibility for signing off very large expenditures and no one 
else had any oversight. We cut through all the bureaucracy in order to get 
things going. We could make decisions and if other people did not like it, hard 
lines. We got on with it. We were not hidebound by previous rules and 
regulations.^"^
This rather relaxed approach did not always sit well with other civil servants in the 
DTI. As one interviewee put it, 'more bureaucratic part of the department was very 
unhappy with the funding aspects of Alvey'.
The Alvey Directorate was independent of central Whitehall control and 
coordination mechanisms also. DTI research programmes were briefed into the Cabinet 
Office through RTP and STAMG, but because Alvey was not briefed into RTP, it was 
not formally briefed into the Cabinet Office. Thus, Alvey was not evaluated or 
controlled in the manner of other Government research programmes. Even if the Alvey 
Programme had been linked directly into the Cabinet Office, it is debatable whether the 
Cabinet Office was capable, at that time, of coordinating or controlling policy. The
Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
Interview, AJ Wallard.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992. 
Interview, Dr William Fawcett.
Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
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inefficiency of the Cabinet Office structure for science and technology issues, and IT in 
particular, prior to the 1983 General Election was discussed in Chapter 2. From 1983 
to 1986, the situation improved very little. Its weaknesses during that period are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
The autonomy the Directorate achieved by being outside DTI and Whitehall 
control mechanisms was augmented by the Directorate's physical separation from its 
DTI parent. The Directorate was not housed in the cramped and dismal corridors of 
Ashdown House. Instead, it was given spacious offices in Millbank Tower overlooking 
the Thames. As one former civil servant from the IT division put it:
...they were in two different buildings. They were only a mile apart, but that 
was significant. It was not a mile you would walk with any appetite. Because 
we were in different buildings, it meant that we did not stumble into each other 
going to the loo or to the canteen.
4.6 Operations
The Directorate relished and cultivated its autonomy. Members viewed themselves as 
pioneers. They designed their own logo, which they wore on custom-made neck ties. 
Their letterhead and business cards displayed the Alvey logo, but made no reference to 
the DTI. Most important, the Directorate eschewed standard operating procedures and 
decision-making by consensus. They opted instead for flexibility, freedom of maneuver 
and individual discretion. The motto Oakley enforced among his directors was: "Make 
decisions today; deal with the consequences tomorrow.'^®
The Directorate took full advantage of the autonomy afforded to it, even to the 
extent of by-passing the various structures designed to assist it. Numerous advisory 
committees operated to advise the Directorate on strategy and on the implications of 
funding decisions. With the exception of the committees established for MMI, 
committee members behaved more like lobbyists than advisors. Their membership most 
often included people who had the most to gain from a sub-programme and they often 
gave advice that favoured their own projects. For example, the Alvey VLSI advisory 
committee was dominated by GEC and Plessey, the two firms who received the most 
Alvey VLSI funds.
Consequently, the Alvey Directorate chose to ignore the committees. As Mr 
Morland suggested. We had real power. We created policy. On the larger projects, we
Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
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decided who would get funding even though we had to discuss the decisions with 
committees'.^^ Mr Oakley said the following about the Advisory Committees:
It is the old game of how you run advisory committees. The competent civil 
servants can always get the decisions they want out of the committees. If the 
decisions are not important, then you don't consult or perhaps you throw the 
bones to the committee. If the decision is important, you take jolly good care 
that the advisory committee comes up with the decision you want.^^
The Directorate also by-passed the Steering Committee. Mr Oakley was, by 
nature, skeptical of decision-making by committee. He chose a chairman for the 
Steering Committee with a similar inclination. Sir Robert Telford saw his Committee's 
role in the following terms: 'I saw our role as to support and guide the Directorate — to 
help the Director get on with it and to achieve the purpose. I never intended it to have 
executive authority . . .If the Alvey Steering Committee had the authority to make 
executive decisions, we never would have kept Brian Oakley.'^^
Many members of the Steering Committee did not interpret their role in such a 
manner. In fact, most of them thought it their right to exert firm control over the 
Directorate. Nevertheless, division within the Steering Committee harmed its 
credibility and, while maintaining the appearance of deference, Mr Oakley and his 
Directorate made decisions with little reference to the Steering Committee's 
recommendations.^'* As Mr Oakley admitted in a House of Lords hearing on Esprit, 
'We have a steering committee which has representatives from the industry and the 
three departments on it and I suppose they are the ultimate authority, but in all the 
working matters it is myself and my Board [Directorate] who set the policy and reach 
the decisions'.^^
Within the Directorate, the sub-programme directors had wide-ranging 
authority. Rather than designing a detailed strategy to which directors would strictly 
adhere, the Directorate chose instead to operate within the framework of a very vague 
strategy: to 'mobilize UK technical strengths in IT. Interpretation was left up the 
directors who created and modified their own sub-programme strategies. Flexibility 
and independence were prized over planning.
The Alvey project selection process was not transparent or structured: it was 
closed and ad hoc. There was a very vague general strategy but few detailed strategies 
for the individual sub-programmes. Further, although the Alvey Committee proposal
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Sir Robert Telford.
Interviews, Sir Robert Telford; Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992; and Mr Derek Roberts. 
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 35, p. 8.
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recommended one possible division of funds across sub-programmes, the Directorate 
had authority to spend as it saw fit. The Alvey Directorate publicly published calls for 
proposals after the A lvey Newsletter \^2iS created, but set no deadlines for submission. 
Project proposals were evaluated by members of the Directorate rather than by teams 
of impartial experts.
Rather than implementing an impartial, transparent process through which 
project proposals were designed, submitted and evaluated, the Alvey Directorate 
assisted a select few companies and academics design projects. These select few were 
primarily those who had served on the Alvey Committee or were on the Steering 
Committee or advisory boards. Together, directors and the select participants designed 
and massaged projects. Directors were also able to act as match-makers — to suggest 
the 'appropriate' composition of a consortium. Projects that had been designed with the 
assistance of a Directorate member were virtually guaranteed of funding.
As far as possible, the Directorate didn't turn them down because we tried to 
work in a way where the projects were discussed with the Directorate staff and 
if necessary with the advisory committee at the draft stage so that a number fell 
by the wayside then....[This] is the right way I personally feel to run a directed 
programme which is much more involved with the people who are putting in 
the project proposal so that unless the director was very badly advised...or they 
were pig-headed, there would not be major upsets where projects which had 
been worked up for a year or so would get the total 'no'.^^
The degree of subjectivity involved in the Alvey process was astonishing. As 
Mr Madron Seligman, MEP suggested to the House of Lords, 'Alvey has much more 
freedom to choose on their personal knowledge of the firms who are making projects. 
Just because they know the firms — such as GEC or Plessey — they are not going to be 
too worried about the details of the proposal'.^^
While these loose procedures allowed the Alvey Directorate to take the 
programme in any direction desired, the procedures had several undesirable side- 
effects. The Directorate had trouble monitoring projects once they got underway. It 
was not until late 1984 when Oakley hired the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
from Sussex University and the Programme of Policy Research in Engineering, Science 
and Technology (PREST) at Manchester University to evaluate the programme that 
the Directorate had any means of monitoring the progress of projects.®* Further,
®® Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
House of Lords, op. cit., in note 35, p. 92.
®* Interview, Dr Ken Guy.
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because proposals could be submitted at any time, Alvey directors could not compare 
proposals and choose the best ones or fund ones that]Jcomplementary.^^
This relaxed and informal process also made it difficult for the Directorate to 
control its budget. The Directorate did not work toward a pre-determined allocation of 
funds across the technical sub-programmes and individual sub-programme directors 
were given complete authority to allocate funds within their sub-programme. Each 
director wanted to spend as much as possible and in order to do so each had to beat 
the others in allocating funds. Mr Oakley put pressure on them in this regard. During 
the first two years of the Directorate's operations, Mr Oakley pressured his sub-to 
'spend, spend, s p e n d ' . H e  was fearful that any uncommitted Alvey funds from the 
DTI and MoD's contribution would be clawed back by the Treasury. Dr Fawcett, for 
example, committed approximately 65 per cent of the entire five-year VLSI budget 
within the first six months of operation.^^
Sub-programme directors and their deputies did meet every Monday afternoon 
to report on the state of affairs within their sub-programmes, but because the directors 
were trying to outspend each other, they were reluctant to be entirely open with their 
funding decisions. As Mr Oakley admitted, the Monday meetings were more 
'consensus-building' than an informed debate on issues or problem solving.Because 
of these loose procedures and spending pressure, most of Alvey's funds were 
committed during the first year of operation and the distribution across sub- 
programmes and participants was very uneven. (The latter is explored further in 
Chapter 5.)
Although Mr Oakley tried to maintain spending oversight, it was difficult. For 
the first several years of operation, the Directorate had no effective way of tracking 
spending. Alvey was funded by three different Departments and the Directorate tried 
to design a computerized financial information system that would compliment those of 
the MoD, DTI and SERC. A system that worked was not in place until February 
1986.“^  ^ After the first year, the Directorate as a whole did not know how much money 
it had committed and at the end of five years, the Directorate spent considerably more 
on academic research than it had planned or calculated.
The lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs) was not surprising given the 
pressure Oakley was under to get his Directorate operational as quickly as possible.
^^Ken Guy, e t a /. Evaluation o f the A lvey Programme for Advanced Information Technology 
(London: HMSO, 1991), p. 38.
Interview, Dr David Thomas.
Interview, Dr William Fawcett. Financial Times, 10 August 1984, p. 4.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 87.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 200.
Interview, Dr David Worsnip.
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This was no easy feat. When Mr Oakley first visited his office at Millbank Tower, there 
was not a single paper clip or file cabinet in sight nor was there nearly enough support 
staff. Devising a set of SOPs would have been time consuming and it would have kept 
the Directorate from its sole task: allocating £250 million in Government funds. 
Furthermore, the Directorate was a mix of civil servants and secondees who were 
unfamiliar with, or unsympathetic to, bureaucratic SOPs.
Although conditions biased the Directorate against SOPs, Mr Oakley made a 
conscious decision to avoid them.
I wanted to get away from the heavy-handed bureaucracy of Whitehall. I 
thought, and still think, that the good people who had all sorts of backgrounds 
and standing in their areas, that it was better that they should run their own 
patch in the way that suited them...than to have a rigid structure at the top like 
the civil service.
No other division of the DTI was allowed such free reign. Take LA division 
and its JOERS programme, for example. According to Dr AJ Wallard,
Alvey more or less made up its own policy without a great deal of reference to 
the rest of the department. It was very different from the JOERS programme... 
JOERS was very much constrained by the operations of the DTI and it was 
part of DTI policy. It was much more of a fixed, Whitehall thing. It was handed 
in the traditional way. Alvey was a new creation. They set their own rules, 
policy and procedures. They had complete control. JOERS, on the other hand, 
was constrained by the more traditional bureaucratic way of running a 
programme."^^
4.7 Conclusion
The environment at the newly created DTI was tumultuous and uncertain. Civil 
servants from the former Department of Industry were affected most adversely by the 
amalgamation. Their budgets were shrinking, their responsibilities were being 
discontinued, their futures were unpredictable. A rapid succession of Secretaries of 
State unable to impose their control only made the situation worse. Competition was 
endemic. The Alvey Programme, which was funded at the expense of existing 
programmes, and its implementing Directorate, which encroached upon precious 
territories, broke traditional IT hierarchy and abrogated bureaucratic procedures, were 
launched in the midst of this competitive environment. Civil servants in LA division
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
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were most threatened by the Alvey Directorate. They were losing budgets and 
responsibilities and were very concerned to protect their patch. They tried various 
means. For example, they refused outright to cede gallium arsenide and they pressured 
the Permanent Secretary and Mr Baker into having displays technology removed from 
the Alvey Directorate. Thus, as Bureaucratic Politics predicts, civil servants in LA  
division worked to protect their budgets and responsibilities which were threatened by 
members o f the A lvey Directorate, who were working to consolidate and expand 
theirs.
This thesis' formulation of Bureaucratic Politics suggests that bureaucrats 
desire to maximize their budgets, responsibilities and rank. The evidence supports this. 
It also suggests another desire among some civil servants: a concern to protect 
tradition, or an accepted ethos. Recall the following quote from Chapter 3 :
Bureaucrats have a warm way o f working with each other. There was no need 
at this point to involve Ministers in it. We went away to get consensus among 
officials and then we could present the finalized thing to the Minister. It was 
necessary to have consensus among the civil servants in order to give advice to 
the Minister so that he doesn't have to arbitrate between civil servants. IT had 
to be sold within the Dol.^^
Civil servants have created a number of traditions, conventions and courtesies 
according to which their relations with one another are conducted. These involve fairly 
easily identified and observable standard operating procedures and hierarchies. They 
also include the more ephemeral concept of'ethos' or 'philosophy'. Civil servants 
committed to that ethos and respectful of those courtesies will work to protect them 
then they are abrogated, by outsiders or by other civil servants.
During the period under review here, civil servants particularly in LA division, 
but also in RTP division and in the Financial Management division, were suspicious of 
the Alvey Directorate's place outside the normal departmental hierarchy and of the 
Directorate's refusal to abide by departmental standard operating procedures. The 
Directorate had been intentionally granted a significant degree of autonomy, but 
perhaps no one, including its creators, could foresee the degree of autonomy the 
Directorate would carve out after becoming operational. A lvey free-wheeled. It had 
self-generated objectives andprocedures and no oversight from other parts o f the 
departments^ or from other Whitehall organizations such as the Cabinet Office. More 
intangibly, civil servants were resentful of the Alvey Directorate's flagrant contempt for 
the civil service's 'way of doing things'.
ss Interview, Mr Oscar Roith. Emphasis added.
Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
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Thus, competition ensued over budgets and responsibilities and the 'proper way 
of doing things'. Whether that competition would have an effect on British policy in 
Esprit is examined in Chapters 6 and 7.
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Alvey Programme Funding Patterns 
Chapter 5
Chapter 4 explored the operations of the Alvey Directorate, highlighting its loose 
operating procedures. It was revealed that the composition of the Alvey Directorate 
was skewed in favour of Britain's largest IT concerns. The result of these two factors 
was that Alvey funds were highly concentrated in a few technical areas and among a 
few participants. This chapter explores those funding decisions, both in terms of 
technical content and participation.
The intention here is not to judge the effectiveness or worth of the Alvey 
Programme or to suggest ways the Programme could have been improved. Such 
evaluations and post mortems have already been performed by experts in the IT field. 
Rather, the purpose is to identify funding and participation patterns that were 
characteristic of the Programme. Careful attention to both is necessary for a discussion 
both of the relationship between Alvey and Esprit and of British policy in Esprit.
5.1 Overview
Alvey funded nearly 200 collaborative projects involving 115 firms, numerous 
universities, several polytechnics and more than 20 research establishments. Although 
the figures indicate a large participation base, statistical analysis exposes the highly 
concentrated nature of that participation. Furthermore, although Alvey funds were 
distributed across five major technical sub-programmes, they were highly concentrated 
in a single technology area, leaving Alvey's coverage in other technical areas 
incomplete. (See Table 5.1.) The technical objectives and achievements of the 
individual sub-programmes are discussed below, followed by an exploration of the 
characteristics of the Programme's participation.
Table 5.1; Technology Areas in Alvey 
Technology Area Per cent of Funding (%)
Very Large Scale Integration 33
Software Engineering 16
Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems 13
Man-Machine Interface 14
Large Scale Demonstrators 12
Systems Architecture 8
Infrastructure/Communication 4
Total 100
Source: Paul Quintas, Working Paper No. 16, April 1992, p. 12.
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5.2 Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)
The VLSI sub-programme was meant to strengthen Britain's microelectronics 
capability in two ways; by increasing the speed of fabrication of Application Specific 
Integrated Circuits (ASICs);^ and by developing a single technology base that could be 
used by all British microchip manufacturers. Rationalization of the British 
semiconductor industry was expected to result fi'om the shared technology base.
Although the VLSI technology area received the most funding, a common 
technology base for the fabrication of chips was not achieved nor was the 
rationalization of the industry accomplished as a result of the Alvey Programme. 
Rationalization and a shared technology base resulted instead from corporate mergers 
that were not associated with the Alvey Programme. Plessey purchased Ferranti 
Semiconductors; GEC and Siemens then purchased Plessey and created GEC-Plessey 
Semiconductors. As a result of the corporate mergers, GEC became the beneficiary of 
all the VLSI work performed under the Alvey umbrella.^ Small to medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and universities received very little VLSI funding.^
The VLSI programme had three concentrations: VLSI technology. Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) for VLSI and VLSI architectures. The goal of CAD for VLSI 
was to create a single CAD resource that would be shared by all IT companies. The 
programme was plagued with difficulties from the start and Alvey's evaluators suggest 
that while individual achievements were 'laudable', CAD for VLSI failed to achieve its 
objective of a shared CAD resource. The objectives were over-ambitious given that: 
UK chip makers were weak in the CAD area; they were not interested in developing a 
new CAD base; there was not a strong CAD equipment sector that could afford the 
necessary investment; and the funds allocated to it were inadequate."* VLSI 
architectures focused on circuit architectures that were necessary to support parallel 
processing. This area was expected to attract academic participation, but industrial 
work absorbed most of the budget.
* ASICs are silicon chips that are modified according to the specific application demands of users.
 ^For a more detailed discussion, see Paul Hare, et. a /. An Assessment o f Esprit in the UK (London: 
HMSO, 1989), p. 59.
 ^SMB and university participation in VLSI was expected to be low. Only the large firms with 
fabrication capability (British Telecom, Plessey, GEC, Ferranti and Inmos) were expected to receive 
funding.
"* Hare, et. al., op. cit., in note 2, pp. 71-72.
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5.3 Software Engineering
The Software Engineering sub-programme sought to alter the software design process 
by creating a disciplined methodology.^ This ambitious new methodology, called the 
Information Systems Factory, would result from research in four areas: Integrated 
Project Support Environment (IPSE) and Tools; Formal Methods; Reliability and 
Metrics; and IKBS for Software Engineering. Research on databases, operating 
systems and applications software was not undertaken. The goal of creating an 
Information Systems Factory was not met, but there were several successes in the 
IPSE and Formal Methods areas that kept Britain on the leading edge of the 
technology.^ Nevertheless, SPRU suggested that the 'acute shortage' of skills in 
industry prohibited industrial exploitation of the research that came out of the sub­
programme.^
Much of Alvey's software engineering work was an extension of work that had 
previously been funded through the SERC in its 1981 Software Technology Initiative 
and its 1977 Distributed Computing Systems programme. The Alvey Directorate 
quickly adopted the SERC's well-formulated strategy and many of the academics 
previously working under the SERC barmer switched to the Alvey Programme.
A primary weakness of the sub-programme was the limited participation of 
small software houses. Their limited participation was caused by several factors: they 
could not afford to pay 50 per cent of the costs of research;* they had little tradition of 
in-house research, much less collaborative research;^ and the exclusion of applications 
software from the Alvey Programme left out numerous small software houses that 
wrote customized software.
As a result of the limited industrial participation and the SERC's prior 
involvement, Alvey's software engineering sub-programme had an 'academic flavouf 
overall. (See Table 5.2.) A majority of the projects were Uncle' projects^^ and 
therefore did not establish the industrial/academic links expected of Alvey projects.
 ^For a discussion, see Paul Quintas, "Engineering Solutions to Software Problems: Some Institutional 
and Social Factors Shaping Change", Technology Analysis & Strategic Management Q/oX. 3, No. 4, 
1991), p. 362.
 ^See Paul Quintas, Working Paper No. 16, April 1992, p. 17.
Hare, e t al, op. cit., in note 2, p. 79 and p. 84.
* Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owen, Alvey: Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative (London: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989), p. 136.
^Ibid., p. 99.
^^Ibid, p. 81.
Hare, et. al, op. cit., in note 2, p. 78.
Uncle projects had only academic partners, but were supervised by a firm, called an "Uncle", that 
had no financial stake in the project. The industrial oversight was believed to guarantee market- 
relevance.
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Table 5.2: Participation in Alvey Software Engineering Sub-programme 
Organization Type Number of Organizations Number of Participants
Hardware Firms^ 10 38
Software Firms 21 47
User Organizations 4 4
Universities/Polytechnics 41 109^
Government Laboratories 4 6
TOTAL 80 204
*GEC, Ferranti, ICL and STC are counted as separate firms. British Telecom is included in this 
category.
^Only 45 of these were projects involving industrial participants.
Source: Alvey Directorate, Alvey Programme Annual Report (UiwdoTi: Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1987).
5.4 Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems (IKBS)
While the software engineering sub-programme sought to change the production 
methods of an existing community of experts, the IKBS sub-programme sought to 
create a new industrial community, build on an existing academic one and bring the 
two together. The IKBS sub-programme was intended to be a ten year programme and 
was designed according to this long-term perspective.
Like the software engineering sub-programme, IKBS benefited from designs 
the SERC had drawn up in 1981 for a 'specially promoted programme' in artificial 
intelligence. If the Alvey Programme had not been approved, the SERC might have 
gone ahead with their programme, but when the Alvey Programme was approved, the 
SERC placed it under the Alvey umbrella.
The Alvey Committee had recommended a relatively small budget for IKBS, 
but when all of Alvey's funds had been spent, IKBS received far more than originally 
allocated. Two factors account for the overspend. First, in 1986 a Systems 
Architecture programme was added to the Alvey Programme. Systems Architecture 
functioned independently, with its own coordinators, but it fell under IKBS in 
accounting terms. Second, when the demand for IKBS funds outstripped the available 
supply, funds from the VLSI budget were transferred to IKBS.
This reallocation of funds involved an interesting case of bureaucratic 
competition within the Alvey Directorate itself. Dr David Thomas, IKBS director, felt 
that far too much money had been allocated to VLSI. After several years, other 
directors started to feel the same, fearing that GEC and Plessey were taking advantage 
of the Alvey Directorate and abusing the funds made available to them.*^ Even the
Owen and Oakley, op. cit., in note 8, p. 130. 
Interview, Dr David Thomas.
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Director of VLSI, Mr Morland, felt that GEC was involved in Alvey only for the 
money and had little intention of reaping the benefits of collaborative research. 'Hirst 
[one of GEC's research centres] would design research projects so that deliverables 
would never be achieved. That way, GEC used Alvey money to support their private 
venture work.... Some of the money that went to GEC might as well have been poured 
down a hole.'^  ^ The large hardware firms had pulled out of several large, strategic 
projects, leaving other consortium members stranded. Moreover, the large firms were 
slow and sloppy with their project proposals, assuming that they were certain to be 
awarded funds by virtue of their size and presumed importance. IKBS researchers 
provided a contrast to this behaviour. They were quick to table high quality proposals, 
they met their deadlines and IKBS was a small expenditure item in the Alvey budget. 
Dr Thomas suggested that, 'The Alvey Directorate had money to spend and if you 
didn't spend it, you lost it. When GEC would say that they were interested and would 
be ready in a year, it was much easier to give the money to the proposals which were 
on the table'.
The results of the IKBS sub-programme were mixed. It strengthened centres 
of research in artificial intelligence and it increased the number of academics working 
in the field. Nevertheless, it failed to move academic research toward the applied end 
of the research spectrum. Although it increased awareness of IKBS in industry, there 
was very little work undertaken in industry. IKBS was dominated by academics 
working in Uncle projects.
5.5 Systems Architecture
This sub-programme was added in 1986. It was dominated by industrial participants 
and STC/ICL lead the pack with its Flagship project, into which numerous smaller 
projects fed.
5.6 Man Machine Interface (MMI)
MMI research explored the meeting between man and machine. It applied insights 
from several disciplines (organizational psychology, occupational therapy, ergonomics) 
to improve the ability of man and machine to communicate. MMI was a 'rag-bag'
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
Interview, Dr David Thomas.
For a comprehensive review of Alvey's IKBS sub-programme, see Erik Arnold, A Review o f  the 
A lvey Intelligent Knowledge-Based Systems (IKBS) Programme SPRU, July 1988).
^^Ibid
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collection of projects that never came together in a coherent whole. The sub- 
programme director, Mr Chris Barrow, admitted that MMI was 'always a bit of a 
Cinderella'2o and even Mr Oakley described it as 'formless, without clear and 
obtainable objectives'.^^ Two other factors exacerbated the problem. First, the sub- 
programme got off to a slow start, and never recovered, when Mr Barrow fell ill 
shortly after taking up the post. Second, the sub-programme was eyed with suspicion 
within the Alvey Directorate. MMI lacked a community of experts and it lacked the 
patronage that VLSI had in the MoD and IKBS and Software Engineering had in the 
SERC. Mr Barrow commented:
...the community was split, and there was very little belief in it, even within the 
Directorate. Some of them [directors] were kind, but most were skeptical. 
Maybe that didn't do us any harm, because maybe we had to work even harder 
and think more deeply. But there were occasions when I felt we could have had 
more support.22
In terms of results, MMI was a mixed bag. Three human interface centres were 
created in Scotland, Loughborough and London. Very little money went into image 
and speech processing. The little money there was went to primarily to defence 
establishments, Edinburgh, Cambridge, University College London, GEC and Logica.
5.7 Large Scale Demonstrators
This sub-programme was not included in the Alvey Committee's original proposal, but 
was added on the suggestion of ICL. The sub-programme's goal was to take research 
from Alvey projects and demonstrate them in 'real-life' applications. Five 
demonstrators were created, the most successful being the Advanced Workstation and 
Systems Architecture Project, which was subsequently modified and called the 
Advanced Network Systems Architectures (ANSA). This project developed and 
demonstrated a single architecture for networked systems.
5.8 Infrastructure and Communications (I&C)
The I&C sub-programme was designed by the Alvey Directorate and originally 
conceived as a communications support network linking researchers in different
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 82.
20 Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 141.
2  ^Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 85.
22 Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 141.
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locations (through electronic mail, for example). Sadly, the electronic mail system was 
a failure; very few researchers used it. The Alvey News, a newsletter appearing twice a 
month with information on conferences and Alvey clubs was more of a success. I&C 
was also to oversee a high-speed network (provided by BT) for the research teams in 
project Universe. In the end, I&C included two research projects of its own: Unison 
and Admiral, two derivations of the Universe project.^^
5.9 Explaining Funding Allocations and Recipients
Chapter 4 revealed that Alvey Programme directors, most of whom were from Britain's 
largest IT concerns, were closely involved in the design of many projects and consortia 
that received Alvey Programme funds. This involvement was, however, limited to a 
small, select group of participants most of whom were directly involved in the Alvey 
decision-making process, either through the Alvey Committee or through Alvey's 
numerous advisory committees or Steering Committee. The select group of 
participants was not formally organized or structured. It was an exclusive, informal 
network. The interactions between Alvey Programme directors and the select few 
participants did not proceed according to well-defined and transparent rules or 
procedures. Rather, the interactions and relations were informal, adhoczxià. secretive. 
The membership o f this small group o f participants, their relationships with members 
o f the A lvey Directorate and the effect o f these two on policy outcome can be 
examined in terms o f action channels.
Chapter 1 argued that organizations have rules, which may be formal or 
informal, that establish who is involved in decision-making and on what issues. Those 
normally involved in decision-making develop relations and contacts with one another. 
The rules also determine who collects, analyzes and disseminates information. 
Individuals who have access to valuable information and are included in decision­
making can define the issue at hand, set the agenda and identify and advance particular 
options. Those options usually benefit themselves or those with whom they have 
developed a relationship. Action is then taken in pursuit of these particular options. 
Other possible issues, agendas and options are dismissed along with any action 
necessary for their fulfilment. Action is channelled in the direction determined by 
those involved in decision-making and inside the information loop. Hence, the term 
'action channels'. This thesis suggests that bureaucrats, in pursuit o f their own 
objectives, chose action from the menu o f alternatives thrown up by their 
organization's action channels.
For a discussion of Admiral and Unison, see Hare, et. ai, op. cit., in note 2, p. 137.
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What were Alvey's action channels? Information was controlled by the Alvey 
Directorate and its members were given ultimate decision-making authority as regards 
project approval and funding allocations. Although the Alvey Committee had 
stipulated that the Steering Committee and advisory committees would exercise some 
control over the Directorate's decision-making, the Directorate had effectively by­
passed them. Thus, as a part of a formal, regulated decision-making process, those 
bodies were powerless. As individuals representative of Britain's strongest (or largest) 
companies, universities and research establishments, they were influential, however. 
The reason: as individuals, they were incorporated into the Alvey Directorate's 
informal, unstructured decision-making process. Alvey Directors tended to consult 
with members of the Alvey Steering Committee and advisory boards on an individual 
basis when designing projects. This was not because they were members of those 
bodies, but because they were representatives of the British companies, universities 
and research establishments for whom and by whom Alvey had been designed. Thus, a 
small, rather exclusive decision-making club and informal process had developed 
whereby Alvey Directors and members of the Steering Committee and advisory 
groups, in an individual capacity, designed Alvey projects. These were the Alvey action 
channels.
Industrial participants incorporated in Alvey's action channels were surprisingly 
small in number. BT, ICL, GEC and Plessey representatives had served on the Alvey 
Committee that designed the Programme. ICL, GEC, Plessey and Logica were 
represented in the Alvey Directorate through their secondees. Employees of GEC, 
Plessey, Thom-EMI and Systems Design Limited (SDL) sat on the Alvey Committee. 
Representatives of British Aerospace, GEC, Plessey, Racal, Thom-EMI, Ferranti and 
STC were involved in the VLSI advisory committees. GEC, Plessey and ICL seconded 
gentlemen to the Alvey Directorate.
According to Bureaucratic Politics, one would expect to find A lvey funds
allocatedprimarily to those incorporated in A lvey's action channels. Statistics bear
this out. As Table 5.3 and 5.4 reveal, Alvey was industrially biased. Tables 5.5, 5.6 and
5.7 reveal that the industrial bias was further skewed toward VLSI and large, defence
oriented firms. GEC and Plessey, were primarily engaged in semiconductor
manufacture and, with the exception of ICL, Alvey's largest funding recipients were
heavily defence oriented. Very few small to medium sized companies or companies
engaged in software design, with the exception of ICL and Logica, were represented.
Only 50 SMEs participated and the funds they received were minimal. The Alvey
Directorate w^s not particularly concerned to see active participation by small and
medium sized companies. Members of the Directorate expected SMEs to bring the
results of Alvey research to the market, but not to be involved greatly in the actual
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research. Mr Oakley admitted that he 'never shared the unalloyed enthusiasm for small 
firms as the saviors of the national economy'.
Not surprisingly, SMEs were excluded from Alvey action channels. They did 
not second representatives to the Alvey Directorate. Relative to the large firms, they 
were poorly represented on Alvey's Steering Committee and advisory committees. As 
Mr Din Ghani, of MARI Advanced Technology, a small company that was not 
included in Alvey action channels, commented:
The Alvey strategy wasn't clear to outside punters, as it were. What you had to 
do in Alvey was to find appropriate bid companies to tag along with. That 
seemed the only way a company like MARI could get funding. They [the big 
companies] had somebody on the inside who could given them information, 
could explain the thinking, could tip them off about critical things they could do 
and what time they should do them. It is a link that was not there for us.^^
Table 5.3: Alvey Project Participation 
Participant Type Number of Number of
Organizations Participations
Firms 115 421
Universities 56 369
Polytechnics 12 19
Government Research 24 53
Establishments
TOTAL 207 862
Source; Paul Quintas, Working Paper No. 16, April 1992, p. 12.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 8, p. 110. 
Interview, Mr Din Ghali.
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Table 5.4: Funding Types of Participants by Technical Area
Technology Firms Academic Other Total
VLSI 34.3 9.2 3.3
(^millions)
46.8
CAD for VLSI 9.3 2.8 0.7 12.8
VLSI Architecture 2.6 2.7 ——— 5.3
Software 15.4 10.1 1.0 26.5
Engineering
System 6.1 5.2 0.4 11.7
Architecture
Man-Machine- 7.4 16.1 2.3 25.8
Interface
Intelligent 11.8 7.8 0.4 20.0
Knowledge Based
Systems
Large 14.1 5.1 1.1 20.3
Demonstrators
Infrastructure/ 5.7 1.5 7.2
Communication
TOTAL 106.7 60.5 9.2 176.4
Note: Figures are for Government funds and represent only 50 per cent funding of industrial work. 
Source: Ken Guy, et. al. Evaluation o f the A lvey Programme for Advanced In fonnation Technology 
(London: HMSO, 1991), p. 23.
Table 5.5: Alvey Projects by Technical Area 
Area Number of Projects %
VLSI 61 31
Software Engineering 35 18
IKBS 55 28
MMI 40 20
LD 5 2
I&C 2 1
TOTAL 198 100
Source: Paul (Quintas, Working Paper No. 16, April 1992, p. 12.
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Table 5.6: Alvey Industrial Participants
Firm Number of Participations Funding
(£000)
GEC 66 22,945
Plessey 39 10,470
ICL 37 14,720
STC/STL 31 8,815
BT 31 9,030
Ferranti 18 8,645
Logica 16 2,325
Software Sciences/Thom EMI 11 3,230
SDL 10 1,730
Racal 9 4,435
BAe 7 1,630
Plasma Technology 51 514
Mari Advanced Technology 21 412
CAP 2 1,065
Scicon 2 n.a.
^Figures from House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industiy, Information Technology, 
Vol. II (London: HSMO, 1988), p. 197. Evaluation o f the A lvey Programme xecoiAs Plasma 
Technology with six participations, but gives no funding amounts, and Mari Advanced Technology 
with three participations, but gives no funding amounts.
Sources: Ken Guy, et. al. Evaluation o f the A lvey Programme for Advancedinformation Technology 
(London: HMSO, 1991), p. 27.
Table 5.7: Defence Orientation of UK IT Firms (1984 figures)
Company Total Defence Sales % Profit from % Total Sales
(£ millions) Defence Sales to MoD
British Aerospace 1786 100 72
GEC 1100 21 60
Plessey 448 31 43
Racal 320 46 30
Thom-EMI 260 12 60
Ferranti 230 45 61
STC 118 11 89
Source: Ken Guy, UK Policies and Programmes in Electronics and In formation Technology: A 
Report to the A lvey Directorate (Brighton: Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 
December 1986), Table 5.
Just as A lvey action channels pre-determined that VLSI and the large, defense
oriented firms would receive most o f A lvey's industrial funds, action channels
predicted that academic funds would be similarly concentrated in a small number o f
select educational establishments. (See Table 5.8.) Although the academic institutions
that received the most Alvey funding were, without a doubt, the homes of Britain's
most respected researchers and thus could be expected to receive much funding,
presence at Alvey’s creation and involvement in its informal decision-making club
(action channels) certainly helped these establishments receive funding,
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Interviewees from the Alvey Directorate attest to targeting these 'first tier' 
universities for inclusion in Alvey's decision-making. Representatives from these 
institutions and Alvey Directors together designed p ro jec ts .T h e  'second tier' 
institutions, in contrast, were intentionally excluded from Alvey action channels and 
were forced, by default, to Esprit. Professor Needham, Director of the Cambridge 
Computing Centre and member of the Alvey Committee and Alvey Steering 
Committee, suggested that, 'We never participated in a mainline Esprit project....I think 
it is fair to say that the second round universities paritcipated in Esprit and the first 
round were in Alvey. Most first round universities regarded Alvey as preferrable to 
Esprit'.^^
Prior to the Alvey Programme in the mid- to late-1970s, Government funded 
several IT programmes through which close contacts were established between a small 
group of academics and industrialists. For example, the Science Research Council's 
Distributed Computing System (DCS) funded academic research at Manchester 
University and Imperial College. Projects funded under the DCS were continued in the 
Alvey Programme. In 1981, the Science Research Council funded Project Universe, 
which linked seven research laboratories; Rutherford Appleton, Cambridge, University 
College London, Loughborough, GEC's Marconi Research Centre, British Telecom 
Research Laboratories and Logica. Through these, several universities became 
members of the British IT fraternity.
Representatives from these universities played a major role in the creation and 
implementation of Alvey. Take the example of Professor Eric Ash. Professor Ash was 
head of the Department o f Electronic and Electrical Engineering at University College, 
London and was Chairman of the SERC's Information Engineering Committee. He 
attended the Westmorland Hotel conference and became a member of the Alvey 
Steering Committee. Through Professor Ash, University College London had a road 
into Alvey decision-making.
The University of Cambridge was also well represented in Alvey's creation and 
implementation. Professor Needham went to Tokyo with the Dol mission. Afterward, 
he prepared an SERC report on artificial intelligence. The report called for research 
into artificial intelligence to be included in the Alvey programme. Professor Needham 
was asked to join the Alvey Committee. His wife. Dr Karen Sparck Jones, also of 
Cambridge, was a member of the IKBS working group that drew up Alvey's IKBS
Interviews, Dr David Thomas; Mr Chris Barrow; Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1993; and Mr David 
Talbot.
Interview Professor Roger Needham.
Interview, Professor Eric Ash.
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strategy. The Cambridge link was strengthened when Professor Alec Broers was 
contracted, in 1985, to assess Alvey's VLSI sub-programme.^^
Table 5.8: Academic Participation in Alvey Projects
Institution Number of Funding
Participations (£000's)
London University (London School of Economics, 
Imperial College, Queen Mary College)
43 5,625
Edinburgh University 36 5,360
Cambridge University 29 3,150
University of Southampton 20 1,975
University of Manchester 18 4,450
Loughborough University 18 4,320
Sussex University 18 1,570
University College London 17 3,530
Oxford University 16 2,220
University of Strathclyde 15 2,570
Warwick 11 1,215
Surrey University 10 1,540
Newcastle University 10 1,460
Reading University 8 1,570
University of Leeds 7 1,430
Lancaster University 7 1,590
UMIST 7 1,250
Source; Ken Guy, et. al. Evaluation o f the A lvey Programme for Advanced Information Technology 
(London: HMSO, 1991), p. 28.
5.10 Conclusion
Shortly after the Alvey Programme was operational, it became clear that it was a 'cash 
cow' for a small number of British companies, primarily ones involved in 
semiconductor manufacture, and academic establishments, primarily ones involved in 
IKBS research. Involvement of small to medium sized enterprises was very low. 
Alvey's participation was biased. According to Mr Atkinson, 'Alvey was hijacked'^® by 
the companies and institutions that were incorporated in Alvey's action channels. A s 
Bureaucratic Politics would predict, action channels afforded them advantages not 
enjoyed by participants outside the channels.
Members of the Alvey Directorate and independent evaluators have concluded 
that while individual Alvey projects were technically sound and respectable, they did 
not comprise an integrated whole. Funds were too concentrated in VLSI and IKBS, 
while funding for other technologies was inadequate. From a technical point of view.
Interview, Professor Roger Needham.
Interview, Mr Reay Atkinson.
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the Alvey Programme's coverage was incomplete. This weakness can be explained in 
terms of the operation of action channels.
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British Policy in Esprit: April 1983 to Late 1984 
Chapter 6
Chapter 4 discussed how the Alvey Directorate contributed to and was affected by the 
competition prevalent in the DTI following the great 1983 amalgamation. This Chapter 
explores the central question of this thesis: Did bureaucratic competition affect British 
policy in Esprit? The time period covered here is from April 1983 to late 1984.
To answer this central question, five hypotheses drawn from the Bureaucratic 
Politics perspective will be tested.
• Bureaucrats work to maximize their budgets, rank and responsibilities.
• They may compete with one another in doing so.
• The preference-from-position function explains bureaucrats* objectives in Esprit. 
That is, bureaucrats' objectives in Esprit can be explained by reference to their 
perceptions of how Esprit would affect their budgets, responsibilities and 
promotional prospects.
• Action channels provide insight into the means by which bureaucrats pursued their 
objectives in Esprit.
• Bureaucratic competition can affect British policy in Esprit when Ministerial 
objectives are not consistent and clearly articulated, when Ministers do not control 
or supervise the issue and when Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms 
are ineffective.
6.1 Approval of Esprit
While the Alvey Directorate was frantically trying to organize itself, allocate funds in 
order to save them from Treasury clawback and expand its area of responsibility, 
negotiations over the first phase of Esprit were taking place in Brussels. The two year 
Esprit pilot phase had just commenced, but the Commission went ahead and submitted 
its formal call to the Council for approval of Esprit I in late May 1983.
The timing of the proposal could have been more astute. The Community was 
embroiled in hostile and extended negotiations over EC budgetary reform. Mrs 
Thatcher had 'wrapped herself in the Union flag' and was determined to protect 
Britain's interests in Europe^, which mainly involved getting her 'own money back'. At 
the June 1983 Stuttgart Council, Britain and Germany made their approval of Esprit
 ^Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Co/zzmim/ÏK (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. 163.
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contingent on reform of EC finances. ^  Agreement on those reforms was not reached at 
the Council meeting and discussion was put off until the Athens summit of December
1983. Esprit remained captive although the Council of Research Ministers had 
approved Esprit in principle.^
The Athens summit did not resolve the budgetary crisis and Esprit remained 
deadlocked. Finally, the Germans suggested a compromise. They would approve Esprit 
if no new sources of financing were required but instead money would come from the 
existing research budget agreed earlier under the Framework Programme.^ Mr 
Kenneth Baker, Britain’s member of the Council of Research Ministers, was 
noncommittal. He had been instructed to stall while the Prime Minister fought her 
larger budgetary battle.^ Viscount Davignon was incensed and publicly accused the 
British and Germans of jeopardizing Europe’s future.^ He travelled to London and met 
with Mrs Thatcher’ and threatened to go ahead with Esprit without Council 
approval.*
In January 1984, the Commission reached a compromise with the British and 
Germans. Esprit was to be funded at a level of 750 million ECU (approximately £426 
million and the level originally proposed by the Commission) and the Commission 
agreed to limit its R&D expenditure over the next two years and fund Esprit out of the 
already agreed appropriations for the Framework Programme.^ The compromise 
allowed Britain to save face because it, in theory, forced some discipline on 
Community spending. Britain was not alone in wishing to bring Community spending 
under control, but it was Mrs Thatcher’s style that led the Economist io write, ’the
’ For a discussion of the EC budgetary arrangements, see Ali M. El-Agraa, The Economics o f  the 
European Community  ^Fourth Edition (London: Harvester Wheatshea£ 1994); and Theo Hitiris, 
European Community Economics, Third Edition (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994).
 ^Europolitique, 14 December 1983.
 ^Agence Europe, 14 December 1983, p. 10. The Framework Programme is a multi-annual strategy 
that sets out research priorities and fixes the overall level of Community funding for R&D. Within the 
Framework Programme are a large number of shared cost research programmes. Esprit being only one 
of them. Member states approve the budget of the Framework Programme through unanimous voting, 
but the individual programmes are approved at Council level by qualified majority.
 ^Financial Times, 27 Februaiy 1984.
 ^Sunday Times, 22 January 1984, p. 13.
’  'Commission Draws up Work Programme for Esprit', Financial Times, 10 February 1984.
 ^Agence Europe, 7 November 1983, p. 5.
 ^Approval of Esprit has been variously explained. Margaret Sharp and Claire Shearman, European 
Technological Collaboration (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 50, argued that it is the 
result of a 'newly formed alliance between the Commission and industry, which brought pressure to 
bear on national governments'. Likewise, Stephen Woolcock, Information Technology: the Challenge 
to Europe', Joumal o f Common Market Studies tyo\. 21, No. 4, June 1984), pp. 515-31, suggested 
that the most significant factor was the support of industry. Wayne Arthur Sandholtz, Crisis and 
Collaboration in European Telematics, PhD dissertation. University of (Zalifbmia at Berkeley, 1989, 
held that approval of Esprit came as a result of a coalition between industry and the Commission that 
was able to sell Esprit to national leaders in an 'adaptive mode', or looking for new strategies to help 
their ailing industries and economies.
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British have a respectable case...But so unpopular has Mrs Thatcher become during 
her budget battle that the British arguments often prove counter-productive'.^® Mr 
Baker claims to have 'persuaded' the Prime Minister to accept Esprit as a 'gesture of 
good will'. 'I agreed to it to show good spirit — that we were acting constructively. We 
had a reputation for being awkward.'^^ Esprit was finally approved on 28 February
1984.
The Prime Minister dug her feet in over Esprit's budget and she resisted the 
increase in the Commission's responsibilities that Esprit required. She did not, 
however, disapprove of Esprit itself. She had supported Community activity in areas of 
high technology numerous times. In her report on the 1983 Athens Summit to the 
House of Commons, she singled Esprit out as an example of constructive Community 
activity. *2 In the discussion document submitted at the 1984 Fountainbleau Summit, 
entitled 'Europe — the Future', she emphasized the growing technological gap between 
Europe and the US and Japan and recognized that Community action on this front was 
necessary for realization of the internal market. According to her logic. Community 
money was better spent on high technology than on subsidies for ailing industries or 
farmers. Mr Baker echoed her sentiment before the House of Commons: 'The United 
Kingdom has always attached a high priority to Esprit which we see as just the kind of 
new policy which the Community needs for its future development'.^^
6.2 The Fundamentals of Esprit I
Esprit I was the first five year phase of a ten year programme fiinding collaborative 
pre-competitive research in IT.^  ^ Consortia involving at least two companies.
Economist, 4 August 1984.
Interview, Mr Kenneth Baker.
House of Commons Debate, 7 December 1983, HansardÇyoX. 50, col. 330).
'Europe — The Future', Journal o f Common Market Studies (WoV 23, No. 1,1984), pp. 74-81. See 
also Ronald Butt, "Mrs Thatcher's Modem Europe', Times, 5 July 1984; and Margaret Thatcher, The 
Downing Street Kear? (London: HarperCoIlins, 1993), p. 336.
House of Conunons Debate, 21 March 1984, Hansard(Wo\. 56, col. 1112).
'Pre-competitive' was a vogue term tossed about in government circles, but never adequately 
defined. The Commission's definition of pre-competitive was hazy, leaving the its funding remit quite 
large.
In analyzing and selecting concerted and cooperative R&D actions to be undertaken by 
companies that are competing with each other in the marketplace, care has been taken to 
ensure that they were sufficiently upstream of the product (i.e. of a pre-competitive nature) 
whilst not too far away from potential application to lose contact with the projected needs of 
industry and society (i.e. of an 'enabling' character).
Conunission of the European Communities, "Proposal for a Council Decision Adopting the First 
European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technologies (Esprit)', 
Com (83) 258 final (Bmssels: OfficialJoumal o f the European Communities, C321, 26 November 
1983), p. 16.
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universities or research institutions established in at least two different member states 
were eligible for funding. In exceptional cases, participation from non-EC firms was 
allowed.
Esprit funding was on a shared cost basis to ensure industrial commitment and 
that market-relevant research was undertaken. Fifty per cent of the cost of each 
research project was provided by the Commission in the form of a grant and the 
remainder was contributed by the participants. There were exceptions to the 50 per 
cent funding rule. Projects were to be divided into two types, A and B, according to 
their objectives and financial requirements. Although the distinction between the two 
was not entirely clear, type A projects were large, 'strategic' and industrially relevant 
while type B projects were small and academically orien ted .T ype B projects were of 
a very long-term nature, more likely to involve SMEs and academic or research 
institutions. Type B projects could be funded at a level greater than 50 per cent when, 
for example, a request for Esprit funding came from SMEs without adequate financial 
resources. Type B projects were to receive 25 per cent of the overall Esprit budget.
Esprit funds were allocated among five technical sub-programmes; advanced 
microelectronics, software technology, advanced information processing, office 
systems and computer-integrated manufacturing. (Note the similarity to Alvey's 
technical coverage.)
Esprit research in advanced microelectronics focused on designing, 
manufacturing and testing very high-speed and very large-scale integrated circuits 
(VLSI). Unlike the Alvey Programme, Esprit research also focused on new conductive 
materials, such as gallium arsenide. The microelectronics sub-programme also covered 
computer-aided design, optical signalling, advanced display technologies and 
'intelligent' sensors for automation and image presentation. This sub-programme also 
covered research on the circuits, switches and fibres necessary for broadband 
communication (technology able to transmit data, text and images over one line).
The Esprit software technology programme was very much like Alvey's 
software engineering programme. Both explored theories and methods for developing 
software. The Esprit advanced information processing programme sought to develop a 
single system capable of'intelligent behaviour', but designed for the non-expert user. 
The Alvey Programme did the same, but under the name IKBS.
Like the Alvey MMI sub-programme, the Esprit office systems sub-programme 
explored the interface between people and machines. Research concentrated on work 
stations and information systems that are used by ofiBce workers.
p. 32.
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The Esprit computer integrated manufacturing (CIM) programme concerned 
the introduction of computer aids in all phases of factory operation. The focus was on: 
computer aided design, computer aided manufacturing, computer aided testing, robots 
and numerically controlled machine tools. The Alvey Programme funded very little 
research in CIM.
In addition to these five technical sub-programmes. Esprit created an 
information exchange system (lES) to facilitate exchange of information. lES provided 
information to Esprit participants through data-base, computer messaging and 
conference services.
Both Esprit and the Alvey Programme funded pre-competitive, collaborative 
research between companies and academics. The technical coverage of the two 
programmes was very similar and duplication of effort and competition between Alvey 
and Esprit were likely to occur. France and Germany were funding large IT R&D 
programmes of their own, so duplication was not limited to British and EC 
programmes. It is interesting, therefore, that the Commission justified Esprit by 
arguing that it would reduce the duplication of effort caused by the numerous, national 
programmes.
Esprit was to:
enhance their effectiveness and reduce these negative effects [of duplication] 
through systematic consultation of all parties interested, during the planning 
and execution of such programmes, aimed at achieving selectivity of attack and 
improved overall efficiency.
In order to do so, the Commission expected national authorities to consult it 
when they created new national programmes and during the implementation of existing 
ones: 'member states and the Community shall exchange all appropriate information to 
which they have access and which they are free to disclose concerning R&D activities 
in the domain covered by this Decision, whether or not planned or carried out under 
their authority.'^* The Commission envisioned that it would play a coordinating role. 
Governments would freely give the Commission information concerning their national 
programmes and let the Commission make amendments to them based on Esprit 
considerations.^^ Civil servants implementing their own national IT R&D programmes 
interpreted this as a threat to their budgets, responsibilities and autonomy.
Ibid.,'p. 15.
^^Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid
Interviews, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992; and Mr Alastair Macdonald, 21 January 1992.
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The technical coverage of Esprit and the Alvey Programme were very similar 
and the management requirements for Esprit as envisioned by the Information 
Technology Task Force (ITTF) were strikingly similar to those put forth by the Alvey 
Committee.
A programme of the nature of that outlined above will be highly complex to 
prepare and execute. Programme management will have to be: very flexible to 
take account of the fact that the IT sector is subject to a rapid rate of change; 
very efficient to ensure the participation of many small companies active in the 
field, which must not be discouraged by bureaucratic procedures leading to 
high overheads.21
Not surprisingly, it was the ITTF that met these requirements. It was small and 
independent of all Directorate Generals, but responsible to the Commission through 
Viscount Davignon. The majority of its staff were seconded from industry, academia 
and member states' Governments and on short-term contracts with the Commission.
Assisting the ITTF were three organizations: the Esprit Management 
Committee, the Esprit Advisory Board and the Esprit Steering Committee. The Esprit 
Management Committee (EMC) consisted of two representatives from each member 
state. Representatives were usually Government officials, but they could also be 
experts from industry or academia. The two British representatives were civil servants 
from the DTI. The EMC approved the five year workplan and yearly workplans. (The 
workplans are discussed in detail later in this Chapter.) It also gave blanket approval to 
the Commission's funding allocations, but it had authority to approve individual 
projects if they were worth 5 million ECU or more. The EMC approved any 
departures from Esprit rules, such as funding that exceeded the 50 per cent rule.
Voting in the EMC was by qualified majority.
The Esprit Advisory Board (EAB) was a consultative body comprised of 
sixteen individuals drawn from industry and academia. Approximately half of the EAB 
members were from the original Roundtable companies and the other half came from 
SMEs, universities and research establishments. (Eventually EAB membership was 
broadened to include IT users.) Membership was normally limited to two years. EAB 
members were to act in a purely personal capacity rather than as representatives of 
employers. The reality, according to Mr Herman Hauser, Chairman of the EAB, was 
rather different. 'There is a UK camp and there is a French camp and the UK camp is 
particularly strong. Of course you are going to side with your c o u n t r y .
Commission of the European Communities, 'On Laying the Foundations for a European Strategic 
Programme of Research and Development in Information Technology: the Pilot Phase', Com (82) 486 
final/2 (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 13 August 1982), p. 19.
Interview, Mr Herman Hauser.
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The EAB usually met four times per year for one day in Brussels and the 
majority of its work was associated with the Esprit yearly workplan when it advised on 
the shape of the plan. Although the EAB was an advisory body, the Commission was 
legally bound to solicit and consider its advice. For this reason, the EAB received all 
Commission documentation, including confidential documents that were not given to 
the EMC and Esprit Steering Committee. The Commission was the secretariat to the 
EAB. According to Mr Stephen Joseph, a former secretary of the EAB, it played an 
important agenda-setting role by drawing up reports and recommendations that were 
used by the Commission as draft documents for future action.
The interests of the largest industrial concerns were represented in the Esprit 
Steering Committee (ESC). The ESC was originally comprised of officials from the 
Roundtable 12, but its membership was modified to represent change among Europe's 
largest IT f i r ms . The  organization's name implies an official decision-making role, 
but 'guidance' and 'legitimization' perhaps best described the ESC. Unlike the EAB and 
the EMC, the ESC had no legal standing in Esprit. Its members had no rights different 
from those of other Esprit participants and although it offered advice to the 
Commission, the Commission was not legally bound to solicit or consider that advice.
Despite its unofficial status, the ESC exerted great influence. Esprit was the 
product of a dialogue between Europe's largest IT companies and the Commission and 
the 'viability and success of Esprit is crucially dependent on the big firms'.^  ^ Although 
SMEs and universities undoubtedly benefited from Esprit, Esprit was essentially a 
mechanism through which subsidies were channelled to Europe's largest IT companies, 
which were represented on the ESC.
The ESC met in Brussels 6-8 times each year where they designed the large, 
strategic programmes around which other Esprit projects were built. According to Mr 
Stephen Joseph, former secretary of the ESC, the ESC presented those projects to the 
Commission, which then instructed experts designing the workplans to 'take them into 
account'.26 Invariably, those projects found their way into the workplan. Thus, in the 
closed forum of the ESC, Esprit's largest projects were designed and because those 
projects received the majority of Esprit funds, Esprit's budget was effectively dispersed 
according to 'gentlemen's agreements' in the ESC.^^
Interview, Mr Stephen Joseph, 9 July 1992.
In May 1991, the 17 Steering Committee members represented Thomson, GEC, Plessey, Marconi 
Underwater Systems, STET, Alcatel, Bull, GEC-Marconi Materials Technology, Philips, SNI, 
Thomson-CSF, Olivetti and Siemens.
Interview, Mr Derek Flyime, 9 December 1991.
Interview, Mr Stephen Joseph, 9 July 1992.
Interviews, Mr Virgilio Pasquali; and Mr Stephen Joseph, 9 July 1992.
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Esprit was built on rather formal and detailed procedures. The general 
trajectory of Esprit was based on a five year workplan that could be amended each 
year to account for advances in technology. The five year workplan was approved by 
the Council of Research Ministers and the EMC, although the Commission could 
revise it at any time without Council approval. The five year workplan was 
complemented by yearly workplans. The yearly workplans set out the details of 
research to be undertaken in a particular year and allocated that year's funding for each 
of the sub-programmes. The yearly workplan was created by several hundred technical 
experts chosen by the Commission and brought to Brussels for several weeks. The 
EAB advised the Commission in the process. The yearly workplan was approved by 
the EMC but not by the Council.
After the EMC approved the yearly workplan, the Commission published calls 
for proposals in the O/ïïciaIJoumal The timing of calls was known only to the 
Commission, but it generally occurred twice a year. Each call laid out, in greater detail 
than the yearly workplan, specific research targets for the call and preferred funding 
allocations. Following the call, companies and academics created consortia and wrote 
project proposals that fit the technical specifications of the call. The project proposals 
were then submitted to the Commission.
To evaluate proposals, a 'mixed bag of naive experts —naive because they never 
do it again' were brought to B russels.E xperts were chosen by the Commission from 
industry and academia and on recommendation from member states, but because the IT 
expert community was small, interviewees suggested that experts were chosen by 
networking or by 'insider trading'. Mr Din Ghali of MARI Advanced Technology, a 
company that frequently sent its employees to evaluate Esprit proposals, suggested 
that the selection process was:
Very ad hoc. A lot of the people are involved in on-going projects. The 
Commission, having worked with them, know them. That's one set. Then there 
is another set of people that the member states put forward. In theory, they [the 
Commission] use people nominated by the member states, but in practice its 
bound to be the people they know and love.^°
The project proposal evaluation period lasted two weeks regardless of how 
many proposals were received. Evaluators were divided into teams of at least three 
according to technical areas and seated in a high-security area in a Commission
Interview, Ms Angela Mi son Fulleylove. Ms Fulleylove frequently serves on Esprit evaluation 
teams.
Interviews, Ms Angela Mison Fulleylove; Mr Virgilio Pasquali; Ms Rosalie Zobel; and Mr Tim 
Simmons.
Interview, Mr Din Ghali.
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building where they were not allowed to speak to each other. Evaluators were given a 
pack of project proposals (the names of the applicants were not revealed) and the 
criteria against which they were to evaluate the proposals. Generally speaking, projects 
were evaluated according to technical soundness, capability of the consortia to deliver 
the promised results, contribution to Esprit objectives and plans to exploit the 
results.^* Each call emphasized some of these over others. Each evaluator read the 
proposals and completed an evaluation form. After the proposals were evaluated by all 
members of the group, the Commission official responsible for that particular technical 
sub-programme gathered the team together and compiled the individual evaluations for 
each project to form a composite assessment. The team members then voted as a 
group to reject or recommend each proposal for funding. This vote, along with the 
reasons why the proposal was accepted or rejected, were recorded on a form called the 
ERl 1. The evaluation team then prepared a short list of all the projects it 
recommended for funding.
A 'foot thick' stack of all ERl Is and short lists were then scrutinized by all 
Esprit sub-programme heads and the Director of Esprit (and the Commissioner in 
charge of DGXIII after the ITTF was given Directorate General status). Commission 
officials were not bound to accept the funding recommendations of the experts and 
Commissioners often reassessed the proposals in light of other, more political, 
considerations. The other considerations included such things as the overall funding 
pattern that resulted from the experts' recommendations as it compared to the 
Commission's desired funding pattern and the balance of funding across member states. 
If, for example, the CIM sub-programme evaluation team did not approve any 
proposals for funding and the yearly workplan allocated X ECU for CIM, the 
Commissioner responsible for CIM had to reassess proposals and approve some for 
funding. As one interviewee suggested, 'it is not good practice not to s p e n d ' .^ ^  j f  a  
Commissioner did not spend the budget allocated in the yearly workplan, that budget 
was likely to be decreased in the next call.
The most controversial consideration was that of the balance of funding across 
member states. Member states expected to receive funding equivalent to their 
contribution, or a juste retour?'^  In 1992, for example, the British Government 
contributed approximately 18 per cent of the total Community budget. Because Esprit 
funds came from the Community budget, the British contribution to Esprit was 
calculated to be 18 per cent. In order to receive a Juste retour, British companies and 
research establishments needed to receive 18 per cent of the Esprit funds that were
Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., in note 15, p. 32.
Interview, Ms Angela Mison Fulleylove.
For a discussion of the importance of Juste retour, see Sandholtz, op. cit., in note 9.
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allocated. The Commission officially denies that juste r e t o u r crucial to their 
funding decisions. They claim that those decisions were based entirely on the project's 
ability to fulfil objective criteria.^ ** In private, however, European Commissioners from 
DGXIII referred to the 'dreaded J word' under whose guiding hand they operated.^^ 
Experts who took part in evaluations claimed that Commissioners stressed the 
importance of Juste retour 2ls a funding criterion.^^ In testimony before the House of 
Lords, Mr JM Watson, Technical Director of ICL, suggested that, I think this is 
straightforward political reality; the money has to be seen to be relatively evenly 
distributed in proportion to the contributions from the member countries'.^?
With the various political considerations in mind. Commissioners often 
amended the technical content of a proposal or membership of a consortia. According 
to interviewees, a lot of'tooing and frowing' between Commissioners, industrialists and 
Government officials on the EMC took place at this point.^^ If, for example, a 
proposal submitted by a company with political influence was rejected by the 
evaluators, officials from the country might approach a Commissioner directly and 
suggest that perhaps the wrong evaluation team assessed the proposal. The 
Commission might then decide to resubmit the proposal to a more 'sympathetic' 
evaluation team. That influential company might also approach their country's 
representatives on the EMC, who might then lobby the Commission on behalf of that 
particular project. The complete package of projects approved by the Commission was 
put before the EMC. The EMC voted to approve or reject the package as a whole.
The Commission signed a contract with each member of a successful 
consortium. Each consortium had a leader who acted on behalf of the consortium in all 
dealings with the Commission. Each project was assigned a project manager who was 
on temporary contract with the Commission. The project manager visited the research 
sites and submitted a progress report to the Commission each month. Every six 
months, the project was scrutinized more carefully and evaluated. Projects normally 
fell behind schedule, but if the project fell too far behind schedule, the Commission 
could terminate it.
Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., in note 15, p. 32.
Intervie\\'S, Mr David Talbot; Mr Steven Roberts; Mr Stephen Joseph, 24 July 1991; Mr Michael 
Hardy; Ms Rosalie Zobel; Mr Ross Cooper; Mr Barney Trench. The concept was, in fact, 
institutionalized at the 1984 Fountainebleau Summit where the Council agreed to apply the principle 
to payments into the budget so that no member would bear a budgetary burden that was excessive to 
its receipts.
Interviews, Ms Angela Mison Fulleylove; Mr Din Ghali; and Mr Tim Simmons.
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Esprit, 8th Report, Session 1984- 
85, (London: HMSO, 1985), p. 57.
Interviews, Ms Angela Mison Fulleylove; Mr Din Ghali; Mr R(*ert (Hooper; Mr Derek Flyime, 3 
December 1992; and Mr Des Langford.
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6.3 Ministers' Policy in Esprit I
Mrs Thatcher established her Government's objectives in Esprit I: limit the size of the 
Brussels bureaucracy, ensure effective management, get Britain's juste retour dnà 
minimize the Esprit budget. These were an extension of her objectives regarding most 
Community issues.^^
Mr Baker articulated these in the House of Commons. On the issue of 
bureaucracy, he said:
At the Research Council member states were also concerned to 
secure...adequate management arrangements for the programme. Important 
improvements have been made to the original management proposals which 
will have the effect of involving member states directly in decisions on major 
projects and the general direction of the programme. This is a point on which 
we rightly insisted. We have also pressed for much of the management to be 
carried out by people on secondment from industry rather than by permanent 
officials.^®
As to the technical work plan, considerable effort has gone into drawing up a 
technical programme for Esprit. Industry has been closely involved in this 
process and many British firms have played their part. I regard this involvement 
of companies as extremely important as a means of ensuring that the 
programme is not just a bureaucratic exercise but it genuinely affected by the 
market place.^^
As far as minimizing the Esprit budget, Mr Baker argued the following:
The Government have always made clear their support for the principle of 
Esprit which was rightly described by the Stuttgart summit as an exemplary 
project. It is indeed the kind of programme the Community should be 
developing. However, it is a substantial programme with a proposed cost of 
some £850 million, half of which will be borne by the Community. It would 
have been wrong to approve a programme of this size unless we were sure that 
it could be paid for.^^
Finally, Mr Baker spoke of getting y W e  nerour from Esprit.
These are by no means the only objectives Mrs Thatcher sought in the European Community. They 
are ones referred to by Ministers in relation to Esprit. For an insight into Mrs Thatcher’s general 
approach to the Community during this period, see Thatcher, op. cit, in note 13, pp. 536-59.
House of Commons Debate, 21 March 1984, Hansard(yo\. 56, col. 1113).
41 Ibid.
42 House of Commons, Written Answer, 29 February 1984, Hansard(WoX. 55, col. 170).
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The United Kingdom was very successful in securing participation in these 
projects; it is involved in over half of them and in the lead in about one third.
So this is a community programme in which there is a very positive net benefit 
to the United Kingdom and British companies."*^
From the time Esprit I was approved to late 1984, civil servants did not pursue 
their Ministers' objectives. They formulated and implemented their own instead. The 
following discussion employs this thesis' formulation of the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective to explore why civil servants failed to implement their Ministers' objectives 
and what factors caused them to formulate the particular objectives that they did 
pursue. Five hypotheses will be tested:
• Bureaucrats work to maximize their budgets, rank and responsibilities.
• They may compete with one another in doing so.
• The preference from position function explains bureaucrats' objectives in Esprit.
That is, bureaucrats' objectives in Esprit can be explained by reference to their
perceptions of how Esprit would affect their budgets, responsibilities and 
promotional prospects.
• Action channels provide insight into the means by which bureaucrats pursued their 
objectives in Esprit.
• Bureaucratic competition can affect British policy in Esprit when Ministerial 
objectives are not consistent and clearly articulated, when Ministers do not control 
or supervise the issue and when Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms 
are ineffective.
6.4 Dc facto British Policy in Esprit I
Esprit pilot phase issues had been handled in Alastair Macdonald's IT division, but 
member states' Governments were minimally involved. (See Chapter 3.) The pilot 
phase had few implementation requirements. British participation in pilot phase 
projects was limited primarily to three companies, GEC, Plessey and ICL, and they 
pursued their interests with little recourse to the DTI.
Esprit I, in contrast, involved member states' Governments, particularly in the 
EMC. Mr Oakley wanted responsibility for Esprit.^ Esprit overlapped the Alvey 
Programme in so many areas that the chance of Esprit poaching Alvey work, thus 
reducing the responsibilities of the Alvey Directorate, was a very real possibility. Mr 
Oakley approached Mr Macdonald and the two agreed that responsibility for Esprit
House of Commons Debate, 21 March 1984, Hansard (Vol. 56, col. 1112). 
^  Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 February 1992.
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should be transferred to Mr Oakley's Alvey Directorate. Mr Macdonald recalled that, 
'Brian Oakley was pleased when I agreed that he should handle Esprit. He was relieved 
that I did not get involved in a turf war. I could have said that I wanted responsibility 
for Esprit because certain aspects of the work in software, especially office and 
software technology, was in IT division'.'*^
Bureaucratic Politics predicts that civil servants fight to protect their 
responsibilities. On the face of it, Mr Macdonald's willingness to pass Esprit to the 
Alvey Directorate goes against this precept. In truth, Mr Macdonald was pleased to be 
rid of an administrative burden he predicted would offer little in the way of budgets, 
responsibilities and promotions. When interviewed, Mr Macdonald said, 'I wouldn't 
have put any money on Esprit. ...I thought that they [the Commission] were playing 
three dimensional chess. Many people thought that the Commission was incapable of 
implementing such an ambitious programme. I sympathized with that cynicism'.'^
The decision to transfer responsibility was a quiet and casual one between two 
civil servants on friendly terms. Their Minister, Mr Baker, was consulted after the 
decision was made. According to Mr Oakley,
I think a good civil servant would have said to a Minister after a meeting which 
was probably not on Esprit, but on Europe or something, 'Oh, by the way, I am 
proposing to put responsibility for Esprit in the Alvey Directorate' or something 
like that. The thing would have been half asking Minister's advice, half asking 
for their authority, but not really expecting them to say no.'*'^
Mr Major was not consulted, despite the fact that Esprit covered research in 
gallium arsenide and MMI, both of which fell under his remit. Mr Major was not 
satisfied with the new arrangement. He had already had to fend off the Alvey 
Directorate when it attempted to bring gallium arsenide research into the Alvey 
Programme. If Mr Oakley and the Alvey Directorate were given responsibility for 
Esprit, they could gain influence over gallium arsenide research through Esprit. 
According to Mr Oakley,
He never really accepted it. Alastair Macdonald very early on, within a few 
weeks of my coming in, saw the sense of my handling Esprit issues and decreed 
that. And that was my charter, as it were. If you stand back from it, it was the 
obvious thing to do. But John Major never liked it....***
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992. 
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992. 
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
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Mr Macdonald supported Mr Oakley's assessment. Mr Macdonald diplomatically 
stated that moving Esprit to the Alvey Directorate required 'delicate man management'. 
'Man management' meant that Mr Oakley had to concede to Major's demand for a seat 
on the Esprit Management Committee.
Mr Oakley and Mr Macdonald justified the decision to move Esprit to the 
Directorate in terms of cost/benefit analysis tinged with a smattering of bureaucratic 
competition. Mr Oakley suggested that the Alvey Directorate was better placed to 
administer Esprit because it could take advantage of economies of scale by 
implementing two similar programmes and because Mr Major had proved himself a 
less than adequate programme manager. When asked whether anyone considered 
giving Mr Major responsibility for Esprit, Mr Oakley responded:
I don't really think so. That point never occurred to me at the time as being 
logical. Looking at the industrial state now, it doesn't seem possible. But at the 
time, and there was a history to it, the components industry was seen as a 
major industry. Of course it was on its way down, but it was a major industry. 
John ran this division, entirely devoted to that. Within a few years, the thing 
was crumbling down and then totally crumbled and we were picking up 
whatever crumbs we could from the Japanese tables. There were major 
problems and there were endless problems about getting British firms to work 
together in gallium arsenide and it went on. As far as that was concerned, he 
[John Major] was clearly in control. But as far as general research on IT was 
concerned, there was no obvious part that dealt with it by tradition. The highly 
applied research in the department was handled by the industry divisions, which 
now seems stupid, and the central research division ran peculiar things where 
there didn't seem to be an appropriate industry division. You must remember 
that at one time I ran those divisions myself, before I came out of the DTI. So, 
when we got a sudden major programme in IT R&D [the Alvey Programme], it 
was quite logical that Alastair should have seen that Esprit, which was IT R&D 
should have gone with it.^ ^
Neither gentleman paid much heed to the conflict of interest generated by this 
decision. Administration of Esprit in Britain was now in the hands of an organization 
that was created expressly to implement the Alvey Programme. Alvey was a national 
programme which, at root, protected British industry from foreign competition, 
including competition from European firms that British industry would be collaborating 
with under Esprit. Esprit undermined the justification for Alvey.
To briefly summarize, Mr Oakley was interested to maximize his budgets and 
responsibilities. Mr Major was interested to protect his. One gentleman could not
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
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pursue his interests without threatening the interests of the other. Consequently, 
competition ensued. The first two hypotheses hold true.
As mentioned earlier, civil servants in the Alvey Directorate did not pursue the 
objectives set down by their Ministers. Instead, they formulated and pursued their own. 
The question is whether those objectives can be explained by reference to the Alvey 
Directorate's perceptions of how Esprit would affect their budgets, responsibilities and 
promotional prospects. In other words, does the preference-ffom-position function 
hold?
Members of the Alvey Directorate did not pursue the Prime Minister and Mr 
Baker's desire to receive juste retour îrom Esprit. Instead, they maneuvered to keep 
important British companies and academics working under the Alvey umbrella In 
Oakley's words, 'we didn't discourage companies and universities from going to Esprit, 
but we didn't encourage them either.'^® As Dr Fawcett attested, 'Esprit was not a 
significant issue'.
Esprit was a threat to the Alvey Directorate's budget. Recall from Chapter 4 
that Mr Oakley was fearful that the Treasury would 'claw back' Alvey funds in its 
efforts to reduce Government spending. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr 
Geoffrey Howe (and later Mr Nigel Lawson), was known to be wary of the 
Programme's finances. The only way the Directorate could ensure that Alvey funds 
were not clawed back was to spend them as quickly as possible. If British companies 
were funded by Esprit rather than by Alvey, Alvey would have fewer projects to fund 
and Alvey money would be vulnerable to the Treasury.
Accordingly Mr Oakley intentionally kept his staff concentrated on Alvey: 'in 
the early years I tried to keep the involvement of the Alvey Directorate staff in Esprit 
matters to a minimum, in order to concentrate our limited effort on Alvey matters....
He only allowed three members of the Directorate to work on Esprit. Dr Walker was 
given primary responsibility and he was assisted by a 'reasonably pedestrian' civil 
servant, G% and a secretary.
Members of the Directorate understood that they were to limit participation in
Esprit.
They had a job to do. Their immediate job was to run their programme and 
they had a budget. If no one was pressing them particularly hard to do it 
[concern themselves with Esprit], then it tended not to get done. They all went
Interview, Dr David Thomas.
Interview, Dr William Fawcett.
Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owen, Alvey: Britain’s Strategic Computing Initiative (London: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989), p. 112.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 February 1992.
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to Brussels, but it was in drips and drabs and I used to feed them the projects 
that were coming out in the [Esprit] decisions for briefings and so on and some 
of them took that seriously and some of them didn't. But the fact of the matter 
is that. ..it was so much easier for them to get on with the job that they had to 
do than to worry about Esprit which they didn't have to do.^ "^
Mr Din Ghali, of MARI Advanced Technology, recalls the Alvey Directorate's 
attitude toward his company's interests in Esprit.
When we were bidding, we had to get the DTI [Alvey Directorate] to back us 
on those projects. I remember someone saying, 'You are going to get one 
project. What do you want more than one for? A small company like you, you 
can't have more than one project.' I said, 'It is important to us. We want three 
projects and we are going for three.' And then they said, 'You know, you are 
against GEC in this.' We said we didn't care. 'We are a British consortium and 
you have to back us.' In the end we won, but it was that sort of battle with the 
officers in the DTI [Alvey Directorate].-^
The Alvey Directorate did not always need actively to discourage companies 
from going to Esprit. Most of Britain's largest and strongest companies and universities 
were content to work in the Alvey framework when Alvey funds were available. The 
overheads and difficulties of working with a European consortium and with the 
Brussels bureaucracy were large relative to working with a British based consortium 
and the Alvey Directorate. As Dr David Thomas put it, 'Anyone who could get Alvey 
funding would go for it over Esprit'
While researchers from strong British firms and universities worked in Alvey, 
those who could not receive Alvey funding were forced by default to Esprit. According 
to Mr Oakley, 'Esprit 'didn't seem to be important. It was the second eleven of the 
British firms in the early years that you could see quite clearly in the analysis that were 
in Esprit. The best teams were staying with the national funding because they could get 
the national funding. The second best teams which were not getting the national 
funding were going that way [to Esprit]'. Expressed in terms of Bureaucratic 
Politics, the A lvey Directorate assisted companies incorporated in A lvey's action 
channels, while those outside the action channels were forced to turn to Esprit.
MARI Advanced Technology fell outside Alvey's action channels. Accordingly,
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Mr Din Ghali.
Interviews, Dr David Thomas; Mr David Dace; Ms Angela Mison Fulleylove; Mr Virgilio 
Pasquali; and Mr Robert Morland. They all agreed.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
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We found that with going to Brussels, we were operating on a level playing 
field. We didn't have to have the right connections with the 'in' crowd. In 
Esprit, we could put in a fairly substantial proposal, showing we knew what we 
were talking about and could bring in appropriate skills from other countries, 
that was assessed on its own merit. Whereas with Alvey, the whole process 
wasn't as open. We didn't know how to handle this. With Brussels, we knew 
exactly where we were. The process was open, you knew what was happening 
and when. With Alvey, there were no deadlines and it was never clear what was 
going on.
The same applied for British academics. According to Mr Oakley, British 
academics working in Esprit were the 'second eleven'. 'Academics who couldn't get 
Alvey funding went to Esprit. The great universities were looking to Alvey and were 
getting Alvey fu n d in g '.Academics in A lvey's action channels received the 
Directorate's attention and Alvey's funds.
Strong British companies and academics did participate in Esprit at the same 
time that they worked through Alvey. Those who participated in Esprit were, generally 
speaking, companies and universities represented on the Esprit Steering Committee or 
the Esprit Advisory Board and thus had a vested interest in Esprit. The quantity of 
work they performed in Esprit paled in comparison, however, to their Alvey work. 
Further, their participation in Esprit was limited to areas not covered in Alvey's 
remit.
In addition to juste retour. Ministers wished to limit the size of the
Brussels bureaucracy and ensure effective Esprit management. The structure of the 
ITTF suited the first objective. The ITTF was small and staffed by a mixture of 
Commission civil servants and industrial secondees. Thus, nothing was expected of the 
Alvey Directorate on this score.
As regards the second, ensuring effective management, there was much the 
Alvey Directorate could have done but did not. During its first couple of years, the 
ITTF was not the model of bureaucratic efficiency. The ITTF had not, for example, 
established effective mechanisms to disseminate information. Every month, the ITTF 
sent crates of computer print-outs to member states' Governments. These supposedly 
provided member states with all the information they needed about Esprit. In fact, the 
print-outs were^entirely intelligible and the Alvey Directorate, for one, ignored them.®* 
In another example of inefficiency, the ITTF was operating according to a timetable 
that potential researchers found exasperating and unworkable. The ITTF was late in
Interview, Mr Din Ghali.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 February 1992.
See, for example, testimony of Logica, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 37, p. 128. For statistics, see 
Memorandum submitted by the Department of Trade and Industry, ibid., p. 189.
®* Interviews, Dr Ken Guy; Mr Paul Quintas; and Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
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preparing yearly workplans, it did not issue calls for proposals according to any 
predictable schedule, it was slow in evaluating project proposals and the ITTF was
unacceptably tardy in paying r e s e a r c h e r s . ^ ^
The Alvey Directorate made no effort to improve these inefficiencies. In fact, 
not once did the Directorate imply that the ITTF's efficiency needed to be improved. 
To do so would be tantamount to the pot calling the kettle black. Like the Alvey 
Directorate, the ITTF was a bureaucratic anomaly. It was not an official Commission 
organization, it was not accountable according to the normal Brussels hierarchy and its 
operating procedures were very loosely followed. Mr David Talbot, Director of Esprit 
Software, suggested that the ITTF and the Alvey Directorate were both 'mavericks’ 
and that ’There was a fellow feeling and sympathetic synergy’.^  ^ It was not in the 
interests o f the Aivey Directors to change the structure o f an organization that 
mirrored their o \m i or to criticize procedures that were equally as loose as theirs
Further, many members of the Alvey Directorate were on good terms with 
members of the ITTF. Mr Oakley and Dr Walker quickly developed a close working 
relationship with the Esprit director, Mr Jean Marie Cadiou, and several of his 
d e p u t i e s .M r  Oakley suggested that at first the 'Esprit guys were extremely nervous. 
They thought there would be rivalry between the two programmes. But they quickly 
saw that there was an organized centre in the UK which knew how to run a 
programme like Esprit. They knew that they could get an organized input. There was 
an office with a label "Esprit" on it. From the Esprit point of view, this was very 
good'.^^ Mr Cadiou and his ITTF were content to work with and support the Alvey 
Directorate. In their testimony to the Lords, Mr Cadiou and Dr Hunke, Director of 
Esprit operations, referred to Mr Oakley as the 'prime' representative of the United 
Kingdom — this despite the fact that Mr Major was also a UK representative on the 
EMC^^ Viscount Davignon described the relationship between the ITTF and the 
Alvey Directorate in the following manner: 'My feeling is that it is off to a good start. 
We all know that coordination efforts are not easy, but it is about the most, I would 
say, sympathetic in terms of relations in between individuals that I have seen for a long
For a summary of the failings of the ITTF, see Commission of the European Communities, 'Esprit: 
The First Phase Progress and Results', Com (86) 687 final (Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities, 8 December 1986); and Commission of the European Communities, 'Concerning a 
Review to Assess the Initial Results of the Programme Esprit', Com (85) 616 final (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities, 19 November 1985).
Interview, Mr David Talbot.
Interviews, Dr Ken Guy; and Mr Paul Quintas.
Interviews, Dr Timothy Walker; Mr Robert Morland; Dr Ken Guy; and Mr Paul Quintas. 
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 Februaiy 1992.
Testimony of Mr Jean Marie Cadiou (Director, Esprit, DGXIII), House of Lords, op. cit., in note 
37, pp. 143-44.
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time, so I would be quite c o n t e n t . I t  was certainly not in the interests of the Alvey 
Directorate to change a good thing. In testimony before the House of Lords, Mr 
Oakley made clear his (not his Ministers') approach to the ITTF.
In policy terms we welcome the way industry has been deeply involved in 
drawing up the strategy and priorities for the programme. In administrative 
terms we welcome the Task Force, that is the IT Task Force of the European 
Community, who seem to be handling the rather difficult programme very 
efficiently.^^
The final objective of Mrs Thatcher, as articulated by Mr Baker, was to limit 
Esprit's budget. In this regard, the Alvey Directorate had little role to play. Esprit 
funding had become a Ministerial prerogative, not one for civil servants. Britain was 
represented at negotiations by Mrs Thatcher or by Mr Baker. Once Esprit I was 
approved, funding levels were set for five years. Esprit II was not to be considered for 
several years.
The only task regarding finances that involved members of the Alvey 
Directorate was in the EMC negotiations over how Esprit money would be allocated 
across the technical sub-programmes. During this period, Mr Brian Oakley, was not 
particularly concerned about where Esprit money went as long as Alvey Programme 
money was being spent.
The lack of concern for Esprit spending decisions during this period is 
important given the fact that the two programmes were likely to spend money on 
similar projects and on similar participants. Duplication was likely, if not inevitable. 
But as Dr Fawcett, Director of Alvey's largest sub-programme (VLSI), revealed, 
'There was no coordination or strategy between Alvey and Esprit or agreement over 
what Alvey should focus on and what Esprit should focus on. We decided to take a 
running start and deal with the other issues l a t e r ' . D r  Walker confirmed this: 'I found 
it very hard to get people to focus on what the balance between Alvey and Esprit 
should be. When Esprit and Alvey started, no one had done any thinking on what the 
balance should be. No one had any clear idea about what activities should be done in 
Esprit and what in A l v e y . T h e  Directorate was concerned only to spend Alvey 
money and to prevent British companies and academics from receiving money 
simultaneously from Alvey and from Esprit for a single research project.
Testimony of Viscount Davignon (Former Head of DGXII), House of Lords, op. cit., in note 37, p. 
173.
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 37, p. 1.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Dr William Fawcett.
Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
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To summarize, Ministers established policy in Esprit: get Britain's juste retour^  
limit the size of the Brussels bureaucracy; ensure effective Esprit management; and 
minimize the Esprit budget. The second and fourth objectives required no action on the 
part of the Alvey Directorate, but the Directorate was expected to act on the first and 
the third. They did not, because geXimg juste retour dind securing effective Esprit 
management worked directly against the occupational interests of members of the 
Alvey Directorate. Rather than pursue Ministerial objectives, they formulated and 
pursued ones that were compatible with their occupational interests. First, they 
intentionally limited British participation in Esprit to ensure the safety of the Alvey 
Directorate's budget. Their actions in this regard were influenced by Alvey action 
channels. Second, they 'welcomed' an Esprit management structure that had proven 
itself to be inefficient. It was not in their occupational interests to criticize the ITTF 
because in doing so they might inadvertently draw attention to their own managerial 
weaknesses, many of which were caused by the autonomy they so jealously guarded. 
Thus, the third and fourth hypotheses are accepted.
6.5 Getting Away with It
The Alvey Directorate did not pursue their Ministers' objectives in Esprit. Rather, they 
pursued their own objectives, which, as Bureaucratic Politics would predict, helped 
them protect their own budgets and responsibilities. In so doing, bureaucratic 
competition affected British policy in Esprit. The relevant question is: Why was the 
Directorate able to pursue its own objectives, which were inspired by occupational 
interests, and ignore Ministerial ones? This thesis hypothesizes that bureaucrats may 
pursue their own interests, in lieu of Ministerial ones, under the following conditions: 
when Ministerial objectives are not consistent or clearly articulated; when Ministers do 
not exercise control or supervision over the issue; and when Whitehall coordination 
and control mechanisms are not functioning effectively.
6.5a Ministerial Objectives
Mrs Thatcher set down very consistent objectives in Esprit. None of her objectives 
were contradictory, in the sense that pursuit of one hindered or prohibited pursuit of 
another. Further, Mr Baker articulated these objectives in a very clear manner. It 
would thus appear that the first condition did not exist in the DTI. Closer inspection, 
however, reveals that Mr Baker's approach to Esprit was not nearly as consistent as his 
Commons speeches would suggest.
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Mr Baker's approach to Esprit was rather confused. In public, he spoke 
positively of Esprit and pledged his Government's wholehearted commitment to it. In 
an interview, he even claimed credit for convincing the Prime Minister to approve it. In 
the same interview, however, he confessed to being skeptical of Esprit and to having a 
fondness for the Alvey Programme instead.'^  ^ The Alvey Programme was his 'baby' and 
he was not interested to let a European programme threaten the Programme (and its 
Directorate) he had worked hard to create. According to Dr David Thomas:
...there was the feeling in lots of parts of the DTI that we were not 
welcome....As soon as the DTI could get Alvey back into the DTI, they did. It 
was always a very uneasy relationship....But we had the support of Ken Baker, 
Britain's first and last Minister of Information Technology, who was pleased 
with the Alvey Directorate.’^'*
Mr Paddy Ashdown picked up on the inconsistencies in Mr Baker's attitude 
toward Esprit. During a Commons debate in which Mr Baker praised Esprit, Mr 
Ashdown suggested that throughout the 'Minister's otherwise extremely valuable and 
useful speech, there seemed to be far too much self-congratulation, which almost 
bordered on complacency The incongruence between Mr Baker's public speeches 
and private behaviour reduced his policy statements to rhetoric from the point of view 
of his civil servants. Thus, the first condition was met.
6.5b Ministerial Control and Supervision
After giving it her approval. Esprit was of little importance in the Prime Minister's 
lexicon of troubles. Her attention was focused on domestic affairs. The Conservatives 
won the June 1983 General Election with a sound Parliamentary majority, but before 
long, 'She looked like a leader marooned.The  economic recovery was very tenuous; 
miners went on strike; and a bomb exploded in the Grand Hotel, Brighton at the 
Conservative Party conference. In the face of pressing domestic issues, Mrs Thatcher 
left Esprit entirely to the DTI and to Mr Baker and his civil servants in particular. Mr 
Baker, who chaired the Information Technology Advisory Panel which advised the 
Prime Minister and who sat on the Cabinet Committee on Information Technology
Interview, Mr Kenneth Baker.
Interview, Dr David Thomas.
Mr Paddy Ashdown, House of Commons Debate, 21 March 1984, Hansard(yo\. 56, col. 1124). 
Emphasis added.
Hugo Young, One o /f /s  (London; Pan Books. 1990), p. 340.
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with the Prime Minister, could not recall the Prime Minister being involved in any 
Esprit issue after it was approved/^
From June 1983, when the Department of Trade and Department of Industry 
were amalgamated, civil servants in the DTI received little in the way of strong 
leadership from their Secretary of States. Mr Cecil Parkinson was their first Secretary 
of State, but his tenure was very brief. He was followed by Mr Norman Tebbit, whose 
relationship with his civil servants was reported to be less than ideal: 'Administration 
was not his forte. There were complaints about decisions not being made, and of great 
testiness with departmental officials....
As far as Mr Baker goes, he paid Esprit little heed and failed to supervise his 
civil servants. He was not a 'hands-on' Minister; he was an 'ideas man'. Mr Duguid 
recalled Baker's managerial style. 'He was at the cutting edge of new things even 
though he would leave it to others whether it worked out or not'.^^ Mr Duguid 
remembered Mr Baker asking his civil servants for 'a scheme a month'. 'We would say, 
"But don't you want to know about the old schemes?" He would say, "Never mind 
about those, I want a new scheme. Dr AT Wallard suggested a similar style.
Baker operated in a way very unlike any other Minister I have seen. He had a 
very outward way of working. Every Monday we had meetings where we 
would meet and throw out ideas for what we thought we should be doing. 
People in IT and electronics caught his imagination. His attitude was 'Right, we 
will do that now.' There was much less considered attention to the issues. Brian 
Oakley had a close personal relationship with the Minister and he [Baker] 
allowed him to drive things on his own.*^
Civil servants in the Alvey Directorate did not work under the watchful eye of 
their Ministers. They were allowed a free reign to pursue their own objectives in 
Esprit. Thus, the second condition was satisfied.
6.5c Whitehall Control and Coordination Mechanisms
Writing about British foreign policy-making, William Wallace suggest that, 'more or 
less formally organized, meeting either regularly or irregularly as circumstances 
require, a network of interdepartmental committees and consultations on matters of
Interview, Mr Kenneth Baker.
Young, op. cit.. in note 76, p. 497.
Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
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external relations extends throughout Whitehall ' .This network can have its own 
momentum and logic. Even in the absence of clearly articulated Ministerial objectives 
and Ministerial oversight, this committee network, which extends across departments 
and across Whitehall, can ensure that policy and its implementation are coordinated 
across departments. During the period under review in this chapter, this network failed 
from the lowest to the highest levels.
At the lowest level, consultation and coordination between the Alvey 
Directorate and other DTI divisions affected by Esprit was minimal. Chapter 4 
discussed how the Alvey Directorate was able to control when and on what issues 
consultation with other divisions of the DTI took place. As regards Esprit in particular, 
the Alvey Directorate established a virtual monopoly on information. The Alvey 
Directorate was the unit formally responsible for Esprit and all information was 
controlled by it. As Dr WB Willot, attested, 'Once Esprit got bedded down, the 
Commission sent out information on a general mailing list. But the more important 
stuff, like project specifications and funding decisions, were gathered by the Alvey 
Directorate and distributed as they saw fit'.*^  Thus, when Esprit information was 
passed to other DTI divisions, it was on the Alvey Directorate's terms.
Despite the fact that Mr Major attended EMC meetings alongside Mr Oakley, 
consultation between LA division and the Alvey Directorate on Esprit issues was 
limited. As Mr Oakley attested, 'There were occasional meetings on Esprit matters 
with John Major and his people. One does not want to make an exaggeration. There 
were only a certain number. I had a team which was the Esprit team'. '^* Dr Walker, the 
Alvey administrator with formal responsibility for Esprit, said that there were no 
standard procedures for briefing other DTI divisions on Esprit. 'It all depends on the 
people involved. Truthfully, LA would probably claim that we didn't given them total 
information and we would say that we did.'*^
Mr Major attended Esprit Management Committee meetings with Oakley, but 
Mr Oakley and Jean Marie Cadiou had the close working relationship. As Dr Walker 
explained, 'Often someone from LA came to the Management Committee, but they did 
not do much. I'm sure they had their contacts in Brussels, but Brian and I knew Cadiou 
well....'^^ As Mr Oakley confessed, 'The Electronics Applications division disliked the 
Alvey Directorate running Esprit. They largely tried to ignore my role, but they did not 
get away with it. John Major didn't have much influence and he was quickly isolated.
William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 50.
Interview, Dr WB Willott.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
Interview, Dr Timothy Walker.
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Rapidly, Brussels turned to me. Thereafter, he was not a very important player'.*"^  Mr 
Major declined an interview, but when asked in a telephone conversation about his role 
in Esprit, he remarked that 'it was not a pleasurable experience' and that 'unfortunately, 
I had no influence at all on Esprit'.**
At the divisional level, the Alvey Directorate had a great measure of 
independence as regards Esprit. The same was true at the departmental level. In the 
DTI, priorities for national and EC research programmes should have been established 
by the RTF division and STAMG. However, as Chapter 4 revealed, the Alvey 
Directorate was independent of RTF and STAMG. Consequently, the Alvey 
Directorate was free of departmental oversight mechanisms and able to pursue its own 
objectives in Esprit.*^
The next level, interdepartmental committees that are meant to coordinate and 
oversee departmental policies, also failed to supervise the Alvey Directorate and hence 
its actions in Esprit. There were two committees (one of departmental Chief Scientists 
and Fermanent Secretaries that reported to the Secretary of the Cabinet and one of 
departmental Chief Scientists that reported to the Chief Scientist in the Cabinet Office) 
that were supposed to coordinate departmental research policies. Because the Alvey 
Directorate was independent of DTI departmental networks, it was free from the 
oversight of these committees. Even if the Alvey Directorate had been incorporated 
into these committees, it is doubtful whether they could have exerted effective control. 
The committees seldom met and were accused of being ineffective.^^
The Cabinet Office, the next step above interdepartmental committees, was too 
weak to exert influence over Esprit. Attempts had been made during Mrs Thatcher's 
second term to redress the inadequacy of the Governmental machinery for science and 
technology. In 1983, the Central Folicy Review Staff (CFRS) was abolished. The 
Science Group was split into two groups (the Science and Technology Secretariat and 
the Economics Secretariat) and both were moved to the Cabinet Office. The Chief 
Scientist was moved with the Science and Technology Secretariat to the Cabinet 
Office and the Secretariat's staff was increased. The Science and Technology 
Secretariat acted as the secretariat for a Cabinet Committee on science and technology 
that reportedly ex i s t ed . The  committee of departmental Chief Scientists and
*^  Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 February 1992.
** Telephone conversation with Mr John Major, 9 November 1992.
*^  Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Civil Research and Development, 
First Report, Session 1986-87, HL20-I (London: HMSO, 1987), p. 21.
^^Ibid, p. 21.
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Permanent Secretaries reported to the Secretary of the Cabinet and the committee of 
departmental Chief Scientists reported to the Chief Scientist in the Cabinet Office.^^
Although authority had been centralized in the Cabinet Office, where the Chief 
Scientist and the Science and Technology Secretariat were now located, the 
effectiveness of the Government machine for science and technology improved little, if 
at all. An article with the headline 'Who is Robin Nicholson' appeared in the Financial 
Times.^ ^ The anecdotal article suggested that in a Cabinet meeting, someone asked 
'Who is Robin Nicholson?'. Not a single Cabinet Minister knew. Robin Nicholson was 
the Chief Scientific Advisor and had been so since late 1981.
Neither the Chief Scientist nor the Science and Technology Secretariat had any 
scrutiny over the Alvey Directorate or influence over Esprit. '^* According to Mr 
Oakley:
My recollection is that there was a Cabinet Office mechanism about the briefing 
of our representative in Brussels in general and that a certain number of issues 
were fed into that Committee. It was never very effective, but it was there. 
When I say never very effective, it probably just did not really worry about 
Esprit very much. My recollection is that the Cabinet Office Committee was 
not terribly interested once the money had been committed.
The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology blamed this 
state of affairs on a 'vacuum at the centre'. The Prime^lalmed responsibility for science 
and technology policy, but did not provide adequate guidance.^^ Regarding 
information technology in particular, the Information Technology sector working party 
of the National Economic Development Council argued that the lack of a coherent 
Government policy had caused a crisis in the IT sector. "^^
The Alvey Directorate was free of Whitehall control and coordination 
mechanisms. Thus, the third condition was satisfied.
6.6 Conclusion
Bureaucratic relationships in the DTI were competitive as some civil servants worked 
to maximize and protect their budgets and responsibilities. (The evidence did not
92 Ibid
9^  Financial Times, 'Who is Robin Nicholson?', 5 March 1983, p. 15.
9'* Interviews, Dr Ken Guy; and Mr Paul Quintas.
95 Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
9^  House of Lords, op. cit., in note 90, p. 41.
92 National Economic Development Council, Information Technology Economic Development 
Committee, Crisis Facing Information Technologies (Londorw National Economic Development 
Council, June 1984).
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indicate that civil servants were concerned with issues of rank and promotion.) As part 
of the competition, civil servants in the Alvey Directorate formulated objectives in 
Esprit that furthered their occupational interests. They pursued those objectives rather 
than ones articulated by their Ministers. Action channels provided useful insight into 
the means by which their objectives in Esprit were pursued. They were allowed to 
follow their interests in lieu of Ministerial ones because they were not provided with 
consistent Ministerial objectives, because they were not subject to Ministerial control 
or supervision and because Whitehall mechanisms were too weak to exert control over 
the Directorate. The Directorate was, as one interviewee put it, 'a loose cannon on 
deck'.^* Consequently, bureaucratic competition was allowed to have a real effect on 
British policy in Esprit.
Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
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British Policy in Esprit: Late 1984 Through 1985 
Chapter 7
From April 1983 to late 1984, the Alvey Directorate created much consternation 
primarily among civil servants in LA division. Alvey threatened their budgets and 
responsibilities. From late 1984 through 1985, Alvey's threat potential was viewed with 
alarm by a greater number of civil servants and its merits were questioned in 
Parliament. A constant barrage of attacks reigned down on the Directorate. The 
Directorate inadvertently gave ammunition to its critics by making its operations and 
funding decisions public.
This Chapter explores the heightened alarm and ensuing competition following 
the Directorate's new policy of openness. Once again,^uestion central to this thesis is 
raised: Did bureaucratic competition affect British policy in Esprit? To answer this, the 
same five hypotheses advanced in Chapter 6 are tested here.
• Bureaucrats work to maximize their budgets, rank and responsibilities.
• They may compete with one another in doing so.
• The preference from position function explains bureaucrats' objectives in Esprit. 
That is, bureaucrats' objectives in Esprit can be explained by reference to their 
perceptions of how Esprit would affect their budgets, responsibilities and 
promotional prospects.
• Action channels provide insight into the means by which bureaucrats pursued their 
objectives in Esprit.
• Bureaucratic competition can affect British policy in Esprit when Ministerial 
objectives are not consistent and clearly articulated, when Ministers do not control 
or supervise the issue and when Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms 
are ineffective.
7.1 Competition Intensifies
During the first year and a half of Alvey, competition was rather localized — it took 
place primarily between the Alvey Directorate and LA division. The competition 
proved rather innocuous for the Directorate during this year and a half. It was tucked 
away in Millbank Tower, outside DTI control channels and supported by the Minister 
for Information Technology. Although the Alvey Directorate had fared well in the 
competition, Mr Oakley felt it necessary to placate some of his critics by opening the 
Directorate's operations and funding decisions to public scrutiny.
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Funding decisions and general Alvey gossip were published twice each month 
in the A lvey Newsletter, which went to virtually every institution active in IT. 
Beginning in 1984, annual reports that disclosed funding allocations were published. 
Well attended annual conferences were held. Perhaps most important in this disclosure 
exercise were two teams of academics Mr Oakley employed in early 1985 to evaluate 
the Alvey Programme. One team was from the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
at Sussex University and the other was from the Programme of Policy Research in 
Engineering, Science and Technology (PREST) at Manchester University.
The teams were asked to assess the technical content and management of the 
programme. Their assessments were not always complimentary. They criticized the 
Directorate's relaxed management and they criticized the fact that Alvey funds were 
highly concentrated among a small number of participants and in the VLSI sub- 
programme. The evaluators reported their findings to a wide audience through the 
A lvey Newsletter, at annual conferences and in a widely read mid-term review of the 
Alvey Programme. * Mr Morland suggested that the Programme's 'dirty laundry was 
aired in public': 'Oakley allowed the evaluators free reign and they had no apparent 
censorship.'2
While the Directorate was 'airing its dirty laundry in public', a number of 
changes were taking place in the DTI. First, the DTI's overall budget was being cut 
substantially. Second, the Department's funding priorities were being redefined. The 
new Secretary of State, Mr Norman Tebbit (and Mr Leon Brittan after him), shifted 
money away from industrial support and toward trade promotion. DTI resources were 
shifted to 'near market' activities such as product development, technology transfer, 
marketing research and consultancy services particularly for SMEs.^ Third, the 
Financial Management Initiative (FMI) was finally taking effect. The FMI had been 
resisted by Ministers and civil servants alike, but by late 1984 it had taken root in 
Whitehall and the DTI: 'permanent secretaries got as close as they ever do to 
enthusiasm when talking about administrative matters.''* Although much of the burden 
of the FMI fell to Ministers, it did force civil servants to concern themselves with 
managerial efficiency and 'value for money'. The new ethos Mrs Thatcher was trying to 
instill in the civil service was finally taking hold.
* Luke Georghiou, et. ai. Evaluation of the Alvey Programme: Interim Report (LonAon: HMSO, 
1987).
2 Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
 ^Department of Trade and Industry, Science and Technology Report 1984-85(London: Department 
of Trade and Industry, 1985).
 ^Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (yntxAQtr. Fontana Press, 1990), p. 619. For a brief discussion of the FMI, 
see Chapter 2.
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Alvey was made vulnerable by the three changes. First, it was a large 
programme sapping the now precious resources over which civil servants in the DTI 
were forced to compete. As Chapter 4 showed, when Alvey was approved, it affected 
the budgets of IT and LA divisions, but had little effect on the budgets of other DTI 
divisions. By late 1984, however, cuts in the DTI's overall budget were forcing the 
entire Department to absorb the costs of Alvey. Second, it was contrary to the 
Secretary of State's new trade oriented spending regime. Third, it was not managed 
according to the ideals encapsulated in the FMI.
Competition ensued. DTI civil servants who had not previously been overly 
concerned with Alvey worked to protect their budgets and responsibilities by 
criticizing the aberration. There is also evidence that they attacked the Directorate in 
order to protect a new ethos that was seeping through Whitehall: 'value for money'. 
Thus, the first two hypotheses hold true.
Mr Duguid described the criticisms.
Alvey seemed to draw a lot of consensus. Scientists supported it. Economists 
supported it. The administrators supported it. Everyone was in favour of 
progress for the DTI and everyone was in favour of Alvey. There was a 
coalition of support. This was a fashion which moved through the DTI and 
Whitehall. Then there was a backlash, a fashion swing. There was talk of the 
programme being so well endowed, but no consideration of whether the 
projects might be wasteful or not. There began to be a question mark over 
Alvey. There were jealousies from those who were not getting money and there 
were also questions about where the fruits of Alvey were.^
Civil servants from the Financial Resources Management division (FRM), who 
had responsibility for the Department's finances, began to question whether the Alvey 
Programme was providing 'value for money'.
The FRM was pressuring everyone to do correct evaluation of programmes. 
They were bearing down on everyone and reflected the culture of change 
toward getting a value for money. John Chapman was the guy. I remember him 
running around saying that things which did not get good evaluations should 
not be funded and pointing out that there were many contending users of scarce 
resources.^
Civil servants from the Policy Planning Unit were similarly critical of Alvey. 
They were concerned that Alvey was absorbing far too much money and spending that 
money in a way that was contrary to their Minister’s policy of support for SMEs.
 ^Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid. 
 ^Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
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There was a growing feeling that IT was not the only enabling technology. 
There were others and we should be more even-handed about it. Biotechnology 
and ceramic technology (the idea that you could make a car out of ceramic) 
were both on the list. There were guys in the PPU [Policy Planning Unit] 
saying that there are other enabling technologies we should look at. Chris 
Benjamin was interested in securing large overseas projects such as power 
stations on the continent. And then there were the programmes and people who 
were giving marketing support for small firms.*^
Dr AJ Wallard recalled a phrase coined against Alvey; '"large regular users". There was 
a feeling that large companies were taking Government to the cleaners.'* According to 
Mr David Wiseman, the consensus across the DTI was that the Alvey Directorate 'paid 
lip service' to SMEs.^
Cloistered away in Millbank Tower, Mr Oakley and his Directorate tried to 
insulate themselves against the backlash. They made light of the criticism, marking it 
down to a innocuous case of bureaucratic competition between the Trade division and 
the Industry division.
I will be blunt. There was quite a bit of little Englanders in the DTI, particularly 
in the middle classes, not at the top levels. The quality of DTI staff falls off 
steeply. Senior officials had qualities which I could never aspire to — the 
undersecretaries and permanent secretaries. But then it dropped off 
precipitously... [Tjhey were dominated by the attitude of the old Board of 
Trade. The feeling for free trade was enormous. They didn't like Industry and 
they didn't like Alvey.
Mr Oakley underestimated the situation. This was no longer a harmless case of 
bureaucratic competition that was limited to a few civil servants in the DTI battling for 
budgets and responsibilities. The Treasury, one of Whitehall's heavyweights, was now 
involved. The Treasury had been hostile toward the Alvey Programme from the outset, 
branding it 'another Concorde' — a project with a high profile but limited commercial 
return. The Treasury was also concerned that Alvey would not generate research that 
was 'additional' to the work already being undertaken by industry. Rather, industry 
would use Alvey Programme funds to finance research they would have funded 
themselves in the absence of the Programme. Government money would be wasted.
The Alvey Directorate had paid little heed to the Treasury's concerns for 
'additionality'. In evaluating project proposals, the Directorate did not consider
 ^Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
* Interview, Dr AJ Wallard.
 ^Interview, Mr David Wiseman.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
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whether industry would fund that research in the absence of Alvey funding. As Mr 
John Barber suggested,
Additionality was rather finessed over. I don't think it was ever treated 
explicitly. It is a bit lost in the mists of time. Also, Government's pro-active role 
in setting strategy would mean that additionality would be ensured. But when 
companies and the Directorate actually got together to design the project, the 
reiteration in actual projects would lose a bit of the additionality.^^
When the Directorate published its funding decisions, the Treasury's suspicions 
were confirmed. Alvey was funding the large, defence oriented semiconductor 
manufacturers who probably would have undertaken the research in the absence of 
Alvey (perhaps even under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence).
The Treasury began to attack the Alvey Directorate. As Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 
who took over as Minister for Information from Mr Baker, recalled.
Critiques began to fall into the hands of the Treasury who did not think Alvey 
was worthwhile to begin with. And the Treasury are all too happy to talk to 
civil servants or industrialists who had not received their fair share of the funds. 
Then Thatcher catches wind of all this and starts sending out memos and 
people have to justify their spending.
The National Audit Office and Committee of Public Accounts got wind of the goings 
on and word went out that they were preparing an investigation of the Alvey 
Directorate.
Dissatisfaction with the Alvey Programme and its Directorate was no longer 
limited to Whitehall. It spread to Westminster as well. Members of Parliament 
expressed similar concerns to those voiced by civil servants in the DTI. Why was 
Alvey funding Britain's largest semiconductor firms at the expense of SMEs and other 
technologies? Why was Alvey so poorly managed? Where were the fruits of the 
Government's spending?
On the issue of SMEs, Mr Paddy Ashdown argued the following:
I have some reservations about Alvey, particularly since it seems to be directed 
too much towards the big computer firms and not sufficiently towards the small 
firms. Yesterday I spoke to Mr Nigel Smith, the chairman of the British 
micromanufacturers group. He said "It simply has not happened. Alvey will not
* ^  Interview, Mr John Barter.
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 9 November 1992.
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produce anything for the small manufacturer. It is not there to assist us — it is a 
carve up for the giants".*^
Mr Kenneth Warren, chairman of the House Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry, expressed a similar concern. In a written question, he asked the Minister for 
Information Technology to 'review the problems presented for the development of 
information technology by the bias in the Alvey programme against the funding of 
contracts with small companies'.
The technical coverage of the Programme also came under attack.
I particularly regret the absence of any real mention of data-base management, 
which is fundamental and in which there is need to stimulate much more effort 
in this country. . . .I also regret the absence of any emphasis on the use of 
declarative languages in the programme for software engineering.^^
Paradoxically, the Government's Alvey programme...is undermining our 
capacity to develop this vital technology [gallium arsenide] effectively for the 
future. Why is that? The Alvey programme is dedicated to developing silicon 
chip-based technology and it is taking up all the available funding with which 
gallium arsenide could be developed. . .Many believe, and I am inclined to agree 
with them, that it might have been more logical for the Government not to have 
tried to catch up on silicon chip technology through the Alvey programme. 
Many in the industry believe that attempt, though brave and admirable, may be 
doomed to failure.
Concern over the management of the programme was expressed.
The British electronics industry has been dominated for years by defence 
requirements, and this can distort the pattern of research and development. Of 
course there is a vast technical expertise available from the Ministry of 
Defence. But the dominance of defence personnel in the administration of the 
Alvey programme on VLSI suggest that with the best will in the world we may 
simply misjudge commercial market requirements.*"^
Inevitably, if in industry the companies... are going to contribute 50 per cent of 
the initial research costs, they will want to see that their own particular interests 
are represented in the research programme. And this is not going to be what 
Alvey anticipated. Alvey was talking about something comparable to the
Mr Paddy Ashdown, House of Commons Debate, 17 February 1984, Hansard(yo\. 54, col. 497). 
Mr Kenneth Warren, House of Commons Written Question, 25 March 1985, Hansard(Wo\. 76, col. 
19).
Lord Flowers, House of Lords Debate, 18 January 1984, HansardÇdoX. 446, col. 1124).
Mr Paddy Ashdown, House of Commons Debate, 11 March 1985, HansardÇyo\. 75, col. 122). 
*^Lord Flowers, House of Lords Debate, 18 January 1984, HansardÇ\lo\. 446, col. 1126).
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Japanese 'Fifth Generation' computer programme, which was a directed 
programme of research in which the director of the programme went out and 
said 'These are the things which we believe should be the first priority for 
research' — rather than waiting for General Electric Company or Logica or 
others in industry to come forward with their own propositions and then trying 
to reconcile them and putting them into some sort of coherent programme.**
Questions were raised about the fruits of the Alvey Programme.
It has been suggested to me by a number of people in the industry that we 
would need to spend about 10 times the sum going to the Alvey programme to 
convert projects into commercial products that could be sold worldwide. If that 
is true, is the Minister confident that the estimated £3.5 billion needed to back 
up the Alvey programme will be forthcoming?*^
Perhaps the most damaging attack from Westminster came in April 1985 when 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Overseas Trade determined that Britain's 
balance of payments deficit in IT would increase from £2.3 billion in 1984 to £4 billion 
by 1988. The Alvey Programme, whose results were not expected for years, would do 
nothing to boost the figures.^®
7.2 The Loss of Kenneth Baker
Criticism against the Alvey Programme and its Directorate was becoming more 
intense, more injurious and it was coming from many different quarters. In the midst of 
this, the Alvey Directorate lost one of its most valuable assets: Mr Baker. Chapter 6 
showed that Mr Baker's patronage was one important factor contributing to the 
Directorate's ability to get on with its business of administering Alvey funds with little 
concern for the world outside Millbank Tower. In September 1984, Mr Baker left the 
DTI and moved to the Department of Environment as Minister for Local Government. 
He was replaced by Mr Geoffrey Pattie.
Mr Pattie was very interested in the space industry, which fell under his remit, 
and was soon accused of neglecting the IT industry. 2* Mr Pattie was defensive against 
the criticism. During interviews, he made the following comments: During my tenancy, 
it was hard to keep people excited about IT. People are more likely to go along with
**Lord McIntosh of Haringey, House of Lords Debate, 18 January 1984, HansardÇWoV 446, col. 
1136).
*^Mr Stuart Randall, House of Commons Debate, 21 December 1984, Hansard(WoX. 70, col. 722).
Financial Times, 1 May 1985, p. 6.
*^ For a scathing article, see 'Miracle Man', Electronics Times, 11 November 1985, p. 22.
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things which are new and exciting';^^ 'enthusiasm for IT was on the wane';^^ 'Baker 
saw an opportunity, put all his energy into it and then left it to explode on other
people.'24
7.3 The European Onslaught
Criticism against the Alvey Programme and its Directorate was raging. The 
Directorate's supportive Minister had left. Europe then invaded the IT scene with four 
initiatives that challenged the merits of national IT programmes.
First, in April 1985, the French Government called for a bold initiative to 
counter the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative ('Star Wars'). EUREKA 
(European Research and Coordination Agency), as it was called, would fund research 
in advanced technology, including information technology.
Second, in late June 1985, the President of the European Commission, Mr 
Jacques Delors, called for a doubling of the Community's research and development 
budget. He suggested that over half of the new budget go to IT R&D.
Third, the Single European Act, which was being negotiated, looked set to give 
the Commission formal competence in areas of high technology and usher in the 
'European Technological Community'.
Fourth, in November 1985, the Commission proposed the second phase of 
Esprit. When Esprit I had been approved in early 1984, the Commission obviously 
intended to see a second, much larger, phase of Esprit approved in the future. The 
future came earlier than expected. Less than two years into the five year Esprit I 
programme, the Commission proposed that the second phase of Esprit be brought 
forward to 1987, rather than 1989 as had been agreed earlier. Most of the 750 million 
ECU budget for Esprit I, which was to last from 1984 to 1989, had already been 
allocated. The Commission wanted Esprit II to begin in 1987 with new funding in the 
range of ECU 2.2 billion.^^
The Commission was clearly anxious to increase its budget and responsibilities. 
The small ITTF was the driving force. From a small, autonomous unit accountable 
only to the Commissioner for Industry, the ITTF had merged with the Directorate
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 9 November 1992.
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 26 November 1992.
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 9 November 1992.
For a discussion of the Single European Act and the Commission's competence in areas of high 
technology, see Margaret Sharp, The Community and New Technologies' in Juliet Lodge (ed.). The 
EC and the Challenge o f  the Future (London; Pinter, 1993).
Financial Times, 18 November 1985, p. 3; and EuropoHtique, 7 December 1985.
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General for Information Technology to become the fully fledged DGXIII.^^ All 
European Community programmes relating to information technology and 
telecommunications were implemented by DGXIII. Esprit was handled through a 
division called DGXIIIa, headquartered in Brussels, under the leadership of Mr Jean 
Marie Cadiou.
In 1985, DGXIIIa had 150 personnel. Fifty of these were C grade secretaries, 
17 were B grade clerical assistants and 83 were A grade administrators. Of the 100 A 
and B grades, 89 were classified by the Commission as 'scientific staff and the 
remainder as 'administrative staff
The eleven 'administrative staff were permanent Commission civil servants who 
had joined the ranks of DGXIIIa through the formal hiring procedures for civil 
servants, which involves a difficult exam, numerous interviews and a long waiting 
period. The remaining 89 'scientific staff were on temporary contract with the 
Commission for a 3-5 year renewable period. Unlike the 'administrative' staff, they did 
not join the Esprit bureaucracy through the formal civil service appointment 
procedures. Rather, they were head-hunted from other posts, both inside the 
Commission and outside, interviewed and immediately rejected or posted to 
DGXIIIa.29
Although the title 'scientific staff implies that these individuals had scientific or 
technological training and industrial or academic backgrounds, most of the 'scientific' 
staff were recruited from other areas of the Commission bureaucracy where they had 
worked for the Commission either on a temporary basis or in a consultant capacity.^® 
Many of the 'scientific' staff had business or management skills and experience rather 
than scientific or technical ones. Use of the word 'temporary' to describe this category 
of employee is also misleading. The Commission limits 'temporary' employment to nine 
years, but interviewees suggest that people who wish to extend 'temporary' 
employment beyond nine years simply apply for the status 'agent temporarie indéfini' — 
temporary agent on indefinite contract. There is no time limit to this type of 
employment. Most of the Esprit staff have this status.^*
Interviewees suggest that this method of personnel recruitment and 
categorization served two purposes. First, it allowed the ITTF to increase its numbers
Personal correspondence with Mr Barney Trench, 15 January 1992.
Commission of the European Communities, 'Proposal for a Council Decision Adopting the First 
European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technologies (Esprit)', 
Com (83) 258 final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 25 May 1983), p. 5. 
Inter\iews, Mr Stephen Joseph, 24 July 1991; and Dr Philip Roe, 24 July 1991.
Interviews Mr Stephen Joseph, 24 July 1991; Dr Philip Roe, 24 July 1991; and Mr Ross Cooper. 
Interviews, Mr Stephen Joseph, 24 July 1991; Dr Philip Roe, 4 November 1992; and personal 
correspondence with Mr Bemey Trench, 24 July 1991.
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very quickly in order to have the resources necessary to implement the first phase of 
Esprit. Second, by classifying the majority of personnel as 'scientific' staff, and not 
counting them as permanent civil servants, the Commission allayed the fears of 
industry and of member states' Governments that the Esprit bureaucracy was just 
another Brussels bureaucracy intent only on ensuring its own survival and feathering its 
own nest. As Dr Philip Roe put it:
The distinction is complete nonsense. The only reason for this is that when MPs 
ask why British money is going to support so many Commissioners in Brussels 
with fat salaries, the junior Minister in the Foreign Office can cite a small 
statistic and jokingly say that it is smaller than the number of staff in the 
Scottish Office.^2
With the increase in Community activity on the R&D front and the growth in 
the Commission bureaucracy, some British civil servants in the Treasury and the DTI 
saw a need to examine more closely the relationship between British Government 
funding for R&D on a national level and Britain's contribution to the Community's 
R&D programmes. Several questions needed to be answered: Who was monitoring 
British spend in Esprit? Was it necessary to fund both Esprit and Alvey? Were Alvey 
and Esprit duplicating each other? Was the Alvey Programme preventing British 
researchers from participating in Esprit?
The Treasury quickly realized that it did not monitor or control the 
Government's contribution to that increasing Community budget.^^ Ninety-five per 
cent of the Community's R&D budget was awarded to private organizations. When 
private British institutions received Community funding, the money was, from the 
Treasury's point of view. Government money that was simply being recycled. The 
British Government's contribution to the Community budget was being converted into 
subsidies to the private sector. This 'hidden subsidy' was not recorded as a Government 
subsidy in departmental budgets nor was it treated as such in the Public Expenditure 
Survey. This situation was unsatisfactory.
Although the Treasury was concerned with all Community spending on R&D, 
Esprit was particularly problematic. It was the largest Community R&D programme 
and it was being administered in the UK by an organization over which the Treasury 
had no control. As Dr Keddie put it. Esprit 'frightened the Treasury'.^"*
Interview, Dr Philip Roe, 4 November 1992.
The following discussion of the evolution of the Treasury's thinking on this matter is drawn from 
an interview with Mr Michael Corcoran, a civil serv'ant in the Treasury's European division. 
Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
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Civil servants from the DTI's Research Technology Policy division were 
similarly concerned about the Alvey Directorate's implementation of Esprit. According 
to Dr Keddie, RTF division began to realize that, 'Significant programmes were 
emerging from Brussels. They were programmes which were driven primarily by 
Brussels civil servants although they did consult some with industry. These 
programmes essentially landed on people's desks. There was absolutely no coordinated 
r e s p o n s e '.Civil servants in RTP wanted to establish a foothold in Esprit.
Civil servants from the DTI's RTP division and the Treasury quietly studied 
publications of the Alvey Directorate and the Commission and came to several 
conclusions.^^ First, the Alvey Directorate was not administering Esprit effectively. As 
Chapter 6 showed, the Alvey Directorate was neglecting Esprit in an effort to protect 
its own Programme. Mr Corcoran realized this: 'It is natural that anyone with a budget 
wants to protect their budget. There was quite a blinkered approach to Community 
spending at the time'.^  ^ Second, Esprit and Alvey were duplicating one another and to 
an unacceptable degree. Third, the Alvey Directorate could not effectively administer 
both Esprit and Alvey. Perhaps the Alvey Directorate was not the appropriate 
organization to handle Esprit. According to Mr Oakley, 'talk of recapturing Esprit' 
began to 'rumble on' in the DTI.^*
Together, civil servants from the DTI and from the Treasury formulated a way 
to establish control over the Alvey Directorate's administration of Esprit. This method 
became known as 'attribution' and worked in the following manner. Community 
spending levels in 1984 were taken as a base line and any growth over those figures 
was taken to represent an increased cost of financing the British contribution to the EC 
budget. Responsibility for particular areas of Community spending was allocated 
across departments, called 'lead' departments, and any increased cost of financing the 
Community budget in a particular area was taken out of, or 'attributed' to, the lead 
department's budget. The DTI was designated the lead department for Community 
research and development, thus any increase in Community R&D spending over 1984 
levels would be subtracted from the DTI's budget. The 'attribution' formula was not 
finalized or formally applied until the Public Expenditure round of 1988 when it was 
applied to all Community spending, but the Treasury was clearly looking for ways to 
establish control over Departmental expenditure on Community programmes?^
Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
Interview, Mr Michael Corcoran.
Interview, Mr Michael Corcoran.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 February 1982.
Interviews, Mr Michael Corcoran; and Dr Alastair Keddie.
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Concern over the Alvey Directorate's administration of Esprit was not limited 
to Whitehall. Westminster was worried as well. In late 1984, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities devoted a hearing entirely to the 
administration of Esprit in the UK. The task they set themselves was to 'test the 
proposition that Alvey and Esprit do not duplicate but complement each other', 
'because there is said to be a suspicion in the Community that the United Kingdom is 
less attached to Esprit than to Alvey...."*® and because the 'existence of Esprit 
alongside Alvey-type national programmes raises questions of coordination and 
overlap, duplication of effort, proper allocation of resources and political 
cooperation'.'** The Lords had certainly grasped the fundamentals of the Alvey 
Directorate's approach to Esprit.
The Committee took evidence from late 1984 through April 1985, at the height 
of the Alvey Directorate's vulnerability. The Lords concluded that Alvey and Esprit 
duplicated one another to a significant degree, despite the protestations of members of 
the Alvey Directorate,'*^ and that the Alvey Programme was deterring British 
researchers from participating in some areas of Esprit, particularly advanced 
information processing and software engineering. The Lords concluded that, 'Greater 
efforts must be made to achieve effective coordination between Esprit and national 
programmes with similar aims so that there is no unnecessary duplication'.'*^
The concerns in Whitehall and Westminster were warranted. Chapter 6 showed 
that the Alvey Directorate had made no serious effort to coordinate the two 
programmes and guard against duplication. Moreover, the Directorate consciously 
tried to keep British companies and academics under the Alvey umbrella in areas where 
Alvey and Esprit overlapped.
The Directorate's standing was very precarious. It was being attacked for its 
own Programme. Its protective Minister had left. It was now in the docks for its 
handling of Esprit and the might of the Treasury, Westminster and RTP division was 
weighing against it.
7.4 An Alvey 2?
Despite the Directorate's uncertain standing, it started to press for a second, five year 
phase of Alvey. The Alvey Programme had been approved as a five year programme.
'*® House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, ESPRIT, 8th Report, Session 
1984-85 (London: HMSO, 1985), p. xv.
'** Ibid., p. xxiv.
Mr Oakley argued that the overlap was 'restricted to perhaps 25-30 per cent of the actual work'. 
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, ibid., p. 2.
'*^  House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. xxxvi.
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but the Alvey Committee had envisioned a second five year phase to follow. In 
December 1984, the Alvey Steering Committee suggested that a committee to discuss 
Alvey 2 should be set up in the summer of 1985. The SERC also pressed for a 
continuation of Alvey. In April 1985, the SERC's Engineering Board concluded that an 
Alvey 2 was desperately needed in light of intensifying global competition in IT goods 
and services."*"*
These early soundings for an Alvey 2 were not met with positive responses. Mr 
Oscar Roith, the DTI Chief Engineer and Scientist, suggested that any programme 
called 'Alvey 2' would be a misnomer."*  ^ Mr Colin Fielding of the Ministry of Defence 
suggested that any follow up programme should be independent of Alvey in order not 
to give politicians the impression that Alvey would run forever.^ The Minister for 
Information Technology, Mr Pattie, did not seem too enamoured with the idea either. 
Addressing the June 1985 Alvey conference, Mr Pattie threw cold water on an Alvey 
2; 'I am sure the Government will want to encourage the continued cooperative 
endeavour in the U.K. Whether such support is needed in the form provided by Alvey, 
and with a U.K. focus, is not so clear. Industry cannot expect financial support to 
continue indefinitely.'"*  ^ The insinuation was that Alvey should be replaced by 
Community programmes. As Bureaucratic Politics would predict, the Alvey Steering 
Committee and Directorate stayed committed to an A lvey 2 despite the negative 
responses. An A lvey 2 promised future budgets and responsibilities. The first 
hypothesis holds.
7.5 A Change of Heart
Facing intense criticism of its handling of Alvey and of Esprit and wishing to see a 
continuation of the Alvey Programme, members of the Alvey Directorate realized that 
Alvey 2 would not have a chance of being approved if it did not dispel Whitehall and 
Westminster's conclusions that Alvey and Esprit duplicated each other and that Alvey 
was preventing Britain from receiving her juste retour. A  new strategy toward Esprit 
was urgently needed in order to guarantee the future o f A lvey and the budgets and 
responsibilities promised by it. The third hypothesis is accepted.
The Directorate was quick to arrive at a solution. It would actively encourage 
and assist British institutions that received little or no funding from the Alvey
"*"* Science Engineering Research Council, 'After the Alvey Program — Academic Research in 
Information Technology', report by a Working Party of the SERC Engineering Board, March 1986. 
"*^ Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owen, Alvey: Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative (London: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989), p. 230.
"*6 Ibid.
Ibid., p. 232.
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Programme, whether because they were SMEs or because they performed research in 
areas not covered under the Alvey Programme, to participate in Esprit. According to 
Mr Chris Barrow, 'We would advise someone who wanted to put something together 
for Esprit that was not covered in Alvey. There were certain Esprit programmes which 
had nothing to do with us. There, we advised people to go to E s p r i t . I n  this manner, 
duplication would be avoided, Alvey's weaknesses would be addressed and British 
juste retour v^o\x\d be achieved.
The Alvey Directorate referred to this strategy in the House of Lords hearing 
on Esprit. Two excerpts from their testimony follow.
The scope of information technology research is wide. So far as the United 
Kingdom is concerned, neither Alvey nor Esprit is alone capable of meeting all 
our requirements. We need both programmes, so long as there is not any 
wasteful duplication between them. The Government's objective is to ensure 
that there is no such duplication. We shall seek to achieve this in the Esprit 
Management Committee in which the Director of the Alvey Programme 
represents the United Kingdom....and Alvey will be managed to take account of 
Esprit. For instance, Alvey will not start projects in areas where there is already 
adequate United Kingdom involvement in Esprit projects."*^
The Alvey Directorate is the formal technical link with the Esprit programme 
and takes particular interest in applications going from the United Kingdom to 
Esprit. It examines copies of these applications with a view to seeing whether 
there is duplication with work happening in another part of Europe on the 
Esprit programme and work Alvey intends to fund. So far as we are able, we 
excise any unnecessary duplication.^®
The new strategy for avoiding duplication and achieving juste  re/oz/rbecame an 
unwritten convention and members of the Directorate understood it to be the new 
modus operand!. In the spirit of the Alvey Directorate, this strategy was not 
accompanied by formalized decision-making procedures. When the Lords expressed 
concern with the lack of clear guidelines to ensure no duplication between the two 
programmes, Mr Oakley responded;
I think. Chairman, one has to face somewhat reluctantly that we are going to 
have to handle the overlap pragmatically. It would be nice to have found areas 
where industry was clearly able to say, 'It is much better to handle this within 
the United Kingdom', or, 'It is much better to handle this in Europe'. It appears
Interview, Mr Chris Barrow.
Memorandum submitted by the Department of Trade and Industry, House of Lords, op. cjt, in note 
40, pp. 184-85.
Testimony of Dr David Thomas, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. 71.
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that the world is not that simple....to establish in abstract any such guidelines I 
am afraid has not proved a practical proposition.^^
Because the Alvey Directorate's new role was in 'orchestrating the U.K. input 
to E S PR I T ' , t h e  Directorate was reorganized. Mr Roger Hird was promoted to a G5 
rank from the DTI's Microelectronics and Electrical Engineering division to replace Dr 
Walker, who was moving to the Policy Planning Unit, as Director of Administration. 
Mr Hird was given responsibility for Esprit and he became Mr Oakley's counterpart on 
the Esprit Management Committee. Mr Hird was assisted by a G7, Ms Caroline Varley 
(she was later replaced by Mr John Head-Rapson) who was helped by five other civil 
servants. Six civil servants were now allocated full-time to Esprit. Compare this to the 
three earlier in Alvey's life.
Mr Hird recognized the importance of Esprit and devised a more coherent 
strategy for assisting British participants in Esprit. Efficient dissemination of Esprit 
information was paramount. The Alvey Directorate invited the Commission to attend 
the annual Alvey conferences and recruit British participants. The Alvey Directorate 
also undertook to educate British researchers about Esprit. Much of the Alvey 
Newsletter \N2iS devoted to Esprit issues. The text of the Commission's calls for Esprit 
proposals, which were published on the Official Journal, were reprinted in the Alvey 
Newsletter were DGXIII press releases. Mr Hird and Ms Varley augmented the 
official publications with their own interpretations of Esprit issues. Their commentary 
appeared in the Alvey Newsletter ?iné in the DTI's publication, British Business.
Such insider information was invaluable to British researchers because the 
Commission had not established an effective mechanism for disseminating 
information.^^ Even if an effective mechanism had been designed, the Commission was 
extremely protective of information. For example, the content and timing of a call for 
proposals were known only to the Commission. Member states' representatives were 
not consulted or informed. At a time known only to it, the Commission would publish 
a call for proposals in the Official Journal. The call was very specific, giving tightly 
defined project areas to be funded. Interested researchers were expected to submit a 
proposal within two months of the call. The timing was impossible for some. Because 
the Commission would fund only those projects set out in its call, interested parties had 
to wait for the formal call before they could begin designing proposals. A quality
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. 3.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 45, p. 112.
The 1985 mid-term review was highly critical of the Commission's communication structures and 
procedures. Commission of the European Communities, 'Concerning a Review to Assess the Initial 
Results of the Programme ESPRIT', Com (85) 616 final (Brussels; Commission of the European 
Communities, 19 November 1985).
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proposal, however, often required more than two months preparation. If a potential 
applicant had some idea of the timing and content of a call, it could get a head start 
and design a high quality proposal and increase its chance of receiving funding. Insider 
knowledge was an invaluable defence against the Commission's inefficient information 
dissemination.
For some Esprit participants, the only source of such information was the 
Alvey Directorate. The Directorate was able to gather 'insider' information through 
several means. Mr Hird and Mr Oakley sat on the Esprit Management Committee 
(EMC). Although the EMC was not formally told of the timing and the content of 
calls, EMC members were able to extract clues from Commissioners. Mr Oakley and 
Mr Cadiou met frequently outside the formal Esprit mechanisms to discuss Alvey and 
Esprit.^ '*
Mr Hird and Mr Oakley also had people on the 'inside'. In 1984, the 
Commission asked the Alvey Directorate to suggest someone to direct Esprit's 
software programme. The Alvey Directorate recommended Mr John Elmore, who was 
active on Alvey's software engineering advisory b oa r d . Wh en  Mr Elmore left the 
Commission, he was replaced by Mr David Talbot, who had been the director of 
Alvey's software engineering sub-programme. Commission decisions were not 
compromised by the men, but they could steer members of the Alvey Directorate in the 
right direction. As Mr Talbot suggested, 'Areas of interest in Esprit and Alvey more or 
less completely overlapped. It was our policy, so to speak, to make sure that we didn't 
do silly things like funding a company twice to do the same work. There was liaison at 
a very detailed level'.
The Alvey Directorate gathered information by maintaining close relations with 
British members of the Esprit Steering Committee and Esprit Advisory Board. 
Generally speaking, members of these two bodies were actively involved in Alvey 
decision-making processes, whether through the Alvey Steering Committee, through 
Alvey advisory boards or working groups. They were also, generally speaking, from 
firms or universities that received large amounts of Alvey funds. Because these two 
bodies worked with the Commission to devise the technical content of the calls, the 
Alvey Directorate was able to gather intelligence on the likely content of calls from 
these representatives.
Finally, the Alvey Directorate took a great interest in the people invited to 
Brussels to evaluate project proposals. In his testimony before the Lords, Mr Oakley
Testimony of Mr Jean Marie Cadiou (Director, Esprit, DGXIII), House of Lords, op. cit., in note 
40, p. 143.
Interview, Mr David Talbot.
Interview, Mr David Talbot.
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made reference to the Directorate's new found interest in Esprit evaluation teams: 'In 
the Directorate we see it as our responsibility to help British industry to be kept well 
informed of what is going on in Esprit, to act as a sort of central link, and I am pretty 
confident that one of the messages we will be bringing to them after this year’s 
evaluation exercise is through is that they must make more effort to release people for 
the evaluation s t a g e . T h e  Directorate often recommended qualified candidates to the 
Commission for inclusion in evaluation teams. Often those people were or had been 
involved in Alvey. For example, while he was director of Alvey's software engineering 
sub-programme, Mr Talbot served as an evaluator for the Commission. If the 
Commission appointed an evaluator that was not recommended by the Directorate, the 
Directorate would 'go out of its way to get to know that person’. When the British 
evaluators returned to the UK from Brussels, they 'briefed' the Alvey Directorate on 
Esprit news they picked up. The Directorate passed information gathered through 
these numerous sources on to potential British participants.
Mr Hird and his assistants also tried to re-educate the Alvey directors to the 
importance of Esprit. During the first year and a half of Alvey, sub-programme 
directors had been instructed to concentrate on Alvey. They could no longer, however, 
afford to ignore or belittle Esprit. Esprit had become Alvey's life-line.
It was necessary to bring the sub-programme directors around because they 
had the technical expertise and knowledge of Esprit that were required to assist 
potential participants design Esprit proposals. According to Mr Hird:
Alvey had a tremendous network of contacts through its advisory boards and 
its committees which were made up of the great and the good of UK IT. We 
expected the [Alvey sub-programme] directors to use their contacts and their 
own stored knowledge to design Esprit and Alvey strategies. The directors had 
a considerable degree of knowledge of Esprit and where the money was.^^
Mr Hird found bringing the Alvey sub-programme directors around to Esprit a 
difficult feat: I had to pound it into the heads of the sub-programme directors that 
Esprit was important. . . M r  Oakley did not sense the same degree of resistance.
I don't think any of them felt any resistance to the gradual growth and 
importance of Esprit . . . we used to have long discussions about what the 
relative balance should be. How do you balance them? I think the Directorate 
as a whole readily agreed that Esprit had become the dominant thing, but there
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. 10. 
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Mr Roger Hird, 28 October 1992.
Interview, Mr Roger Hird, 28 October 1992.
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was still the feeling that there were things which needed to be done nationally. 
It was getting the balance of those right.
Dr Thomas recalled the change in orientation. When the Alvey Programme 
began, There was a very real danger that our best universities would be picked off by 
German and French companies in Esprit. If  this happened, it would positively be 
helping the competition in Europe because, as you know, there was collaboration but 
there was also competition'. This attitude changed. People felt that organizing UK 
universities and companies would help them secure Esprit contracts. We did not see 
ourselves in competition with Esprit. We saw ourselves as organizing British interests 
for working in Esprit.
The Alvey sub-programme directors were brought around and took a very 
active role in assisting British researchers with Esprit. The Directorate helped 
researchers find consortium partners; 'We feel that the Directorate can help to bring 
about these marriages in Europe.. .We can act to some extent as a lubricant in the 
p r oc e s s . T h e y  helped researchers design Esprit proposals.^"* They examined copies 
of Esprit project proposals and suggested amendments. According to Dr Thomas,
Within the Alvey programme we keep very close contact with these companies 
and advise them to make sure there is a good national coverage in bidding for 
Esprit projects and also no duplication. Yes, we do, through the Alvey 
Directorate, have intimate contact with the companies in the areas where the 
bidding is taking place.^^
As an interviewee from ICL recalled, 'With most of our proposals the DTI [Alvey 
Directorate] knew what we were doing and we got the "that's good" before we 
submitted it'.^  ^ Mr Duguid recalled sitting in on meetings of the Alvey Directorate 
where, 'there was consideration of the duplication and waste of effort which would 
result from companies applying for Alvey and Esprit funding at the same time...'.^"^
The Alvey Directorate even went so far as to turn some Alvey project 
proposals into Esprit projects by 'adding a European partner'.^* As Mr Hird recalled.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Dr David Thomas.
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. 10.
Interviews, Mr Chris Barrow; Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992; Mr Roger Hird, 28 October 1992; Mr 
Robert Morland; Mr David Talbot; and Dr David Thomas. Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of 
Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. p. 10; Memorandum Submitted by the Department of Trade and 
Industry, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, pp. 182-198.
Testimony of Dr David Thomas, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. 77.
Interview, Mr David Dace.
Interview, Mr Andrew Duguid.
Interviews, Mr David Dace; and Mr Chris Barrow.
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Toward the end, we were taking Alvey proposals and putting them directly into Esprit. 
The Esprit Flagship project is one of these'.
Mr Hird and Mr Oakley lobbied on behalf of British participants in meetings of 
the EMC. As Mr Oakley saw it, 'In a sense, what was the Alvey Esprit team for? It 
was to maximize the return of the programme to the UK.... It was essentially there to 
help UK industry get its r e tu rn ' .An  interviewee from British Aerospace suggested 
that her company would approach the Alvey Directorate saying, 'I have all these 
proposals here and I am particularly interested in this. The DTI [Alvey Directorate] 
would then work through particular Commissioners to get it accepted'."^*
Although the UK was only one among ten (and twelve after January 1986) 
other member states pursuing their interests in the EMC, the UK was particularly 
successful. Mr Oakley suggested that he and Mr Hird were successful on the EMC 
because they were always the best briefed members of the EMC. Other member states' 
representatives were not well prepared or did not seem to take Esprit seriously. As Mr 
Oakley put it, 'I'm not being big headed about it, but when you looked around the 
table, with a few honourable exceptions, the quality of the Management Committee 
was very low. Governments throughout Europe really put very little effort into the 
Committee and things'.
7.6 British Policy in Esprit: Getting UK Juste Retour
Recall from Chapter 6 that Ministers articulated several objectives in Esprit: limit the 
size of the Esprit bureaucracy and ensure efficient management, limit the Esprit budget 
and achieve juste retour. From 1983 to late 1984, the Alvey Directorate did not pursue 
any of those objectives over which it had some control. How did the Directorate fare 
during the period examined in this Chapter?
The Alvey Directorate made no attempt to limit the size of the Esprit 
bureaucracy or ensure that it operated efficiently. Given the fact that the Brussels 
bureaucracy was mushrooming and in a rather covert and under-handed manner, the 
Alvey Directorate certainly could have taken up this issue. DGXIII was large and 
ineffective, as the mid-term review of Esprit showed. An explanation for the 
Directorate's behaviour on this score lies, once again, in the fact that it was not in the 
Directorate's interest to make an issue of the operations of the Commission. DGXIII 
may have been inefficient, but to highlight this fact would have brought scorn down on
Interview, Mr Roger Hird, 28 October 1992. 
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Interview, Ms Angela Mison Fulleylove.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
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the Alvey Directorate itself — and its critics were lying in wait. In the interests o f self- 
preservation, the A lvey Directorate ignored a Ministerial objective.
As regards limiting the size of Esprit's budget, the Directorate once again had 
little role to play. The Commission had made a bid for a much increased Esprit II 
budget, but the financial issues surrounding Esprit were the prerogative of the Council 
of Ministers. Mr Pattie would represent British interests and those interests, as had 
been the case with Esprit I, would be determined by him and Mrs Thatcher.
The Directorate did pursue juste retour. largue that it did so not out o f 
concern for M inisterial interests, but for self-preservation. Esprit needed to be taken 
seriously because it had become Alvey's life-line. The desire to guarantee the budget of 
an Alvey 2 and responsibilities for those who would implement Alvey 2 were foremost 
in the minds of Alvey directors. In order to do so, the Alvey Directorate had to disarm 
its critics by achieVi^juste retour for Britain. Thepreference-from-position holds and 
the third hypothesis is accepted.
From late 1984, the Alvey Directorate attempted to fill gaps in the Alvey 
Programme and, at the same time, achieve a juste retour ïov the UK by encouraging 
British researchers to work in Esprit. This was Britain's de facto policy in Esprit. 
Bureaucratic competition did affect British policy in Esprit. The Alvey Directorate 
identified areas of weakness in Alvey, both in terms of participation and technical 
coverage. In areas where Alvey was weak, British participation in Esprit was 
encouraged. The statistics presented below bear this out."^
Member states seek a return from Community programmes, including Esprit, that is greater than or 
equal to their contribution to that programme. The accounting surrounding this seemingly simple rule 
is not as straightforward as one might expect. This is so for several reasons. First, member states do 
not contribute directly to individual Community programmes. Rather, they contribute to the overall 
budget of the Community, from which funding for individual programmes is allocated. Thus, the UK 
does not contribute directly to Esprit, but does so indirectly through its contribution to the general 
Commuait) budget. During the period under observation, the British contribution to the Community 
budget was fiercely contested and the rebates Mrs Thatcher secured made for a fluctuating overall 
contribution, causingyaffe /r/our calculations to change with it. Second, it is difficult to know exactly 
how much Esprit funding actually ends up in the bank accounts of British organizations. Although a 
contract signed with a British researcher is recorded as a British contract, that researcher may then 
sub-contract the work to a French researcher, for example, without the record being changed. Neither 
the Commission nor Whitehall departments are able to keep close tabs on these arrangements or the 
monetary flows involved. Third, Esprit funds flow both to public and private organizations in the UK. 
For example, when a contract is signed between the Commission and GEC or London University, 
funds are transferred to the private sector. On the other hand, when the SERC's Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory receives Esprit funding, the transfer is to a public organization. When publishing 
statistics, the Commission does not distinguish between the two, but from the British government's 
point of view, should funds received by the public and private sector or just the private sector be 
included in yW e /efour calculations? During the period under investigation, an answer to this 
question was not reached in the Treasury or in the DTI. Finally, because juste retour\s highly 
sensitive politically, the Commission does not provide statistics in a format conducive to accurate 
y W e  /erour calculations. Only a rough indication of juste retour osoi be gleaned. As a result, 
calculations of juste retour m\xsX be based on two sets of statistics which can be obtained from the
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As Table 7.1 reveals, British participation rates in Esprit I were high. British 
researchers participated in 69 per cent of all Esprit projects. (Only France and 
Germany had comparable figures.^ "* ) Participation rates were not uniform, however, 
across the different technical sub-programmes. British researchers were most involved 
in the Microelectronics and Software Engineering sub-programmes and least involved 
in the Advanced Information Processing and CIM sub-programmes. Variances in the 
large sub-programme categories, as well as variances within elements of the sub- 
programmes, can be explained by reference to the Alvey Directorate's policy of leading 
British researchers to Esprit when Alvey could not meet their needs.
Table 7.1 : UK Esprit Project Involvement by Technical Area 
Technical Area Total Esprit Projects with UK % of Total
Projects Involvement Projects with UK
Involvement
Advanced 49 37 75
Microelectronics
Software 48 34 71
Engineering
Advanced 51 34 66
Information 
Processing
Office Systems 45 31 68
Computer 33 20 61
Integrated 
Manufacture
Source; Compiled from Paul Hare, et. al.. Assessment o f Esprit in the f/XT(London: HMSO, 1989), p. 
27 and p. 59.
7.6a Software Technology
As Chapter 5 revealed, Alvey's software engineering programme was not an 
overwhelming success. Small to medium sized British software houses were poorly 
represented, while academics received most of the funds. Industrial/academic 
collaboration was not generated and industrial take-up of academic research was poor. 
Many of the overly ambitious goals were not met. Two important elements of 
Software Technology that were left out of Alvey were included in Esprit: Management 
and Industrial aspects and Evaluation and Demonstration. Despite these weaknesses.
Commission: number of participants from individual member states and the number of projects in 
which member states' participants were involved. These figures are taken as indicative of juste retour. 
Paul Hare, et. al.. An Assessment o f Esprit in the t/XT (London: HMSO, 1989), p. 59.
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Alvey was strong in two elements; Theories, Methods and Tools and Common 
Environment.
In areas where Alvey was weak, the Alvey Directorate made every effort to 
encourage participation of British software houses in E sp rit.B ritish  participation in 
Esprit's Management and Industrial area was high, with British researchers 
representing 33 per cent of the main contractors and 39 per cent of all participants.^^ 
Alvey did not fund research in this area.’^'^  British participation in the Evaluations and 
Demonstrations area was also high, with British researchers representing 25 per cent of 
all main contractors and 21 per cent of all participants. Again, Alvey was weak in this 
area, only funding four demonstrator projects.”^*
In the area of Theories, Methods and Tools on the other hand, 'there can be 
little doubt...that the size of the Alvey push in this area distracted potential applicant's 
attention from the Esprit opportunities'.'^^ Similarly, British participation in Esprit's 
Common Environment programme was low. Of the 11 projects funding by Esprit, only 
one involved a British researcher as a main contractor and British researchers 
comprised only 21 per cent of all researchers. Alvey placed a high priority on creating 
a common software environment, but Alvey's goal was to create a common 
environment in the UK rather than across Europe. Given this national orientation,
Alvey Directors were keen to see British companies working in Alvey rather than 
Esprit.
7.6b Computer Integrated Manufacture fCIM) and Office Svstems
Testifying before the House of Lords, Mr Oakley suggested the following relationship 
between Alvey and Esprit in the areas of CIM and office systems.
The degree of overlap of the two is by no means complete. The Esprit 
programme spreads considerably wider than the Alvey Programme. In 
particular, two of the five segments of the Esprit Programme, those are the 
applied ones, one is in office systems and the other is in computer integrated 
manufacture, do not have a direct equivalent in the Alvey Programme.
Interview, Mr David Talbot.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 51.
^^Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 50.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 50.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 50.
^°Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 51.
Testimony of Mr Brian Oakley, House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. 2.
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Although Alvey had no direct equivalent to Esprit's office systems, some of 
Esprit's coverage was duplicated in Alvey's MMI sub-programme. It could be 
expected, therefore, that British participation in Esprit would be something of a mixed 
bag. Statistics bear this out. Figures in Table 7.1 reveal a relatively high number of 
projects involving British researchers. Analysts explain this pattern by reference to the 
lack of coverage in Alvey. Nevertheless, participation across the entire sub- 
programme was by no means uniform. Once again, participation in Esprit was low in 
areas covered by Alvey (Advanced Workstations and Human-Machine Interface and 
Integrated Office Information Systems) and high in areas not covered by Alvey (Office 
System Science and Human Factors, Communication Systems and Advanced Multi- 
Media Information Storage and Retrieval Systems).*^
As regards UK participation in CIM, figures in Table 7.1 reveal that the 
number of Esprit projects involving British researchers was lower here than in any 
other sub-programme. Moreover, of the six elements comprising Esprit CIM, three of 
them involved no British participants as main contractors and of the total number of 
participants, only 17 per cent were British.*'*
If the logic employed above to analyze British participation in Esprit was 
applied to CIM, it could be expected that Alvey was strong in the CIM area because 
Alvey directors tried to keep British researchers under the Alvey umbrella. This is not 
the case, however, because Alvey did not have a CIM sub-programme. What 
prevented high levels of British participation in Esprit CIM was the availability of 
research funds at the national level through programmes other than Alvey. British 
academics researching CIM were being funded by the SERC under its ACME 
(Advanced Computers in Manufacture Engineering) programme while the DTI funded 
industrial research through Mr John Major's LA Division. Mr Major had been isolated 
and excluded from the structures through which the Alvey directorate gathered, 
analyzed and disseminated Esprit information. Interviewees suggested that because 
CIM was not handled in the Alvey Directorate, there was no mechanism through which 
potential CIM participants could be led to Esprit, hence the low participation rates.
7.6c Advanced Information Processing (AIP) or IKBS
British participation in Esprit AIP was lower than in all technical areas other than CIM 
The reason for this is that Alvey funded a large amount of research in this area.
Hare, op. c/A, in note 74, p. 54.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 53.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 55.
Interviews, Mr Roger Hird, 28 October 1992; and Mr Derek FI\Tine, 3 December 1992.
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Although the original level of funding under Alvey for IKBS was low relative to other 
Alvey sub-programmes, Chapter 5 showed that more funds were allocated to IKBS 
than was originally budgeted. In fact, IKBS proved to be one of Alvey's most 
successful programmes. However, in Esprit's Computer Architectures areas of AIP 
British participation was high. (Participation in this area accounts for the figures in 
Table 7.1.) Again, the commendable British participation in this element of Esprit was 
caused by a gap in the Alvey programme. Alvey did not fund research in architectures 
until 1986 when the Systems Architecture element was added. According to Oakley,
We started an Alvey study, it was South Hampton and RSRE, there must have 
been MIGA or some computer firm. We actually funded the study, but the main 
project appeared as an Esprit project quite early on in Esprit, probably the 
second round in Esprit I ...The thing is complex, but we didn't have an architect 
programme in Alvey in the first place. It was a mistake. There should have been 
one. But we didn't have it and so there wasn't an obvious slot.*^
7.6d Microelectronics
Table 7.1 reveals that British researchers were involved in 75 per cent of all Esprit 
microelectronics projects — a higher proportion than any other Esprit sub-programme. 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 reveal that British hardware firms represented 24 per cent of all 
British participants in Esprit, but received 49 per cent of all Esprit contracts awarded 
to British researchers. Compared to Esprit as a whole, the participation of British 
hardware firms was low,*"^  but British hardware firms held double the number of 
contracts than the next closest British organization type, which was universities. Table 
7.4 reveals the extreme concentration of Esprit contracts in a very small number of 
British hardware firms. With very few exceptions, only firms that were among the 
largest' recipients of Alvey funding participated to any significant degree in Esprit. In 
fact, the top four British Esprit contract recipients were also the top four Alvey 
contract recipients and they were Britain's largest hardware manufacturers. GEC alone 
held nearly 17 per cent of all Esprit contracts involving British researchers.
Interview, Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
This was to be expected because the number of British hardware firms was low relative to the rest 
of Europe.
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Table 7.2: Esprit Participation Levels by Organizations o f a Given Type
Participant Type % of total British % of total Esprit
Participants Participants
Universities 32 ( + 3 7%) 23.3
Research Organizations 11 ( - 1 7 % ) 13.3
Hardware Firms 24 ( - 22% ) 30.6
Software Firms 14 ( - 26% ) 18.9
Other Firms 19 ( + 37%) 13.9
Note; Numbers in brackets are the percentage difference between UK statistics and Esprit statistics.
Source: Compiled from Paul Hare, et. al. Assessment o f Esprit in the (London: HMSO, 1989), p.
28 and p. 45.
Table 7.3: Esprit Contract Holdings by Organizations of a Given Type
Participant Type % of total British % of total Esprit
Contracts Contracts
Universities 25 ( + 1 1 % ) 22.5
Research Organizations 8 ( - 4 1 % ) 13.6
Hardware Firms 49 ( + 1 5 % ) 42.5
Software Firms 8 (  - 42% ) 13.8
Other Firms 10 ( + 32%) 7.6
Note: Numbers in brackets are the percentage difference between UK statistics and Esprit statistics.
Source: Compiled from Paul Hare, et. al. , Assessment o f Esprit in the UK (London: HMSO, 1989), p.
28 and p. 45.
Table 7.4: Esprit and Alvey Contracts Held by British Industrial Participants
Firm Number of Alvey Number of Esprit
Contracts Contracts
GEC 66 45
ICL/STC/STL 68 35
Plessey 39 15
British Telecom 31 14
Ferranti 18 3
Logica 16 3
Software Sciences/Thom EMI 11 3
Systems Designers Limited 10 0
Racal 9 0
British Aerospace 7 5
Plasma Technology 6 2
Mari Advanced Microelectronics 3 4
CAP 2 3
Scicon 2 3
AMTRI 0 2
Barr & Stroud 0 2
BICC 0 2
Source: Compiled from Paul Hare, et. al,, Assessment o f Esprit in the C/XT (London: HMSO, 1989), p.
28 and p. 45; and Ken Guy, et. al. Evaluation o f the Alvey Programme for Advanced In fonnation 
Technology HMSO, 1991), p. 27 and Appendix.
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7.6e Hardware Firms
The exceptionally high number of contracts held by a relatively small number of British 
hardware firms can be explained partially by reference to the factors relevant to British 
participation in the other Esprit sub-programmes. The Alvey Programme had no 
equivalent to Esprit's gallium arsenide or standards research. Also, the Alvey 
Programme's CAD for VLSI element was very weak. In these three areas the Alvey 
Directorate could clearly identify gaps in Alvey and address them by encouraging 
researchers to move to Esprit. Predictably, British participation in these areas of Esprit 
was high.^*
This explanation, however, applies to a small portion of British participation in 
Esprit microelectronics. The fact is that, aside from these three areas. Esprit and Alvey 
covered virtually identical areas of research. British hardware firms participated 
simultaneously in Alvey and in Esprit in identical areas of research (but not on identical 
projects). As a result of the technical similarity between Alvey VLSI and Esprit VLSI, 
the Alvey Directorate was not able to lead British researchers to Esprit in areas where 
Alvey was weak. There was hardly a point in doing so, however. In its VLSI sub- 
programme, the Alvey Directorate was not faced with the possibility of British 
researchers moving en masse to Esprit and leaving Alvey funds uncommitted and 
hence vulnerable to Treasury claw-back. Approximately 80 per cent of the Alvey VLSI 
funds had been committed by the time the first Esprit I contract was signed. An 
explanation of the participation of British hardware firms in Esprit must be explained in 
terms other than 'gap management' as a means to juste retour.
The explanation may be found in bureaucratic political considerations. In order 
to fend off criticism, the Alvey Directorate needed to ensure that Britain received her 
Juste retour ïïom  Esprit. To do so, the Alvey Directorate needed to assist British 
researchers in their efforts to obtain Esprit funds. The most effective way of doing so 
was to make use of contacts that had been established and nurtured through the Alvey 
Programme. As Chapter 5 revealed, the Alvey directors had closest contact with 
Britain's largest companies (which were primarily hardware manufacturers). In fact, 
many of the Alvey directors were seconded from those companies. Because most of 
Alvey's VLSI funds had been committed. Esprit did not pose as direct a threat to Alvey 
as did the other Esprit sub-programmes. By encouraging British hardware 
manufacturers to turn to Esprit, the Alvey Directorate could ensure juste retour ïov 
Britain without harming its own programme. Action channels were again at work
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 46.
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helping to determine the manner in which the Directorate's own interests were 
pursued. The fifth  hypothesis holds true.
High levels of participation in Esprit among Britain's hardware firms would 
virtually guarantee Britain's juste retour. The reason is two-fold. First, Alvey 
strengthened the five British chipmaker's production capability in CMOS and bipolar 
devices to such a degree that they were well positioned to take advantage of Esprit in 
those areas.Second,  Esprit was essentially built for and by Europe's large, hardware 
firms. Europe's largest industrial concerns (most of which had VLSI capability) were 
represented in the Esprit decision-making process through the Esprit Advisory Board 
and the Esprit Steering Committee. Moreover, 75 percent of Esprit projects, type 'A' 
projects, are designed according to their strategies. Further, because only the large 
industrial concerns could afford to release valuable employees, many of the 'technical' 
staff of DGXIII were seconded from Europe's largest companies. With these factors in 
their favour, the large firms were bound to receive the lion's share of Esprit funding. 
Statistics bear this out.
Table 7.5; Participation of the Roundtable 12 Companies in Esprit I
Company Nt
GEC (UK) 45
Bull (France) 38
Thomson (France) 37
STET (Italy) 36
Philips (Netherlands) 34
STC (UK) 33
Olivetti (Italy) 29
Siemens (Germany) 27
CGE (France) 27
AEG (Germany) 25
Plessey (UK) 15
Nixdorf (Germany) 13
Note: These projects represent 73 per cent of all Esprit projects.
Source: Paul Hare, et. al. An Assessment o f Esprit in the LÎXT (London: HMSO, 1989), p. 28.
7.6f Academic Participation
A similar pattern of Esprit participation to that which prevailed among British 
hardware firms can be found among British academics. As Table 7.6 reveals, the most 
active academic participants in Esprit were also the most active academic participants 
in Alvey.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 46.
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Table 7.6: Esprit and AJvey Contracts Held by British Academics
Name Number of Alvey 
Contracts
Number of Esprit 
Contracts
London University (London School of 
Economics, Imperial College, Queen Mary 
College)
43 10
University College London 17 6
University of Strathclyde 15 5
University of Manchester 18 4
Polytechnic of the South Bank 0 3
Cranfield Institute of Technology 1 3
University of Leeds 7 3
University of Southampton 20 3
Brunei University 0 2
Cambridge University 29 2
University of Stirling 0 2
Source: Compiled from Paul Hare, et. al. An Assessment o f Esprit in the UK, p. 46 and Ken Guy, 
Evaluation o f the Alvey Programme (London-. HMSO, 1991), p. 28.
Three factors account for the concentration of Esprit contracts in such a small 
number of universities. Two of the factors were independent of the Alvey Programme 
and its Directorate while the third was a direct result of the Alvey Directorate's action 
channels. Turning to the factors independent of Alvey, the first relates to the strength 
of the academic institutions. Academics from the institutions listed above were world 
renownëFor example, Robert Kowalski of Imperial College and Donald Mi chi e at 
Edinburgh University were experts in the field of artificial intelligence. Moreover, these 
establishments were large enough to have the funding and administrative staff sufficient 
to absorb the large overheads involved in preparing Esprit project proposals and 
undertaking cross-border collaborative research. Second, representatives from many of 
these institutions had been involved in Esprit's creation (for example. Professor Brian 
Warboys from the University of Manchester had helped design Esprit's software 
technology strategy or were involved in its implementation. In October 1985, an 
independent review board to evaluate the progress of the first phase of Esprit was 
assembled. Academics from the following British educational establishments were 
invited to attend: Cranfield Institute of Technology, Hatfield Polytechnic, Leeds 
University, London University, Polytechnic of the South Bank, Queen Mary College 
and Strathclyde University. (Note the correspondence with the academic institutions 
appearing in the table above.)
The third factor contributing to the success of these academic institutions in 
Esprit relates to purposive action on the part of the Alvey Directorate. Note the
Oakely and Owen, op. cit., in note 45, p. 37.
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correlation between Britain's highest Esprit contract holders and their participation in 
the Alvey Programme. Only three academic institutions holding more than one Esprit 
contract were not among Alvey's top academic funding recipients. As with the British 
hardware firms, the Alvey Directorate made good use of the contacts it had established 
with these select few academic institutions in which Alvey funds were concentrated. 
The Alvey Directorate assisted these select few institutions with their Esprit activities, 
but left other academic institutions to their own devices, which proved inadequate to 
guide them through the maze of the Commission bureaucracy. Once again, action 
channels were allowing the A lvey Directorate to pursue its own interests.
It is noteworthy that while most British academic institutions were 
simultaneously active in Esprit and Alvey, their Alvey work far outweighed their Esprit 
work. The reason: Alvey funded much more academic research than was originally 
planned. Funds were actually transferred from the DTI and from the MoD to cover the 
shortfall in the SERC's budget created when the Directorate approved far more 
academic research than was originally planned. Consequently, few academics found a 
need to turn to Esprit; Alvey provided a sufficient source of funds. Thus, in a sense, 
the Alvey Programme prevented academic institutions from participating in Esprit. The 
Alvey Directorate could not afford to allow its critics to wield this weapon, so it had to 
encourage some academic participation in Esprit. Predictably, Alvey directors 
encouraged academics to participate in Esprit in areas where Alvey was weak, 
primarily in the computer architectures element of Esprit's advanced information 
processing sub-programme and in CIM.^^
7.6g Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)
Recall that the Directorate was vulnerable to the criticism that Alvey was a carve up 
for Britain's largest firms to the exclusion of SMEs. It was here that the Directorate 
could have made best use of Esprit by concentrating their attention on getting British 
SMEs into Esprit. Ironically, however, it is here that the Alvey Directorate had the 
least success, as the tables below reveal.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74. pp. 51-54.
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Table 7.7: Percentage of Organizations in Size Category
Category % of UK Participants in % of Total Esprit
Category Participants in Category
Universities * 32 ( + 37% ) 23.3
Small-Medium Small (500 or 31 ( - 2 2 % ) 39.5
less employees)
Medium (more than 500 but 18 ( + 5% ) 17.1
less than 5,000 employees)
Large (more than 5,000 19 ( - 5 % ) 20.1
employees)
Note: * Universities were not assigned a size category in Commission statistics. Numbers in brackets
are the percentage difference between UK statistics and Esprit-wide statistics.
Source: Compiled from Paul Hare, et. al.. An Assessment o f Esprit in the UK (London: HMSO,
1989), p. 28 and p. 44.
Table 7.8: Percentage of Contracts Held by Organizations in Size Category
Category % of UK Contracts Held % of Total Esprit
by Participants in Size Contracts Held by
Category Participants in Size
Category
Universities * 25 ( + 1 1 % ) 22.5
Small-Medium Small (500 or 15 ( - 4 2 % ) 25.8
less employees)
Medium (more than 500 but 13 ( - 6 % ) 13.9
less than 5,000 employees)
Large (more than 5,000 47 ( + 24% ) 37.8
employees)
Note: * Universities were not assigned a size category in Commission statistics. Numbers in brackets
are the percentage difference between UK statistics and Esprit-wide statistics.
Source: Compiled from Paul Hare, et. a!.. An Assessment o f Esprit in the UK (London: HMSO, 
1989), p. 28 and p. 44.
Two factors account for the failure of the Alvey Directorate to lead a 
significant number of British SMEs into Esprit. First, the Alvey Directorate had not 
established strong contacts with British SMEs. Lacking strong links with SMEs, the 
Alvey Directorate could not provide assistance sufficient to guarantee that British 
SMEs received a substantial number of Esprit contracts.
Second, Esprit itself was structurally biased against SMEs. In terms of funding, 
SMEs were given a secondary role; only 25 per cent of Esprit projects, type "B" 
projects, were designed to promote participation of SMEs. Further, SMEs were not 
fully incorporated into Esprit decision-making structures and processes. They were not 
members of the Esprit Steering Committee and although they were represented on the 
Esprit Advisory Board, interviewees attest that even in that forum their concerns were 
overshadowed by those of the larger firms.^  ^ The role of SMEs in Esprit was revealed
Interviews, Mr Stephen Joseph, 24 July 1991; and Mr Herman Hauser.
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in the 1985 mid-term review of Esprit. The review board received many complaints 
from SMEs about the structural biases against them. SMEs argued for a voice on the 
IT Roundtable and on the Esprit Steering Committee. The review board responded: Tn 
the considered view of the Review Board it would be impractical and unwise to 
enhance the representation on the Roundtable and Steering Committee and 
organizations wishing to have a say are urged to make use of existing means of 
consultation.'^^
Despite the Alvey Directorate's inability to generate substantial involvement of 
British SMEs in Esprit, the Directorate was remarkably successful in other areas. In 
fact, British researchers received more Esprit funding than researchers from any other 
member state. According to Mr Talbot, 'The UK no doubt had the highest share of the 
thing which is never mentioned - juste retouf The Financial ry/77^ 5 calculated, and 
the Commission confirmed, that for every £1 Britain contributed to the Community 
research budget, the Community spent £1.25 in B r i t a i n . gross terms, French and 
German researchers received more Esprit funding than British researchers, but when 
those funds are compared to their respective Government's contribution to the Esprit 
budget, Britain received the highest juste retour^^ By providing assistance to firms and 
universities which fell within Alvey's action channels, the Directorate enabled Britain to 
achieve her juste retour'm Esprit. At the same time, the Directorate was able to 
address some of the weaknesses in the Alvey Programme, which its critics so often 
discussed.
7.7 Getting Away With It (Again)
The A lvey Directorate's actions in Esprit were driven by its concern to see the future 
o f A lvey guaranteed. A s such, bureaucratic competition did affect British policy in 
Esprit. It did so because Ministers did not articulate consistent objectives, because 
Ministers did not exercise control or supervise the issue and Whitehall control and 
coordination mechanisms did not influence the Alvey Directorate.
7.7a Ministerial Objectives
Mrs Thatcher and Mr Baker had clearly articulated consistent objectives in Esprit.
When Mr Pattie moved in, he did not articulate his own or reiterate those which had 
been developed by his predecessor. When asked during an interview what his
Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., in note 53, p. 38 and Annex I. 
Interview, Mr David Talbot.
Financial Times, 30 March 1987.
Hare, op. cit., in note 74, p. 56.
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objectives were in Esprit while he was Minister for Information Technology, he did not 
recall having any.^ "^  It is irrelevant whether this was the truth or whether Mr Pattie was 
merely being sarcastic. The fact is that he did not deem it necessary to provide 
objectives regarding Esprit for his civil servants.
7.7b Ministerial Control and Supervision
During Mr Pattie's tenure, members of the Alvey Directorate received no more 
Ministerial supervision than they had under Mr Baker. Mr Baker chose to give his civil 
servants free reign, but Mr Pattie was forced to by the sheer weight of work. Mr 
Pattie's time and energy were monopolized by negotiations over the Framework 
Programme budget, EUREKA and the European Space Agency.^*
The Minister immediately responsible for Alvey and Esprit offered the Alvey 
Directorate little guidance and supervision. The environment at the Secretary of State's 
office exacerbated the vacuum left by Mr Pattie. From late 1984 through 1985, the 
DTI had two Secretaries of State: Mr Norman Tebbit and Mr Leon Brittan. Neither 
were able to establish control and dictate the direction of the Department, much less 
supervise the operations of a maverick organization tucked away in Millbank Tower.
As Chapter 6 showed, Mr Tebbit was not an apt administrator and for an indication of 
Mr Brittain's leadership, one has to look only so far as the Westland affair.
Westland was a small British helicopter manufacturer that ran into financial 
difficulty in 1984. In order to raise the necessary capital, Westland needed a new 
majority shareholder. Sikorsky, an American company, or a European consortium were 
two possibilities. Mr Brittan, Secretary of State at the DTI, felt that decision of which 
partner to take on should be left to the Westland board. Mr Michael Heseltine, 
Secretary of State at the MoD, favoured a European consortium. Cabinet agreed that 
the Westland board should decide. Nevertheless, Mr Heseltine continued to lobby for 
the European consortium by writing to Lloyds Merchant Bank (advisers to the 
European consortium) of the weaknesses of the Sikorsky option. Mrs Thatcher 
responded to Mr Heseltine's break with the Cabinet decision by asking the Solicitor- 
General to wri te a letter to Mr Heseltine informing him of'material inaccuracies' in the 
letter he had written to Lloyds. Miss Colette Bowe, the DTI's press officer, leaked 
portions of the Solicitor-General's letter that were damaging to Mr Heseltine to the 
Press Association. Mr Heseltine resigned from the Cabinet. The question everyone 
wanted answered was. Who authorized the leak? Mr Brittan? Number 10? The Prime
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 26 November 1992. 
Interview. Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 26 November 1992.
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Minister herself? In the House of Commons, Mrs Thatcher admitted that the leak had 
been authorized by Mr Brittan after he had obtained the go-ahead from Bernard 
Ingham, Mrs Thatcher's Press Secretary, and Charles Powell, her Private Secretary. Mr 
Brittan was forced to resign from Cabinet. The Westland Affair harmed Ministerial 
authority in the DTI and across Whitehall, 'No official in future would know where he 
or she stood'.^
7.7c Whitehall Control and Coordination Mechanisms
Whitehall control structures at the Cabinet level and interdepartmental level were not 
functioning effectively. No improvements had been made to the mechanisms discussed 
in detail in Chapter 6. (The Treasury had designed, but not implemented, its attribution 
formula, which was meant to reign in on the Alvey Directorate.) The Alvey Directorate 
continued to operate independently.
As far as DTI control and coordination mechanisms, the situation had 
worsened. RTP was interested to exert control over the Alvey Directorate, but the 
attribution formula it was designing with the Treasury was not yet operational. The 
Directorate continued to function independently of the RTP, the Financial Resources 
Management division and STAMG. As far as Esprit issues were concerned, the 
Directorate had established a monopoly. It kept very close contact with 
Commissioners, on both a personal level and through formal structures such as the 
EMC. Mr Major had been side-lined. In fact, he had stopped attending the EMC 
meetings altogether. Mr Major's lack of influence was implicitly recognized by House 
of Lords: he was not called to give evidence in their Esprit hearing despite the fact that 
his gallium arsenide work overlapped with Esprit VLSI.
7.8 Conclusion
By late 1984, competition in the D TI over budgets and responsibilities was endemic. 
Criticism of the Alvey Directorate had reached such a feverish level that the chances of 
a follow on to the Programme were being undermined. In order to guarantee a future 
budget for Alvey and responsibilities for those who would implement it, the 
Directorate changed its strategy in Esprit. Survival depended on avoiding duplication 
and a c h i e v i n g retour. Bureaucrats formulated objectives in Esprit that were 
designed explicitly to protect their future budgets and responsibilities. Thus, 
Bureaucratic Politics' preference from position function applied. The manner in which
^^Hennessy, op. cit., in note 4, p. 305.
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bureaucrats pursued those objectives in Esprit was largely a product o f A lvey's action 
channels.
The objectives of the Alvey Directorate became Britain's de facto ^ oXxcy in 
Esprit. This was so because M inisters failed to articulate consistent objectives, they 
failed to control or supervise Esprit issues and because Whitehall control mechanisms 
were ineffective.
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The Interim: 1986 Through 1987 
Chapter 8
Chapter 6 showed that Ministers consistently articulated their objectives toward Esprit 
I, but their behaviour reduced those objectives to rhetorical significance. Chapter 7 
revealed that the Minister for Information Technology failed to articulate objectives 
toward Esprit. Ministers in the DTI also failed to scrutinize and control Esprit issues. 
Further, Departmental and Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms were not 
adequate to reign in the Alvey Directorate. Consequently, civil servants responsible for 
Esprit’s implementation did not pursue the objectives articulated by Ministers. Rather, 
they acted to further their own interests, which included protecting the budgets and 
responsibilities afforded to them by the Alvey Programme. The interests of civil 
servants, as opposed to those of Ministers, became a de British policy in Esprit I.
Although civil servants successfully used Esprit to shield themselves from 
criticism emanating from Whitehall and Westminster, they could not neutralize the 
threat that European R&D programmes themselves posed to the budgets and 
responsibilities garnered through Alvey. From early to mid-1986, numerous proposals 
were made for ambitious and costly European R&D programmes. At the same time in 
Britain, Ministers continued to ’roll back the frontiers of the state’ and slashed the 
DTI’s budget for national R&D programmes. Despite the cuts, civil servants helped 
prepare a proposal for a large, ambitious national IT R&D programme to follow Alvey 
and run alongside (and perhaps compete with) European programmes. Civil servants 
planned to draw large budgets and responsibilities from the proposed programme. This 
Chapter tests whether the Bureaucratic Politics perspective can explain why civil 
servants pursued a path that was clearly against the Government's commitment to 
reducing its involvement in industry.
In June 1987, seven months after the proposal for an Alvey 2 was submitted, a 
new Secretary of State was appointed to the DTI. Lord David Young was a 
businessman with a pro-European attitude and a philosophical commitment to 'rolling 
back the frontiers of the state’. The proposed programme for an Alvey 2 did not fit his 
sympathies. Accordingly, he and his junior Minister withheld their response to the 
Alvey 2 proposal. They did, however, approve the second phase of Esprit. This 
Minister was clearly intent on establishing a new departmental R&D policy that gave 
European R&D programmes priority over national ones.
Although Lord Young clearly intended to change departmental policy 
regarding European R&D, only the barest outlines of his new approach were 
discernible at this time. They were not formalized or well articulated. Further, although
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Lord Young was clearly determined to make his mark on the department, he had not 
fully gained control over it. Finally, Lord Young did not, during his first six months in 
office, cure the organizational chaos characteristic of the DTI. His desire to reorganize 
the department was known, but at this point departmental control and coordination 
mechanisms remained in flux.
How would civil servants behave in this environment? The Bureaucratic 
Politics perspective as formulated by Allison and Halperin would expect bureaucrats to 
act to maximize their budgets and responsibilities. Thus, one would expect bureaucrats 
to lobby their Ministers to approve Alvey 2 (a programme they were instrumental in 
designing and which afforded them large budgets and responsibilities) and neglect 
Esprit because it was clearly a threat to their proposed programme.
While this thesis accepts the Bureaucratic Politics' basic proposition, it argues 
that while bureaucrats seek to maximize their budgets and responsibilities, those 
desires are mitigated when Ministerial objectives are consistent and well articulated, 
when Ministerial control is strong and when Whitehall control and coordination 
mechanisms are effective. During this period. Lord Young began to assert his control, 
his actions indicated a policy reorientation and he was committed to changing the 
structure of the department. This thesis' reformulation would expect to see these 
factors affect the actions of civil servants. Perhaps civil servants would pay Esprit 
greater attention than Allison and Halperin's formulation would allow.
8.1 European Initiatives
As early as 1985, evidence that IT initiatives on the European front might eclipse 
national efforts began to accumulate. The first clue was Mrs Thatcher's positive 
response to the EUREKA proposal. As discussed in Chapter 7, EUREKA was not a 
Commission programme and its participation was not limited to EC member states. 
Researchers from any West European country were eligible for funding. From Mrs 
Thatcher's point of view, EUREKA proved an attractive alternative to the ambitious 
programmes funded and implemented by the Commission.
The Foreign Office and the Treasury also gave EUREKA enthusiastic support. 
Eureka provided an avenue for the Foreign Office to establish a foothold in 
international science and technology issues while the Treasury saw it as an inexpensive 
alternative to EC programmes. ^  The DTI was quick to realize the importance of 
EUREKA and in March 1986, eight months before Eureka was approved, it agreed to
 ^The importance the government attached to Eureka was evidenced by the Prime Minister's presence 
at a inter-govemmental ministerial conference on Eureka. Computer Weekly, 3 July 1986, p. 1.
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subsidize half the costs incurred by British companies working 6n EureKot projects.^ 
This subsidy would come from the department's existing budget. When viewed in the 
context of the DTI's shrinking R&D budget, EUREKA subsidies would cut into 
funding for national programmes. Mr Pattie effortlessly steered EUREKA through 
inter-Govemmental negotiations and it was approved in November 1986.
While EUREKA was being negotiated, the Commission started to lobby for an 
increased R&D budget. In April 1986, it proposed to triple its R&D budget under the 
Framework Programme to ECU 10.3 billion (approximately £6.3 billion).
In May, the Commission submitted a discussion document to the Council 
proposing the second phase of Esprit. The document recommended a budget of ECU
2.2 billion (approximately £1.5 billion) — three times larger than Esprit 1.^  Because the 
Community's contribution to Esprit 11 would come from the Framework Programme, 
Esprit 11 could not get underway until the Framework was approved.
8.2 R&D in the Department o f Trade and Industry
While the Commission was lobbying to increase its R&D spending, the DTI's budget 
for R&D was cut substantially. (See Tables 8.1 and 8.2.) In 1984/85, the DTI's total 
R&D spend was £367.5 million. It was expected to fall to £355.7 million in 1986/87.
In terms of industrial R&D, in 1984/85 the DTI spent £146.0 million; in 1986/87 it 
expected to spend £141.8 million. The decrease in DTI R&D funding was very 
dramatic in IT. The DTI spent £35.7 million in 1984/85 but planned to spend only 
£14.9 million in 1986/87. The DTI's industrial support was moving away from R&D 
and closer to the market.
Table 8.1 : DTI Expenditure on R&D 
(at constant 1985/86 prices, £miIlions)
Outturn Estimates
1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90
367.5 374.4 355.7 346.7 351.7 378.3
Source: Cabinet Office, Annual Review o f Government Funded R&D (XjonéoTï: HMSO, 1987), p. 8.
 ^Guardian, 14 March 1986, p. 19; Financial Times, 14 March 1986, p. 8.
 ^Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council: 
The Second Phase of ESPRIT, Com (86) 269 final (Brussels: Commission of the European 
(Communities, 21 May 1986).
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Table 8.2: DTI General Industrial R&D Expenditure by Subject Area 
(at current prices, f  millions)
Outturn Estimates
Subject Area 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
Alvey Directorate 5.5 12.7 28.5 29.2
Electronics 4.8 5.5 6.7 9.5
32.6 32.6 21.3 24.6
Information technology 35.7 26.8 14.9 24.6
T elecommunications — — 3.7 1.7 1.9
Mechanical engineering and 21.2 21.1 17.8 14.2
manufacturing technology
Textiles, materials, chemicals 13.4 12.6 13.9 10.6
Metals and minerals 5.5 5.8 7.1 7.3
Maritime technology and 6.2 6.5 4.5 6.3
shipbuilding
Electrical engineering 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0
Vehicles 12.0 9.5 8.5 9.3
Biotechnology 2.9 5.9 6.1 7.2
Public purchasing 0.1 0.5 0.7
SMART ——— 0.3 0.5
Measurements ——— 1.1 1.5 1.4
Other industrial R&D 1.4 1.0 1.9 3.9
Air ——— 1.8 2.2 0.7
Total General Industrial R&D 146.0 152.3 141.8 157.6
Source; Cabinet Office, Annual Review o f Government Funded R&D Qjonùon\ HMSO, 1987), p. 10.
The shift away from support for industrial R&D was not part of a well- 
formulated and coherent departmental policy. However, the message behind the 
numbers, combined with proposed increases in the Community's R&D budget, did not 
bode well for a national programme to follow Alvey. Indeed, in a December 1985 
interview, Mr Pattie, who was well aware of the Alvey Directorate's hopes for an 
Alvey 2, suggested that UK companies could not hope to compete on their own in 
world markets: 'We can select niches to gain success, but the UK market is puny in 
world terms.' Mr Pattie regarded a national focus as futile; alliances with European 
companies were the only hope for British IT : 'We are putting a lot of effort into the 
European dimension. I suppose I am "Mr Eureka" and I very passionately believe in 
European projects so the companies can become players on the world stage.'^ These 
were reported to be sentiments widely held in the DTI and Westminster.^
Electronics Times, 12 December 1985, p. 27. 
 ^Ibid
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8.3 IT86 Committee Deliberations
Despite the factors mitigating against an Alvey 2, the Alvey Directorate was 
determined. It launched its formal campaign for an Alvey 2 on 4 February 1986 by 
announcing that Sir Austin Bide, chairman of Glaxo and former Chairman of British 
Leyland, would chair a committee to consider a national IT strategy to follow Alvey. 
The IT86 Committee, as it was called, was comprised of 22 members who were 
appointed by Sir Robert Telford, Chairman of the Alvey Steering Committee, before 
Sir Austin was appointed.^ This committee spawned a number of subcommittees, 
which involved some 180 academics, industrialists and civil servants.’
Civil servants were well represented on the committees. Among them were: Mr 
Brian Oakley (Director of the Alvey Programme); Mr Alastair Macdonald (who had 
been promoted to Deputy Secretary in charge of IT and LA divisions); Mr John Major 
(who was still Under Secretary in LA division and was later succeeded by Dr John 
Thynne); Dr WB Willott (who succeeded Mr Macdonald as Under Secretary of IT 
division); Mr Roger Hird (Director of Administration in the Alvey Directorate); Ms 
Caroline Varley (a 07 who handled Esprit issues in the Alvey Directorate and was 
succeeded by Mr John Head-Rapson); Mr Robert Morland (Director of Alvey VLSI); 
Mr Laurence Clarke (Deputy Director of the Alvey Programme); Mr David Talbot 
(Director of Alvey Software Engineering); and four other DTI officials. Also attending 
were one civil servant from the MoD and one from the SERC. Dr David Thomas, 
Director of Alvey IKBS represented the SERC on the Committee.* Note the high 
proportion of members from the Alvey Directorate.
Although most of these civil servants were listed in the report of the 
Committee, they were classified as 'ex-ofhcio' members. Dr John Thynne, who 
replaced Mr John Major in the summer of 1986, explained the reason. Tf a 
Government official had been a "formal” member, then it would mean that the 
Government had committed itself to a particular programme.*^ Mr Robert Morland 
agreed: *We had to make careful that we didn't look like an Alvey 2 team and that we 
were sensitive to all the political considerations.'^® It was necessary though to have 
civil servants on the Committee because, as Dr Thynne insisted. Ministers would never 
back a proposal if it was created entirely by people outside Government.
 ^Interview, Sir Austin Bide.
’ 'Information Technology -  A Plan for Concerted Action', Report of the IT86 Committee (London: 
HMSO, 1986).
* Ibid. Interviews, Mr Robert Morland; and Sir Austin Bide.
 ^Interview, Dr John Thynne, 15 October 1992.
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
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Although the number of civil servants involved in creating Alvey 2 was 
disguised in the report, they were very active. They took the Committee's ideas to 
Ministers, registered Ministers' reactions and reported back to the Committee 
recommending ways to satisfy Ministerial concerns. They also had the important task 
of drafting the Committee's final report. As Dr Thynne attested, 'I would be overly 
modest to say that I did not play a very influential role in the Committee'. The Report 
tried to make it appear otherwise, but this was clearly a DTI effort in which the 
interests of the Alvey Directorate were very well represented.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the conclusions the Committee would reach 
had been established by civil servants before it began deliberating. As Sir Austin 
concluded, 'it was clear that people had talked themselves into a format for the next go 
round. The Committee had been established to solve problems, but they had already 
decided what they were going to do'.^^ A s Bureaucratic Politics would predict, they 
were going to recommend a national programme o f significant size to be 
implemented by some o f the civil servants on the Committee. In this way, the future 
budgets and responsibilities of the civil servants on the Committee would be 
guaranteed.
8.4 Back in Europe
While the IT86 Committee deliberated, negotiations over Esprit II and the Framework 
Programme took place. The negotiations Mr Pattie inherited on 1 July 1986, when 
Britain took over Presidency of the Council and Mr Pattie became chairman of the 
Council of Research Ministers, were deadlocked. The British, German and French 
Governments had vetoed the Commission's earlier proposal for a trebling of the 
Framework budget. The Commission tried to break the deadlock by cutting its 
proposal down to ECU 8.89 billion and then down further to ECU 7.7 billion. In line 
with the Framework cuts, the proposed five year budget for Esprit II was to ECU 2 
billion, or approximately £1.3 billion. An agreement had not been reached by 
November.
8.5 IT86 Committee Reports
In November, while the Framework negotiations were stalled, the IT86 Committee 
published its report. Despite the DTI's shrinking R&D budget and the growing
* ^  Interview, Dr John Thynne, 15 October 1992. 
Interview, Sir Austin Bide.
Computing, 31 July 1986, p. 2.
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importance of Community R&D, the IT86 Committee called for a very ambitious, five 
year programme worth one billion pounds. The programme was founded on an 
Applications Scheme, which would exploit IT research and stimulate the development 
o f new products and services, that was supported by a Basic Research Scheme. The 
Research Scheme would focus on human interface, software, IKBS, systems 
architecture, speech, signal and image processing, and hardware.
In terms of finance, £425 million would come from the public purse. The 
Applications Scheme would require £125 million from the Government which, when 
combined with contributions from industry, would generate an Applications Scheme 
worth £500 million or more. The Research Scheme would cost £550 million, of which 
£300 million would come from the Government. The Government's contribution would 
come from the budgets of the DTI and SERC. (The MoD had decided not to fund 
more industrially relevant research, but to focus their funds on defence research.
The Committee recommended an implementation structure virtually identical to 
the Alvey Directorate. Strategic decision-making would reside with an Executive 
Board chaired by a senior industrialist. Members of the Board would be drawn from 
the IT community. Assisting the Executive Board would be an Executive Group. Like 
the Alvey Directorate, the Group would have a 'separately identified budget within the 
DTI' and it would have its 'own identity and leader' who would be drawn from 
industry. Members of the Executive Group would be seconded from industry and 
civil servants from the SERC and DTI. The IT86 Committee suggested that some 
members of the Alvey Directorate should become members of the Executive Group to 
ensure continuity. Bureaucratic Politics would predict ju st that: bureaucrats calling for 
a programme with a large budget would position themselves to be in control o f that 
budget.
All project proposals would be submitted to the Executive Board, but the 
Board would delegate much of the decision-making and administration to the 
Executive Group, particularly as regards the allocation of funds. As with the Alvey 
Programme, the SERC and DTI funds would be pooled and allocated by a third 
organization. As Sir Austin saw it, 'This was a pretty dubious runner. There was not a 
great deal of realism in this because people don't give up their procedures and rights 
that easily'.** Alvey had shown how unwilling Whitehall departments are to relinquish
The following convention will be used to prevent confusion over the term 'applications'. 
'Applications', with a capital 'A' is used to denote a particular category of research — one that has 
market relevance. It is in contrast to "basic' or 'pre-competitive' research, which has no specific use 
envisioned. The term 'application', with a lower case 'a' denotes a bid or a petition for funding. 
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992.
'Information Technology', op. cit., in note 7, p. 54. 
p. 55.
** Interview, Sir Austin Bide.
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decision-making authority when they release their money to another organization. It 
was appealing, however, to civil servants given implementation responsibility.
The Committee's recommendation for a large national programme was 
threatened by the Commission's proposal for a large second phase of Esprit. As Sir 
Austin commented, 'They were hung to begin with. They had sold themselves on a 
programme, but Esprit could be seen as almost a competitor to whatever we were 
going to propose. Esprit was an alternative method of dealing with the same type of 
problem that Alvey was dealing with'.*^ Given planned cuts in the DTI's budget for 
R&D, Ministers would certainly consider allowing Esprit to do all the work.
The Committee was not blind to the problem. They tried to solve it by 
justifying their national programme in terms of European ones. The Committee argued 
that a national programme was needed in order for the UK to use European 
programmes to its 'best advantage'.
We should stress, however, that in each area where European collaboration is 
considered the most effective way forward, a careful analysis should be made 
of the UK-based support which may be necessary for the UK to sell itself as an 
effective and desirable partner to European collaborators. This is a key reason 
for continuation of a UK research programme. Without this support the UK 
may be unable to secure a fair return from programmes like Esprit.^®
The national programme was to be 'complementary' to Esprit. Having learned 
from Alvey's failure to prevent duplication, the Committee attempted to theorize such 
'complementarity'. The national programme would identify areas of research needed to 
improve UK competitiveness. Some of that research could be carried out in Europe, 
but most of it should be conducted through the national programme. Basic research 
should be undertaken in Europe where: the costs and skills require combination of 
resources; European partners can provide technical skills unavailable in the UK; and if 
the project involved standards.^^ Concerning the Applications Scheme, the Committee 
envisioned a two stage process. Projects would be worked up in the UK and then 
moved to the European level where collaboration would generate market opportunities 
in Europe for UK firms. 22
In what would prove to be one of the Committee's most controversial 
proposals, it recommended that the UK's £135 million contribution to Esprit should 
come from the budget of this new programme and that Esprit should be implemented 
by the Executive Group. This would 'stimulate a proper awareness of the European
Interview, Sir Austin Bide.
2® 'Information Technology', op. cit.., in note 7, p. 43.
21 'Information Technology', op. cit., in note 7, p. 43.
22 'Information Technology', op. cit., in note 7, p. 44.
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possibilities and second, to provide any necessary support (such as help in finding 
European partners or mediation with the Commission) for project proposals which 
contribute to the overall objective of enhancing UK international competitiveness' . I n  
truth, it would enlarge the budgets and responsibilities o f the civil servants 
implementing A lvey 2 and allow them to protect their programme from Esprit. The 
Committee justified their budgetary requirements in the following terms. The resources 
of the Group needed to be larger than those of the Alvey Directorate in order to move 
Esprit in a direction consistent with British interests. The report recommended that 'in 
future such support and involvement [in Esprit] should be even stronger and should be 
adequately resourced, so that applications involving UK collaborators receive full and 
favourable consideration in the evaluation process.' '^*
Although the Committee attempted to mesh their national programme with 
Esprit, it was a half-hearted effort undertaken with the primary purpose of making a 
national programme, which benefited civil servants among others, politically 
acceptable.25 Consider the two contradictory passages that appeared in the 
Committee's report.
In putting forward our recommendations for a Plan of Action, we attach 
considerable importance to encouraging participation in current or planned 
European programmes such as Esprit, EUREKA and RACE. In many cases, 
work will be identified which can and should be carried out in collaboration 
with European partners. In particular, the Research Effort which we propose is 
based on the assumption that a significant proportion of the projects will be 
carried out as part of the second phase of the Esprit programme.^^»
UK organisations should be given every support in their applications to Esprit 
where a particular project meets the objectives of the UK Plan of Action, but 
programme management should occasionally seek to discourage projects from 
being carried out in Esprit, for example, where wasteful duplication of UK 
work is identified.22
The IT86 Committee was determined to see a national programme, but it was forced, 
in its own self-interest, to cater to European R&D activities.
The IT86 Committee's national programme was clearly designed to maximize 
bureaucrat's budgets and responsibilities. The question remains, however, why civil 
servants on the IT86 Committee allowed a proposal calling for a large national
23 'Information Technology', op. cit., in note 7, p. 44.
2^* 'Information Technology', qp. cit., in note 7, p. 44.
25 Interviews, Mr Brian Oakley, 25 Februaiy 1992; Sir Austin Bide; and Mr Robert Morland. 
2^  'Information Technology', op. cit., in note 7, p. 22.
2”^ 'Information Technology', op. cit., in note 7, p. 44.
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programme to go forward when Ministers were in the process of slashing the 
department's R&D budget and when Community's R&D activities were on the 
increase. This thesis' reformulation of Bureaucratic Politics provides an answer. In the 
face o f conflicting Ministerial objectives and in the absence ofM inisterial control, 
civil servants acted to further their immediate occupational interests.
Mrs Thatcher and her Ministers in the DTI faced a dilemma they failed to 
resolve. They wished to stall the Commission's relentless drive forward on the R&D 
front. There was little, aside from delaying the process, they could do to stop the 
Commission. At the same time, they were committed to ’rolling back the frontiers of 
the state' and cut the DTI's budget for national R&D programmes. The two objectives 
were at odds with one another. They could not cut national R&D funds without 
strengthening the power of the Commission. Rather than accepting the reality and 
inevitability of the situation and developing a strategy for organizing and empowering 
Whitehall to take full advantage of European R&D, they compounded the dilemma by 
becoming increasingly intractable in European negotiations and holding the Framework 
Programme and Esprit II to ransom.
Not only did Ministers fail to formulate a coherent policy to cope with the 
reality of the situation, they did not scrutinize or control the activities of civil servants 
on the IT86 Committee. Mr Pattie was embroiled in the Framework negotiations and 
although he received briefings on the Committee's progress, he paid very little attention 
to their progress. Mr Pattie reported that he simply did not have the time or the energy 
to supervise the IT86 Committee.^* He left them to go it alone.
In the face o f unresolved policy conflicts and lacking M inisterial control, civil 
servants acted to further their own occupational interests by designing a programme 
that would provide them with budgets and responsibilities. Their programme was 
against the Conservative's commitment to reduce Government involvement in industry 
and it ignored the inevitable eclipse of national R&D by European R&D, but it did 
further the occupational interests of the civil servants involved in its design.
Mr Pattie received the report, calling it 'impressive and constructive'.^^ He 
promised to pursue the report with urgency and suggested that work could begin by 
Easter. He shelved the report, however, pending the outcome of the Esprit II and 
Framework Programme negotiations, which remained deadlocked.
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 26 November 1992.
Computer Weekly, 27 November 1986, p. 1.
Financial Times, 22 November 1986, p. 1; and Computer Weekly, 27 November 1986, p. 1,
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8.6 Back to European Negotiations
While the IT86 report sat on Mr Pattie's desk, he returned to the Framework 
negotiations with a very difficult position to argue. The Prime Minister and Treasury 
wished to see an ECU 3.1 billion Framework but would allow no more than ECU 3.5 
billion.^^ The Dutch, French and Germans also wanted a much reduced budget, but the 
British position was the most extreme. In December, Mr Delors threatened to 
withdraw the Framework proposal and let all programmes under it terminate if member 
states continued to press for funding less than ECU 4 billion.
The Commission finally made a counter-offer: an ECU 3.7 billion Framework 
Programme to run for three years instead of five.^  ^ Research Ministers agreed to 
consider the proposal and meet again on 22 December. Mr Pattie cancelled the 22 
December meeting, arguing that agreement was unlikely, despite the fact that a 
majority of member states wanted the meeting to go a h e a d . M a ny  observers judged 
Mr Pattie's handling of the Presidency of the Council of Research Ministers as a dismal 
failure. If, as Helen Wallace suggests, the Presidency of the Council 'constitute[s] a 
rigorous test of a Government's capacity to demonstrate efficiency and procedural 
dexterity',^"^ then Britain was the loser in the field of R&D.
In February 1987, the Belgians, who were now holding the Presidency of the 
Council, tabled yet another compromise. They proposed a five year Framework 
Programme worth ECU 5.396 billion, which when added to the ECU 1.084 billion 
being spent on programmes already agreed gave a total of ECU 6.48 billion 
(approximately £4.8 billion). The Belgians insisted that this was the 'final compromise' 
and that member states had to agree it before 3 April or no further Research Council 
meetings would be arranged.^^ The British, French and Germans immediately rejected 
the Belgian compromise.^^
By March, the French and Germans had been won around to the Belgian 
compromise. Mr Pattie remained intransigent. Mrs Thatcher allowed him no room to 
negotiate. She had relaxed her budget demands, allowing him to accept a Framework 
worth ECU 4 - 4.2 billion, but 'He was not given one ECU's worth of freedom to 
negotiate from this point. He must have felt like a messenger boy. I had seen the note 
from Number 10 giving him his orders. And he was ridiculed. Commissioners called
Infomatics Daily Bulletin, 11 December 1986; Agence Europe, 19 February 1987.
Infomatics Daily Bulletin, 11 December 1986.
Agence Europe, 11 December 1986.
Hellen Wallace, 'The British Presidency of the European Community's Council of Ministers: the 
Opportunity to Persuade', International Affairs (yo\. 62, No. 4, Autumn 1986), p. 583.
Agence Europe, 26 March 1987; and Computing, 2 April 1987, p. 4.
Agence Europe, 25 February 1987.
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him incompetent'.^'^ Speaking at a conference in Cheshire, Mr Cadiou said, 'The UK is 
one of the countries which has benefited most from Esprit. It defies logic as to why it 
should be the country that is blocking the p r ogramme ' .Mr  Pattie fired back, calling 
the Community's R&D a 'shambles'.^^
The Belgian's 3 April deadline passed without an agreement. The European 
Parliament then voted to have the Commission withdraw its proposal if the UK did not 
approve it within three weeks.^ It was obvious that Britain would not comply. Mrs 
Thatcher had just called a General Election for June and all Ministers' were mobilized 
for a campaign blitz.
8.7 Progress on the IT86 Report
By April, the DTI had finalized its response to the IT86 report. According to Dr John 
Thynne and Mr Alastair Macdonald, who were drafting the Government's response and 
had both been members of the IT86 Committee, Mr Pattie had approved the 
Applications Scheme at the requested funding level and reduced funding for the 
Research Scheme.'** All that remained was for Mr Pattie to get the Prime Minister's 
approval. Mr Pattie decided to approach the Prime Minister after the General Election, 
surmising that his influence would be greater then. Rumour had it that he would 
replace Mr Paul Channon as Secretary of State at the DTI.^^
The Conservatives were returned to office in June 1987, but Mr Pattie was 
sacked. Lord David Young was appointed Secretary of State at the DTI. Lord Young 
was a businessman philosophically committed to 'rolling back the fi*ontiers of the state'. 
He had a pro-European attitude and a desire to change the course of the DTI, making 
it the "Department for Europe' and getting it off the backs of industry. Mr Kenneth 
Clarke was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister of State for Trade 
and Industry with responsibility for computing, microelectronics and 
telecommunications. The post of Minister of State for Information Technology was 
abolished.
Interviews, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992; and Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
Computing, 21 May 1987, p. 3.
Times, 31 March 1987, p. 24.
^^Electronics Weekly, 8 April 1987, p. 1; Financial Times, 4 April 1987, p. 2; Times, 4 April 1987,
p. 6.
*^* Interviews, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992 and 15 October 1992; and Mr Alastair Macdonald, 
28 October 1992.
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 26 November 1992.
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8.8 The New Team and Outlines of a New R&D Policy
The new Ministers inherited the IT86 report and the intractable Esprit II and 
Framework Programme negotiations. The programme proposed by the IT86 
Committee was antithetical to Lord Young's commitment to get government off the 
backs of industry and reorientate the DTI toward Europe. Consequently, he and Mr 
Clarke 'stonewalled' the report."*  ^ Observers expected the Government's response to 
the IT86 report (which was now called 'IT92' because the Government had delayed so 
long) to be announced at the July 1987 Alvey conference. At the conference, Mr 
Clarke confirmed that 'the Government are in principle quite prepared to accept that 
there is a case for continuing to fund collaborative programmes in some way, but 
'What we have to do now is to examine critically the justification for further 
Government funding at a time when there are huge demands for the tax-payeris 
money'.'*'*
Mr Clarke and Lord Young's refusal to rule on the IT86 Report served two 
purposes. First, it was a tentative step to establish their control over IT R&D issues in 
the Department. They would not allow civil servants to pressure them into approving a 
programme simply because a previous Minister, Mr Pattie, had been sympathetic to it. 
Second, it was a clear indication that the Ministers intended to reorientate their 
department's R&D policy.^^
Meanwhile, the Framework Programme negotiations dragged on. Senior 
figures within the Commission were so frustrated with the pace of the negotiations that 
several of them, including its president Mr Delors, threatened to resign if an agreement 
was not reached by the end of the year.**^  Observers in Britain hoped that the new 
Ministers would bring a new approach. The Financial 77/72^ 5 reported that neither 
Lord Young nor Mr Clarke was opposed to the Framework Programme and that any 
log-jam that remained would be the doing of the Treasury . M r  Pattie was blamed for 
the Government's earlier failure to find a solution.
In early July, Mr Clarke proposed a face saving device that would cut a mere 
ECU 417 million off the Belgian's offer.*** Agreement was finally reached on 14 July 
1987 for a Framework Programme budget of ECU 5.2 billion and the unofficial go- 
ahead for Esprit II was given.
'*^  Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owen, Alvey: Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative (London: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989), p. 241.
^  Ibid., p. 242; Electronics Times, 23 July 1987, p. 8.
Interview, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992.
^  Financial Times, 18 June 1987, p. 3; and Guardian, 18 June 1987, p. 1 and p. 36.
'*^  Financial Times, 24 June 1987, p. 2, 25 June 1987, p. 3 and 26 June 1987, p. 7.
'** Engineer, 9 July 1987, p. 6.
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Many Esprit research teams had been disbanded or left idle for lack of funds as 
a result of the one year delay in the start of the Framework Programme/^ Dr Thynne 
assessed Britain's achievements in the negotiations: 'We died in the ditches over it. We 
lost all credibility. If we had agreed to the figure of 6, we would not be seen as 
begrudging Europeans, but as constructive members undertaking the worthwhile task 
of disciplining the budget. As it was, no one got credit for going to 5.2.'^°
After the Framework budget was agreed, the Commission submitted its formal 
proposal for Esprit II as well as its draft work programme for Esprit 11.^ * The original 
proposal calling for a budget of ECU 2.2 billion had been reduced to ECU 1.6 billion. 
Esprit n  was formally approved in April 1988, after a nine month delay, at a level of 
ECU 1.6 billion (approximately £1,056 million).Esprit II represented a major shift from 
Esprit I. Esprit II would be more industrially oriented with concentration on 
Applications research in three general areas: microelectronics, information processing 
systems and IT Application technologies. Like the IT86 Committee's proposed 
programme, the Esprit Applications orientation would be supplemented by a Basic 
Research programme designed primarily for academics.
Lord Young's decision to stonewall on the IT86 report and approve Esprit II 
was indicative of his desire to formalize the shift in DTI R&D policy that had been 
surreptitiously introduced under Mr Channon's tenure. In Lord Young's DTI, Europe 
would be at the centre of British R&D policy. Although his intentions were clear. Lord 
Young did not formalize or clearly articulate them. Only the barest outlines were 
discernible. Further, although he had taken his first steps toward establishing control 
over departmental R&D policy, his grip was loose during his first six months in office. 
Finally, Lord Young did not, during this six month period, make organizational 
changes that would cure the inefficiencies of departmental control and coordination 
mechanisms. He was beginning to exert control and formulate new objectives, but the 
conditions of uncertainty and organizational inefficiency conducive to bureaucratic 
competition remained. How did civil servants respond?
Financial Times, 15 July 1987, p. 42 and 23 July 1987, p. 2, p. 8 and p. 22; Times, 23 July 1987, p. 
4 and p. 7.
Interview, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992.
Commission of the European Communities, 'Proposal for a Council Regulation Concerning the 
European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technologies 
(ESPRIT)', Com (87) 313 final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, July 1987). 
Commission of the European Communities, 'Draft ESPRIT Workprogramme', 22 July 1987.
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8.9 Responses to New Policy Outlines
As time passed with no Ministerial decision on Alvey 2, the prospects for it, and the 
budgets and implementation responsibilities for civil servants that were tied up in it, 
looked unlikely to be realized. In contrast, Lord Young's approval of Esprit converted 
it into a guaranteed source of budgets and responsibilities. Some civil servants 
recognized their Minister's actions as the harbinger of a new policy toward European 
R&D that would have strong ramifications for their occupational interests. A s 
Bureaucratic Politics wouldpredict, civil servants who saw Europe as a means to 
budgets and responsibilities maneuvered to establish a presence in Esprit. That 
maneuvering was significantly different than that observed during earlier periods, 
however. Rather than operating independently o f M inisterial direction, their actions 
were now compatible with Lord Young's emerging policy reorientation, which gave 
increasing priority to European R&D programmes over national ones.
Civil servants in the DTI's Research Technology Policy Division (RTP) 
instigated organizational changes and strategy reorientations that increased their 
influence over Community R&D. They did so by arguing for a coherent, constructive 
and positive departmental policy toward European R&D and by giving themselves 
responsibility for its formulation. In this manner, their desire for increased 
responsibilities was made consistent with the broad outlines of Lord Young's policy 
reorientation.
According to Dr Alastair Keddie of RTP division.
We realized that we needed to set up a framework for dealing with Europe and 
that we needed to get our act together to operate more effectively. We had to 
increase our dialogue with our opposites in other countries and increase our 
dialogue with our opposites within the Department [DTI] and across 
departments. We had to adopt a more constructive, forward thinking
approach. 52
The first step in generating a constructive, coherent approach to European 
R&D was to improve the attitude of civil servants in the DTI toward European R&D 
Given Lord Young's pro-European attitude, RTP was concerned that many civil 
servants in the DTI were far too dismissive of European programmes and that they had 
not fully realized the growing significance of Community initiatives. Thus, RTP made it 
their 'policy to get the DTI to recognize that the European scene was changing 
rapidly'. 53 RTP division created a list of areas that should be financed through
52 Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
53 Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
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Community funds and a list of those that should be funded nationally. Information 
technology and telecommunications topped the list of areas appropriate for EC 
funding. RTP also turned its attention to finances. Having concluded that little, if any, 
effort to calculate the appropriate size of Community R&D spend had been undertaken 
by the Treasury or Number 10 during the Framework negotiations, RTP decided to 
conduct a thorough analysis of all EC R&D programmes and suggest the optimal size 
and sensible growth rates.
The DTI needed a strong organization capable of bringing the disparate 
interests of the numerous divisions with R&D responsibilities together into a single, 
coherent policy. RTP was just the organization. W e had to put structures into place 
which would integrate interests across divisions in the D epartm ent.N um erous task 
forces and working groups, bringing together civil servants from across the DTI, were 
created. RTP was at the centre of this network: 'We also had to get it realized in the 
department that there was a single group of people who were representing the UK 
interest rather than everyone representing their own interests. It was a very carrot and 
stick approach.
RTP concluded that better coordination and consultation was needed across 
Whitehall and with the European Commission.^"  ^ Officials from RTP initiated frequent 
meetings with their counterparts in the Cabinet Office. Dr Keddie stated that during 
this period, he had daily contact with the Cabinet Office. Officials from RTP also 
instigated regular bilateral talks with their counterparts in France and Germany and 
they warmed up relations with Commissioners from DGXII (Research) and DGXIII 
(Information Technology and Telecommunications).^*
Maneuvering for influence over and responsibility for European R&D was not 
limited to RTP division. It extended across the IT and LA divisions and the Alvey 
Directorate as well and it involved significant organizational restructuring. As with the 
activities of RTP division, this maneuvering was conducted within parameters set by 
Lord Young's emerging orientation toward European R&D.
On 10 October 1987, Mr Oakley retired from the civil service and left the 
Alvey Directorate in the hands of his Deputy, Mr Laurence Clarke. Mr Clarke 
understood his assignment to be temporary, pending the Government's decision on the 
IT86 re p o r t .T h e  IT86 report had recommended that their programme be 
implemented by an Executive Group, led by an industrialist. Mr Macdonald, who had
Interviews, Mr Adrian Grilli, 25 January, 1993; and Mr John Barber. 
Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
Interview, Mr Adrian Grilli, 25 January 1993.
Interview, Mr David Wiseman.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 43, p. 253.
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been promoted to Deputy Secretary in charge of IT and LA divisions, informed Mr 
Clarke that if the Government accepted the IT86 proposals and an Executive Group 
was created, Mr Clarke would be one among many applicants considered for the post 
of director.^®
Mr Clarke thought that he was secure in his job at least until Ministers ruled on 
the IT86 report. The unexpected then happened. Mr Clarke received a call on 6 
November from Mr Macdonald informing him that a civil servant would immediately 
replace him as head of the Alvey Directorate and that a civil servant would head the 
Executive Group, if it was created.^^ Mr Clarke was incensed and wrote a letter to the 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Brian Hayes, expressing his dissatisfaction. Sir Brian agreed 
to meet with Mr Clarke and at their 16 November meeting, Mr Hayes informed him 
that Dr Timothy Walker had been chosen to lead the Alvey Directorate and any 
subsequent o r g a n i z a t i o n . ^ 2  ( D j- Walker had been Alvey's first Director of 
Administration, but had moved to the Policy Planning Unit to become Mr Paul 
Channon and then Lord Young's principal private secretary.) The SERC was not 
consulted. They were told of the decision on 18 November, only five days before Dr 
Walker took over from Mr Clarke. Needless to say, the SERC were 'very, very 
an g ry '.W h y  was this decision made and why was it made with so little respect for 
the formalities of consultation? The explanation lies in the maneuvering of civil 
servants in the DTI.
Turn the clock back to 1986. In late 1986, Mr John Major announced his 
decision to retire from the civil service. Mr Macdonald, who had just been promoted to 
Deputy Secretary in charge of IT and LA divisions, needed to find a replacement. He 
rang his good friend. Dr John Thynne who was heading up the DTI's regional office in 
the Northwest, and asked him to return to London and take over LA division. Dr 
Thynne agreed.
After a short time in LA division. Dr Thynne concluded that the allocation of 
IT responsibilities across the DTI was senseless. Three organizations had responsibility 
for information technology: IT division, which was now led by Dr WB Willott of 
Under Secretary rank; LA division, which was led by Dr Thynne, also of Under 
Secretary rank; and the Alvey Directorate, which was led by Mr Oakley, a Deputy 
Secretary. Dr Thynne told Mr Macdonald of his concerns and Mr Macdonald 
recommended that Dr Thynne come up with a plan to reorganize the department.
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 43, p. 253. 
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 43, p. 253. 
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 43, p. 254. 
Interview, Dr David Worsnip.
Interview, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992.
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After consulting with Mr Oakley, Dr Thynne recommended the following 
reorganization. LA division would be disbanded and its responsibility for all research in 
silicon, gallium arsenide and optoelectronics be transferred to the Alvey Directorate, or 
whatever its successor organization was to be called. The Alvey Directorate would 
also have responsibility for any programme that resulted fi'om the IT86 report. 
Responsibility for Esprit would revert to the IT division along with the Alvey 
Directorate's limited activities in software research. IT division would retain its 
responsibilities for issues such as consumer electronics, radio, television, video and 
computer services.
This recommendation was significant because it 'normalized' the Alvey 
Directorate. The Alvey Directorate was given responsibilities that were not associated 
with the Alvey Programme. Therefore, it was no longer a transitory organization with 
a life-time limited to the Programme it was created to implement. As Dr Alastair 
Keddie of RTP division saw it, 'the Alvey Directorate became just one o f the many 
divisions. What was Alvey became part of the input of the entire department'.®^
Mr Oakley, Dr Thynne and Mr Macdonald believed it necessary to normalize 
the Directorate for one major reason; it was the only way to take full advantage of 
Esprit. They predicted that if Ministers were to approve any part of the IT86 
recommendations, it would be a scaled down version of the Applications Scheme. The 
Basic Research Scheme would be rejected or funded at an insignificant level.®® Esprit 
would thus be the only significant source of funding for basic research in the UK. It 
was therefore necessary to ensure effective implementation. The IT86 report had 
recommended that the Executive Group, the Alvey Directorate look-alike, implement 
Esprit. This was impossible. By this time, the backlash against the Alvey Directorate 
had become too strong to ignore. Even outside observers had realized the scale of 
resentment.
A laudable recommendation of the plan [IT86 report] is its suggestion that a 
single, high powered organisation be set up within the DTI to oversee and 
manage the proposed programmes' activities. This will not please the 
bureaucrats at the other ministries involved....®^
For Whitehall, Alvey has been a traumatic experience. The Government's old 
ways of supporting research are less strenuous than this co-operative venture, 
and it has shown no readiness to repeat elsewhere the formula of multi-
®^ Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
®® Mr Macdonald and Dr Thynne were, at this time, drafting Mr Pattie's response to the IT86 report 
and were well aware of his intentions. They kept Mr Oakley informed. Interviews, Dr John Thynne, 2 
December 1992; and Mr Brian Oakley, 2 June 1992.
®^  Electronics Times, 27 November 1986, p. 16.
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department funding for a major research initiative. Whitehall is expected to 
strenuously resist one Alvey view that 'We need an Alvey directorate, or 
something like it, in perpetuity'.^*
From Mr Macdonald's point of view.
Esprit was going to be the real driving force in future. It was a lower risk 
strategy to have a civil servant who knew Whitehall and Brussels than to put an 
industrialist in just to cheer industry up. We were going to have to get the most 
value out o f Esprit and that needed a civil servant who could find his way 
through the system, create no disputes and squeeze as much out of the system 
as possible.®^
Bringing the Alvey Directorate, and its successor, back into the DTI was the only 
satisfactory solution.
Mr Macdonald was now faced with staffing decisions. Mr Oakley had also 
announced his retirement and Dr Willott was moving to the Export Credits Guarantee 
Department. Civil servants were needed to run the reorganized IT division and Alvey 
Directorate (and its successor). There were two candidates: Dr Thynne and Dr Walker. 
Dr Thynne had reorganized himself out of a job and Dr Walker's tenure at the 
Secretary of State's office was over. Mr Macdonald asked Dr Thynne which 
organization he would prefer to lead and Dr Thynne requested the Alvey Directorate. 
Mr Macdonald agreed, but soon after realized that Dr Thynne might best be able to 
handle the managerial complexity of IT division so he asked if Dr Thynne would take 
IT d iv is io n .D r Thynne agreed and became Under Secretary in IT division while Dr 
Walker was promoted to Under Secretary and took over from Mr Clarke in November 
1987 as head of the Alvey Directorate. Dr Walker saw the reorganization in the 
following terms:
In DTI there was always a tension between the Electronics Applications (LA) 
Division and the Alvey Directorate. I now have the former LA people in my 
directorate. The new structure has brought the two together and integrated 
them in such a way that they are now one team, rather than two teams 
competing.
At this juncture, Dr Thynne had formal responsibility for Esprit although both 
he and Dr Walker attended EMC meetings. From Dr Walker's point of view, it was
Financial Times, 12 August 1986, p. 10.
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992. 
Interview, Dr John Thynne, 15 October 1992. 
Oakley and Owen, op. cit., in note 43, p. 261.
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vital that he obtain responsibility for Esprit. Having just returned from the office of the 
Secretary of State, Dr Walker suspected that Lord Young would approve only the 
Applications Scheme of the IT86 report and probably at a much lower level than the 
IT86 Committee recommended. If this came to pass, one of two things would occur: 
Dr Walker's organization would be given limited responsibilities and a painfully small 
budget; or the justification for his organization would disappear and the organization 
along with it. Dr Walker had to find a rationale for his organization and a budget. 
Esprit offered both. Mr Morland, Director of Alvey VLSI, explained Dr Walker's 
concern with Esprit: "He was climbingüs way up through the civil service ladder and he 
was looking for a way to move through the organization [DTI]. He was not going to 
stick his neck out for IT in the UK. Supporting the UK IT industry was not the way to 
the top.'^^ Esprit was.
Dr Walker entered into Esprit negotiations with great enthusiasm. Dr Thynne, 
on the other hand, judged that Japanese IT would be of increasing importanccto British 
industry and he turned his attention to the Far East and away from Europe. It was in 
both men s' interest to allow Dr Walker to be the UK's representative to the EMC, 
leaving Dr Thynne free to pursue his interests in Japan. As Dr Thynne remarked:
I agreed with Tim that we would both be on the EMC, but he would go and I 
wouldn't. There was no point in two Under Secretaries going. I was very busy 
and I was looking at Japan by this point. Tim was an able operator and we 
were very friendly. We shared confidence, we were open and we were 
friends.^^
Mr Macdonald agreed to the arrangement and formal responsibility for Esprit 
was transferred from IT division to Dr Walker's Alvey Directorate. As Mr Macdonald 
saw it, 'Tim Walker had been Brian Oakley's deputy and he had Esprit experience. He 
had also been the private principle to Lord Young and that definitely had political 
advantage. He was someone who knew Ministers and Ministers would be much more 
inclined to listen to someone they knew'.'^  ^ The autonomy of the Alvey Directorate 
was abolished. Dr Walker and his Directorate were moved fi'om Millbank Tower to the 
DTI's offices in Victoria.
Having gained responsibility for Esprit, Dr Walker attempted to secure larger 
budgets and responsibilities by increasing the appeal of a national Applications 
programme to run simultaneously with Esprit. The problem was, however, that Esprit 
II was Applications oriented. Why should Ministers, who were trying to reduce the
Inverview, Mr Robert Morland.
^  Interview, Dr John Thynne, 15 October 1992. 
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992.
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Department's R&D spend, approve a programme that would fund research that would 
qualify for European funds? The IT86 Committee had attempted to solve the problem 
by arguing that a national programme was necessary for Britain to get the most out of 
European programmes. Dr Walker recognized this for what it was: a Committee's 
instinctive and desperate attempt to discredit that which would threaten their own 
recommendations. Having just returned from the Secretary of State's office, Dr Walker 
knew the futility of the exercise. A stronger, more analytical, approach was needed.
If Dr Walker could assure his Ministers that a national Applications programme 
could fund research not being undertaken in Esprit, hence negating the prospects of 
duplication, then the chances of his organization being rewarded with increased 
budgets and wide-ranging responsibilities would be greater. In this vein. Dr Walker 
invited members of the Directorate and IT specialists to design elements of a national 
Applications programme that was inextricably linked, but different from. Esprit II. The 
experts designed strategies for three technical areas: devices, systems architecture and 
systems engineering.
Mr Morland and Mr John Bass of Plessey's Caswell research centre designed 
the devices stra teg y .T h ey  visited Brussels to discover what work the Commission 
planned to fund through Esprit II. Commissioners were reluctant to discuss their plans 
in any detail, so Mr Morland and Mr Bass visited most British companies involved in 
Esprit work and gathered details about their Esprit projects. From this information, 
they were able to sketch an accurate outline of the Commission's strategy. They then 
identified gaps in the Esprit strategy and fill in those gaps with a national programme.
A similar approach was taken in the areas of systems architecture and systems 
engineering."^^
An important element of Dr Walker's scheme was the participation of the 
SERC. Dr Walker knew that the budget he might be allocated was likely to be 
painfully small. In order to run an Applications programme of any significance, he 
needed another source of money. The MoD was no longer interested in industrial 
research, but the SERC wanted to keep a presence in IT R&D.^^ Dr Walker held tal ks 
with civil servants from the SERC on possible frameworks for future collaboration.
While Minister's deliberated on the IT86 report, some civil servants surmised 
the general outlines of their Department's future R&D policy: European R&D would
Interview, Mr Robert Morland.
The strategies were eventually published in 1988. They were: Information Engineering Directorate, 
'Silicon 2000. Devices: A National Research Programme in Silicon VLSI and CAD* (DTI: June 
1988); Information Engineering Directorate, 'Systems Architecture. A Strategy for Research in 
Parallel Architecture, Distributed Systems, Vision and Speech Technologies' (DTI: June 1988); and 
Information Engineering Directorate, 'Systems Engineering. Improved Design and Construction of 
Complex IT Systems (DTI: June 1988).
Interviews, Dr David Worsnip; and Dr David Thomas.
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move centre stage and national R&D would be of minimal importance. Future budgets 
and responsibilities would emanate primarily from Europe. Consequently, they 
worked to bring Esprit into their individual remits. Thus, bureaucratic competition for 
budgets and responsibilities existed, but it was conducted within parameters set by 
Lord Young. Those parameters stipulated that European R&D programmes would be 
given increasing priority over national programme. Civil servants now had to await the 
fate of IT86.
8.10 Elsewhere in Whitehall
Civil servants in the DTI were not the only ones to realize the growing importance of 
European R&D and work to establish a foothold there. Civil servants in the Treasury 
and Cabinet Office did the same.
Under the strong guidance of Mr Nigel Lawson, the Treasury extended its 
presence in Community R&D by formalizing its 'attribution' formula and preparing 
departments for its application in the 1988 Public Expenditure round. The finalized 
attribution formula worked in the following manner."^ * In discussion with the Cabinet 
Office and with departments, the Treasury would assign a 'lead' department for each 
area of Community R&D spend. The DTI was assigned the lead department for all 
Community spending on information technology, including Esprit. The Government's 
contribution to the Community's R&D budget would come from, or be 'attributed' to, 
the budget of the respective lead department. This amount of the yearly 'attribution' 
would be settled during the yearly Public Expenditure Survey (PES), during which the 
annual budget for each department is negotiated.
The departmental budget, as negotiated during the PES round, includes two 
elements; money that may be spent on national programmes implemented by the 
department; and the Government's contribution to the Community R&D budget. If 
Community spending on R&D exceeds 1984 levels, which it has every year since.
Sources for this discussion include the following interviews: Mr Michael Corcoran and personal 
correspondence 26 Januaiy 1993; Mr Adrian Grilli, 11 February 1993; Dr Alastair Keddie; Ms 
Christine Symes; Mr Derek Flynne, 9 December 1992; Mr Alan Mayo, 20 Januaiy 1992. Testimoiy of 
The Hon Douglas Hogg (MP and Minister for Trade and Enterprise, DTI) Mr Robert Foster (DTI), Mr 
PL Thomas (Cabinet Office), Mr PJ Colyear (Cabinet Office), House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Communities, A Community Framework for R&D, 17th Report, Session 1989-90 
(London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 12-22. Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum by the Department of 
Trade and Industiy/Cabinet Office, ibid., pp. 78-81. Testimony of Mr D Révolta (Treasury), Mr C 
Farthing (Treasury) and Mr M Mercer (Treasury), House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, International Scientific Programmes, Second Report, Session 1990-1991, HL Paper 24-11 
(London: HMSO, February 1991), pp. 1-13.
The amount of the attribution is negotiated during a round of negotiations called Euro-PES 
(European Public Expenditure Survey). Euro-PES simply refers to that element of the Public 
Expenditure Survey that relates to European Community spending.
203
money allocated to national programmes must be cut back to keep departmental 
spending within the budget agreed with the Treasury. Thus, any increase in Community 
spending above this predetermined level results in a proportional decrease in money 
that can be spent on national programmes implemented by the lead department. Money 
over the 1984 levels that the Commission spends on Esprit must be taken from the 
DTTs budget for its own national programmes. The Treasury then reduces the 
department's budget for national programmes (not the Department's total budget) at 
the beginning of the next year's PES round. Departments may then bid for a 
reinstatement of some or all of this reduction. Through this system, 'value for money' 
could be secured and the Treasury could control the British contribution to the 
Community budget.
While the Treasury was exerting its influence over Community R&D, the 
Cabinet Office attempted to do the same. Numerous organizational changes took place 
in the Cabinet Office, all which were designed to increase the Cabinet Office's influence 
over national and Community R&D.
The first change was the replacement of Sir Robin Nicholson with Mr John 
Fairclough as the Chief Scientific Advisor in the Cabinet Office. Mr Fairclough was 
determined to strengthen the Cabinet O ffice.Throughout the decade, the Cabinet 
Office had been weak and incapable of exerting control or influence over departmental 
R&D spending. In the words of Sir John Kingman, the Cabinet Office science 
secretariat needed 'power'.
Mr Fairclough made a number of changes to obtain such 'power'. He first 
increased the staff numbers in the Science and Technology Secretariat and expanded 
their responsibilities. The Science and Technology Secretariat was responsible for 
preparing the annual report on Government funded R&D. The first several reports 
were rather unprofessional and unambitious. Mr Fairclough insisted that their scope 
and quality improve. Although preparing the report was a time-consuming and tedious 
task for the Secretariat, it afforded them several privileges. It enabled them to establish 
close contact with civil servants responsible for departmental R&D decisions. It gave 
them valuable information about each department's priorities and procedures for 
making R&D decisions.
In early 1986, the Information Technology Advisory Panel (ITAP), which was 
created in 1982 to advise the Prime Minister, was dissolved. To fill the gap, the terms 
of reference for the Advisory Council for Applied Research and Development 
(ACARD) were expanded. The Chief Scientist was a member of ACARD and the
Interview, Sir John Fairclough. Financial Times, 25 July 1987, p. 6.
House of Lords Select Commitee on Science and Technology, Civil Research and Development, 
First Report, Session 1986-87, HL20-II (London: HMSO, 1987), p. 40.
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Science and Technology Secretariat served as the secretariat for this strengthened 
organization. In this capacity, civil servants assisted members of ACARD prepare 
reports on issues of relevance to Government funding of R&D. These papers were
prepared for the Prime Minister and published with her consent. In this way, civil 
servants had a route through which they could present their ideas to the top levels of 
Government.*^
Finally, Mr Fairclough convinced the Prime Minister to create a 'watchdog' 
body in the Cabinet Office called the Science and Technology Assessment Office 
(STAO). The STAO had 5 to 10 members, was a sub-unit of the Science and 
Technology Secretariat and reported to Mr Fairclough. The ST AO's terms of reference 
were to: establish a central body that would analyze the contribution made by 
Government funded R&D to the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy; advise 
Ministers and civil servants on the shape, content and conduct of national R&D 
programmes; and advise on spending priorities.*'* The STAO was the embodiment of 
the concern with 'value for money! As The Times put it, 'The powers in Whitehall, 
particularly the Cabinet Office [are] concerned that Britain is not getting value for 
money from the 4,000 million pounds a year pumped into computers, electronics and 
other high technology research'. *^  The Alvey Programme was on Mr Fairclough's hit- 
list. Although Mr Fairclough was a strong supporter of IT, having come from IBM, he 
believed the Alvey Programme, and any others like it, was an ineffective way of aiding 
industry. Its focus on pre-competitive research was a waste of Government money 
because it offered no 'value added' to the British economy.*^
These reforms allowed the Science and Technology Secretariat to extend its 
authority into international R&D issues. Members of the Secretariat strengthened 
contacts with civil servants in Whitehall departments with responsibility for EC R&D. 
The Secretariat also began to strengthen consultation mechanisms for coordinati^j 
individual department's policies for EC R&D.*^ The Secretariat claimed ultimate 
responsibility for coordinating departmental interests in the Framework Programme. 
Members of the Secretariat also initiated meetings with European science Ministers 
and European Commissioners. In this manner, the Secretariat could gather its own 
information on Community R&D rather than relying on departments to choose the
*^  Testimony of Sir Francis Tombs (Chairman ACARD), ibid, p. 436.
*^  Testimony of Mrs Catherine Cunningham (Cabinet Office, Head of ACARD Secretariat), ibid., p. 
441.
*'* Testimony of Sir John Fairclough, ibid., p. 453.
*^  Times, 8 July 1986.
*^  Interview, Sir John Fairclough. Financial Times, 18 December 1986, p. 24; and Times, 12 
December 1986.
*^  Interviews, Dr Alastair Keddie; Mr Alan Mayo, 20 January 1992; and Mr David Warren. 
Testimony of Sir John Fairclough, House of Lords, HL 20-1, op. cit., in note 82, p. 459.
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information they wised to pass on to the Cabinet Office. These were the first of many 
actions that strengthened the Cabinet Office Science and Technology Secretariat and 
eventually allowed it to gain a controlling interest in EC R&D.
8.11 Westminster's Assessment
In the wake of the Framework Programme and Esprit II negotiations, the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology concluded that morale in the 
scientific community was at an all-time low and that the 'overall picture conveys an 
impression of turmoil and frustration'.** In their January 1987 report, the Lords called 
for a new approach to policy-making. Two of their recommendations were for a 
science Minister to be appointed to the Cabinet and replacement of ACARD with a 
Council of Science and Technology that was chaired by the Prime Minister.*^
The Government's accepted some, but not all, of the recommendations. 
ACARD's name was changed to the Advisory Council on Science and Technology 
(ACOST). ACARD's remit was limited to R&D, but ACOST's would include all 
science and technology issues. ACOST's remit was; 'To advise Government on: the 
priorities for science and technology in the United Kingdom; the application of science 
and technology, developed in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, for the benefit of 
both the public and private sectors in accordance with national needs; the co­
ordination, in collaboration with Departmental Advisory Bodies, of science and 
technology activities; the nature and extent of United Kingdom participation in 
international collaboration in science and tech n o lo g y .It was expected that ACOST 
would be a much more powerful body than ACARD. As the Financial wrote, 
'Never before has British science and technology as a whole had a mechanism for 
deciding priorities'.^* As the central advisory structure became more powerful and had 
easier access to the Prime Minister, so did the Chief Scientific Advisor, who was a 
member of ACOST, and the Science and Technology Secretariat which serviced it.
Although the Government's central advisory structure was changed, the Prime 
Minister was still personally in charge of the country's civil R&D. She exercised her 
leadership by creating and chairing a Cabinet committee, called E(ST), which was a 
sub-committee of the Cabinet Economic C o m m i t t e e . ^ ^  This Committee was advised by
** House of Lords, HL 20-1, op. cÆ, in note 82, pp. 11-12.
*^  House of Lords, HL 20-1, op. cit^  in note 82, pp. 64-66.
Civil Research and Development, Government response to th First Report of the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1986-87 session. Cm 185 (London: HMSO, July 1987),
p. 2.
Financial Times, 2 September 1987, p. 29.
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Fea/y (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 639; Financial 
Times, 21 July 1987, p. 1 and 9 April 1990, p. 32.
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ACOST. Despite the changes, it was clear that the Prime Minister continued to resist 
change or admit that the Government's R&D policy-making machinery was failing. In 
the DTI, however, Ministers were working to bring coherence and order to 
Government policy-making as regards national and Community R&D. Similar actions 
were being taken in the Treasury and Cabinet Office.
8.12 Conclusion
Before Lord Young's appointment to the DTI, Ministerial objectives regarding 
European R&D were inconsistent. When Ministers cut the DTI's budget for national 
R&D programmes, civil servants responsible for IT R&D lost budgets and 
responsibilities previously afforded to them through national programmes. The only 
secure future source of budgets and responsibilities was through involvement in EC 
R&D programmes. At the same time that their budget cuts increased the significance 
of Europe, Ministers attempted to reduce the importance of European R&D by 
blocking the Framework Programme and Esprit II negotiations. In this environment of 
policy uncertainty. Ministers failed to control or closely supervise events taking place 
on the national IT R&D front. Civil servants on the IT86 Committee were given a free 
hand to design a national IT R&D programme. Lacking clear Ministerial objectives 
and control, civil servants satisfied their own occupational interests. They designed a 
national programme that afforded them a large budget and wide-ranging 
responsibilities. This is just as this thesis' formulation of the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective would predict.
When Lord Young took office, he began to exert his authority and set the 
foundations of a new departmental policy toward Europe. He expected European 
R&D programmes to eclipse national ones. During this interim period, while 
Ministerial objectives were not formalized and while Ministerial control was not 
entirely established, civil servants continued to work to maximize their budgets and 
responsibilities. However, as this thesis'reformulation o f the perspective would 
expect. Lord Young's emerging objectives and incipient control did affect civil 
servants' behaviour. It set parameters for their bureaucratic maneuvering. Civil 
servants attempted to maximize their budgets and responsibilities by exerting their 
influence in Esprit. As a result, Lord Young's objective of giving greater importance to 
European R&D was realized.
Civil servants no longer perceived EC programmes, particularly Esprit, as a 
threat to their budgets and responsibilities. Rather, EC programmes were a source of 
them. Further, the evidence in this Chapter suggests that bureaucrats now saw a direct
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relationship between responsibility for EC programmes and promotions. Thus, Lord 
Young's objective of increasing the significancèx)f EC R&D was realized.
Civil servants sought to bring EC R&D into their spheres of influence. Did 
action channels, as formulated in this thesis, provide insight into the means they 
employed to achieve this objective? Action channels were notinstnunentalin 
examining the behaviour o f civil servants during this period. The reason: civil servants 
were working to break down the action channels that existed from 1983 through 1985 
and build new ones that would further their Minister's objectives and further their own 
occupational interests. Thus, action channels were the object rather than the 
determinant o f bureaucratic action.
Did bureaucratic competition affect British policy in Esprit during this period? 
No, because policy-making was monopolized by Mrs Thatcher, the Treasury and 
Ministers in the DTI. All decisions were taken by Ministers, with little if any, recourse 
to civil servants. Mr Pattie could not recall soliciting the advice of his civil servants 
during this period.^^ Those decisions were driven by the Prime Minister's desire to 
minimize the budget of the EC.
The Framework Programme and Esprit II negotiations were deadlocked for 
over a year, during which time most Esprit activity came to a halt. There were few 
EMC meetings to attend, there were no official workplans created, there were no 
project proposals to evaluate. All the avenues through which civil servants had 
previously exerted influence in Esprit were closed. Ministers had usurped their 
decision-making license. Thus, although the IT86 Committee's treatment of Esprit was 
conditioned by civil servants' desire for budgets and responsibilities and although civil 
servants competed over responsibility for Esprit during Lord Young's first six months 
in office, the Ministerial attention afforded to Esprit prohibited bureaucratic 
competition from having a real effect on Esprit.
Interview, Mr Geoffrey Pattie, 9 November 1992.
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British Policy in Esprit: January 1988 to April 1991 
Chapter 9
From September 1984 to June 1987, civil servants in the DTI worked under three 
different Secretaries of State who did not establish control over the Department or 
infuse it with their objectives. Lord Young's arrival heralded a change. Early in his 
tenure, he began to assert control and although his policies were not formalized during 
his first six months in office, the outlines of those objectives were plain. Finally, in 
January 1988, he clearly and forcefully articulated his policy objectives in a White 
Paper. At the same time, he reformed the DTI's organization and procedures for 
implementing Community R&D programmes. The reforms placed a single division in 
charge of overseeing the activities of all divisions with responsibility for EC R&D. The 
hypotheses advanced in this thesis expect to find civil servants faithfully implementing 
the policies of their Minister when the objectives are clearly articulated, when Ministers 
have established control and when organizational structures and procedures ensure 
faithful implementation of those objectives. The hypotheses also predict a lessening of 
bureaucratic competition in the Department and a consequent reduction, if not 
elimination, of the effect such competition can have on British policy-making.
9.1 Innovation Policy* in the Department of Trade and Industry
In June 1987, the DTI had welcomed Lord David Young as their Secretary of State. 
During his first six months in the Department, Lord Young kept a low profile while 
redefining his Department's objectives, but in January 1988 he published them in a 
White Paper, entitled DTI — The Department for Enterprise'.^ The rechristened 
Department was no longer in the business of subsidizing industry. It was now 
something of a publicist: it would provide information about and encourage businesses 
to use 'new approaches', whether it be management or technology, in their operations.^ 
Accordingly, most of the DTI's budget would go toward subsidies for consultancy 
services, training, technology transfer and awareness programmes.
The Department's new R&D policy was also set out in the White Paper. 
'Innovation policy*, as it was now called, had four planks. First, the Department would 
shift responsibility for research onto companies and off Government. Second, if 
companies needed financial support for R&D, they should turn to the EC's Framework
 ^Department of Trade and Industry, 'DTI -  the Department for Enterprise' (London: HMSO, 1988), 
p. 5.
 ^Ibid, p. 3.
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Programme rather than relying on national R&D programmes. EC R&D would take 
priority over national R&D programmes. Third, the DTI would fund a limited amount 
o f research, but only where it had widespread benefits, where it facilitated technology 
transfer and where it was necessary to develop commercial applications. Fourth, all 
DTI funded R&D, whether on a national or EC level, had to be monitored and 
evaluated to ensure that it was giving 'value for money'. The fourth plank of the DTI's 
R&D policy reflected the 'value for money' and 'efficiency' concerns that were now 
indelibly inscribed in the Whitehall lexicon.
All research programmes that did not fit the philosophy of the 'innovation 
policy' were discontinued or rejected. The Microelectronics Industry Support 
Programme, the Support for Software Products and the Fibreoptics and 
Optoelectronics scheme were canceled.^ Then, the long awaited verdict on IT86 was 
given.
There would be no Alvey 2 as envisioned by the IT86 Committee. Lord Young 
explained that the Government had already agreed to support Esprit II, which, under 
the Treasury's attribution formula, would require a £200 million contribution from the 
DTI budget to the EC's Framework Programme budget.'* There was no justification 
for financing a large research programme at the national level if research could be 
financed through Esprit II. In this spirit, the DTI's new IT R&D policy was to 
'encourage the participation of UK companies in technological collaboration with other 
European firms and research communities, including programmes such as ESPRIT and 
RACE' (Research in Advanced Communications in Europe), ensure complementarity 
between EC and national R&D programmes and to get 'value for money' from both 
national and EC R&D spending.^
Lord Young rejected IT86's £1 billion programme but allocated a meager £29 
million over three years, to be combined with a £55 million contribution from the 
SERC, for a small national collaborative IT R&D programme. Projects approved for 
funding could have up to 50 per cent of their research costs covered by the DTI/SERC 
programme. This was not the Applications Scheme recommended by the IT86 
Committee nor was it a stand-alone programme. All projects funded under this 
programme had to be 'complementary' to Esprit.
The White Paper formalized a major policy shift some DTI civil servants had 
recognized as inevitable: European R&D programmes had replaced national ones. 
Although some civil servants expected a policy shift of this nature, they had not 
foreseen the extent of it. They had surmised that Esprit II would kill the £1 billion IT86
3 Ibid., p. 33.
p. 36.
^Ibid, p. 35.
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programme, but they had hoped that Lord Young would approve a small national IT 
Applications programme. He did not. Mr Macdonald explained the decision.
...the Department as a whole had moved away from seeing IT as the central 
thing in the whole firmament. Several UK companies involved in Alvey were 
not half as strong as they had been in 1981 and 1982 and it was clear that 
Esprit and RACE were absorbing large sums of money. Ministers were 
thinking, 'Crikey, we already have Esprit growing out of all expectations and of 
all the other things that we can spend money on, let the EC spend it on IT. IT 
has had its turn. IT is not the only thing in the world. What about space, 
biotechnology? IT has Esprit anyway. IT can't have its cake and eat it too.' 
These were very powerful arguments.^
Lord Young's objectives regarding Esprit were clearly and forcefully set out in 
the White Paper. They were frequently repeated. A few examples will suffice. 
Immediately after Lord Young published his White Paper, the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Trade and Industry announced that it would examine the state of 
information technology in the UK. Lord Young was invited to discuss his Department's 
IT policy. He reiterated the shift away from national IT R&D toward European 
Community IT R&D.
The Department's objectives include the encouragement of collaborative 
research and of technology transfer and the result of the review of innovation 
policy has been to give this greater emphasis including collaboration in 
Europe."^
In recent years European programmes — such as ESPRIT and RACE — have 
assumed much greater importance, reflecting the significant scale of investment 
required in IT research and development programmes and the need for 
European firms to collaborate in order to match the efforts being made by their 
major US and Japanese competitors.*
Ministerial objectives were also reiterated in the House of Commons. Mr John 
Butcher, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Industry and Consumer Affairs, 
was asked whether the Government's rejection of the IT86 programme and its meager 
£29 million allocated for a national programme left a large void. Mr Butcher responded 
that his Department's shift toward European R&D was an appropriate means to fill any
 ^Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992.
 ^Memorandum from the Department of Trade and Industry, House of Commons Trade and Industry 
Committee, First Report, Session 1988-89, Information Technology^ Volume II (London; HMSO,
1988), p.5.
193.
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'void'; 'So we are following up Alvey in the right way in collaborative and pan- 
European research'.^
9.2 Organizing for Implementation
Ministers clearly articulated their objectives. They also designed structures and 
procedures that would ensure faithful implementation. First, they put a check on the 
ability of civil servants to authorize spending. Second, they redesigned the IT hierarchy 
and strengthened RTP to make 'free-wheeling' among divisions impossible.
Prior to Lord Young and Mr Clarke's arrival at the DTI, civil servants had to 
have their research budgets approved by Ministers, but once those budgets were 
approved, civil servants were free to spend them without Ministerial oversight. When 
Mr Clarke arrived, he stipulated that any research project qualifying for Government 
support of £50,000 or more had to be approved by him personally. According to Dr 
Thynne, 'As you know, £50,000 is peanuts. As you can imagine, his in-tray grew by 6 
inches a day. He didn't care and he didn't read the proposals. This was his way of 
stopping the department spending on things he didn't approve of anyway. There was an 
enormous log-jam.'^°
9.2a Information Engineering Directorate
The White Paper authorized a new national IT R&D programme that combined £29 
million from the DTI and £55 million from the SERC. The new programme, called the 
Joint Framework for Information Technology (JFIT), was a blanket programme under 
which numerous small programmes, pooling funds from the SERC and several DTI 
divisions, were funded. Most of the £29 million authorized by Lord Young for national 
IT R&D was combined with SERC money to financed research in devices, systems 
architectures and systems engineering under a £61 million JFIT programme called the 
Information Engineering Advanced Technology Programme (lEATP).*^
 ^House of Commons, Oral Answers, 13 April 1988, HansardQJoA. 131, col. 151).
Interview, Dr John Thynne, 15 October 1992.
 ^^  The JFIT structure grew quickly and DTI money from divisions other than the lED was 
contributed. In addition to the Information Engineering Advanced Technology Programme, JFIT 
incorporated Open Systems Standardisation Programmes, Gallium Arsenide, Optoelectronics, 
Superconductivity, Technology Transfer Programmes and some LINK projects that funded research 
between industry and Higher Educational Institutions. Correspondence to DTI from Dr Timothy 
Walker, March 1988; Department of Trade and Industry, 'Programmes Run Under the Joint 
Framework for Information Technology, internal mimeo, 15 September 1992; and Memorandum from 
the Department of Trade and Industry, op. c/A, in note 7, pp. 194-195. See also, Independent, 18 June 
1990, p. 16.
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The White Paper referred to a 'new unit' that would implement all collaborative 
research activities in the field of IT, which included JFIT and Esprit. This unit was 
named the Information Engineering Directorate (BED), which was a new name for the 
Alvey Directorate that Dr Walker had been leading since November 1987. Like the 
Alvey Directorate before it, the lED was staffed by civil servants and industrial 
secondees.
Industrial secondees in the lED had limited authority relative to their 
predecessors in the Alvey Directorate. They were seconded for a two-year period only 
and given a rank of G5. (Alvey secondees did not have time limits on their 
secondments and some were given a G3 rank.) They did not independently make 
funding decisions, but instead implemented decisions made by a higher authority, 
ITAB. Their spending authority was checked. For example. Dr Dennis Potter, an 
industrial secondee of G5 rank in charge of a branch of the lED, was empowered to 
implement programmes, but he did not have the power to commit formally DTI 
money. He had to have a civil servant in his branch and of G6 sign a cheque allocating 
DTI funds.
The lED was divided into five sections; Administration, Devices, Systems 
Architecture, Systems Engineering and International Affairs. The International Affairs 
section was much stronger than its predecessor in the Alvey Directorate. It needed to 
be: Lord Young created the lED expressly to 'allow better coordination of support for 
European and national work in this area [IT R&D]'.^^ The lED's tasks were to make 
the best use of Esprit and to ensure that national R&D programmes were 
'complementary' to Esprit. The International Affairs section was on equal footing with 
the four other sections. Dr AJ Wallard, who was brought in from RTP, was its director 
and he had responsibility for Esprit and a number of other EC IT programmes. 
Reporting to Dr Wallard was the Esprit Planning Office, which was staffed by six civil 
servants.*"*
Dr Wallard's appointment caused a stir in the BED. Prior to January 1988,
Esprit had been the responsibility o f Mr Roger Hird. Mr Hird was not at all satisfied 
with the new arrangement: 'I told Tim Walker that if I lose Esprit, you lose me. I lost 
Esprit.'*^ Mr Hird was moved to the DTI's office in the West Midlands. Esprit was still 
contested territory.
Interview, Dr Dennis Potter.
13 X)TI — the Department for Enterprise', op. c/A, in note 1, p. 36.
1"* Mr John Head-Rapson led the Esprit Planning OfiBce and was assisted by Mr Derek Flynne, Mr Des 
Langford and three other civil servants. Interviews, Dr AJ Wallard; and Mr John Head Rapson.
1^  Interview, Mr Roger Hird, 28 October 1992.
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Unlike the Alvey Directorate prior to November 1987, the lED and the Esprit 
Planning Office were firmly within the DTI hierarchy. Dr Walker, an Under Secretary, 
reported to Mr Alastair Macdonald, a Deputy Secretary, who reported to the 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Brian Hayes, and to the Minister for Trade and Industry, Mr 
Kenneth Clarke (who was later replaced by Mr Anthony Newton).
A new advisory structure, called the Information Technology Advisory Board 
(ITAB) was created to advise the lED and SERC on research priorities and funding 
allocations for JFIT. Reporting to ITAB were three committees (devices, systems 
architecture and systems engineering) and numerous sub-committees whose nearly 200 
members were academics and industrialists involved in IT as well as users of IT 
products and services.*^
ITAB proved to be a very effective and powerful organization. None of the 
infighting that took place in the Alvey Steering Committee occurred in ITAB nor did 
the lED side-line ITAB as the Alvey Directorate had the Alvey Steering Committee. 
According to Mr Macdonald, the ITAB has come damn close to executive authority. 
We would not go against an ITAB funding suggestion, but the cheques would have 
our signature'.** Dr David Worsnip agreed: ITAB has a monopoly of IT in the UK. 
There is no way you can avoid ITAB if you want Government funding if you want to 
do R&D in IT.*^
9.2b Research Technologv Policv Division
The linchpin in the increasingly hierarchical structure for Departmental R&D policy­
making was RTP division.20 RTP was given responsibility to coordinate all divisions' 
spending on national R&D and to oversee the entire department's activities related to 
the Community's Framework Programme. It undertook these in several ways. First, it 
organized and chaired the Science and Technology Assessment Management Group 
(STAMG). Recall from Chapter 4 that STAMG was comprised of civil servants from 
all the main spending units of the DTI. In this forum, the DTI's entire R&D budget was 
allocated. Ministers were 'informed' of the allocations and could accept, reject or
Civil Service (London: HMSO, 1988); and Civil Service Yearbook ÇLxmàon: HMSO,
1989). Mr Macdonald had responsibility for six divisions involved in IT: Information Engineering 
Directorate, Information Technology, Telecommunications and Post Office, Radiocommunications; 
Manufacturing Technology and Materials and the Enterprise Initiative. Each of the divisions under 
Mr Macdonald was led by an Under Secretary.
Department of Trade and Industry, departmental mimeo, DTI/SERC IT Advisory Committee 
Structure', February 1989.
** Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992.
Interview, Dr David Worsnip.
20 Rxp's formal responsibilities are found in the Civil Service Yearbook, op. cit., in note 16.
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amend them .21 STAMG was advised by 16 specialist advisory committees, staffed by 
industrialists, called the Technology Requirements Boards. RTP provided liaison 
between STAMG and the Technology Requirements Boards.
Second, RTP was given authority to approve and monitor specific 
Departmental R&D programmes according to 'value for money* criteria. RTP had 
begun developing a procedure in late 1986 for this purpose. The procedure, called 
ROAME analysis, was formalized and applied to most DTI R&D spend following the 
publication of the White P a p e r .  22
ROAME was an acronym for: Rationale, Objective, Appraisal, Monitoring, 
Evaluation. Each R&D programme funded by the DTI had a ROAME statement 
prepared by civil servants responsible for the programme. The ROAME statement was 
sent to RTP division and the programme was approved only if RTP decided that it 
complied with Lord Young's objectives for Government funded R&D. According to 
Dr Ken Guy, ROAME ensured that civil servants in the DTI stuck to the 'party line' 
and that their Minister's view 'permeates all divisions', including the IED.23
Third, all divisions with responsibility for programmes under the EC's 
Framework Programme had to brief RTP on their objectives for and activities in those 
EC programmes. In this way, RTP ensured that divisional interests and activities were 
compatible with Ministerial objectives.
Fourth, in addition to coordinating departmental R&D spending and overseeing 
divisions' involvement in EC R&D programmes, RTP also had a hand in programme 
implementation. It was the secretariat for EUREKA and it implemented BRITE (Basic 
Research in Industrial Technologies for Europe), another EC IT R&D programme. It 
also represented the UK in the EC's MONITOR programme, which was created in 
1989 to evaluate EC R&D programmes.
9.3 Implementation: January 1988 to May 1989
Through a complex consultation procedure involving the Esprit Planning Office, other 
members of the lED, ITAB and RTP, M inister's objectives in Esprit were 
implemented. British participation in Esprit increased enormously, complementarity 
between Esprit and the national IT R&D programme (lEATP) was pursued and Value 
for money' considered.
Esprit was of utmost importance in all decision-making and timely and accurate 
information about the Commission's plans for Esprit were essential. The Esprit
2  ^Interview, Dr Alastair Keddie.
22 Interviews, Mr Philip Hills; Dr Philip Roe, 4 November 1992; Mr Adrian Grilli, 11 February 1993. 
2  ^Interview, Dr Ken Guy.
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Planning Office was responsible for gathering, analyzing and providing the lED and 
ITAB with this information. '^^ Whether intentionally or through a failure of 
communication, the Commission released remarkably little information on E sp rit.A s  
Mr Head-Rapson, who was in charge of the Esprit Planning Office, put it, 'The 
Commission was very bad at telling people what they were doing. Actually, they were 
appalling. It was pathetic*.
Because Esprit information was vital to the operations of the lED, Mr John 
Head-Rapson and his team devised a 'much more coherent and structured process for 
dealing with Esprit' than had been applied by his predecessors in the Alvey 
Directorate.^^ Two means of obtaining valuable information were devised.^* First, the 
Esprit Planning Office gathered information from British representatives on the 
committees that created Esprit's yearly workplan. Many of those representatives were 
members of the ITAB committees and had been recommended to the Commission by 
the Esprit Planning Office. The representatives briefed the Esprit Planning Office on 
the final shape of the workplan long before the Commission published it in the Official 
Journal. Second, a similar process was used when project proposals were evaluated. 
Recall that the Commission invited teams of experts to Brussels for several days to 
evaluate proposals and recommend ones for funding. The final funding decisions were 
the Commission's prerogative, but British experts, on their return to the UK, could tell 
the Esprit Project Office which projects they felt were likely to be funded. The Esprit 
Project Office could then piece together a fairly accurate picture of Esprit before an 
official announcement of approved projects was made.
The Esprit Planning Office briefed ITAB and its committees on the shape of 
Esprit. ITAB, in consultation with the SERC and JED, would then design its JFIT and 
lEATP workplans in such a way to avoid duplication. If the Esprit trajectory changed, 
the JFIT strategy would be modified accordingly. Similarly, individual lEATP projects 
would be funded only if they were complementary to ones funded through Esprit. 
According to Mr Head-Rapson, this was a continual process of'iteration' through 
which the JFIT strategy and funding decisions were made dependent on and
Interviews, Mr John Head-Rapson; and Mr Derek Flynne, 3 December 1992.
An independent board empowered to evaluate the Framework Programme leaned toward the 
former. It referred to the 'dirigiste' style of DGXIII where 'people are encouraged to stay too long in 
their posts, where over time they acquire proprietorial attitudes to the programmes and lines which 
they are charged to administer*. TTie Report of the Framework Programme Review Board' (Brussels, 
June 1989), p. 10.
Interview, Mr John Head-Rapson.
Interviews, Mr John Head-Rapson; and Dr AJ Wallard.
Interviews, Mr John Head-Rapson; Dr AJ Wallard; Mr Derek Flynne, 9 December 1991; and Mr 
Des Langford.
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complementary to E sp rit.T h e  UK strategy was a 'moving feast with broad lines 
around it. It had to be juggled depending on where Esprit projects were falling. But 
that was the nature of the beast. It was a dreadful exercise to coordinate'.^°
RTP was involved in the process as well. RTP had responsibility for approving 
and monitoring individual programmes, such as lEATP, that were funded under JFIT. 
Every programme under JFIT had a ROAME statement that went to RTP for 
approval. If the ROAME statement did not prove 'value for money' (that is, place the 
programme within the department's overall spending priorities, as established by the 
Technology Requirements Boards, STAMG and Ministers) and if it did not fit within 
the Department's policy toward the Framework Programme, the programme could be 
rejected.3^ The programme was then evaluated by RTP every year or six months, 
depending on the duration of the programme. If the programme was not meeting the 
objectives set out in its ROAME statement, RTP could terminate it. Mr Hills suggested 
that few programmes were terminated because civil servants learned how to tailor the 
ROAME statements to ensure continuation of their project. Nevertheless, it was an 
extremely effective controlling device that allowed RTP to have a hand in ensuring 
their Minister's objective of complementarity between national and EC R&D.
Through these processes, lEATP was subordinated and made complementary 
to Esprit. According to Mr Macdonald,
Esprit was the cornerstone of British IT policy at the time. Esprit money was 
big compared to the DTI We took the attitude that anything we could have 
done in Esprit, then we will look to Esprit first. We will look to the national 
programme to be filling in Esprit cracks. . .
In fact, the lED was empowered to find only £29 million worth of Esprit 'cracks'. This 
is a complete reversal of the policy undertaken by the Alvey Directorate when it 
attempted to fill Alvey gaps with Esprit projects.
In addition to ensuring that national R&D programmes were complementary to 
Esprit, the lED was instructed to maximize British participation in Esprit. The Esprit 
Planning Office set about this in several ways. First, they made certain that Esprit was 
well-publicized. The Esprit Planning Office maintained a very large database of British 
researchers interested in Esprit. After the workplan had been formalized, the Esprit 
Planning Office mailed copies to hundreds of potential participants and invited any 
interested parties to information days where the workplan was explained. The Esprit
JFIT News, Issue No. 2, March 1989, p. 2.
Interview, Mr John Head-Rapson.
Interviews, Dr John Thynne, 15 October 1992; Mr John Head-Rapson; and Mr Philip Hills. 
Interview, Mr Alastair Macdonald, 28 October 1992.
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Planning Office also mailed copies of the Commission's formal calls for proposals. 
These mail-outs were done even though both the workplan and the call for proposals 
appeared in the OfTicial Journal.
Once the Commission had issued a formal call for proposals, the Esprit 
Planning Office acted as a marriage broker. It analyzed the call and contacted, and 
often visited, researchers who seemed well-suited to particular research projects in the 
call. The Esprit Planning Office also helped researchers prepare Esprit applications. 
When applications were rejected, the Esprit Planning Office tried to find out why by 
contacting British representatives on the review boards. The Esprit Planning Office 
then briefed unsuccessful applicants on why their proposal was rejected in order for the 
applicant to prepare a better proposal in the next round. As Mr Head-Rapson put it, 
'We performed a post-mortem'.^^
The Esprit Planning Office also lobbied Brussels directly on behalf of British 
researchers. Recall that teams of experts recommended projects for approval to the 
Commission, but the Commission had the final decision. When the Commission 
deliberated, members of the Esprit Planning Office, who also sat on the EMC, 
pressured the Commission to approve 'high priority' projects. The Esprit Planning 
Office had copies of all Esprit proposals involving British researchers. Those projects 
were discussed in ITAB meetings and some were labeled 'high priority'. "^* Priority was 
usually determined on the size of the project and the strength of the consortium. In 
lobbying the Commission, the Esprit Planning Office was able to exert influence 'only 
at the margins' because it was one of 12 member states lobbying for priority projects.^^ 
The number of British applications to Esprit soared. This was no doubt 
partially due to the fact that very little national funding for IT R&D was available and 
researchers had no choice other than to turn to Esprit. Nevertheless, the workings of 
the Esprit Planning Office can not be discounted. In March 1988, the Commission had 
received more than 1,500 proposals; half of those involved UK participants.^^ In 
November 1988, 128 UK organizations had been awarded Esprit II contracts; 68 were 
first time participants.^"^
Finally, all R&D, whether it be national or European, had to be monitored and 
evaluated to ensure 'value for money'. The LED's LEATP projects were subjected to the 
ROAME process, but RTP could not perform the same analysis of projects funded 
through Esprit. Nor could the Esprit Planning Office. RTP and the Esprit Planning
Interview, Mr John Head-Rapson.
Interview, Mr John Head-Rapson.
Interview, Mr John Head-Rapson.
Financial Times, 21 March 1988, p. 8. See also Computer Weekly, 23 June 1988, p. 2; Electronics 
Times, 12 May 1988, p. 6.
British Business, 4 November 1988, p. 12.
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Office could, however, pressure the Commission to perform its own evaluations and 
improve its existing monitoring techniques.^*
RTP sponsored an international workshop to explore the various means by 
which Government funded R&D programmes were evaluated and assessed in Europe 
and elsewhere. RTF's agenda was made very clear by Dr R Coleman, the DTI Chief 
Scientist and head of RTP division, in his opening speech at the workshop: 'there is a 
Community out there who also have to be convinced to some extent of the value of 
such [assessment and evaluation] techniques'.^^ Also in this vein, RTP helped create 
the EC's MONITOR programme.Approved in 1989 for four years, MONITOR was 
to design strict monitoring and evaluation procedures to be applied to all Community 
R&D.41
Thus, during this period the Esprit Planning Office pursued all policies 
articulated by Lord Young and his M inisters toward Esprit. Those objectives had been 
clearly and forcefully articulated and they were consistent and compatible. Civil 
servants were to maximize British participation in Esprit and allocate a limited budget 
to projects complementary to Esprit. There were no competing priorities for civil 
servants in the lED. Ministers had established control. By requiring that funding for 
large projects had to have their personal approval, they reduced the scope for 
independent decision-making on the part of civil servants. Ministers also created 
structures that ensured the faithful implementation o f these objectives. The 
organization responsible for Esprit, the Esprit Planning Office, was lodged firmly in a 
strong IT hierarchy. The Esprit Planning Office was further scrutinized by RTP, which 
was headed by the Chief Scientist and which was linked into the STAMG and the 
Technology Requirements Boards. Bureaucratic competition was not extinguished by 
these conditions: Esprit remained contested territory as civil servants worked to gain 
budgets and responsibilities. That competition was not, however, allowed to have a 
real effect on British policy in Esprit.
Reinforcing the new structures and procedures that minimized 'free wheeling' 
were two scathing reports on the Alvey Directorate published by the Committee of 
Public Accounts and the National Audit Office. In early 1988, these organizations
Interview, Mr John Head-Rapson.
Luke Georghiou and Eric Davis (eds.). Evaluation o f R&D: A Policymaker's Perspective, 
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Assessment and Evaluation, 17-18 November 1988 
(London; HMSO, 1988), p. 3.
Interview, Dr Phillip Hills. See also testimony of Mr Robert Foster (DTI), House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities, A Community Framework for R&D, 17th Report, Session 
1989-90, HL Paper 66 (London: HMSO, June 1990), p. 14.
'Council Decision Adopting a Community Prograimne in the Field of Strategic Analysis, 
Forecasting and Evaluation in Matters of Research and Technology (Monitor)', 89/414/EEC 
(Brussels: OfficialJoumal of the European Communities, No L 200, 13 July 1989).
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decided to evaluate the success of the Alvey Programme and the effectiveness of the 
Alvey Directorate. They gathered evidence by reading confidential papers, evaluations, 
internal audits and by interviewing Sir Brian Hayes, the Permanent Secretary, Mr 
Macdonald and members of the Alvey Directorate, which at that point was the LED 
under Dr Walker.
They were relentless in their questioning and they published two very damning 
r e p o r t s . Both reports criticized, among other things, the Directorate's financial 
management, its reluctance to heed the advice of experts and its weak monitoring 
procedures. The Public Accounts Committee was particularly disgruntled with the 
'hands off approach of the Alvey Directorate. The Committee recommended that the 
'Department should take steps to ensure that any relevant lessons learned will be 
applied to all new collaborative projects that they support in whatever field'. With these 
two powerful bodies investigating the faults of the Alvey Directorate, and demanding 
that those faults not be repeated, the wisest course for the lED was to 'go by the book'.
9.4 More Change; May 1989 Through Early 1991
From May 1989 through early 1991, the DTI underwent major change. In May 1989, 
Dr Walker was moved from the lED to the Department of Energy. Dr John Thynne, 
who was head of the Information Technology Division, immediately and informally 
took on Dr Walker's responsibilities."*  ^ A year later, in April 1990, Dr Thynne's 
expanded responsibilities were formalized with the announcement that the lED was 
disbanded and all its responsibilities transferred to the Information Technology 
Division."*"*
Shortly after Dr Walker left the DTI, so did Lord Young. In July 1989, Lord 
Young became Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party and Mr Nicholas Ridley 
became Secretary of State at the DTI. Mr Ridley was certainly no fan of Europe and 
his hostility toward the EC was a stark contrast to Lord Young's pro-European 
approach. Mr Ridley made his sentiments well known."*  ^ Prior to his assignment at the
"*^ National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, "Department of Trade and 
IndusUy: The Alvey Programme for Advanced Information Technology', House of Commons Paper 
402 (London: HMSO, 24 March 1988); Committee of Public Accounts, "The Alvey Programme for 
Advanced Information Technology', Fifty-First Report, Session 1987-88, House of Commons Paper 
477.
"*^ JFIT News, Issue No. 4, June 1989, p. 1.
"*"* JFIT News, Issue No. 12, April 1990, p. 1.
See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Feary (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 722-723; 
Kenneth Baker, The Turbulent Years: My Life in Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), pp. 357- 
359; and Nigel Lawson, The View From No. 11 : Memoirs o f a Tory RadicalÇ^nAon: Corgi, 1993), 
pp. 942-943.
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DTI, Mr Ridley had, for example, argued fiercely against putting sterling in the EC's 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). After a year at the DTI, Mr Ridley resigned when 
the Spectator an interview in which he was critical of the growing power of
Germany and its Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. Mrs Thatcher replaced Mr Ridley with Mr 
Peter Lilley, a 'Euro-skeptic' and a 'card-carrying Thatcherite'."*^ Mr Lilley was the 
twelfth Secretary of State at the DTI in eleven years.
Although their sentiments toward Europe might have tended in another 
direction, neither Mr Ridley nor Mr Lilley reversed the fundamentals of Lord Young's 
R&D policy: companies should bear the burden of R&D costs, but if assistance was 
necessary, it should come from the European Community rather than the DTI. Mr 
Lilley publicly stated this policy as did his Ministers.'*'  ^ For example, in May 1991, Mr 
Edward Leigh, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Industry, put forth the 
Department's policy toward European IT R&D:
The Government actively seeks complementarity as far as possible between 
Community and national research programmes. National programmes help to 
strengthen the UK's technology base and hence encourage more effective UK 
participation in Community research and development programmes.'**
9.5 Esprit in the Information Technology Division
In accordance with the new Minister's demands, EC R&D remained the object around 
which national programmes were built and implemented. C ivil servants worked to 
maximize British participation in Esprit and implement a small national budget for 
projects complementary to Esprit. Dr Thynne, now responsible for Esprit and national 
collaborative IT R&D programmes under JFIT, expressed the objectives of his 
division: 'The work of the Directorate has a major international research element and it 
is essential to continue integrating this into our thinking so that the resultant 
technology can transfer effectively and profitably into a larger market.'^^ JFIT and 
lEATP workplans would be designed and continuously modified to account for 
European programmes and JFIT funding decisions would be made in consideration of 
EC R&D projects. To ensure this. Dr Thynne strengthened and made more formal the 
decision-making structures and procedures that guaranteed faithful implementation of 
his Minister's objectives.
^  Thatcher, ibid., p. 846.
'Innovation: Competition and Culture', Speech by Rt Hon Peter Lilley, MP, Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry at the University of Warwick, 21 May 1991. See also Financial Times, March 11, 
1991, p. 30, 11 March 1991, p. 30, 30 May 1991, p. 19, 1 May 1991, p. 18.
House of Commons, Written Answers, 13 May 1991, Hansard(Wo\. 191, col. 37).
JFIT News, Issue No. 4, June 1989, p. 1
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IT Division was divided into nine branches: Administration, Devices, Systems 
Architectures, Systems Engineering, Control and Instrumentation, International 
Affairs, Computer Security and Use of IT and Software Technology. All international 
IT programmes were handled in the International Affairs branch, which was led by Dr 
AJ Wallard. Mr Derek Flynne, a G5, was given responsibility for Esprit and all other 
EC IT R&D programmes. The Administration and International Affairs branches 
were staffed primarily by civil servants while the technical branches were staffed by a 
mix of civil servants from the DTI and SERC and industrial and academic secondees.^ ^  
The head of each technical branch was most often an industrial secondee. The various 
and sundry small national IT programmes (such as Gallium arsenide. Optoelectronics, 
Advanced Semiconductor Materials) were implemented by the relevant technical 
branches.
Dr Thynne also expanded the Information Technology Advisory Board's sub­
committees. In addition to the Devices, Systems Architectures and Systems 
Engineering Committees created under Dr Walker, he added two others: Education 
and Training; and Control and Instrumentation and S t a n d a r d s . ^ ^  jh e  technical 
branches of IT division acted as secretariats for the ITAB committees.
Perhaps most important, the procedures by which national programmes, under 
JFIT, were made complementary to European ones, and Esprit in particular, were 
strengthened and made more standard. A description of those procedures, based 
primarily on interviews, follows.
Based on information gathered from EMC meetings, from British members of 
the EAB and ESC and from British researchers who sat on Esprit evaluation teams, Mr 
Flynne and his Esprit Planning Office prepared a paper summarizing their assessment 
of the direction the Commission was likely to take with Esprit. In that paper, they also 
recommended technology areas that should be covered in Esprit, if they were not 
already, and areas that should be covered by national programmes under JFIT. They 
sent this paper to all the technical branches of IT division, to RTP, to the 
Telecommunications division and to the Economics division of the DTI. Each division 
would comment and the Esprit Planning Office would incorporate the comments into a 
second draft. The second draft would then be sent to trade associations, to companies 
and to universities. After each body returned their comments, the Esprit Planning 
Office prepared a third version of the paper. The third version was then sent ITAB and
50 JFITNews^ Issue, No. 13, May 1990, p. 6.
Interviews, Mr Derek Flynne, 9 December 1991; and Dr Denis Potter.
JFIT News, Issue No. 18, November 1990, p. 5.
The following discussion is based on interviews: Mr Derek Flyime, 9 December 1991 and 3 
December 1992; Mr Des Langford; Dr Dennis Potter; Dr John Thyime, 15 October 1992; Mr Alastair 
Macdonald, 21 January 1992; Ms Christine Symes; and Dr Alastair Keddie.
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its numerous sub-committees, which would then accept, reject or revise the 
recommendations. In this way, the short-term workplans of JFIT and the UK's short­
term interests in Esprit were established and national programmes were made 
complementary to Esprit. As Mr Flynne stressed, Esprit is the immovable policy 
object and we have to fit national programmes around it‘.^ ^
The general strategy of IT division was to fund standards work, research in 
silicon technology and research that would lead to products with a Europe-wide 
market through E s p r i t . U K  national programmes should fund what Dr Thynne called 
'cloud on the horizon', research.
I was on the look-out for what I call 'clouds on the horizon' — things which we 
will need in Europe. I thought it was important that we build up our strength in 
these areas so that by the time the Europeans see its importance, we will be in 
the lead and can lead the programme to the best interest of UK Ltd.^^
'Cloud on the horizon' research to be funded under JFIT included such areas as 
application specific circuits, neuronetworks, gallium arsenide and optoelectronics.
The strategy was then implemented by members of the Esprit Planning Office in 
formal meetings of the Esprit Management Committee, in informal meetings with other 
member states representatives and over dinner with European Commissioners. One of 
the most effective means of accomplishing this was to prepare a discussion document 
that advanced the interests of UK Ltd.'. The Esprit Planning Office also employed 
means devised earlier in the lED. They briefed British representatives to the Esprit 
Advisory Board and the Esprit Steering Committee. They also worked closely with 
British members of Esprit project evaluation teams and working parties that created 
Esprit workplans.
Although the Esprit Planning Office was formally responsible for Esprit, it did 
not monopolize access to the Commission. Mr Flynne and Dr Wallard were the official 
representatives to the EMC, but they frequently took the heads of the technical 
branches to meet with individual Commissioners. Further, although he infrequently 
attended EMC meetings. Dr Thynne kept very close contact with Mr Cadiou, the 
Commissioner in charge of Esprit.
Ministers demanded complementarity between national programmes and Esprit 
and they demanded that British participation in Esprit was maximized. To achieve the
Interview, Mr Derek Flynne, 9 December 1991.
See Luke Georghiou, et. al.. The Impact o f European Community Policies for Research and 
Technological Development Upon Science and Technology in the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 
1992), p. 86.
Interview, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992.
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latter, the IT division employed similar methods used by the lED. The Esprit Planning 
Office published an EspritNewsletter'm which they reported relevant Esprit 
information. They prepared and updated a rather professional and lengthy brochure 
outlining the history of Esprit, the details of Esprit's technical coverage and the 
mechanisms of Esprit decision-making. They mailed out copies of Esprit calls for 
proposals to all researchers listed on a very extensive database of potential Esprit 
participants. When a project in an Esprit call looked suited to the abilities of a 
particular research team, the Esprit Planning Office contacted that team and, if the 
team was interested to apply for Esprit funds, the Esprit Planning Office helped them 
prepare a proposal. The Esprit Planning Office sponsored an Esprit Information Day 
every July, which drew over 500 delegates. They lobbied on behalf of particular 
projects in the EMC.
The IT division went a step further than its predecessor to ensure that British 
researchers got the most out of Esprit. In early 1991, the DTI hired PA Consulting, a 
consultancy firm, to assist British researchers obtain funds from Esprit's CIME 
(Computer Integrated Manufacture and Engineering) programme. PA Consulting ran 
seminars, circulated information, matched partners and helped firms prepare Esprit 
applications.
Through these various means, the IT division assisted British researchers attain 
very high participation rates in Esprit. In May 1991, Mr Edward Leigh proudly 
presented the following statistics to the House of Commons: British researchers were 
participating in over 70 per cent of all Esprit II projects and they received nearly 18 per 
cent of all funds available under Esprit II.
Dr Thynne pursued the interests of UK Ltd'. Unlike during the Alvey era, the 
interests of'UK Ltd' were not independent of Esprit. In fact. Esprit was the interest of 
U K  Ltd.'. As Dr Thynne asserted, 'I spent a lot of time talking to Cadiou. We always 
got on well together. He recognized that /  would work as hard as possible to be 
constructive and to protect the Commission's interest [Esprit]— which was m y interest 
as well by that timé}^ This is exactly what Ministers had intended.
Dr Thynne and members of the Esprit Planning Office were the last civil 
servants to influence British policy in Esprit. Dr Thynne retired from the civil service in 
November 1990 and Mr Keith Shotten replaced him as the G3 in charge of IT division.
Engineer 7 February 1991, p. 10.
58 House of Commons, Written Answers, 13 May 1991, Hansardtyol. 191, col. 37), See also, 
testimony of Mr Douglas Hogg (Minister for Trade and Enterprise, DTI), House of Lords, op. cit., in 
note 40, p. 16.
Interview, Dr John Thynne, 2 December 1992. Emphasis added.
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Although Esprit II was slated to run through 1992, Mr Shotten had no role to play: 
Esprit funds had been entirely allocated by late April 1991.
Ministers accomplished their goals o f shifting priority to European R&D, 
maximizing British participation in EC R&D and enforcing complementarity between 
national and EC programmes by several means. First, they clearly articulated their 
objectives. Civil servants in IT division were certain of what was expected of them and 
they were not forced, as had been the case with the Alvey Directorate, to choose 
between competing priorities.
Second, Ministers established control by designing a budgetary scheme that 
supported their objectives. In 1991/92, the DTI contributed as much to European IT, 
primarily Esprit, as it spent on all its national IT programmes, only a small portion of 
which were implemented by Dr Thynne's IT division.^® The only significant source of 
budgets and responsibilities for Dr Thynne's division came from Europe. Not 
surprisingly. Dr Thynne turned his attention to Europe. Ministers had successfully 
harnessed the ubiquitous desire of civil servants for increased budgets and 
responsibilities to the pursuit of Ministerial objectives. The interests o f Ministers and 
civil servants had become complementary—pursuit o f one facilitated pursuit o f  the 
other. As Professor Roger Needham concluded, 'The achievement of the post-Alvey 
DTI has been to turn that around [the preference for national programmes over 
Esprit]. They have done this by bureaucracy. They have turned around preferences 
toward Esprit. The result of the DTI bureaucracy has been to put the DTI at the 
bottom of the list and not Esprit'.^* Ministers had achieved their objectives. 
Bureaucratic competition was not eradicated, but rather its energies were channelled 
to another end.
Third, Ministers created organizational structures that ensured faith ful 
implementation o f  their objectives. The Esprit Planning Office was firmly embedded in 
a departmental hierarchy extending upwards through IT division, RTP division, 
STAMG and the Permanent Secretary to reach Ministers. No autonomous decision­
making could be enjoyed by any unit of the DTI handling R&D issues.
9.6 Exit Esprit
Few researchers noticed that Esprit had ended. It had been quietly replaced by another 
EC IT R&D programme of a slightly different name. The new programme was called 
A Specific Programme of Research and Technological Development in the Field of
Interview, Ms Diane Williams.
Interview, Professor Roger Needham.
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Information Technology, which was often shortened to the unfortunate acronym 
ASPIT or simply called Esprit III. The new programme was part of the Third 
Framework Programme (1990-1994), which had been proposed by the Commission in 
August 1989 and approved in April 1 9 9 0 .^2  The new IT R&D programme, proposed 
in July 1990, was approved in principle in April 1991 with a budget of approximately 
ECU 1.4 billion^  ^ and officially approved in July 1991.^ The new programme would 
run to December 1995 and pick up where Esprit II left off by funding research in 
microelectronics, software engineering and information processing systems, advanced 
business and home systems, peripherals, computer integrated manufacturing and 
engineering and basic research. Esprit had been replaced.
9.7 Conclusion
At the beginning of the period examined in this Chapter, civil servants in the DTI 
worked under a forceful Minister who clearly articulated a set of coherent and 
compatible objectives as regards IT R&D. The DTI would: give EC R&D priority over 
national R&D; ensure maximum British participation in EC R&D programmes; see that 
all national IT R&D programmes were complementary to EC ones; and seek 'value for 
money'. Lord Young's successors maintained these policies.
Lord Young and his Ministers kept close control over civil servants by 
implementing a strict spending regime. Ministers personally approving all expenditure 
of any significance. Most important, by rejecting the IT86 proposal and approving 
Esprit II, they established a budgetary regime that harnessed civil servant s'desire for 
increased budgets and responsibilities to the advancement of Ministerial objectives. 
Esprit had become the major source of budgets and responsibilities for civil servants 
handling IT R&D issues. A s Bureaucratic Politics would predict, civil servants gave 
priority to the issue that catered to those desires: Esprit. This is exactly as Ministers 
intended. The interests o f Ministers and civil servants had become complementary — 
pursuit o f  one facilitated pursuit o f  the other.
Commission of the European Communities, 'Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the 
Framework Programme of Community Activities in the Field of Research and Technological 
Development (1990 to 1994)', Com(89) 397 final (Brussels: Officiai Journal o f the European 
Communities, No. C 243, 23 September 1989). Council Decision Concerning the Framework 
Programme o f Community Activities in the Field o f Research and Technological Development (1990 
to 1994), 90/221/Euratom, EEC (Brussels: Official Journal o f the European Communities, No. L 
117, 8 May 1990).
Reuters News Service, 21 April 1991.
Council Decision Adopting a Specific Research and Technological Development Programme in 
the Field o f Information Technologies (1990 -1994), 91/394/EEC (Brussels: Official Journal o f the 
European Communities, No L 218, 6 August 1991).
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Ministers reorganized the DTI hierarchy into a tight ladder structure with 
themselves sitting firmly atop. Complementing organizational change were reforms 
that established strict procedures for R&D decision-making. Those procedures allowed 
RTP to be the keeper, so to speak, of Ministerial objectives. The Esprit Planning 
Office was incorporated within the DTI's strict IT hierarchy, it was forced to adhere to 
the Department's decision-making procedures and it was supervised by a strong RTP 
division. Mr Ridley and Mr Lilley adopted the centralized decision-making structures 
and procedures designed by Lord Young. In 1990, the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology 'commended' the DTI for its handling of 
international science and technology issues.^  ^ This was a radical departure from the 
stream of harsh criticism the Lords had, since the early 1980s, levied on Government 
science and technology policy-making.
As a result of these various factors, civil servants implementing Esprit faithfully 
pursued the objectives established by their Ministers. Bureaucratic competition was 
ever present, but it was not permitted to have a detrimental effect on Ministerial 
objectives in Esprit. In fact, it could be said that bureaucratic competition facilitated 
the implementation o f Ministerial objectives. Evidence in this Chapter leads to the 
conclusion that while insights from Bureaucratic Politics can help explain the interests 
o f indixidual bureaucrats, it does not always provide an explanation ofpolicy.
House of Lords, op. cit., in note 40, p. 31.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
This thesis began with the questions, Who makes British foreign policy and whose 
interests are being advanced?'. Ministers or civil servants? Literature on the policy 
process and evidence gathered for this thesis is mixed.
For example, in his book. Arguments for Democracy, Mr Anthony Benn wrote
that,
...the civil service sees itself as being above the party battle, with a political 
position of its own to defend against all-comers, including incoming 
governments armed with their philosophy and programmes. ^
Richard Crossman was surprised by the power of civil servants.
I realise the tremendous effort it requires not to be taken over by the Civil 
Service. My Minister's room is like a padded cell, and in certain ways I am like 
a person who is suddenly certified a lunatic and put safely into this great vast 
room, cut off from real life and surrounded by male and female trained nurses 
and attendants. When I am in a good mood they occasionally allow an ordinary 
human being to come and visit me; but they make sure that I behave right, and 
that the other person behaves right; and they know how to handle me ...It's also 
profoundly true that one has only to do absolutely nothing whatsoever in order 
to be floated forward on the stream.^
Opposing viewpoints exist. In his memoirs. Lord Carrington dismissed the 
caricature of the civil servant who is 'determined to frustrate the will of ministers, by 
courteous, ingenious and constitutionally proper means, if the ministerial will or policy 
threatens the cosy and established civil service consensus, the bureaucratic inertia, the 
status quo'.3
Sir Brian Hayes, a former Permanent Secretary at the DTI, attested to the 
following.
The civil servant has no power of his own. He is here to help a Minister and to 
be the Minister's agent....I think the job of the civil servant is to make sure that 
his Minister is informed; that he has all the facts; that he's made aware of all the 
options and that he is shown all the considerations bearing on those options. It
* Anthony Benn, Arguments for Democracy, Chris Mullen (ed.), (London: Cape, 1981), p. 50.
2 Anthony Howard (ed ). The Crossman Z>/a77e5 (London: Mandarin, 1991), p. 25.
 ^Lord Peter Carrington, Reflect on Things Past: The Mémoires o f Lord Carrington (London: Collins, 
1988), p. 146.
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is then for the Minister to take the decision. That is how the system ought to 
operate and that is how I think, in the vast majority of cases, it does operate.'*
Sir Edward Heath gave the following evidence in 1977 to the House of 
Commons Expenditure Committee;
...I believe that civil servants like to be under ministerial control. There is 
nothing they dislike more than to have a minister whom they feel is weak, who 
does not know his mind and who wants to leave it to them. That is not their 
mentality or approach. . . What they like is to have a minister who knows a 
policy he wants to pursue, who will take advice on the consequences of it, and 
how it can be implemented....^
According to David Vital, The influence of the civil service on British policy­
making is certainly very powerful, but what chiefly characterizes its relations with the 
political component of the hierarchy is nevertheless its fundamental and ultimate 
docility'.^ The making of foreign policy, then, is the business of the Executive and for 
almost all practical purposes the Executive is unfettered in its exercise of this 
function.'"  ^ For Vital, the Executive is the Cabinet and in that, the Prime Minister's is 
'probably by far the most powerful single office'.*
It seems that the literature renders a search for a definitive answer to the 
questions, 'Who makes British foreign policy and whose interests are being advanced?', 
inconclusive. I did not find the solution during the course of my research. Rather, it 
suggests that policy results from a dynamic, often tumultuous and unstructured, social 
process involving Ministers and civil servants in relationships of mutual dependency.^ 
Dependence does not mean that Ministers and civil servants have an equal influence on 
policy at all times and on all issues: one or the other may be dominant. Consequently, 
the pertinent question is, 'Whose input is more significant at a particular point in time 
or on a particular issue?'. Because the answer may be 'civil servants', foreign policy 
analysts should have at their disposal tools for analyzing policy-making if and when 
that occurs. The Bureaucratic Politics perspective is one tool that analysts could keep
“* Quoted in Clive Ponting, Whitehall: Tragedy and Farce Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p. 12
 ^House of Commons Expenditure Committee, The Civil Service, Eleventh Report, Session 1976-77, 
HC 535-11 (London; HMSO, July 1977), p. 764.
 ^David Vital, The Making o f British Foreign Policy (yjQwàorv. Allen &Umvin, 1968), p. 46.
Ibid, p. 49.
^Ibid, p. 53.
 ^Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher, The Civil Service Today, Second Edition (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991), put forth this argument. See also Bruce Headey, British Cabinet Ministers (^ jondion: 
Allen and Unwin, 1974); Brian Smith, Policy Making in British Government {0'xîot& . Martin 
Robertson, 1976); and O.K. Fiy, The Administrative 'Revolution'in WhitehallÇijondLon: Croom 
Helm, 1981).
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in their tool kits. But is it strong enough and is it appropriate for a study of British 
foreign policy-making?
10.1 A Brief Review
I was under no false illusions about the Bureaucratic Politics perspective. It has 
weaknesses and some are so significant that they threaten to render the perspective 
ineffectual. This thesis recommended ways to fortify the perspective, while remaining 
faithful to its basic propositions. I briefly summarize the fundamental propositions of 
the perspective, its weaknesses and the reformulations advanced in this thesis. The 
merits and demerits of the reformulation are evaluated and areas for future research 
suggested. Finally a verdict is passed on the applicability of the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective to a study of British foreign policy-making.
The basic argument of the perspective is simple; bureaucrats have interests that 
are often not synonymous with the objectives of their Ministers; those interests are 
determined by the bureaucrat's position in the bureaucracy; bureaucrats compete to 
protect or advance those interests; and that competition can determine a country's 
foreign policy. Its simplicity is, however, marred by several fallacies and untenable 
propositions.
First, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective advanced by Allison and Halperin 
was founded on an untenable dichotomy. In order to distinguish their perspective from 
the traditional approach (called the Rational Actor Model), which saw policy-making 
as a harmonious process involving actors unified in their goals, they suggested that 
policy-making was, in fact, a conflictual process involving bureaucrats competing for 
different and often contradictory goals. The Bureaucratic Politics Model was the name 
given to describe the latter. Their theoretical construct forced the untenable conclusion 
that competition among bureaucrats was not rational behaviour. The solution proposed 
in this thesis is self-evident: all behaviour where means are geared to ends should be 
taken as rational. This is regardless of whose behaviour it is, whether conflict is visible 
or invisible or which means are employed and to what end.
Second, Allison and Halperin's model was over-stated. It suggested that 
bureaucrats have organizational, personal, domestic and national security interests. 
Bureaucrats compete against each other to protect or advance those interests and in 
that competition, they use 'politics', which was defined as 'pulling and hauling and 
intricate games'. Nebulous 'action channels', or regularized procedures for decision­
making, affect the outcome of'politics'. The net is cast so wide and the terms so 
loosely defined that the perspective allows (and indeed encourages) the analyst to
attribute virtually any observable behaviour to bureaucratic competition. It provides no
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facility for distinguishing 'politics' in aid of bureaucratic competition from 'politics' in 
aid of consensus-building. The explanatory and predictive power of the perspective 
was sacrificed for want of strict definition.
In an effort to make the perspective more discerning, this thesis defined 
bureaucratic competition in a strict and limited manner. Behaviour was attributed to 
bureaucratic competition only if it exhibited the following characteristics. First, the 
bureaucrat sought to maximize one or more of their occupational interests: resources, 
responsibility and rank. Second, the bureaucrat perceived a conflicting relationship 
between his or her occupational interests and those of other bureaucrats. That is, 
greater responsibility, for example, for one meant decreased responsibility for another. 
Third, the bureaucrat interpreted events in light of how they affected his or her 
resources, responsibilities and rank. Fourth, based on this interpretation, the bureaucrat 
made decisions and took action to maximize resources, responsibilities and rank. (This 
is the preference-from-position function.) That action may have included a variety of 
behaviour (for example, negotiation, coalition-building, bargaining, manipulation, 
deceit or domination). The action would be chosen from a menu established by action 
channels.
Third, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective formulated by Allison and 
Halperin, and employed by a number of other analysts, envisioned a world of impotent 
political leaders. Allison and Halperin did refer to situations when bureaucratic 
competition did not have a significant influence on policy, but they did not adequately 
theorize those situations. The result was a model with inflated claims. To bring the 
model back down to earth, the conditions under which bureaucratic competition may 
affect policy were theorized for the case of British foreign policy-making in Esprit.
The hypothesized conditions under which bureaucratic competition may have 
an affect on British foreign policy-making were, ironically, devised primarily from the 
literature arguing that bureaucratic competition is of minimal significance in British 
foreign policy-making. That literature pointed to two fundamental elements necessary 
for effective policy-making in Britain: Ministerial objectives and authority; and the 
Whitehall machinery. From this, I hypothesized that if competition among bureaucrats 
pursuing their own interests was to affect policy, it would be likely to occur in the 
absence of consistent Ministerial objectives, Ministerial control and oversight and 
machinery that effectively coordinated and controlled policy.
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10.2 Evaluating the Reformulation
10.2a Rationality
The assumption that any decision or action designed to advance a particular goal is 
rational proved valuable and should be taken as a starting point for future studies 
employing the Bureaucratic Politics perspective. The assumption of rationality also 
cures the false dichotomy in Allison and Halperin's formulation. It allows the 
researcher to move beyond the theoretical debate over rationality and irrationality in 
human behaviour. While there may be more to be said in this debate, it was not the 
purpose of this thesis to do so.
The assumption of rationality also allowed the homo bureaucraticus of Allison 
and Halperin's formulation to evolve into a homo sapien. a being capable of acting 
selfishly and selflessly. Surely the homo sapien is the creature involved in policy­
making and thus the one on which analysts should concentrate.
The assumption of rationality reduced the need to define 'politics', which like 
the term 'security', seems destined to be forever 'contested'. Allison and Halperin 
defined 'politics' as 'subtle pulling and hauling' that involved 'bargaining' along 
regularized channels. This thesis has sympathy for attempts to define 'politics', but is 
concerned that their definition did not adequately stress the boundless nature of 
politics; politics can be seen as any behaviour employed to a particular end. Whether 
we refer to bargaining, manipulation, deception, coalition-building, log-rolling or a 
litany of other behaviour, the relevant point is that bureaucrats choose behaviour, 
possibly from a menu, that is designed to advance a particular interest.
10.2b Action Channels
This thesis undertook a revision of Allison and Halperin's treatment of'action 
channels'. Allison and Halperin defined 'action channels' as 'regularized procedures for 
producing a particular class of action' and they suggested that action channels bestow 
bargaining advantages on certain players in their competition against others. I found 
their suggestions rather weak and set out to refine them by incorporating ideas from 
March and Simon's work on organizational behaviour. This thesis suggested that a 
bureaucrat's choice of means to advance his or her occupational interests will be 
chosen from a menu of alternatives established by decision-making procedures and 
relationships between decision-makers, called action channels. Action channels were 
treated as dynamic. Those who have power to create them benefit in the competitive
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game. By exploring these action channels, the analyst should be able to predict the 
means by which bureaucrats pursue their interests.
Action channels, as formulated here, proved useful in exploring the decisions 
and actions taken by members of the Alvey Directorate in Esprit from 1983 through 
1985. The relationships that existed among decision-makers and the procedures by 
which they made decisions certainly guided members of the organization in particular 
directions. Action channels did not operate forcefully in the years from 1986 to early 
1988 because they were being refashioned. True to the suggestion in this thesis, civil 
servants with the power to create or amend action channels did so in a manner that 
was to their benefit. From 1988 to 1992, the concept of action channels proved of little 
use as a tool of analysis. It appears that action channels are instrumental only when an 
organization's formal structures and procedures that regulate relationships and 
decision-making are weak and ineffective. In the absence of formal structures and 
procedures, civil servants create ones through which they can advance their own 
interests.
Although the concept of action channels was useful, I must conclude that its 
use was limited. First, as defined by Allison and Halperin and reformulated here, action 
channels are too vague and loosely defined. As a result, they have a tendency to 
become a repository for behaviour that cannot be explained according to more robust 
propositions. Second, I question whether action channels are not simply decision­
making structures and procedures, or SOPs, disguised by new terminology. As they 
stand, action channels offer little more insight than the statement 'decision-makers 
decide'. There is no doubt that decision-making structures and procedures affect the 
competitive game in bureaucracies, but in future, analysts should employ a 
straightforward analysis of those structures and procedures rather than renaming them 
and imbuing them with unwarranted significance.
10.2c Interests
Allison and Halperin suggested that bureaucrats compete as they pursue personal, 
organizational, domestic and national security interests. This categorization of interests 
is so expansive and all-inclusive that the perspective is reduced to suggesting that 
bureaucrats compete in pursuit of anything that interests them and that policy is 
affected in the process. The demerits of such a sweeping generalization are obvious.
To make the perspective more parsimonious, this thesis reduced the number of 
interests to one: occupational interests, which include the desire to maximize budgets, 
responsibilities and rank. Behaviour was attributed to bureaucratic competition only
when bureaucrats competed in pursuit of one or more of their occupational concerns.
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I found this reformulation useful during the course of my research. First, it 
forced me to be circumspect and cautious in attributing behaviour to bureaucratic 
competition. If I could identify the exact interest(s) a bureaucrat was pursuing, rather 
than some sweeping categories of interests, then I was confident that I was not 
choosing or molding the facts to fit a theory or perspective. Instead, I could test the 
facts against a theory or perspective. Second, unlike Allison and Halperin's model, this 
reformulation reduced my tendency to attribute behaviour to competition when, in 
actuality, it was designed to promote consensus. It is imperative that the perspective 
allows the analyst to distinguish the two. Consensus-building is central to government 
by democracy. A model that allegedly explains decision-making in a democracy should 
not force those who employ it to see only government by competition. Decision­
making involves both competition and consensus-building and we need a perspective 
that allows the analyst to see both. While Allison and Halperin's simplification was 
made with noble intentions, it proved to be more distorting than revealing.
This reformulation has two demerits. First, by being so specific, it reduces the 
frequency with which the perspective can be employed. However, I believe this 
negative effect is more than off-set by the greater accuracy afforded by the 
reformulation. Second, it can easily be misconstrued as implying that the only interest a 
bureaucrat has is to maximize budgets, rank and/or responsibilities. In fact, the 
opposite is held to be true; bureaucrats have numerous interests that may combine in 
such a large number of permutations that no theory could attest to understanding much 
less predicting. What this reformulation does is single out one of those interest sets for 
closer attention. It does not make an a priori assumption that civil servants always 
pursue their occupational interests. Rather, it treats occupational interests as a variable 
in need of testing.
I believe the case for reducing bureaucratic interests to a single category is 
theoretically strong. Did it prove true in fact? Bureaucrats involved in Esprit from 
1982-1992 did, without doubt, wish to maximize their budgets and responsibilities. 
During interviews, civil servants invariably referred to one, and usually, both of these 
interests. In fact, many civil servants boasted of their budgets and responsibilities and 
several admitted that responsibilities and budgets were a sign of'virility'.
The evidence in this thesis supports the proposition that bureaucrats seek to
maximize their budgets and responsibilities. This proposition should not, however, be
taken as fact in future studies of British foreign policy-making. Rather, it should be
tested against the evidence provided by policy-making in different time periods and in
different issue areas. The Public Choice literature of recent years argues that
bureaucrats do not always seek to maximize their budgets and responsibilities. Patrick
Dunleavy, for example, argues that the interests of some bureaucrats would be best
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served by minimizing their budgets and that some bureaucrats are interested to reduce 
their responsibilities.^*^
As regards rank, I cannot confidently assert that rank maximization was an 
interest driving civil servants involved with Esprit. Only once did an interviewer, Mr 
Roger Hird, refer to rank and this reference was made in the context of a criticism of 
another civil servant. Dr Timothy Walker. As such, I must dismiss this as evidence that 
civil servants sought to maximize their rank.
I was surprised to find so little evidence supporting rank maximization as a 
significant interest. Could it be that Esprit was unique? Throughout the decade under 
observation, Esprit was implemented by organizations that were staffed by a mix of 
civil servants and industrial and academic secondees. Because they were not career 
civil servants and were on temporary secondment, the secondees were not driven by a 
desire to maximize their rank in the civil service. Furthermore, they did not seem 
driven by a desire to progress within their companies. In fact, the people I interviewed 
who were or had been secondees suggested that someone seeking a secondment was 
usually bored with their work and that they did not expect to be taken back into the 
company from which they came. ^  ^  They expected their secondment to offer a break 
from the monotony of their jobs and perhaps to lead to a job with another company, 
but not necessarily at a higher level of responsibility or pay. Perhaps the attitudes of 
secondees affected the attitudes of civil servants in the organization.
Perhaps the answer lies in the nature of those who are attracted to the civil 
service. The civil service offers a career and job security in return for relatively low 
r e m u n e r a t i o n ^ ^  and minimal opportunities for advancement. Perhaps those who are 
attracted by these offerings seek little in the way of career advancement in terms of 
rank. Perhaps they prefer instead the more honorable aspects of the civil servants (for 
example, the guardians of government) or the less pecuniary benefits (for example, 
respect). If the latter are true, then an analysis of bureaucratic behaviour from the point 
of view of rank maximization is misplaced.
I am not convinced, however, that rank maximization as a bureaucratic interest 
should be dismissed nor am I convinced that rank maximization was not a concern of 
some of the civil servants involved in Esprit. A quick look at the rank of two civil
Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public C&o/ce (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1991); Patrick Dunleavy, 'The Architecture of the British Central State, Part I: Framework for 
Analysis', Public Administration ÇWo\. 67, Autumn 1989); and Patrick Dunleavy, The Architecture of 
the British Central State, Part II: Empirical Findings', Public Administration (Wq\. 67, Winter 1989).
Interviews, Dr Dennis Potter; Dr Philip Roe, 4 November 1992; Mr David Talbot; Mr Robert 
Morland; and Mr Chris Barrow.
Mrs Thatcher set in motion a number of reforms, contracting out for example, that challenged this. 
Mr Major seems intent on staying her course.
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servants who played a significant role in Esprit is revealing. In 1982, Mr Alastair 
Macdonald was an Under Secretary (G3); in 1985 he was promoted to Deputy 
Secretary (G2); he currently holds that rank along with six other gentlemen in the DTI; 
and he was recently awarded a CB. What lies in store for Mr Macdonald? Dr Timothy 
Walker's rise has been spectacular. In 1983/84, he was promoted to G5 and named 
Director of Administration in the Alvey Directorate. In 1986, he was named the 
Principal Private Secretary to Mr Paul Channon and later Lord Young. In 1988, he 
was promoted to Under Secretary (G3) and currently holds that rank. These gentlemen 
are not the passive and unwitting recipients of promotions. Certainly they have earned 
their promotions.
Although it may not be universally applicable, it is inconceivable that not a 
single British civil servant seeks promotion. Perhaps the desire for promotion applies 
to a very small proportion of British civil servants, but if the ones it does apply to are 
influential in policy-making, then analysts must not dismiss rank maximization as a real 
and perhaps significant driving force. The question remains why interviewees seldom 
referred to rank as a factor in their decision-making. I refer to the collegial ethos of the 
British civil service. A social taboo in the British civil service militates against open 
expression of the desire for promotion. Possessing a large budget, however, seems to 
be something of a 'virility test'.
That brings me to an interesting finding. While testing whether civil servants do 
indeed wish to maximize their budgets, responsibilities and rank, I kept running across 
another interest set that civil servants seemed to be protecting: the procedures, habits, 
or traditions according to which civil servants conduct their affairs with one another. 
Scholars and civil servants often speak of the 'collegial' atmosphere (or the 'village') of 
Whitehall. Protecting that atmosphere when it is threatened seems to be an end in and 
of itself, independent of and perhaps additional to the desire for increased budgets, 
rank and responsibility. It would be interesting to test this notion further.
10.2d Preference-from-Position Function
Perhaps the most fundamental of Bureaucratic Politics' propositions is that bureaucrats'
preferences are determined by their position in the bureaucracy. According to this
thesis' reformulation of interests, the preference-from-position function asserts that
bureaucrats will interpret a particular issue in terms of how it affects their budgets,
responsibilities and rank and that their decisions or actions on that particular issue will
be designed to maximize their budgets, responsibilities and rank. Evidence in support
of this proposition is mixed. I can conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that
from 1983 through 1985, civil servants took action in Esprit that was explicitly
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designed to protect the budgets and responsibilities that the Alvey Programme afforded 
them. Interviewees attested to this and secondary sources, such as statistics and 
Government documents, back up the testimony.
From 1986 through 1987, European R&D programmes grew relative to 
national R&D programmes. Ministers sent signals that R&D priorities were going to 
shift — that European R&D programmes would take precedence over national ones. 
Some civil servants realized that European R&D programmes were the only 
guaranteed future source of budgets and responsibilities. Ministerial objectives and 
bureaucrats' occupational concerns began to converge. Again, I can conclude with a 
high degree of certainty that civil servants maneuvered to bring European R&D issues 
into their remits, whether by gaining implementation responsibility or by designing 
decision-making structures and procedures through which they could exert influence, 
in order to maximize their budgets and responsibilities. This time, however. Ministers 
were sending clues as to where civil servants should look for budgets and 
responsibilities.
I did not find evidence that would allow me to state, with a high level of 
confidence, that civil servants made decisions and took action in Esprit from early 
1988 to 1992 that was designed explicitly to further their occupational interests. Civil 
servants did not give up their desires for increased budgets and responsibilities and 
behaviour that was consistent with those desires was in evidence. However, I cannot 
attribute that behaviour entirely to the desire to maximize budgets and responsibilities.
It seems that the preference-from-position function was overridden by another force 
that was affecting civil servants' behaviour; Ministers. Civil servants faithfully pursued 
the objectives established by their Ministers. That said, however, it is possible that civil 
servants were pursuing Minister's interests because that was the only way they could 
maximize their own budgets and responsibilities. On this score, I am stuck in the 'which 
come first, the chicken or the egg?' logic. Thus, of the ten years under observation, 
only in five years were the six criteria established in this thesis for attributing decisions 
or behaviour to bureaucratic competition met.
I must draw attention to several considerations. The first and most significant is
that the Bureaucratic Politics perspective as formulated by Allison and Halperin and as
refined in this thesis does not give the analyst the ability to state categorically that a
bureaucrat's behaviour was the result entirely of a desire to maximize budgets, rank or
responsibilities. The position-from-preference function has weaknesses. It does not
allow the analyst to dismiss entirely the myriad of other possible factors (for example,
personal ideology or individual idiosyncrasies) that may be affecting a bureaucrat's
behaviour at the same time that occupational interests are influential. The perspective
cannot isolate a single category of causal factors. What the perspective, as refined
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here, can do is to suggest whether the preference-from-position function was having a 
significant effect on behaviour in a given circumstance.
The second consideration arises from the first. If the perspective does not let us 
rule out factors other than bureaucratic position that may determine behaviour, then 
we need to know the conditions under which bureaucratic position is likely to be 
determinate. The perspective, as postulated by Allison and Halperin, does not provide 
this facility.
10.2e Conditions
This thesis hypothesized that if competition among bureaucrats pursuing their 
occupational interests was to affect policy, it would be most likely to occur in the 
absence of; consistent Ministerial objectives. Ministerial control and supervision; and 
Whitehall machinery that effectively coordinated and controlled policy within and 
across departments. The evidence supports this hypothesis.
From 1983 through 1985, civil servants did not pursue the policies articulated 
by Ministers. Two factors account for the inability, or unwillingness, of civil servants 
to pursue their Minister's objectives. First, Ministerial objectives, particularly in the 
Department of Trade and Industry, as regards economic policy and European 
Community policy were inconsistent. The Conservative Party won the 1979 election 
with an economic ideology formulated in large part by Sir Keith Joseph: 'roll back the 
frontiers of the state'. Sir Keith became Secretary of State at the Department of 
Industry, but in the face of a severe recession, approved numerous industrial support 
measures that were contrary to Conservative economic policy. Sir Keith's successor 
acted in a similar manner.
Inconsistency characterized European policy as well. The Prime Minister was 
vociferous toward the Community and her approach to most Community issues had 
several common threads: limit expenditure, get money's worth for Britain, limit the size 
of the Brussels bureaucracy and ensure effective management. Her antipathy toward 
the Community and general objectives were not shared by all her Ministers. Cabinet 
was divided over European policy and, as a result, Government's approach toward the 
Community was schizophrenic. Mr Kenneth Baker exemplified this. Although he and 
the Prime Minister laid down a fairly consistent set of objectives toward Esprit, Mr 
Baker acted in a manner that was contradictory to those objectives.
Second, civil servants were free of Ministerial supervision and Whitehall 
control mechanisms, both of which are meant to ensure that civil servants pursue 
Ministers' objectives. Once Esprit 1 was approved, it received very little Ministerial 
attention, having been dismissed as a overly ambitious programme that would
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suffocate in Brussels red tape. Whitehall control mechanisms were dysfunctional at the 
Departmental level and at the centre of Government. In the DTI, policy responsibility 
was fragmented and hierarchical reporting lines were severed. At the centre, the 
Cabinet Office was incapable of exerting influence in Esprit.
Lacking a consistent policy framework firmly enforced by Ministers or 
Whitehall mechanisms, civil servants responsible for Esprit responded to a more 
immediate and tangible pressure: bureaucratic competition. Their Department was in 
turmoil, having been reorganized numerous times in a very short period. Within this 
turbulent organizational environment, civil servants felt insecure and threatened. 
Competition among them was rampant.
Esprit was affected by, and contributed to that competition. Responsibility for 
Esprit fell to a bureaucratic anomaly: the Alvey Directorate. The Directorate was an 
autonomous, self-styled organization comprised of civil servants, industrialists and 
academics. Although ostensibly within the DTI, members of the Directorate did not 
obey the rules and procedures applicable to other civil servants. Further, members of 
the Directorate were keen to increase their responsibilities and protect their budgets. 
Some civil servants in the DTI proper looked upon the Directorate with a mixture of 
hostility and envy; some attempted to undermine it. Members of the Alvey Directorate 
took action in Esprit that was designed to protect the Alvey programme and the 
Directorate itself. Their actions were not designed to further Ministerial objectives.
The combination of defensive, reflexive decisions made by a small number of 
civil servants, industrialists and academics reacting to bureaucratic competition 
comprised a de British policy in Esprit. While scholars and practitioners have 
recognized the prevalence of bureaucratic competition in Whitehall, this was a case 
where that competition had a real effect on British policy in Esprit. It did so because 
Ministers did not pursue a consistent set of objectives, because Ministers did not 
maintain adequate control or supervision over civil servants responsible for Esprit and 
because DTI and Cabinet Office control mechanisms were ineffective.
From 1986 through 1987, civil servants witnessed a dramatic increase in 
Community funded R&D relative to nationally funded R&D. To the extent that 
bureaucrats seek budgets and responsibilities, only EC programmes afforded both.
Civil servants who perceived the new importance of the EC maneuvered to bring EC 
R&D programmes, particularly Esprit, into their individual portfolios. Civil servants 
were not acting entirely on their own accord, however. Their new Secretary of State 
was sending signals that he intended to change the R&D orientation of the Department 
— giving it a European orientation. Thus, while civil servants competed for budgets 
and responsibilities, their competition took place within parameters set by their 
Minister.
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Although Esprit figured in civil servants' efforts to increase their budgets and 
responsibilities, they had very little influence over it during this period. They had been 
excluded from the policy-making process when Esprit moved up the political ladder. 
Mrs Thatcher and several Ministers took command over Esprit, usurping the decision­
making license enjoyed by civil servants from 1983 through 1985. Thus, although 
bureaucratic competition over Esprit continued, Ministerial attention given to it from 
1986 through 1987 prohibited the competition from having a real effect on British 
policy in Esprit.
By early 1988, Lord Young had established his authority in the Department and 
set down incontrovertible objectives toward national and European R&D. He provided 
civil servants with strong leadership and with clear and consistent objectives. He also 
refashioned the DTI's policy demarcation lines, hierarchy and control mechanisms to 
ensure that civil servants followed his lead.
Responsibility for Esprit was placed in a small project office whose only 
responsibility was to administer Esprit. The project office fell within a newly designed 
division which was firmly briefed into a much strengthened Departmental control and 
coordination mechanism centred on the Research Technology Policy division. RTP 
division was finally capable of enforcing Minister's R&D policy in all DTI divisions. 
Esprit was entirely subsumed within the larger policy framework set down by 
Ministers. While civil servants may have wished to increase their budgets and 
responsibilities, I could not identify action geared toward these ends and thus 
bureaucratic competition did not exert a real influence on British policy in Esprit.
This thesis began by juxtaposing two statements concerning British policy in 
Esprit. In 1983, that policy was expressed in the following terms; 'Esprit is 
complementary to the programme we propose [the Alvey P r o g r am m e] . B y  1988, the 
statement had changed to: British IT research programmes were to be 'complementaiy 
to Esprit'.*^ Do these statements represent a change in British policy toward Esprit or 
were they the product of linguistic carelessness? Evidence presented here supports the 
conclusion that they did represent a change in British policy. That change resulted from 
the differential impact of bureaucratic competition during the ten year period under 
review. That impact was made different by two factors: the degree of Ministerial 
control and supervision and consistency of Ministerial objectives; and the efficiency of 
Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms.
Department of Industry, 'A Programme for Advanced Information Technology: The Report of the 
Alvey Committee' (London: Department of Industry, 1982), p. 7.
Department of Trade and Industry, 'DTI — the Department for Enterprise', Cm 278 (London: 
HMSO, January 1988), p. 36.
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While the evidence supported the hypothesis, four cautions are in order. First, 
it is unclear from my research whether bureaucratic competition affects policy in the 
absence of both Ministerial control and consistent objectives a/2(/effective Whitehall 
control and coordination mechanisms or whether the absence of one is sufficient. 
Second, due to the lack of methodological tools, I found it difficult to objectively 
assess the degree of Ministerial control or Whitehall efficiency. (The implications of 
this are discussed in the next section.)
Third, my suggestion that Whitehall control and coordination mechanisms 
prevented bureaucratic competition from having a real effect on policy implied that 
those mechanisms were somehow above or independent of bureaucratic politics. Some 
of the evidence presented here points to the opposite: that Whitehall mechanisms can, 
in fact, be the product of bureaucratic competition. Take, for instance, the case from 
late 1984 through 1985 when civil servants in the DTI's Research Technology Policy 
division and in the Treasury became concerned with the operations of the Alvey 
Directorate and devised procedures through which they could exert control over 
European R&D and Esprit in particular. (See Chapter 7.)
Fourth, this thesis argues that the evolution of British policy from one 
determined largely by bureaucratic competition to one consistent with Ministerial 
dictates is the result of two factors: Ministerial control, the articulation and 
compatibility of Ministerial objectives; and Whitehall control structures and 
procedures. A cause and effect relationship is posited: change in the these factors 
affected the behaviour of civil servants and policy itself. While the evidence gathered 
allows me to make this argument with a high degree of confidence, I must consider 
whether changes in bureaucrats' behaviour (and policy) were coincidental to, rather 
than caused by, changes in the factors mentioned above.
To test whether the evolution of policy and policy-making was coincidental to 
changes in the factors requires counter-factual argument. While not wishing to 
succumb to a tyranny of the 'ifs', it is useful to consider the following. If Lord Young 
had not established control in the DTI, had not developed and articulated a clear policy 
for making UK IT R&D programmes secondary to EC ones and had not designed 
organizational structures and procedures to enforce that policy, would civil servants 
have independently developed and pursued the very same (or even similar) policy? Is 
there some 'Euro-logic', so to speak, that draws civil servants toward Europe and, as a 
result, establishes British foreign policy? The amount of time civil servants from the 
Esprit Unit or from the Cabinet Office spend in Brussels and the sheer number of R&D 
issues with a European dimension encourages an affirmative answer. The evidence 
gathered during my course of research does not, however.
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In an analysis of the effects of the EC on British foreign policy, David Allen 
points to the increase in contacts between civil servants and Ministers from the 
member states and the European Commission. He suggests that those contacts have 
led to a an 'expansion of Britain's external relations'*^ and to a '"Europeanization" of 
both the procedures and the substance of British foreign policy'.*^ For Allen, 'foreign 
policy' and 'external relations' are distinct notions: "Foreign policy...has to be 
understood as an attempt to bring some order to this expanded set of foreign contacts - 
- an attempt in other words to design, manage and control Britain's external relations in 
order to try to achieve the objectives of foreign policy.'*^ Increased contact is not 
synonymous with foreign policy. Rather, foreign policy is the manner in which those 
contacts are organized and the purposes to which they work. Thus, contact between 
British civil servants involved in Esprit and other member states' civil servants and 
European Commissioners should be seen an 'expansion of Britain's external relations' 
rather than a foreign policy perse.
Lord Young set British policy m Esprit and accompanied that policy with 
actions that forced civil servants to pursue it. He slashed the DTI's budget for national 
IT R&D programmes and approved a large DTI budgetary appropriation for Esprit II. 
These decisions harnessed civil servants' desires for budgets and responsibilities to the 
advancement of Ministerial objectives. Civil servants turned to that which afforded 
them budgets and responsibilities and in so doing advanced their Minister's policy 
objectives. I believe that if Lord Young had approved a the national programme 
proposed by the IT86 Committee to operate alongside Esprit II, civil servants in the 
DTI would have responded in much the same way that members of the Alvey 
Directorate did: they would have acted to protect the budgets and responsibilities that 
would accrue to them through the national programme they themselves had designed. 
The reason: the national programme designed by the IT86 Committee afforded far 
greater spending authority and responsibility to civil servants in the DTI than did 
Esprit. Although it was important, the role for British civil servants in Esprit was 
basically limited to that of a match-maker and post box for decisions that were made in 
Brussels either in the EMC forum, in which the UK was one among twelve voices, or 
by European Commissioners in conjunction with the ESC and EAB. In contrast,
British civil servants implementing a national programme, had it been approved in the 
form suggested by the IT86 Committee, would have had powers that ranged from 
designing projects to allocating funds.
*5 David Allen, 'Britain and Western Europe' in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), 
British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change & Transforniation Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 184.
p. 191.
Ibid., p. 184.
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10.3 Future Research
Although the Bureaucratie Politics perspective proved of mixed success in this study, I 
believe that its fundamental insights are robust and worthy of continued attention. 
Further research should be carried out as regards both the reformulations undertaken 
here and the basics of the perspective proposed by Allison and Halperin.
In order to increase the parsimony of the perspective, this thesis used a single 
category of bureaucratic interests: occupational interests. This does not suggest or 
imply that occupational interests are the only interests bureaucrats possess. 
Bureaucrats may seek any number of interests (for example, autonomy, the 'good life', 
pecuniary benefits, interesting work, to impart their values) at different times and in 
different combinations. Ideally, the analyst should be able to isolate a particular interest 
from all others and analyze its effects holding other things constant. But this is the 
world of the economist. Perhaps scholars of international relations must be satisfied 
with having the ability to state, with a high degree of confidence, that a particular 
interest was dominant over all others at a particular point in time.
Today, we make subjective evaluations in this regard. Is there not some tool, 
perhaps a criteria, that could be developed that would allow analysts to make objective 
evaluations regarding the impact of a particular interest on the behaviour of 
bureaucrats? It would also be useful if the conditions under which a bureaucrat is likely 
to respond to a particular interest could be identified. Are there certain social 
structures, decision-making structures or procedures or emotional conditions within a 
governmental organization that raise the importance of occupational interests, for 
example, over all others in the minds of bureaucrats?
The preference-from-position function is elemental to the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective. It is also one of its most significant weaknesses. The perspective as 
formulated by Allison and Halperin suggests that bureaucrats interpret a particular 
issue in light of how it affects their interests, which are determined by their position in 
the bureaucracy, and they take action on that issue that is designed to further their 
interests, which include maximizing budgets, responsibilities and rank. A statement of 
the preference-from-position function truer to human behaviour would be qualified: 
bureaucrats may interpret a particular issue in light of how it affects their interests and 
they may take action on that issue to further their interests. So long as conditions exist 
where bureaucrats act without reference to their occupational interests (for example, 
the bureaucrat perceived no relationship between the issue and his or her interests) or 
even against them, analysts need objective criteria according to which they can 
evaluate and test behaviour before attributing it to the preference-from-position 
function. Further, because bureaucrats do not necessarily act in a manner consistent
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with their interests, there is a need to establish conditions under which bureaucrats are 
most likely to behave according to the preference-from-position function.
This thesis concludes that bureaucratic competition can affect British policy in 
the absence of Ministerial control and supervision, clearly articulated consistent 
Ministerial objectives and in the absence of effective Whitehall control and 
coordination mechanisms. Further research on both conditions is needed. First, it 
would be helpful if analysts had an objective measure for deciding whether the 
Whitehall machinery is operating 'effectively'. In developing such a measure, research 
could focus on the workings of intra- and inter-departmental committees and on the 
functioning of the Cabinet Office. Relationships among civil servants that are 
established by these committees and through the auspices of the Cabinet Office should 
be examined.
While the need for objective criteria is obvious and although possible starting 
points in the development of such criteria can be identified, their development 
nevertheless poses difficult conceptual questions, perhaps the most significant being, 
'From where do we derive those measures?'. Can we pin-point a time in the history 
when the machinery of British Government was working perfectly? Is there an ideal 
against which we can judge the current situation? Perhaps we could measure efficiency 
in terms of whether objectives were met. This may be a fruitful avenue for some case 
studies, but it is of little use here — the reason being that Ministerial objectives as 
regards Esprit changed with great frequency. We cannot measure efficiency in terms of 
hitting a target when the target is constantly moving. Perhaps we could measure 
efficiency in terms of how well a government maintains consistency or coherence of 
action in the face of frequently changing objectives. This avenue leads to circular 
reasoning: we would have to define 'consistency' and 'coherence' before we could 
define 'efficiency'. Given the conceptual difficulty of creating objective measures, 
subjective judgments of'efficiency', if they are made with integrity, must suffice.**
Second, what exactly constitutes Ministerial control? Is there some minimal 
level of authority below which bureaucratic competition begins to affect policy? How 
do Ministers establish control? Political scientists in the US are developing a 
framework, labelled the 'principal-agent' model of bureaucratic relationships, that may 
be useful.*^ The model suggests that central political institutions (principals) bound
** I am grateful to Professor James Mayall for help with this issue.
See for example, Nathaniel Beck, 'Presidential Influence on the Federal Reserve in the 1970s', 
American Political Science Review (Wo\. 26. 1982), pp. 415-45; Terry M. Moe, 'Regulatory 
Performance and Presidential Administration', American Journal o f Political Science {yo\. 26, 1982), 
pp. 197-224; Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization', American Journal o f Political 
Science (Wo\. 28, 1984), pp. 739-777; Barry R  Weingast and Mark J. Moran, 'Bureaucratic 
Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission',
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and mold the preferences of bureaucrats (agents). Their ability to do so depends on 
three factors; the presence and use of tools of political control, the resources and 
receptivity of bureaucrats to control and relationships that affect the principal-agent 
responses. Among the tools of political control are the ability to make appointments, 
manipulate personnel, control organizational structure, provide resources, exercise 
direct authority and employ oversight mechanisms.^® Research exploring whether 
British Ministers employ these as control mechanisms would be valuable as would 
research on control mechanisms that are unique to Britain, such as ones employed by 
the Departmental Permanent Secretaries, the Secretary of State's private office. 
Parliament, the Public Accounts Committee, the National Audit Office and the 
Cabinet.
10.4 The Final Judgment
Steve Smith suggested that,
...in many ways the single most important task that a study of British foreign 
policy could perform for FPA would be to investigate the phenomena of 
bureaucratic and organisational politics at a variety of levels within 
government over a variety of policy issue-areas. As it stands, we simply do not 
know the extent to which they operate in the British case. We know the 
arguments for and against in the case of the United States (and even in the 
Soviet one!) but we, as FPA theorists, do not know the caveats that must be 
applied to the findings that come from over the Atlantic.^i
In answer, this thesis concludes the following. Bureaucrats involved with Esprit 
sought to maximize their budgets and responsibilities. Bureaucratic competition does 
exist in Whitehall and that competition can affect policy under the conditions 
hypothesized. Finally, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective, in amended form, is useful 
in explaining British foreign policy.
One must question, however, whether Esprit was a unique issue area that 
encouraged behaviour among bureaucrats that is not evidenced in other policy issues 
and whether the unusual number of Ministerial reshuffles at the Department of Trade
Journal of Political Economy 91, 1983), pp. 765-800; John T. Scholtz and Feng-heng Wei, 
'Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System', American Political Science Review (yo\. 80, 1986), 
pp. 1249-1270; B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air 
Enforcements', American Political Science Review (WoX. 82, No. 1, March 1988), pp. 213-234; and 
B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, 'The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy', 
American Political Science Review (WoX. 85, No. 3, September 1991), pp. 801-828.
20 Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness', ibid., p. 213-215.
Steve Smith, 'Foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy' in Lawrence Freedman 
and Michael Clarke, Britain in the lFb/7(y (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 68.
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and Industry created an organizational environment so conducive to bureaucratic 
competition that it is atypical of Whitehall. If either of these is found to be the case, 
then the general applicability of the Bureaucratic Politics perspective and the 
reformulations presented here seems limited. If, however, fundamental divisions within 
the Conservative Party over Europe or Mrs Thatcher's leadership style or perhaps even 
the Conservative Party's economic philosophy encouraged bureaucratic competition, 
further research into the effects on bureaucratic competition in other policy arenas is 
warranted.
I am inclined to argue that Esprit was not as unique as it might first appear. 
From a survey of news, I would expect a Bureaucratic Politics approach to shed light 
on, for example, the Matrix Churchill case where British businessmen were accused of 
selling sensitive equipment to Iraq before and during the Gulf War. In the Scott inquiry 
following the affair, civil servants were implicated in the Government's defence and the 
uncertainty of Ministerial objectives was c l e a r . 2 2
Further research might also explore the nature of civil servant-Minister 
relationships under Mr Major — a relationship which, as this thesis has shown, is a vital 
factor affecting whether bureaucratic competition can have a real affect on policy. Mr 
Major has undertaken quite a radical reform of the British civil service through the 
market-testing programme, where the efficiency of the civil service is tested, and 
contracting-out, whereby many functions previously performed by the civil service are 
contracted-out to the private sector. Numerous top-level civil servants have 
commented on the effects the market-testing programme is having on the civil service, 
using such terms as 'adversarial', 'alienating', 'damaging effect on morale', 'crisis', 
'hopelessly awry'.^^ The Public Accounts Committee warned that Mr Major's 
contracting-out policy threatens the 'time-honoured values of integrity, impartiality and 
incorruptibility' o f the British civil service. '^* Sir Peter Kemp, former Permanent 
Secretary at the Office of Public Service and Science, declared that Whitehall is being 
led by "'wayward barons'" pulling in different directions. As a result, the Civil Service 
is unhappy, unsure of itself and becoming "littered with policies that do not w o r k '" .^ ^  
Those 'wayward barons', are 'all doing their own thing and reporting to different people 
... there is no single person who pulls them together'.^^ The similarity between the civil 
service environment described here and during the early years of Esprit seems to be 
great.
See for example, Independent, 18 January 1994 and 22 January 1994.
Independent, 15 November 1993, p. 1, 16 November 1993 and 25 November 1993, p. 33.
Independent, 28 January 1994, p. 1 and p. 15; Economist, 19 March 1994, p. 16 and pp. 39-41.
Independent, 15 November 1993, p. 1.
26 Ibid.
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Finally, further research could apply the Bureaucratic Politics perspective as 
reformulated here to a study of German and French IT R&D policy. Both governments 
implemented large national IT R&D programmes, run by civil servants, simultaneous 
with Esprit. Although my research on French and German IT R&D policy is cursory, I 
would not be surprised to find much of the same behaviour occurring in those 
governments as occurred in the UK from 1983 through 1985.
This study employed an amended version of the Bureaucratic Politics 
perspective and found that bureaucratic competition can have a real effect on British 
foreign policy-making under certain conditions. In reaching these conclusions, I found 
the Bureaucratic Politics perspective as amended a useful analytical tool for exploring 
an important element of the policy-process. I did not, however, find its explanatory 
power equally as impressive. The perspective proved useful in explaining policy during 
only one-third of the period under observation. In the remaining two-thirds, it 
facilitated a study of the intra-governmental policy-making process, but it did not offer 
an explanation of policy. The literature falling under Allison's 'Rational Actor Model' 
would probably have proved the most useful tool for analyzing policy during the last 
one-third if not the last two-thirds of the decade. A 'Rational Actor Model' approach 
would not, however, have been able to explain British policy in Esprit from 1983 
through 1985.
10.5 The Judgment in Clive Ponting's Trial
In Mr Ponting's trial, Mr Justice McGowan accused Mr Ponting of acting in his own 
interest rather than in the interests of his Ministers, the latter being synonymous with 
the national interest. Mr Ponting's defence was that he was acting in the national 
interest, which was, in this case, different from the interests of his Ministers. Mr 
Ponting was acquitted.
In 1986 he wrote a book, entitled Whitehall: Tragedy and Farce, in which he 
explained how Government policy is made. His words will end this thesis.
Some conflicts can be extraordinarily complex as several different departments 
try to promote their differing interests. For example, defence of the North Sea 
oil and gas fields and fishery protection is provided by the Navy and RAF but 
partly paid for by other departments. The Navy and RAF see this as a 
convenient way of maintaining more ships and aircraft but as usual everything 
they do is very expensive. The Scottish Office run their own Fishery Protection 
Fleet, MAFF are keen to do the same because it would be cheaper and increase 
their independence. Energy are worried that if MAFF pull out they will have to 
pay a bigger bill to defend the oil fields. The Welsh Office and Northern Ireland 
Office also have to pay their share of the costs. And at the end of all this 
confusion a new government policy emerges. It emerges not after careful
247
assessment of the national interest but after a balancing of various Whitehall 
interests.
Ponting, op. cit., in note 4, p. 103.
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Research Methodology 
Appendix A
Although several studies have examined British participation in Esprit from a technical 
and statistical point of view, this thesis is the first to explore British policy in Esprit 
from a decision-making perspective. Very little information about the policy process is 
publicly available and that which is comes primarily from Commons and Lords debates, 
Select Committee hearings and brief, and often tantalizing, allusions in journals and 
newspapers. Because information in these sources is limited, interviews were the 
primary source of information.
A strict and well-structured interviewing methodology was employed in order 
to piece together correctly the policy-making puzzle. Based on preliminary research, 
categories of actors were identified: Members of Parliament, Ministers, civil servants 
(from the Ministry of Defence, Department of Trade and Industry and Science and 
Engineering Research Council, Cabinet Office, Treasury and the European 
Commission), industrialists and academics. Eighty-four interviews were conducted and 
the choice of interviewees was based on three considerations. First, their personal 
involvement in the policy-making process, the degree of which was indicated by other 
interviewees and literature searches. Second, whether they were omitted from the 
policy process when protocol or common sense would suggest that they should have 
been involved. Non-participation was taken to be as important as its converse. Third, 
the degree of influence exerted by the category of actor into which individuals fell. An 
attempt was made to chose the number of interviewees from each category according 
to the apparent influence of each category in the policy process. A list of interviews 
appears in Appendix B.
Regarding the civil servants interviewed, I made a short-list, from preliminary 
reading, of civil servants whose names appeared frequently. They were primarily from 
the DTI and my first interviews were conducted with these individuals. Many 
recommended that I speak with other civil servants and when this occurred, I 
researched the involvement of the individual to whom I was referred and chose 
whether or not to ask for an interview. During those early interviews, I asked whether 
there were individuals, or divisions of the DTI or any other Whitehall Department, 
who were not involved in the process but should have been. If the answer was 
affirmative, I examined Whitehall and DTI Departmental protocol and decided whether 
to interview the missing civil servants.
With the exception of one gentleman, I am confident that I interviewed all civil 
servants from the DTI who had a significant influence in Esprit, whether directly or
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through their absence. These included civil servants from the DTI's Policy Planning 
Unit, Research Technology Policy division. Electronic Applications division and the 
various embodiments of information technology divisions. Mr John Major, former 
Under Secretary of LA division, refused my numerous pleas for an interview, but he 
was willing to reveal something of his involvement in Esprit over the telephone when I 
contacted him for an interview. Civil servants of all ranks were interviewed. Some 
were currently in the civil service; some had retired. Care was taken to interview both 
administrators and specialists as well as civil servants from all DTI divisions with any 
responsibility for R&D.
The number of interviews conducted with civil servants from the Ministry of 
Defence and the Science and Engineering Research Council compared to those from 
the DTI is indicative of their relative influence on British policy-making in Esprit. Only 
during Esprit's first phase did the MoD have any real influence and that was through 
the figure of Dr William Fawcett, Director of Alvey VLSI, who was interviewed. Prior 
to moving to the Alvey Directorate, Dr Fawcett was in charge of the Physics Group at 
the MoD's Royal Signals and Radar Establishment. The SERC's involvement in Esprit 
was similarly limited, but well represented in interviews with Dr David Worsnip (who 
was in charge of the SERC's involvement in Esprit II), Mr Brian Oakley (who was 
Secretary of the SERC before moving to the Alvey Directorate) and Dr David Thomas 
(who was simultaneously head of Alvey IKBS and information technology in the 
SERC during Esprit I).
Civil servants from the Cabinet Office and the Treasury were invaluable. The 
number of civil servants from these organization who were directly involved in Esprit 
was surprisingly small, but those who were involved agreed to interviews and were 
very helpful. Not only did they provide detailed information of their role in Esprit, but 
they patiently answered my queries regarding Whitehall mechanisms and procedures. 
They were also very helpful in providing sensitive information before it was made 
publicly available.
Regarding interviews with members of the European Commission, I obtained a 
list of all members of DGXIII. I requested interviews with the head of DGXIII and 
Esprit, but was referred to their juniors. I conducted interviews with Commissioners in 
charge of individual Esprit sub-programmes, their juniors and the Secretary of the 
Esprit Advisory Board and Esprit Steering Committee, but regret that I was unable to 
meet with Mr Carpentier or Mr Cadiou. Nevertheless, I believe the individuals I did 
interview painted a fairly accurate picture of the Esprit process and relations between 
Commissioners and civil servants from the DTI.
Not surprisingly, the most difficult interviews to schedule were with Members
of Parliament and Ministers. Regarding the former, I am satisfied that I met with
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perhaps the two most influential MPs on the information technology front: Mr Kenneth 
Warren, former Chairman of the Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry, 
and Mr Michael Marshall, Chairman of the Parliamentary Information Technology 
Committee. Regarding interviews with Ministers, I was able to interview only Lord 
Patrick Jenkin, Mr Kenneth Baker and Mr Geoffrey Pattie. Fortunately, however, these 
Ministers were in office during the most important phases of Esprit's operation. These 
very colourful gentlemen provided extremely enlightening glimpses into Whitehall and 
Westminster. Numerous attempts were made to interview Mrs Thatcher, Mr Kenneth 
Clarke and Lord David Young, but to no avail.
Industrialists and academics were also valuable sources of information. I first 
drew up a list of industrialists and academics who were members of the Alvey 
Committee, Alvey Directorate, Alvey Steering Committee, Alvey Advisory Board, the 
Esprit Advisory Board and Esprit Steering Committee. Although I met with many 
individuals, it quickly became apparent that academic and industrial participation in 
Esprit and Alvey was a rather exclusive affair. A balanced view was needed, so I 
identified academics and industrialists not involved in Esprit or Alvey. Although I met 
with several, it seems that employment in the IT sector is rather precarious and I had 
difficulty tracing individuals from smaller companies that had been excluded from 
Alvey or Esprit. For their perceptions, I had to rely primarily on evaluations of Esprit 
and Alvey performed by academics. Nevertheless, most academics and industrialists 
who played an important role in decision-making were interviewed.
All interviews, with the exception of several ones over the telephone, were 
conducted in a similar manner. I sent a letter introducing myself, my research and 
reason for wanting an interview. Each letter was followed a week later by a telephone 
call. Before each interview, I introduced my research and gave an overview of the 
questions I would ask. Each interviewee within a particular category was asked similar 
questions, which were complimented with questions tailored to their particular 
involvement. (In several interviews, I was asked to send a list of questions prior to the 
meeting.) I brought a tape recorder to every meeting. In cases where tape-recording 
was permitted, I have used direct quotes rather than risk losing insinuations and 
emotions by paraphrasing. About half of the interviewees requested that I not use a 
tape recorder and in these cases, I took extensive notes and, except in cases where I 
was certain that I noted a statement correctly, refrained from quoting the interviewee 
verbatim and paraphrased them instead. I have honoured the requests of any 
interviewee who asked not to be attributed with a particular statement. I found it 
surprising how few interviewees asked not to be attributed. In fact, only one 
interviewee, Mr Oscar Roith (former DTI Chief Scientist) placed strict conditions on 
my use of his testimony.
266
Senior civil servants and industrialists were remarkably forthcoming and often 
in a intense and passionate manner. I was surprised to find that R&D, information 
technology, Esprit or Alvey could be the subject of the emotional outpourings I 
witnessed (and often had to endure). It seemed that interviewees associated this thesis' 
subject matter with many political hot-potatoes: British sovereignty, Mrs Thatcher's 
leadership style, the role of govemment, the future of Britain's economy. Interviewees 
were often directly, and not so diplomatically, critical of particular individuals. I had no 
desire to portray any interviewee in a bad light and used derogatory statements and 
information only when it was vital to an argument advanced in this thesis.
Much of the information gathered from interviews has never been recorded and 
thus represents a substantial and original contribution to the body of existing literature 
on British foreign policy-making, on the organization of the British government for 
science and technology policy-making, on Esprit and on the operations of the 
European Commission. While interviews are a valid and strong method of research, the 
subjectivity involved weakens them as a research method. Thus, I took great care to 
validate and confirm that information provided during an interview was accurate. Two 
methods were used. First, every interviewee within a particular category was asked 
similar questions. If interviewees answered in a similar manner, the information was 
deemed accurate. In the cases where questions were tailored to a particular individual 
or where information was not verifiable, that information is presented as the viewpoint 
of that individual. Second, wherever possible, I used secondary sources to verify 
information. House of Commons and House of Lords debates. Select Committee 
inquiries and memoirs proved invaluable in this regard as did Brian Oakley and 
Kenneth Owen's account of Alvey, Alvey: Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative.
Numerous secondary sources were used. Thanks to technological advances in 
document storage and retrieval, I was able to carry out an exhaustive search of 
newspaper and journal articles filed under the following key words: information 
technology. Esprit, science and technology, research and development, Alvey 
Programme and individuals' names. Articles from the Financial Times, the Economist, 
Electronics Weekly, Electronics Time, Computer Weekly, Computing, Engineer ?ind 
Infomatics Daily Bulletin were particularly useful secondary sources, providing 
background information and corroboration of facts gathered during interviews. One 
journal. Information Technology and Public Policy, was a useful source of 
information on British governmental initiatives in the field of IT R&D. I also searched 
DTI publications such as British Business znd JFITNewsdind popular journals such as 
Science dûnd New Scientist. I found the latter two to be of limited use. For information 
on activities o f the European Commission, I monitored Agence Europe and 
Europolitique.
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Publications of the Alvey Directorate were valuable. I found most of these 
publications through the British Library of Political and Economic Science or in the 
DTI library. When documents were not available, former members of the Alvey 
Directorate could usually provide them. Because the Alvey Directorate was interested 
to present its own programme in the best light possible, much of the information 
provided had to be used with caution. Fortunately, evaluations of Alvey were 
performed by the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at Sussex University and the 
Programme for Policy Research in Engineering Science and Technology at the 
University of Manchester (PREST). Copies of these evaluations were obtained through 
the SPRU library and from members of the evaluation teams. These evaluations are 
geared primarily toward a technical analysis of the Alvey Programme and had limited 
information on Esprit. Nevertheless, they were useful for background research and in 
preparation for interviews.
Documentation from the European Commission, while abundant and easily 
accessed at the Commission's library in Brussels, proved disappointing. In 1991 the 
Commission began publishing a magazine, called DGXIII, in which Esprit issues were 
reported, but prior to that time most Community documentation on Esprit was limited 
to that published in the Official Journal, which consists primarily of proposals from the 
Commission to the Council and the Council's approval of EC programmes. Several 
reviews of Esprit were financed by the Commission, but their lack of statistical analysis 
was astonishing. The best statistics on British participation in Esprit are found in a 
publication, An Assessment o f Esprit in the UK, which was prepared by three British 
academics.
A systematic search of Hansard, Select Committee reports and finds from other 
governmental bodies (such as the National Economic Development Office, Advisory 
Committee on Research and Development and the Advisory Council on Science and 
Technology) were also valuable.
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List of Interviewees 
Appendix B
Dr Steven Billet
Mr Harry Elhardt
Ms Alison Birkett
Mr Ross Cooper
Mr Michael Hardy
Mr Stephen Joseph
Dr Philip Roe
Mr J Rosenbaum
Mr Barney Trench
Mr Steven Brummel
AT&T (Washington, DC), 
Director of Federal Govemment 
Affairs.
Previous: AT&T (Brussels), 
Director of Public Affairs
AT&T (Brussels), Director, EC 
Public Affairs
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Economic 
and International Aspects)
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Aurora 
Programme)
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Director, 
General Affairs)
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Secretary 
of Esprit Steering Committee and 
Esprit Advisory Board)
DTI (Information Manufacturing 
Technology Division). Previous: 
Seconded to Commission of the 
European Communities, DGXIII
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (RACE)
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Public 
Relations)
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & 
Feld (Consultant on EC IT policy)
23 July 1991
23 July 1991
24 July 1991
24 July 1991
24 July 1991
24 July 1991 
9 July 1992
24 July 1991 
4 November 1992
24 July 1991
24 July 1991
25 July 1991
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Mr Donald Pongrace
Mr Des Langford
Professor John 
Ashworth
Mr Kenneth Warren
Mr Herman Houser 
Mr Derek Flynne 
Ms Christine Symes
Ms Angela Mison 
Fulleylove
Sir John Fairclough
Mr Doug Hoyle 
Mr David Warren
Mr Alan Mayo
26 July 1991
21 October 1991
22 October 1991
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & 
Feld
(Consultant on EC IT policy)
DTI (Esprit Unit)
Director, London School of 
Economics. Previous; Chief 
Scientific Advisor, Central Policy 
Review Staff
Member of Parliament 
(Conservative). Previous: 
Chairman, House of Commons 
Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry
Active Book Company, Chairman; 28 November 1991 
Chairman, Esprit Advisory Board (telephone)
5 November 1991
DTI (Head, Esprit Unit) 9 December 1991 
3 December 1992
DTI (Research Technology Policy 7 January 1992 
Division)
British Aerospace, Information 
Technology Strategist
Rothschild Ventures Ltd., 
Chairman.
Previous: Chief Scientific Advisor, 
Cabinet Office
Member of Parliament (Labour)
Cabinet Office (Office of Science 
and Technology)
Cabinet Office (Office of Science 
and Technology)
8 January 1992 
10 January 1992
16 January 1992 
20 January 1992
20 January 1992 
23 June 1992 
9 March 1993
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Mr Alastair 
Macdonald
Dr John Thynne
Mr David Dace 
Mr Brian Oakley
Dr Dennis Potter
Mr Derek Roberts
DTI, Deputy Secretary 
(Aerospace, Chemicals and 
Biotechnology, Electronics and 
Electrical Engineering, Steel, 
Metals and Minerals, Vehicles 
divisions). Previous: DTI, Deputy 
Secretary (Aircraft, Electronic 
Applications, Information 
Technology, Telecommunications 
and Post Office and 
Radiocommunications divisions); 
Under Secretary (Information 
Technology division); Member of 
IT86 Committee; Member of 
Alvey Steering Committee; 
Member of Alvey Committee
Electronics Components Industry 
Federation, Director. Previous: 
Under Secretary, DTI (Electronic 
Applications and Information 
Technology divisions)
ICL, Technical Director
Logica (Cambridge), Director. 
Previous: Director, Alvey 
Programme; Member of Alvey 
Committee; Secretary SERC
DTI (Information Manufacturing 
Technology division. Director of 
Systems Software and Architecture 
branch). Seconded from British 
Aerospace.
University College London, 
Provost. Previous: GEC, Deputy 
Managing Director (Technology); 
Member of Alvey Committee; 
Member of Esprit Steering 
Committee
21 January 1992
28 October 1992
23 January 1992 
15 October 1992 
2 December 1992
4 February 1992
25 February 1992 
2 June 1992
17 March 1992
18 March 1992
Ms Diane Williams DTI (Information Manufacturing 
Technology Division)
23 March 1992 
(telephone)
271
Mr Tim Simmons
Mr Virgilio Pasquali
Mr Robert Cooper
British Aerospace, Esprit Project 
Manager
ICL, Manager for Group Technical 
Strategy. Previous; Member of 
Rountable 12 Steering Committee
MARI Advanced Technology, 
Director
6 May 1992 
(telephone)
8 May 1992
12 May 1992
Mr Din Ghali MARI Advanced Technology, 12 May 1992 
Deputy Director
Mr Reay Atkinson Retired. Previous: DTI, Under 12 May 1992 
Secretary (Information Technology 
division); Head of Tokyo mission
Sir Michael Marshall
Ms Rosalie Zobel
Dr Timothy Walker
Member of Parliament 
(Conservative); Chairman, 
Parliamentary Information 
Technology Committee
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Deputy 
Head of Esprit Office Systems)
DTI, Under Secretary (Energy 
division). Previous: DTI, Under 
Secretary (Information Engineering 
Directorate), Policy Planning Unit, 
Private Secretary to Paul Channon 
and David Young; Director 
(Administration), Alvey 
Directorate
14 May 1992
11 June 1992 
(telephone)
27 August 1992
Mr David Wiseman Independent Committee for the 
Supervision of Telephone 
Information Standards, Head of 
Secretariat. Previous: DTI 
(Research Technology Policy 
division)
14 October 1992
272
Dr David Thomas Impérial College, Pro-Rector 
(Contracts). Previous: Director 
(IKBS), Alvey Directorate; Head 
of Information Technology in 
SERC; Member of IT86 
Committee
26 October 1992
Professor Roger 
Needham
Mr Roger Hird
Mr Chris Barrow
Mr Robert Morland
Mr Geoffrey Pattie
Mr John Major
Cambridge Computer Laboratory, 
Director. Previous: Member of 
Alvey Committee; Member of 
Alvey Steering Committee
DTI, West Midlands. Previous: 
Director (Administration), Alvey 
Directorate; Member of IT86 
Committee; DTI (Electronics 
Applications division)
Retired. Previous: Director (MMI), 
Alvey Directorate; Plessey, Head 
of Advanced Systems; Member of 
Esprit Office Automation panel
Scientific Generic. Previous: 
Director (VLSI), Alvey 
Directorate; PA Consulting
Member of Parliament 
(Conservative). Previous: Minister 
for Information Technology
Retired. Previous: DTI, Under 
Secretary (Electronic Applications 
Division); Member of Alvey 
Committee; Member of Alvey 
Steering Committee; Member of 
IT86 Committee
26 October 1992
28 October 1992 
8 November 1992 
(telephone)
29 October 1992
3 November 1992
9 November 1992 
26 November 1992
9 November 1992
(telephone
conversation)
Sir Austin Bide
Dr WB Willott
Retired. Previous: Chairman, IT86 
Committee; Glaxo, Chairman; 
British Leyland; Chairman
Export Credits Guarantee 
Department. Previous: DTI, Under 
Secretary (Information Technology 
division)
10 November 1992
10 November 1992
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Mr Ian Young
Sir Robert Telford
Dr AJ Waliard
Dr William Fawcett
Mr Oscar Roith
Mr Stephen Roberts
Mr David Talbot
DTI (Information Manufacturing 
Technology division)
Retired. Previous: Chairman, 
Alvey Steering Committee; GEC- 
Marconi, Chairman and Life 
President; Department of Industry 
Electronics and Avionics 
Requiments Board
National Physical Laboratory. 
Previous: DTI (Research 
Technology Policy division and 
Information Engineering division)
Retired. Previous: Director 
(VLSI), Alvey Directorate; Head 
of Physics Group at MoD's Royal 
Signals and Radar Establishment; 
Thom-EMI Protech Research, 
Director
London Transport. Previous: DTI, 
Deputy Secretary (Chief Engineer 
and Scientist and head of Research 
Technology Policy division)
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Secretary 
of Esprit Steering Committee and 
Esprit Advisory Board)
Commission of the European 
Communities, DGXIII (Head of 
Esprit Software and Advanced 
Information Technology). 
Previous: Director (Software 
Engineering), Alvey Directorate; 
ICL, Strategy Manager
12 November 1992
12 November 1992
13 November 1992
18 November 1992
19 November 1992
23 November 1992
24 November 1992
Mr Andrew Duguid
Dr Helen Wallace 
Dr Alan Cawson
Lloyds of London. Previous: DTI 27 November 1992
(IT division. Policy Planning Unit,
Private Secretary to Keith Joseph)
Sussex University 
Sussex University
30 November 1992 
30 November 1992
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Mr Paul Quintas 
Dr Ken Guy 
Lord Patrick Jenkin
Professor Eric Ash
Mr Michael Corcoran 
Mr John Barber
Mr Philip Hills
Mr Adrian Grilli
Mr John Head-Rapson
Sir John Alvey
Dr Alastair Keddie
Dr Margaret Sharp 
Dr David Worsnip
Science Policy Research Unit, 
Sussex University
Science Policy Research Unit, 
Sussex University
House of Lords. Previous: 
Secretary of State at Department 
of Industry
Imperial College, Rector. Previous: 
Member of Alvey Steering 
Committee; Chairman, SERC 
After-Alvey Inquiry
Treasury (European Division)
DTI (Economics, Market 
Intelligence and Statistics division)
DTI (Research Technology Policy 
division)
DTI (Research Technology Policy 
division)
DTI (Insurance division). Previous: 
DTI (Information Engineering 
Directorate)
Retired. Previous. Chairman,
Alvey Committee; British Telecom, 
Director of Technology
DTI (Research Techology Policy 
division)
Sussex University
SERC, Head of Information 
Technology
9 December 1992
9 December 1992
10 December 1992
14 January 1993
19 January 1993
24 January 1993 
(telephone)
25 January 1993
25 January 1993 
11 February 1993
2 February 1993
2 February 1993
23 February 1993
26 February 1993 
1 March 1993
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Mr Kenneth Baker Member of Parliament 3 March 1993
(Conservative). Previous;
Chairman, Conservative Party;
Home Office Secretary; Secretary 
of State for Education; Minister for 
Information Technology in DTI
Ms Linda Prior DTI (Information Manufacturing 29 May 1993
Technology division). Previous:
Alvey Directorate, director of 
publicity
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Glossary of Technical Terms* 
Appendix C
Computer Aided Design
The generating of computer automated designs for visual display. In the design 
of major systems (such as aircraft or the layout of hospitals), computers are being used 
not just to perform the task of the draughtsmen but to use their ability to compute in 
order to optimize the design engineering.
Hardware
The physical mechanical and electrical components of a computer system.
Integrated Circuits
A field of electronics developed during the early 1950s to do with 
miniaturization of computer equipment so that many electronic components can be 
placed on silicon 'chips' that run computer applications. There are two major types of 
integrated circuits: application specific and standard. As the name would suggest, 
application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) are silicon chips that are modified 
according to the specific demands of a user. Standard integrated circuits, on the other 
hand, have a regularized form and are used for generalized or common needs.
Intelligent Knowledge-Based Systems
An intelligent knowledge-based system (IKBS) is intended ultimately to reason 
logically from initial ideas to conclusions; take decisions; and give advice. To do this a 
large amount of knowledge is needed, and hence more powerful processing systems. A 
powerful problem-solving capacity to apply knowledge is also needed and therefore 
more effective transfer of human intelligence to the computer.
Man-Machine Interface
Improving the ease with which people can use and interact with computers is 
fundamental to progress. Commercial success will come to those who make their 
products 'user friendly', that is easy for non-experts to use. So the interface instruments 
(verbal, visual and touch input-output devices) need to be improved. So does 
understanding communication across the interface. This involves work on speech and 
image processing.
Semiconductor
A material (for example, silicon or gallium arsenide) which, though basically an 
insulator, can conduct electricity if suitably treated.
* From House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, ESPRIT, 8th Report, Session 
1984-85 (London: HMSO, 1985), pp. vii-viii.
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Software
Defined narrowly, software is the programmes and routines which are written 
to instruct the computer to perform data processing operations. Defined more broadly, 
software encompasses all that is not hardware; the work and documentation that goes 
into a data processing system, as well as computer languages, libraries, internal 
operating systems, compilers and industrial or commercial application programmes.
Software Engineering
The production of reliable and cost-effective software. It is still common to 
build even large and application-specific computer systems using ad hoc techniques. 
But as systems become more complex and costly, and as markets become more 
competitive, an ad hoc approach becomes unacceptable. Software engineering 
provides an engineered approach to reliability, conformity with requirements and cost- 
effectiveness.
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)
Microelectronics provide the physical infrastructure for the collection, 
transmission and manipulation of information. This predominately takes the form of 
circuits placed on silicon chips. Research in microelectronics aims to increase the speed 
and capability of silicon chips while reducing their power consumption, size and cost. 
The ability to make such advances hinges on the ability to place more circuits on a 
single silicon chip. This technology is called Very Large Scale Integration.
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